Supreme Court Day Award Briefs
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Each year, outstanding advocates in the Law School compete in the Supreme Court Competition for the honor of presenting final arguments to the Iowa Supreme Court. The student who submits the best brief wins the M. Gene Blackburn Award, named for a professor (and 1955 Drake Law graduate) in recognition of his dedication to the development of appellate advocacy. The recipient is chosen on the basis of superior writing skills that communicate an issue position based upon an innovative, creative, and concise approach. The award includes a cash prize, funded by the Cedar Rapids, Iowa law firm of Simmons Perrine Moyer & Bergmann.
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Item APPEAL FROM THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR STORY COUNTY THE HONORABLE WAUGHIN JARTH, JUDGE(2025) Heeter, Jordan2025 Supreme Court Competition Problem: Dale Gilbert is an ordinary graduate student, except he is one of four identical quadruplets. One of his brothers, TBD Gilbert, was the subject of an arrest warrant. Dale was arrested on that warrant by a Story County deputy who thought that "TBD" was an alias or a placeholder. The deputy confirmed that Dale's last name and birth date matched the warrant, so he arrested Dale and took him to the Story County Jail. That was around 4:45 p.m. on Friday, December 22. As soon as Dale figured out that they were looking for "TBD Gilbert," he told every deputy within earshot that he was not TBD and that he could prove that TBD Gilbert was a separate person. The four of them used to be in a boy band called 2winz, and their last music video opened with a graphic of each brother's name. That music video was the top search engine result for 2winz (and it still is — seriously, go look). Dale repeatedly asked the deputies who monitored the jail to take a few seconds to access the publicly available proof that Dale Gilbert and TBD Gilbert were two separate people. None of the deputies would do it; they told him that he could say what he needed to say during his appearance before the next available magistrate, as was standard procedure. No magistrates were available over the weekend or on Christmas day. Dale stayed in jail until the morning of December 26, when he had his virtual appearance before the magistrate who issued TBD's arrest warrant. The judge immediately knew that Dale was not TBD. He ordered the Story County deputies to release Dale and apologize for ruining his holiday weekend. Dale sued Story County, alleging that the deputies violated his constitutional rights. He has two claims. His first alleges that they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. He argues that, even if the arrest was a reasonable mistake of fact, it stopped being reasonable as he repeatedly told them that he was not TBD and offered readily available proof. It's not clear where this Court should draw the line between a reasonable seizure that arises from ordinary execution of an arrest warrant in good faith, and an unreasonable seizure that even a valid arrest warrant can't salvage. How should a court tell the difference? Dale's second claim alleges that the deputies violated his Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against deprivations of liberty without due process. The U.S. Supreme Court said that a three-day stint in jail in a similar case of mistaken identity didn't establish a due process violation, in Baker v. McCollan. How should this Court apply Baker? And Baker was decided in 1979 — have subsequent cases (or other developments) changed how courts should apply Baker in cases like these? It's up to our intrepid student advocates to try to guide the Court to satisfying answers to those difficult constitutional questions — and they've got just one day to do it.Item State of Iowa vs. Morgan Sluff, Brief for the Appellee(2024) Valentine, Nadia2024 Supreme Court Competition Problem: Morgan Sluff is a firebrand labor activist with large followings on social media. She was the social media director for Iowa's largest union. The State charged her with extortion. The minutes of testimony (which Sluff has received) say that the State expects to present testimony from Peter Pastures, a member of that union's executive board. The State expects Pastures to testify that Sluff threatened that she would expose his extramarital affair unless he voted to approve her salary increase. Almost immediately upon receiving the minutes of testimony, Sluff began posting about Pastures on social media. Her posts claimed that Pastures was "going to lie" in court, just like he "lied to his wife in his wedding vows." She insinuated that he had more than one extramarital affair. She also referred to him as "Perjury Petey." Sluff also made posts about the prosecutor, a county attorney by the name of John Doe. Sluff declared that the county had a "rat problem," and she announced that she was running for county attorney to replace Doe because "Dallas County deserves . . . [s]omeone who can say NO to a political hit job and someone who a jury can BELIEVE." She added that "[d]angerous criminals keep getting away with MURDER because every juror knows they can't believe a word from JOHN D'OH!" Sluff mentioned Pastures, Doe, or both in more than 2,000 posts over 49 days. The State moved for an order to restrain Sluff from making public statements about Pastures or Doe during the pendency of this prosecution. Sluff resisted. The district court applied the three-part test from the DC Circuit's decision in United States v. Trump. As to Sluff's statements pertaining to each person, the district court considered: (1) whether a gag order would be justified by a sufficiently serious risk of prejudice to an ongoing judicial proceeding; (2) whether there were any less restrictive alternatives that would adequately address that risk; and (3) whether the gag order that it contemplated was narrowly tailored to address that prejudice without burdening more speech than necessary to do so. Ultimately, the district court granted the State's request (mostly). It issued an order that prohibited Sluff from making any public posts about Pastures during the pendency of this prosecution. Its order also prohibited Sluff from making public statements about Doe that referenced this ongoing criminal proceeding (she could still make statements about Doe that did not contain any reference to this prosecution). Sluff appeals from that order. Her advocacy emphasizes the primacy of her First Amendment right to free speech, especially when it concerns matters of public concern. The State counters with its interest (and the judiciary's interest) in a fair trial, which often requires courts to act to protect witnesses and potential jurors from being influenced by extrajudicial pressures and contaminants. Resolving these challenges will require trade-offs, and none of them are completely satisfying. The Iowa Supreme Court will have to chart its own course through these choppy waters, with whatever navigational assistance they can get from our intrepid student advocate.Item State of Iowa vs. Sam Craft, Brief for the Appellant(2023) Boyer, Elizabeth2023 Supreme Court Competition Problem: Sam Craft lives in a small home on Birch Street in Eldora, Iowa. Craft owns the home and is its sole occupant. The back yard is surrounded by a fence. The front yard is unfenced. There are four other houses on Birch Street, which is a short dead-end side street. Birch Street connects onto Main Street, between a grocery store and a small church. In early 2020, DCI Special Agent Trails suspected that there was some activity related to fentanyl trafficking at Craft’s residence. She obtained permission from the city to install a small digital video camera on a telephone pole just across the street from Craft’s residence. Throughout 2021, the camera was active and pointed at the front of Craft’s house. Agent Trails monitored the feed. She could also review footage, after the fact. She was able to zoom in to get enough detail to see license plate numbers or facial expressions. But most of the time, the camera was zoomed out to capture a wider shot of the exterior of Craft’s home. No part of the interior of Craft’s home is visible in any of the footage that Agent Trails used. In March 2022, Special Agent Trails applied for a warrant to search Craft’s home. In her search warrant application, she relied on that video footage to establish a pattern of what looked like mid-level drug distribution activity: regular visits by known users and low-level dealers, and bi-weekly visits from a subject with no other known connection to Eldora, who drove a different rental vehicle on each visit to Craft’s residence. A magistrate found probable cause to issue the search warrant. Agents found a large quantity of fentanyl in his home, and evidence that would help prove an ongoing intent to distribute it (including drug ledgers, scales, and packaging supplies). Craft was charged with possession of fentanyl with intent to deliver. Craft moved to suppress all the evidence discovered during the search of his home. He argued that the search warrant was issued based on evidence that was obtained through a warrantless search that violated Craft’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. The State argued that warrantless visual surveillance of the area surrounding a home does not constitute a search. The State argued that any subjective expectation of privacy in activities that occur in public view—just outside of Craft’s residence—would never be objectively reasonable. And if there’s no expectation of privacy, the State is free to view and record that activity. The District Court granted Craft’s Motion to Suppress. It acknowledged that the unfenced front yard of Craft’s home was open to public view. But it held that surreptitious, continuous surveillance of the front of a private home for an entire year is unreasonably invasive and violates a reasonable expectation of privacy—even if widespread availability of new technology makes it easy to do. So it ruled that using the pole camera was a search that violated the Fourth Amendment, and it suppressed all of the evidence found through the search warrant. The State appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court retained the appeal. The State must convince the Justices that the district court was incorrect, and using this pole camera was not a search. Craft must convince the Justices that the district court got it right, and that this as a search. This is a novel, complex, and difficult issue—but our intrepid finalists are up to the task!Item State of Iowa vs. Ronnie Dobbs, Brief for the Appellant (2022)(2022) Lee, Steffi2022 Supreme Court Competition Problem: The Iowa legislature recently created a new requirement for Iowans who are required to register as sex offenders. Iowa Code section 692A.201(1) requires any registered sex offender to get a special driver's license (or non-driving ID) that includes a label, in orange capital letters: "SEX OFFENDER". Section 692A.201(2) makes it a crime to alter or deface that special ID card, with the intent to defraud. Ronnie Dobbs is a Tier III sex offender. He registered, and he went to the Story County Sheriff’s Office to verify his registration information (as he is required to do, thrice a year.) In July 2021, after this new law had just passed, Dobbs was told that he needed the special ID. He got a new driver’s license. But during his next visit, Story County discovered that he had altered that new license by scratching out the “SEX OFFENDER” mark (or so the State has alleged). Dobbs was charged with violating section 692A.201(2). Dobbs moved to dismiss the charge, on the grounds that section 692A.201 violated his First Amendment rights by compelling his speech. The State resisted. But the district court agreed with Dobbs that the branded ID card was an attempt to force Dobbs to carry and display the State's message about him, and it granted Dobbs's motion to dismiss. The State appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court retained the appeal to determine whether section 692A.201 violates the First Amendment. Generally, when the government speaks on its own behalf, it may choose what it says. So, if this is government speech (and not compelled private speech), then it is probably constitutional. If it is compelled private speech, then the State has to show that this law withstands strict scrutiny, which means the measure must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. That is a tough standard to satisfy -- but it's not impossible, and some compelled disclosures have withstood strict scrutiny before. It is up to the students to try to convince this Court to adopt their view of whether this is government speech or compelled private speech, and (if it does burden a constitutional right) whether it would withstand that exacting level of scrutiny.Item State of Iowa vs. Ronnie Dobbs, Brief for Appellant(2021) Brundage, Logan2021 Supreme Court Competition Problem: One fateful night, Ronnie Dobbs was playing music very loud and honking the horn of his car for no apparent reason. Iowa State Patrol Trooper Terry Twillstein was nearby, and he had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to believe that Dobbs was violating a local noise ordinance. Trooper Twillstein followed Dobbs and caught up to him. When Trooper Twillstein’s car was directly behind Dobbs’ vehicle, he turned on his overhead lights and his siren to initiate a traffic stop. But Dobbs did not stop—instead, he turned onto a driveway, drove up, and parked in a garage. Trooper Twillstein saw the garage begin to close as soon as Dobbs’ vehicle was inside—so he jumped out of his vehicle, ran to the garage door, and put his foot in front of the sensor to stop the door from closing. Then, Trooper Twillstein walked into the garage to talk to Dobbs. Upon speaking with Dobbs, Trooper Twillstein observed that Dobbs was drunk and arrested him. Dobbs was charged with Operating While Intoxicated (third offense). Dobbs seems to have committed two misdemeanors, in addition to the noise ordinance violation: eluding and interference with official acts. Under Iowa law, Trooper Twillstein was authorized to arrest Dobbs for committing any misdemeanor offense in his presence. But by following Dobbs into his garage as Dobbs fled from him, Trooper Twillstein made a warrantless entry into the protected area of Dobbs’ home (the “curtilage”). That would violate both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution—unless that warrantless entry was “reasonable” in a constitutional sense. The State argues that this fits within the exception for warrantless entry in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing offender. Dobbs argues that these facts do not establish the kind of exigency that would be required to invoke the “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement. A very similar case is pending in the U.S. Supreme Court right now: Lange v. California. But Lange only involved a Fourth Amendment claim. This case involves a Fourth Amendment claim, but it also involves a challenge under Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The Iowa Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on what the Iowa Constitution allows, and what it forbids. Our competitors will have to advance their most persuasive vision for how to read and apply each of these constitutional provisions, how to balance the complex array of competing interests involved, and how to craft a fair and practical rule that Iowa courts can apply to resolve future cases. The two questions before the Supreme Court are: 1. Did Trooper Twillstein’s entry into Dobbs’ garage—while in “hot pursuit” of a person who had committed a misdemeanor eluding offense—violate the Fourth Amendment? 2. Did Trooper Twillstein’s entry into Dobbs’ garage—while in “hot pursuit” of a person who had committed a misdemeanor eluding offense—violate Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution?