State of Iowa vs. Morgan Sluff, Brief for the Appellee
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Authors
Valentine, Nadia
Issue Date
2024
Type
Other
Language
en_US
Keywords
First Amendment , Constitutional Law , Freedom of Speech , Jury Selection , Social Media
Alternative Title
Abstract
2024 Supreme Court Competition Problem:
Morgan Sluff is a firebrand labor activist with large followings on social media. She was the social media director for Iowa's largest union. The State charged her with extortion. The minutes of testimony (which Sluff has received) say that the State expects to present testimony from Peter Pastures, a member of that union's executive board. The State expects Pastures to testify that Sluff threatened that she would expose his extramarital affair unless he voted to approve her salary increase.
Almost immediately upon receiving the minutes of testimony, Sluff began posting about Pastures on social media. Her posts claimed that Pastures was "going to lie" in court, just like he "lied to his wife in his wedding vows." She insinuated that he had more than one extramarital affair. She also referred to him as "Perjury Petey." Sluff also made posts about the prosecutor, a county attorney by the name of John Doe. Sluff
declared that the county had a "rat problem," and she announced that she was running for county attorney to replace Doe because "Dallas County deserves . . . [s]omeone who can say NO to a political hit job and someone who a jury can BELIEVE." She added that "[d]angerous criminals keep getting away with MURDER because every juror knows they can't believe a word from JOHN D'OH!" Sluff mentioned Pastures, Doe, or both in more than 2,000 posts over 49 days.
The State moved for an order to restrain Sluff from making public statements about Pastures or Doe during the pendency of this prosecution. Sluff resisted. The district court applied the three-part test from the DC Circuit's decision in United States v. Trump. As to Sluff's statements pertaining to each person, the district court considered:
(1) whether a gag order would be justified by a sufficiently serious risk of prejudice to an ongoing judicial proceeding; (2) whether there were any less restrictive alternatives that would adequately address that risk; and (3) whether the gag order that it contemplated was narrowly tailored to address that prejudice without burdening more speech than necessary to do so. Ultimately, the district court granted the State's request (mostly). It issued an order that prohibited Sluff from making any public posts about Pastures during the pendency of this prosecution. Its order also prohibited Sluff from making public statements about Doe that referenced this ongoing criminal proceeding (she could still make statements about Doe that did not contain any reference to this prosecution).
Sluff appeals from that order. Her advocacy emphasizes the primacy of her First Amendment right to free speech, especially when it concerns matters of public concern. The State counters with its interest (and the judiciary's interest) in a fair trial, which often requires courts to act to protect witnesses and potential jurors from being influenced by extrajudicial pressures and contaminants. Resolving these challenges will require trade-offs, and none of them are completely satisfying. The Iowa Supreme Court will have to chart its own course through these choppy waters, with whatever navigational assistance they can get from our intrepid student advocate.
Description
Legal Brief. 55 pages