CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

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CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUES

Basic to a study of immortality is the question whether death annihilates all possibility of future life, and whether man's emotive response to death by the formulation of such ideas of immortality is unwarranted. The writer especially proposes in this study to consider the relevance of the Christian issue of immortality. However, there are other correlative problems that importantly confront such an inquiry: Does the Christian doctrine present a warranted body of faith that is congenial to attested scientific fact? Does the Christian solution actually constitute proof that there really is personal survival of death?

In considering these issues the history of the idea of life after death will be examined, also noting some of the outstanding alternatives to the Christian concept of the resurrection. In presenting the arguments for the validity of the Christian belief, the relation of the tenet to the idea of God will be a basic consideration. Other data will also be given in pointing out what seems to many to be the logical necessity and warranty of the belief, as well as the contributive evidence of hope, faith, personality, and the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Besides advancing the tenets of this Christian faith, attention will be given to some of the major arguments opposing such belief. These arguments will be seen to be centered upon the attack of materialists against the dualism that seems necessary to uphold the belief and the body-soul difficulties that are involved. The psychological illusionists also reject the thought of personal immortality because of the incredibility of the
idea and the attested inadequacy of the various proofs that have been advanced in support of such a means of life after death. Other alternative ideas of future life raise objections to the thought of personal immortality by the impersonal nature of their divergent beliefs. Notions such as absorption, the immortality of value, influence, and biological reproduction are directly contrary to the Christian tenet that every individual personality survives death as an indispensable and indestructible unit.

Statement of the problem. It is the purpose of this study to investigate the ability of the Christian doctrine of personal immortality to provide a sufficient and warranted solution to the implicit problems of man facing death.

The evident mortality of man. Nothing is so certain about life as death. The reality of death as an apparent certainty has been a continuous, influential factor that has contributed to the development of the general idea of and desire for future life. Without this thought provoking occasion of death there would be no need or reason for man to have any ideas of survival. The arising various conceptions of the prospect of life after death are perhaps the result of diverse catalytic experiences as thoughts are released in the mental processes of men in different cultural environments.

Through the epoch of man's life wars, catastrophes, accidents, disease, and old age stalk him until he finally succumbs. Without any respect of persons, and without exception to position or situation, man has found himself vulnerable to death. Such is the assertion of the
familiar, logistic syllogism of philosophical history. "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." This Greek observation placed within a logical frame is undoubtedly a representative assumption and conclusion that people everywhere in time have recognized.

Although the validity of such a conclusion depends upon the truth of the assumptive generalization, ever since man can remember he has seen death curtail human life. Dying has become recognized as the occasion when bodily functions and movements permanently cease. Man earnestly considers the weighty matter of death as well as the intrinsic meaning of life when death has menaced the welfare of his tribe or nation, or clouded the happiness of his family, or even threatened to envelop his own life.

The manifest finality of death amid the ephemeral brevity of human physical existence in comparison with the longevity of some lower and insignificant forms of life is startling to the intelligent, self-conscious human being. Such evidences are arrayed against the recognized infinite potentialities of the individual and the general sense of the incompleteness of life. The intellect of man is also troubled because of the patent injustices concerning many of the vital relationships of life. Furthermore, when death separates kindred people, sorrow comes because of the apparent curtailment and betrayal of man's peculiar capacity for lasting love and attachment.

Such a mental conflict gives rise to the question of the ages as typically put by Job, "If a man die, shall he live again?" Other related

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questions also occur. Can man possibly be immortal, as well as mortal? If so, how does a person survive after bodily death? These, and allied questions have been the burden of every generation. Apparently the growth of the idea of survival was fostered by man's preoccupation with death, from the most primitive times. It is suggested that this motivated man to originate an acceptable conception of a "hereafter," and that he consequently disposed of his dead accordingly.

**Concepts of death.** Wallis points out that death was regarded as unnatural by ancient and preliterate cultures, that it was not part of the original plan of the Creator. Ancient Jews regarded death as punishment for the sin committed by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Formerly, in Moroccan Mohammedan tradition, people did not die absolutely, but lost consciousness for a while and then revived. The jealousy of Lalla Fatima Zohra, daughter of the Prophet, was responsible for a change in this plan. Death became final after the Prophet prayed in compliance with his daughter's wish that the child of her rival would remain dead.¹

Many preliterate cultures conceive the pristine condition of man as one in which there was no death. The concept is found in Polynesia and in many African and North American tribes. For instance, the Efe, Congo pygmies, say that in the beginning there was no death. Muri-muri, the creator, gave a pot to Toad and bade him handle it with care, for death was in it. Toad carelessly allowed Frog to take over his burden, who soon let the pot fall. It broke into pieces, and thus death came

into the world. In other cultures only death from obvious cause is natural.¹

Therefore, it seems to this writer that occurring ideas of future life are significantly man's emotional response to death. Also, it appears that there are at least two possible catalytic agents that would require such response, and they are fear of death and the sentiment of love. Thus, whatever care is given to the dead seems to be at least partially indicative of man's emotional response to death, probably reflecting his ideas concerning a hereafter.

The significance of burial practices. As Wilson D. Wallis says, many students of comparative religion attach much importance to the cult of the cult of the dead. Some regard ancestor worship as the earliest form of religion or as a developmental stage of all higher religions. However, Wallis feels that the term ancestor worship is largely a misnomer. Even in the higher religions it is stated that there is seldom worship of ancestors, though there may be a cult of the dead, that is, ceremonies, rites, offerings, or prayers, designed to ensure the comfort of the deceased, enlist their aid, or thwart their malice toward the living. The cult of the dead is seemingly based upon the fear of the ghost, a fear which is apparently spontaneous. In many preliterate cultures measures are taken to prevent the return of the ghost or ensure that it would not harm the living.²

An examination of mortuary ritual based on the earliest archaeological evidence reveals a distinct relation of death rituals to religious

¹Ibid., pp. 206-207. ²Ibid.
Moreover, 9. Bronze when varies that the First men to live in

Earth, Vegetation, and Monolithic stages.

is verified by the numerous skulls, and headless bodies found in Patna-

are preserved for various reasons, and parasitized deposits in prehistoric times, perhaps for various reasons, the present that the tooth was washed

because in them it was supposed that soil-sustained residues having jammed, these fragments were annoyed for the same purpose as in bono

and they were then carefully preserved for ritual purposes. according to the

been discovered after death, buried until they had decomposed, and the

have been also discovered together with a few long bones. The bodies had

and teeth, and pieces of same belonging to more than forty persons,

since the discovery of the rock in 1927 at Dréon-bone

contribution of man's discoveries is dated back approximately 50,000 years. 1-

garbled evidence of the ritual treatment of the dead, on numerous cal-

it is new horizons on human origins, is presently regarded as affording the

man's stratigraphic peculiarities. The discovery, in addition to the fact

what Professor Bally announced to be a new genre of very early

of Choukoutien, about 27 miles southwest of Pekin, are the evidence of

be letters. For example, the deposits at Dréon-bone HII, near the village
several of these caves has made Palestine one of the great centers of the search for Early and Middle Stone Age man. In two caves south of Mt. Carmel it is stated that a dozen skeletons of a mixed "race" related to Neanderthal man were found. They are said to belong to the Middle Palaeolithic Age. Wright says the most interesting fact is that as early as this they had certain beliefs about an after-life, which was indicated by the care they took in the burial of their dead.¹

Again, according to Wright, the Mesolithic period is now better known from Palestinian caves than from anywhere else in the world. A large number of skeletons have been found belonging to a slender, long-headed people who were 5 to 5 feet 4 inches in height. They were perhaps members of the group from which the Semites descended. They are called Natufian man, from the Wadi Natuf northwest of Jerusalem where they were found. Relics show they were far advanced over their predecessors. Great care was also taken in the burial of the dead. Wright says the ornaments worn in life were worn in the grave, and this seemingly indicates a belief in physical survival.²

The Late Stone or Neolithic Age, dated in the Near East about the 6th and 5th millennia B.C., is the time when the first villages were founded and the first experiments in a more complex community life were undertaken. Some of the most interesting and important discoveries of this period have been made at the famous Biblical city of Jericho. Wright indicates that it was a sizable city then with the world's oldest buildings and massive stone wall fortification. One building was apparently a

²Ibid.
temple, for around it were religious objects including clay statues, presumably idols, occurring in two groups, each containing a man, woman, and child. The earliest known clay modelling may be said to occur here also, because several skulls have been found which had faces modelled upon them in clay.  

Further peculiar burial evidence was found at the site of Teleilat el-Chassul, near Jericho. A number of burials, or at least skeletons, were found within the houses. The bones of many infants were also uncovered, usually within pottery jars. The decapitated head of a child of six or seven years was found very carefully enclosed in a jar which had been cut in two, then put together with the head inside, and covered with a stopper of clay. Examination of the head showed that it had been struck off with a blow which had crushed the left side of the face and head. As the jar was laid against the base of a wall, it may have been a foundation sacrifice. Chester McCown says that at least some religious or superstitious value was attached to the burial of the head. Again, the infants in jars may have been burials of stillborn, or very young people in the hope, possibly, that the spirit would return soon to animate another.  

Thus, James says the archeological record testifies that the human state of flux, dying to be born again, called forth a series of "rites de passage" at critical junctures to obtain a fresh outpouring of life and power. By aid of these transitional rituals from life to death, or from death to life, the idea of immortality appears to have arisen. As various

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1. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
3. James, op. cit., p. 143.
concepts were developed and emphasized, the idea of survival took on a number of different beliefs, entering the fiber of civilizations. In retrospect, there are several representative forms of the idea of future life as the different cultures entered a historic frame, which are of note in tracing the progress of the basic idea of survival as a background for present day Christian thought.

Historic roots. For instance, Wallis indicates that in ancient Egypt the concept that happiness after death depends on a life of virtue was a belief of gradual growth. Ultimately it crystallized into the psychostasia doctrine, the weighing of the heart before Osiris to test the merits of the deceased. It was contemporary with a competing, more primitive theory that funerary rites and knowledge of potent formulas were the only passports to eternal bliss.¹

Again, in early Iranian belief, after death the soul wanders three days and is confronted with a beautiful maiden, personification of its good thoughts, words, and deeds. In later belief this concept is supplemented with the doctrine that the evil soul is confronted with a personification of its evil deeds in the form of an old hag. Each man is formally credited with good, and the evil is reckoned against him as debits. After death the soul arrives at the accountant's bridge, over which lies the way to heaven.²

In Homeric Greece the dead were reckoned to be shades that existed ineffectually in Hades. Later, the Hero Cults as well as Bacchic, Orphic, and Eleusian mystery doctrines greatly affected the eschatology of ancient

¹Wallis, op. cit., p. 252. ²Ibid., pp. 255-256.
The emerging dualistic philosophy of Plato, dividing body and soul, was to have considerable influence upon the development of Christian thought. A more detailed discussion of these aspects will be presented in later sections.

According to John Peters, the early Hebrews believed in the persistence of the "nephesh," or personality, after death. They dwelt as ghosts, or "refaim," in Sheol, a place beneath the earth, and habitation in which depended in general on proper entombment. Moreover, Peters indicates that further development came at least partly as the result of national persecution and exile. When the nation ceased to be important, national hopes and expectations began to be transferred to the individual. He was to be personally responsible to God, and he became individually involved with the prophetic, Messianic idea. Thus arose the idea of resurrection. Out of this background the advent of Jesus Christ, his crucifixion, and his asserted resurrection and ascension gave birth to the Christian Religion and its peculiar hope of immortality.

Aside from these ideas of continued existence related to the various cultural backgrounds, there has been the abiding strain of primitive, uncivilized thought regarding life after death. It is generally accepted that, basically, uncivilized thought of continued spirit or ghostlike existence after death has remained much the same. Thus, although some belief in future life is quite universal, the principles of belief are certainly not common. Yet, even today the religions of Eastern Civilization, including Christianity which was largely adopted by Western

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1 Cf. Ibid., pp. 269-273.
Civilization, are still influential to the acceptance of their corresponding ideas of future life by the cultures of which they are a part. Out of the various representative ideas concerning survival, the writer is chiefly concerned about the Christian doctrine of personal immortality.

**The Christian doctrine defined.** First of all, it is to be recognized that the term "Christian" is commonly used in a freer and broader sense today than in the early beginnings of the Church. Because of this prevailing usage, it may not be said that personal immortality is the only doctrine of future life held by professing Christians. There may even be some who have no definite belief concerning future life. Although the message of the Apostolic Church was at first founded upon the victory of Jesus over death, his disciples' immediate reaction to his resurrection and ascension was in expecting him to return and set up an earthly kingdom during their lifetime. As the Apostles began to realize the extent and length of their mission, they then instituted, with emphasis, the belief that the Christian had a "lively hope" in everlasting life through Christ. This personal hope of life after death was founded on the belief that Jesus was the Christ, and that he was raised from the dead: "Knowing that he that raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise us also with Jesus, and shall present us with you."\(^1\) However, as Christian doctrine continued to be formulated by the post apostolic fathers and later theologians, a diversity of concept within the Christian Church soon arose.

Although the general view of immortality, as recorded in the New Testament, is that of the preservation of individual personality, one

\(^1\)II Corinthians 4:14.
cannot say with all certainty that every Christian conceived of it as resurrection of the whole body. The Apostle Paul inferred a spiritual aspect by saying, "We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." This may infer that life does not necessitate the raising of the body, but that the immortal spirit returns to God who gave it. The similarities of Platonic thought in this regard are quite apparent. The combination of this aspect of Christian thought and Plato's concept of the separation of body and soul has produced a philosophical-Christian concept of personal-spirit immortality rather than the preservation of personality after death by means of resurrection. Thus, one must distinguish the spiritual and bodily concepts of personal immortality in even using the term personal immortality. Therefore, in using the term "Christian doctrine of personal immortality," the writer does so qualifiedly. Christians have varying concepts of immortality, and the writer is aware of the two common means thought of as preserving individual personality, namely, the immortal soul and the resurrected body. For the present, and unless otherwise designated, the words "Christian doctrine of personal immortality" will be used in a general sense, meaning a Christian belief that future life after death is carried on by the preservation of individual personality.

However, because of alternate views, the writer is also concerned with considering the Christian belief in relation to other views of future life, especially those indicating impersonal existence and the expiration

2 See also Ecclesiastes 12:7.
of the total person at death. Since the rise of scientific technics, the validity and utility of the Christian doctrine have been questioned. Presently, this technological society views the Christian belief in personal immortality with askance, looking for a visible sign of scientific credibility. Some have already dismissed it as an unwanted belief and an unreasonable hope, as well as an unpleasant reminder of past Christian dogmatism.

**The conflict between Christianity and science.** From the time of Constantine the Great in the 4th Century until around the 15th Century, Christianity became a ruler's religion and enjoyed distinguished recognition and prominence. During this period the dogma of Christianity was almost unquestioningly accepted by the bulk of Western Civilization. However, during the 15th and 16th Centuries there began a skeptical trend to disregard Christian theology as man began to look inquisitively to nature for answers to his questions. This was apparently a part of the general awakening of the Renaissance. As this attitude of natural inquiry continued to rise in Europe in the 17th Century, many commenced to reject their previous mystical knowledge, and they sought for a type of knowledge that would eliminate mystery. This was the beginning of the cultural departure from unreserved belief in the mysteries of the Christian Religion and the acknowledgment of the revealed truth of the Bible. Within the two following centuries the modern scientific method was formulated by science and philosophy as the means to all truth.

In this method the scientist asks definite questions of nature and according to the sort of question he asks he will get a different sort of answer, as well as a different sort of science. He devises an experiment
which will give him an answer to the question of his interest. For instance, this is what Galileo did; he idealized the conditions of his experiment with inclined planes so that only the factors which were amenable to mathematical treatment entered into the results. This method of question and answer was described by Francis Bacon, a prophet of the new science, as "putting nature to the question." In the language of the 17th Century this meant extracting information by the methods of the Inquisition. The plan of "putting nature to the question" may properly be called the experimental method, and this is what is distinctive about the modern scientific method. It is also noted that the experiment and not experience is the important character in modern science.¹

Thus European scientists and philosophers not only departed from the contemplative mysteries of Christian thought, but they also denied the religious mysteries bound up in Greek science and philosophy. Greek thought had been the parent of both science and logic. However, the logic and science of the Greek philosophers was too interwoven with their religious view of the world for acceptance by the new analytical science and philosophy. By this repudiation of "a priori" truths and mere contemplative problems, the scientists and the philosophers of the Renaissance sought to dispel all mystery with their experimental and analytical method. It was the business of science to cure the lack of knowledge, and it became the goal of philosophy to cure unclear thinking. The attitude fostered by the scientific method is mirrored by Wittgenstein as he wrote in the

"Tractatus;" "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak, thereof must one be silent; and everything which can be known, can be expressed in propositions of science."1 The mystical and the supernatural is therefore inexpressible. Only the natural can speak in intelligible tones. Hence, with the instruments of the scientific method in his grip, man's tendency was to release the habit of contemplation and employ the experimental method in explaining or solving all problems.

This methodological attitude of recognizing knowledge was destined to force Christian concepts and beliefs to go on the defensive. As the scientific method took over every facet of man's existence, becoming the sole criteria for knowledge and reality, the epistemology and metaphysics of Christianity were scorned. Science came to disregard the existence of God and the spiritual entity of man's being, explaining the universe and man in terms of matter. Naturalistic philosophical systems were also advanced in support of humanism and materialism, taking various forms of utilitarianism and positivism. Such systems repudiated the infallibility of the Bible, the supposed Word of God, because of apparent contradictory accounts recorded therein. Widespread theological liberalism resulted from this impact of science historical methodology, and analytical philosophy in the early 20th Century.

Today within the field of Christian thought there is an attempt to salvage the Christian message by the establishment of a "new" orthodoxy, apparently as a reaction to the seeming inadequacy of Liberalism

1 Ibid., as quoted on p. 20.
during the critical periods of war within this half century. However, along with Neo-Orthodoxy, Existentialism, a Neo-Liberalism, and Theological Naturalism have also arisen as distinct movements. Neo-Orthodoxy has made a particular effort to determine and clarify the "kerygma" apart from attached traditions that have been objectionable to the scientific spirit of this technical age. Men such as Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr are some of the familiar proponents of this movement. However, there are varying ideas as to what extent its historical criticism should be applied. Rudolph Bultmann, an existentialist would propound an extreme application, whereas Niebuhr would typify a more conservative approach. Traditional fundamentalism still remains for the less scientific-minded people. The scientific movement of experimental methodology has certainly exercised a great influence upon every aspect of man's existence, especially from the 17th Century to this time.

Assuredly, this scientific advance has been physically beneficial, for by its instruments of experimentation man has gained much knowledge, especially of himself and the universe. Through such knowledge man has learned to increase his own welfare, and he has thereby amassed numerous material conveniences to his way of life. Also, through the science of medicine various physical and mental ills have been cured or alleviated, thus allowing a longer and fuller life. However, as science has been a useful tool to man, it has also become a dreadful weapon of destruction. Now more than ever before, it is within the nervous hands of willful humanity to either forge the tools of continued invaluable progress or cast weapons that will obliterate civilization. Recently discovered atomic energy may be used to develop a utopia or an inferno. Thus, it may
be indicated that man needs more than the advantages of science to even bring his physical life into fruition.

However, this writer has no quarrel with the scientific method except as it is presumptuously used and dogmatically declared to be the method of approaching all truth. The Christian Church has had disregard for some of the physical evidences of science, and science in turn has denied the traditions and "revealed truths" upheld by some Christian thought. The real differences between science and Christianity seem to be focalized upon their adverse conceptions in relation to God and man, and their method of corroborating belief to indubitable knowledge. Thus it is necessary to study the Christian doctrine of personal immortality in the light of "scientific truth" and "revealed truth" as they may be apprehended by experience.

**Methods of knowledge.** The writer has previously discussed the scientific method of verifying knowledge and attaining truth by "putting nature to the question" and arriving at certainty through critical analysis, corroborating experiments, and comparing with other recognized human authority. However, no authority is recognized as absolute. Such evidences are steps in determining scientific fact. In contrast, Christian thought is based upon absolute authority, a God who acts to reveal truth unto mankind, and especially the "believer." There is variance of opinion among the exponents of Christianity as to the extent that infallibility is placed upon such controversial revelation as: the Holy Scriptures, Jesus Christ, and as may be received in personal experience.

However, it must be realized, as H. Richard Niebuhr states, that
one can speak and think significantly about God only from the point of view of faith in Him. Therefore, Christian theology must begin with revelation because it knows that man cannot think about God only as historic, communal beings and only as believers.\(^1\) Broadly speaking, revelation includes every manifestation of God to the consciousness and perception of man, whether in the constitution of his mind, of his society, in the framework of nature, or in the processes of Divine government. The scope of man's realization concerning the activity of God will be limited or enlarged, according to his unbelief or belief. Basically, belief in revelation is belief that God has authoritatively spoken; not only through history, but to man as an individual.

Before examining revelation any further, the term should be defined more explicitly.

Our English word 'revelation' comes from the Latin 'revelatio,' which designates an unveiling or uncovering. In the literal sense it is applied to anything that was formerly hidden by a covering. The Greek word 'apokalupsis' (from which we get 'apocalypse') covers practically the same idea as 'revelation.'\(^2\)

Basically, "apokalupsis" as used in the New Testament is connected with the first advent of Christ and its resulting truths. For instance:

(1) It is used of the "unveiling" of the mystery of redemption (Romans 16:25; Ephesians 3:3); (2) It is used in connection with the "unveiling" of Jesus Christ to the Gentile world (Luke 2:32); (3) It is used as the "unveiling" of knowledge to Paul regarding the content of the Gospel (II Corinthians 12:1, 7; Ephesians 3:3); (4) The word "apokalupsis" is used


as the "unveiling" of knowledge about the Gospel to a Christian congregation (I Corinthians 14:6, 26); (5) It is used as the "unveiling" of knowledge about Paul's apostleship (Galatians 1:12) and subsequent guidance (Galatians 2:2); (6) The word is also used to distinguish the "unveiling" of knowledge to a reader of the Scriptures (Ephesians 1:17); and (7) It is used representing the "unveiling" of Jesus Christ concerning the present age of grace (Revelation 1:1).¹

Revelation, as it is used to represent the unveiling of truth to man which he could not otherwise know by ordinary, technical reasoning, is the restricted sense of the concept. It is in this regard that revelation especially addresses the human faculty of believing through the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit who awakens faith on this special, ecstatic level of experience must regenerate the reasoning of man so that it is humbled to receive knowledge of truth which it could not ordinarily grasp by natural sensory perception alone. This responsive, "unveiling" level extends above and beyond technical means to God's communication with man, especially in the realm of religious experience and value judgments. Such an "unveiling" is established and verified when the believer feelingly experiences a corroborating fellowship with God and other believers, and as the revelation harmonizes with any previous affirming experience or truth.

It seems obvious that the concept of special revelation does not stand alone, but it is vitally related to other expressions involved in the total conception of God's revelation to man, namely, the related expressions of inspiration and illumination. Much that is in the Bible

¹Ibid., pp. 85-86.
is not a revelation in the sense of "unveiling" something which was hidden, since many of the facts were matters of common observation and investigation (cf. Luke 1:1 ff). Conservative theology maintains that all of the Biblical writers were agents of the spirit of God and thus their writings were God-breathed whether they concerned matters of history, or whether they concerned supernaturally revealed truths which no man could discover by natural reasoning. In this regard, revelation assures one that he has in the Bible a knowledge of God, which God has given to man; inspiration assures him that such revelation has been accurately and truthfully transmitted to him through prophets and apostles chosen by God to be His spokesmen.¹

Although the revelation of God through the Scriptures, and even His Son, may be reckoned as basically complete, continuous amplification and illumination is not to be denied. Biblically a prophet could receive a revelation from God but not understand the import of what he received. It seems evident that Daniel did not understand the significance of the visions committed to him until he received illumination as to their meaning (cf. Daniel 9:22; 10:12-14). The Apostle John, the seer of Patmos, needed the interpreting angel to give meaning to the visions he saw (cf. Revelation 19:9-10). It appears impossible for man to figure out who or what God is unless God reveals His nature to mankind by a continuous illumination through the natural realm and the special revelation of His Word, individualizing the meaning for each successive generation.

Because of the distinction drawn between the natural and special

¹Ibid., p. 87.
manifestations of God, it has been quite customary to divide revelation into two aspects. In a general and perhaps basic sense one may recognize the natural revelation of God in the universe, providence, history, and in man's conscience. Then, in a special and more personal sense, the so-called supernatural revelation of God in the Holy Scriptures of the Bible and the unfolding of Himself through the Son and the plan of redemption is distinguished as existing above and beyond the basic scope of natural revelation.

However, there are those who completely rely upon the scientific method as the efficient means of accumulating knowledge of every aspect of nature by sensory perception. The naturalist believes that the human situation is the same for all, "believer" and "unbeliever" in the supernatural, witnessing the same human history, and the same inner life. Living in a self-existent, self-operating world, man is to be satisfied to justify all that happens to him on natural grounds. Yet, the "believer" would declare that he is more than an incidental happenstance in nature, and that there are experiences and situations that do not lend themselves to natural justification. Human consciousness, itself, is imperceptible to sense. The suggestion of ideals, thinking, feeling, choosing, are all experiences of the individual personality that can hardly be referred to natural perception, but they must be inferred from the data of our own personal consciousness. Th_e "believer" would maintain that such inference belongs to a supernatural realm, of which religious experience

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is a part, and that it completes the spectrum of experience so man may ascertain religious knowledge.

The natural and the supernatural may be distinguished by the way in which they make themselves known, the value they have for a person. The natural world is known by sensation and its varied comparative values, and the supernatural world is known by the sense of its sacred or absolute values. In other terms, the distinction is between "things seen and temporal" and "things unseen and eternal." One may refer to "temporal" and "eternal" not only as differences of time, but also of immediate value. A supernatural realm implies more than values of nature, it is absolute value experience that stirs the human sense of the holy, which demands to be esteemed as sacred or ideal. The supernatural is the special concern of religion, and nothing else is concerned with it in the same way as religion. Likewise, natural phenomena are said to be the special concern of science.¹

Still, a mediating view, such as the Religious Naturalism of Henry Nelson Wieman, endeavors to take a synthetic position by explaining even religious experience naturalistically. He says that God is the name for

...the growth of meaning and value in the world...the increase in those connections between activities which make the activities mutually sustaining, mutually enhancing, and mutually meaningful.²

Wieman further states:

God is the integrating process at work in the universe. It is that which makes for increasing interdependence and co-operation in the world...in human life, individual and social, the


integrating process has attempted a more precious, a more beautiful, a more intensive and much more complicated integration than appears on any other plane of which we know. . . .

The principle of integration at the human level is love; integration fulfills itself in human life as we become members one of another, the life of each individual serving as a function of the lives of others, as the beating of the heart is a function of the movement of the limbs, quickening or slowing to meet their requirements, but with conscious mutual understanding. . . . We do not for a moment claim that movement toward integration is the only movement at work in the world. . . . All is not God and God is not all. All is not good and good is not all. . . . There is death, disintegration, futility, and ruin. . . . All good is derived from the process of integration. It is derived from God, the integrating behavior of the universe. . . . God, the progressive integrating process, is the movement toward richer and more intensive integrations. Such a God at times may be a destroyer, because destruction is necessary in order to have progression. . . . God is that which progressively and in greatest measure increases the value of existence.1

Thus, for Wieman, God means those energies of nature which render possible the increase of rational, social experience. The realm of human knowledge, then, is dependent upon the interplay of personal intelligence with the integrating process of nature. Such inclusion of so-called supernatural experience, even that of religious content, into the fold of natural experience as a whole, is made on the basis of equating God with the integrating process of nature. Even the concerns of religion, the values of truth, beauty, and love—the highest values known, are grounded in this process. The complete scheme of human experience is bound with social interdependence in God, the integrating process.

However, Wieman says:

'God is not identical with society but he is the integrating process which has reached in society its highest historical achievement. In society it has achieved the most complex, inclusive and delicately interdependent association of elements which the actual world reveals to our experience. But this integrating

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process has in it, so all evidence seems to indicate, further possibilities of integration which far exceed the most complex society thus far developed. If it does include these possibilities, God in the form of possibility far transcends society. Also he transcends society in another direction. This process of integration has in it a cosmic past which stretches back far beyond the earliest human society. This cosmic past is in some measure and in some form operative in the present. If in society one means to include all the accumulated precipitate of this cosmic past, he can do so; but he is then using the word "society" in a very different sense from its ordinary meaning. He makes society a cosmic process. Thus cosmically conceived, society begins to approximate God, although God is still to be distinguished from it since God involves, in addition, the realm of further possibilities of integration.

It may be asked if such a definition of God in terms of growth alone, as Wieman seems to make, is not too one-sided. Certainly belief in God is a belief in betterment, in growth, in increase of value in the universe. So-called supernatural knowledge and experience revolves around growth and change and the process of integration. It is derived from such an idea, but according to Brightman this religious naturalism of Wieman has apparently neglected the factor of permanence in the very idea of God. Consequently, Brightman states that the religious worshipper is unlikely to have much confidence in God as a conserver of value. The millions of years required for the development of the life forms, it is said, argues for a God who is unchangeable. The picture of God as a being who is capable of change and growth is questionable. The very idea of change in the universe is questionable, according to Brightman. The universe is constantly changing, and the change is in a direction which is not approximating the ideal of growth and progress. The change is in a direction which is approximating the ideal of decay and destruction. The change is in a direction which is approximating the ideal of stagnation and death. The change is in a direction which is approximating the ideal of regression and decline.

Religiously speaking, Brightman feels that God must be a Savior before He can be a Giver. Thus, in terms of experience and reality, he says if God is a dynamic part of nature, for religious meaning, it seems God must also be the ground of that nature. Also, one might wonder whether a naturalistic theism gives a satisfactory coherent account of the objective co-ordinator of naturalness without presupposing a supernatural will in the facts of human consciousness in nature, or of either the origins or the
increase of value in nature.¹

However, such criticism of this religious naturalism may, at least in part, arise from the misinterpretation of what Wieman actually says. His integrating process is apparently not intended to be without conservation, for he says in his book, *Methods of Private Religious Living*:

> We find our life's fulfillment when we enter into appreciative organic union with ever more of the total concrete fullness of the world; for in so doing our lives become identified with that cosmic activity which is the sustainer and magnifier of all values. But we must proceed toward this organic union with the fullness of things by a slow and selective process.²

Also, it seems evident that Wieman does indicate the idea of permanence in his conception of God, as well as the thought that God is the ground of nature. A previous quotation appears to bear such import:

> "All good is derived from the process of integration. It is derived from God, the integrating behavior of the universe."³

In spite of such seeming misinterpretations by Brightman, it would appear that he does suggest a valid weakness in such naturalistic theism. From a personalistic standpoint, one would doubt if this type of scheme gives a satisfying and coherent account of the objective sources of individual consciousness in nature, and whether the origins or the increase of value in nature could arise from an integrating process that is seemingly represented by an impersonal dynamic.⁴ It would seem that value is value-less, without recognition and appreciation, without the factor of intelligent personality. Furthermore, any integrating process, or coordinator of nature would appear to move without reason, or purpose, or

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²Wieman, *op. cit.*, p. 100.  
³Ibid.  
⁴Brightman, *loc. cit.*
arrangement, except by the intervention of intelligent personality as a part of such process. Thus, the writer chooses to use the distinctions of natural and supernatural concerning man's knowing experiences, indicating that the scientific, naturalistic method of ascertaining knowledge may not be sufficient in its application to the full spectrum of man's experience.

The writer tarries over the methods of knowledge because one's perspective concerning ways and means of ascertaining truth are related to his concepts regarding the possibility of life after death. The current discussion has basically touched upon what seems to be representative approaches of man in qualifying his experiences of knowing: (1) the scientific approach which would generally label so-called supernatural experience as illusory; (2) a Christian approach would distinguish man's experience as being on two levels, natural and supernatural; and (3) the naturalistic-theistic approach which would equate the natural and supernatural realms of the Christian view on the basis that all is natural, that God is the integrating process of the universe. It seems apparent that belief in any doctrine of personal immortality is immediately dependent upon the qualified distinction between what some call two functioning aspects of man's experience, natural and supernatural.

However, it is not that this writer proposes the absolute divorce of the natural and the supernatural from each other and confines them as in opposition. It is sometimes difficult to say which is the more mechanical or free, the more ordinary or miraculous. For one does not know how much freedom there is in the natural, or how much law there is
involved in the supernatural. Occasionally it seems the natural reveals the more miraculous, and the supernatural can at times be seen as interwoven with common, everyday experience. Rather than say the two are in opposition, one could say that the both together comprise the fullness of human experience. Yet, man's interests in the natural and in the supernatural are different and very definitely distinguish two aspects of his experience. Part of experience is natural, in the sense that its values are comparative and to be judged as they serve man's needs; and the other part is supernatural, in the sense that its values are absolute, to which his needs must submit.¹ Furthermore, Oman states:

We know the Supernatural as it reflects itself in the sense of the holy and has for us absolute value directly and without further argument; and the question is not that it exists, but how it exists in its relation to us and our relation to it. We can make no more out of arguing abstractly about it than we should out of arguing abstractly, as men long did, about the Natural. The supreme task, the task which has more than any other marked human progress, has been to discover the true Supernatural, and this means again to exercise the true sense of the holy and have the right judgment of the sacred. Only as we are related to it and it to us by the right judgment inspired by the right feeling, can we with profit ask: What is the Supernatural?²

It may be immediately asked, however, how is one to tell if the right judgment, the right feeling, or even the true sense of the holy are in proper alignment? By what tangible criteria, then, may we distinguish the supernatural? The "true sense of the holy," "right judgment," and "right feeling" are not defined, and it would seem that such dependence on "right feeling" is beyond what feelings alone could bear. Recognition of the supernatural, it would seem, depends on a particular concept of man's nature and development. Thus, Olin Curtis suggests in

¹Oman, op. cit., p. 72.
²Ibid.
a discussion of the Christian conception of the supernatural:

To man, in his development, that is supernatural which belongs to the infinite mystery beyond nature, that is, beyond the realm of ordinary individual seizure. In the Christian conception there is no contradiction of this purely anthropological view; but there is a deeper interpretation of the facts. To obtain this deeper interpretation, the standpoint is changed from man to God. Both the natural and the supernatural now have significance only as expressions of the divine will. In one sense, the old dualism disappears, for there is but one universe, of which God is creator,upholder, and ruler. At the bottom of things, there is one organism, working out one sublime intention...Had sin never come into the world, the divine bearing in the universe, and toward men, would be ever one, and that one bearing normal, natural. But sin has come into the world, and that awful event changes everything. God's relations with us, his plans for us, all are no longer entirely normal. With sin once a reality, there comes into God's method a kind of dualism. There are now two divine bearings, one toward the lower individual, and one toward the higher moral person. Thus, God makes, in a perfect manner, precisely the same distinction that man makes in an imperfect manner. These two bearings of God may properly be called the natural and the supernatural. Whatever comes by the ordinary volitions of God, whatever expresses the divine habit, is natural; and whatever comes by the extraordinary volitions of God is supernatural. The Christian supernatural, therefore, is not a bare expression of the purpose of God, but is an expression of his unusual volitions in carrying out his purpose...It is because of this moral and redemptional bias that we must regard the supernatural as much more than mere wonder, as much more than that which is temporarily extraordinary to man. Forever will it be extraordinary to man, for it is extraordinary to God himself.1

It may be suggested here that belief in the Christian doctrine of personal immortality finds occasion in the supernatural, the extraordinary expression of God's purpose. This belief in personal immortality may be founded on various bases that are considered as such extraordinary expressions of God: The life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the authority of the Holy Scriptures, as they are related to personal experience. The credentials of belief in the reality of personal immortality are of necessity founded upon individual experience. Knowledge

implies a knower, and the experience of knowing always refers to a grasping intellect. This applies whether knowledge is received in a "bolt from the blue," or from sensory perception, and it applies whether the knowing experience is classified as natural or supernatural. However, the elements of belief are different from the composition of knowledge, even though both a believer and a knower imply an individual experience.

The main peculiarity of belief, as contrasted with knowledge, is that it always involves personal decision. Some of the higher forms of knowledge are personal to the extent that they are interlaced with self-consciousness, but they are never direct resultants of self-decision. Indeed, the worth of knowledge lies largely in the fact that it comes by coercion. You cannot, whatever may be your character, stand out against a demonstrable truth. . . . Belief on the contrary, is very largely a personal creation. Whether you will have any belief or not depends, in the last issue, upon yourself, upon how much you care for your ideals, upon how much you are willing to venture in the name of a finer manhood. And so in belief there is a daring, a militant spirit, a resolute purpose to fling one's whole being beyond the dusty commonplace of the surface experience.  

In this regard, many who believe in personal immortality feel that such belief is corroborated by supernatural revelation. Then there is the difficulty of pointing out the method or the possibility of differentiating between true and false revelation, especially to the disbelieving skeptic. The previous discussion of the scientific approach to truth was stated to be by the method of sensation and the comparison of measurable values. Corroboration of postulates is demonstrated by this same process. Whereas, those who believe in the supernatural as an extraordinary divine expression, even to the extent of revelation, are hindered in the corroboration of a belief, say, in personal immortality, because it does not lend

1 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
itself to such a demonstration. Still, some recognize the very experience of receiving revelation as corroboration of a given belief. However, the question arises if all such experiences are a part of one's living encounter with God. The evident contradiction among many asserted revelations would lead one to believe that revelation needs further classification and verification. In return, some would declare that knowledge comes instinctively and intelligently whether an experience is true. However, whatever the belief, it should never be an arbitrary vagary, never at all be presumptuous. In presumption one becomes willful, egotistic, self-sufficient, enormously selfish. By contrast, in veritable belief a man is humble and the reverent servant of all reality. Yet belief cannot go beyond self-knowledge, for it lacks that power of swift and universal conquest which knowledge has. Belief cannot make direct use of demonstration, but true knowledge can, and given a rational chance such knowledge can gain dominion anywhere. The best belief can do is to furnish a probable argument of persuasive appeal.¹

It is noted that people may be confronted with the same Bible, the same Christ, and the same doctrines, but some are not persuaded to believe. Perhaps the results of acceptance, rejection, or deferred judgment may largely be presupposed in the starting point and by the method of approach used. However, Cailliet rather dogmatically states that humanity divides itself as to whether man shall be the measure of all things, or whether God shall be the measure. He points out that it is a question of either-or, recognizing no cause for deferred judgment. Thus, he says that when man himself is recognized as the measure, one may expect to deal with

¹Ibid., pp. 149, 150.
mechanists, who reduce everything to the most elementary forms of understanding; with monists and materialists, who persist in explaining the superior by the inferior. Whereas, Cailliet says, if God is recognized as the measure, people find themselves raised up to the notion of a self-justified and self-sufficient reason, and they seek a manifestation of the doctrine of personal immortality upon absolute authority and the super-living God in nature, in history, and in their own selves. In this effort God helps them to understand their own soul, and their soul in turn helps them to understand nature and to recognize the redeeming acts of God.¹

It would seem that Cailliet has made a proper differentiation, but he has apparently assumed that truth always bursts in upon every individual with valid immediacy. The writer would rather think that ascertaining truth, and even beliefs that become self-knowledge, many times are a part of a process that sometimes involves deferred judgment. In the affirmation of beliefs, though they appear as knowledge, one must guard against dogmatism that is unwarranted. This is the great challenge of the natural materialists concerning the religious belief in personal immortality, that it is unwarranted, and that the believer is accused of being dogmatic.

Professor defines a dogmatist as one whose belief exceeds his cognitive grounds for belief, thereby implying some extent of cognitive error. Christian thought has been generally based upon the dogma of infallible authority, but three difficulties with authority as an ultimate criterion of knowledge have been raised: (1) that supposedly infallible authorities often conflict, (2) that the competence of an infallible authority is often seriously questioned in terms of other criteria, (3) that in the event of conflicting authorities or questioned authority, the customary appeal to

¹Cailliet, op. cit., pp. 57, 58.
other criteria often results in cognitive success. These same flaws may be enumerated in connection with the dogma of self-evident principles and the dogma of indubitable fact.¹

Such objections may also be raised against the dependence of the doctrine of personal immortality upon absolute authority and the supernatural aspects of experience. A materialist can see little or no evidence in the natural realm of experience, and nothing that would warrant such a belief. The scientific method does admit authority, but it is held to be a secondary criterion of cognitive belief rather than a primary source of truth. Thus, the writer readily admits that in the single level of natural experience there is not sufficient corroboration nor conclusive proof to warrant belief in personal immortality. In spite of the three difficulties that were raised in relation to absolute authority, it is questionable as to whether the existence of absolute authority can be completely discredited, but the difficulty of complete understanding and the positive knowledge of such authority is certainly recognized. Even so, it would seem that this is not sufficient cause to rule out such authority as a possible source of knowledge, and as a probable aid in the affirmation of a belief in personal immortality.

Although such common sense material may not be definitely cognized, its basic presence remains even though the surface material may change. In spite of the fact that the belief and feeling concerning life after death has long been a part of the material of common sense, there is no justification to adopt it as refined knowledge or as a conclusive warranty

on which to base a particular belief in immortality. Even so, the fact
of the general, common idea of future life is of great significance.

As it has been previously discussed, this "common-sense fact" of
survival went uncriticized for millennia. It was accepted without much
reflection, and the Christian doctrine of personal immortality was dog-
matically held as an undeniable belief of the Christian Church. When
such dogmatism was abandoned, and the belief was critically analyzed in
connection with natural corroborative evidence, many doubted and rejected
the belief because of the lack of such evidence. Thus the question arises
further: how may one satisfactorily corroborate the belief in survival,
the belief in personal immortality?

Again, Pepper says, "There are two types of corroborations and
accordingly two types of critical evidence. There is corroborations of
man with man, and corroborations of fact with fact." The first may be
called "multiplicative corroborations" and the second, "structural cor-
roborations." Both types of corroborations are found in common sense, or
very close to it, for there is no sudden leap from uncriticized to
criticized fact. Thus common sense has the germs of criticism in it and
performs some degree of criticism by itself. However, common sense con-
tinually demands the responsible criticism of refined knowledge, and
refined knowledge sooner or later requires the security of common sense
support. For critical knowledge hangs over a vacuum unless it acknowl-
edges openly the actual, though strange, source of its significance and
security in the uncriticized material of common sense.  

Thus, aside from the unrefined evidence of common sense, there

\[1\] Ibid., p. 45.  
\[2\] Ibid., pp. 46-47.
appears to be no corroboration of the belief in survival on the solitary level of natural experience. But if the aspect of the supernatural intervening with natural experience is recognized, testifying to absolute value and authority, it may be concluded that there is a source of knowledge that may be refined in the complete spectrum of natural-supernatural experience. It is not that every whimsical feeling should be reckoned as certainty from God, or that principles should be accepted just because they are said to be from God. On the combined level of experience there is to be a testing and a criticism of the "revelatory" ideas that clamor for belief and certitude. This is the very affirmation of the acclaimed, authoritative Scripture itself: "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God..."1

Therefore, even though one may have an immediate experience, a revelation from God, it must be acknowledged and interpreted by the intellectual reason of the individual. The essence of revelation is more than the communication of divine truth to man, but it is also a guide to greater comprehension. Such communication and understanding must somehow be made reasonable to the mind of the individual. John Locke said, "He that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both."2 Hence, if a person has an experience, and he views it is relation to his store of reliable experience, and he somehow feels that it is of God, he has a religious right to place his trust in the authenticity of that experience. Trust is vital to religion, and so reasonable to the occasion that demands such a trusting response, that it is difficult to

1 John 4:1a.

2 As quoted by E. S. Brightman, op. cit., p. 177.
challenge. Of course this trust presumes something or someone trustworthy. Religiously, it means confident loyalty to what is believed to be of true value. If a man will trust God, he will also obey, for obedience also presupposes an authority that is acknowledged as demanding obedience. Thus, religious obedience means action in accordance with what is believed to be supreme authority. Both trust and obedience are attitudes of the will, and they are usually thought of as directed toward God, especially in the religious sense. According to this connotation to faith in regard to one's response to a given experience, there is no reason why the religious man should accept any experience as a valid "revelation-claim" or should treat any experience as a supernatural gift of God unless that experience commends itself to his reason as embodying ideal value. Only then does the attitude of faith set in, and its function is not to discover occult truths inaccessible to ordinary intelligence. Rather, this faith is to act on the highest available value-truths.\(^1\)

Furthermore, it would seem that the Christian doctrine of personal immortality is of such absolute value character that its truth appeal to the response of man cannot be verified solely in the natural realm of experience. Instead, complete and final verification must be reserved for the level of human experience that apprehends ideals. From ages past, the belief in a hereafter has been a constant part of common sense knowledge. It may be supposed that the early corroboration of this belief arose out of man's dire need for a hope of survival as a comparable value. But to Christians especially, corroboration refers to the fact that the

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 181.
belief appealed to man as an absolute value to which he might submit his
need.

However, in spite of what many seem to think, the Christian intention, in relation to such doctrines as immortality, is not necessarily to make provision for coercive knowledge. A truth, or a reality, is known only when it carries rational beings beyond dispute. Christianity provides only for belief that can be self-knowledge. For Christianity is not an exact science, aiming to force assent by an irrefragable process. There is not one Christian doctrine, not one Christian event, not one Christian reality, securely beyond the possibility of any man's personal rejection. The Christian intention is not to compel the mind—not even to satisfy the mind as an isolated fragment, as a mere instrument of rationality. Rather, the Christian plan, and concerning the doctrine of immortality, is to meet the whole man with his mind, his personality, and his conscience. Again, the intent is to take a moral person who dares, under the stress of his moral needs, and with his ideal beckoning in the distance, to believe in the Christian doctrine, and to cause him to be certain that whatever of person or event or doctrine is vitally coherent with his experience is grounded in reality and vibrant with truth.¹

The method of such Christian certainty, with regard to the doctrine of immortality, begins with the feature of self-knowledge; when in self-grasp a man obtains the necessary fixed point, and in full self conscious-
ness he obtains the realization of his experience. Such knowledge cannot be transferred by demonstration, but as reality it is an object of self knowledge. A central reason a Christian may be sure of this or that is

¹Curtis, op. cit., pp. 151, 152.
because of its fitness with his moral ideal. Along with the start in self-knowledge and the influence of the moral ideal, there is involved a personal venture of actual self-decision in all so-called Christian certainty. Thus far, the process by which certainty is obtained is this: The man knows himself; gathers the depth of his Christian experience into self-conscious realization; perceives that a certain fact or doctrine is in living conjunction with his inner experience; perceives that this fact or doctrine fits into his moral ideal; and then ventures to submit himself in personal belief. Such a venture is rational, but it is not rationalistic, for man willingly takes some risk to satisfy the demands of his personal and moral life. This process of certainty would not be complete if there were not social confirmation. Two words, conviction and clinch, suggest the philosophy of certainty in belief. There is the personal element of conviction, and then there is the social element by which the personal conviction is clinched or confirmed.¹

By differentiating between the ordinary and extraordinary expressions of God, the natural and the supernatural, by distinguishing between precise knowledge and personal belief, and in reviewing the Christian intention in connection with the process of Christian certainty, it seems one may further discuss the place of the doctrine of immortality in a scientific world. Perhaps it is presumptuous for naturalists, using the scientific method to discredit such a belief that refers beyond the ordinary, that is more than comparative value, and that seeks its certainty in the domain of personal religious experience. Though such

¹Ibid., pp. 152-154.
beliefs and experiences may be accepted or rejected because they do not carry the compulsory facts of verified, demonstrated scientific fact, such personal and communal beliefs and experiences are not to be hastily dismissed.

As has been previously intimated, the certainty of death has seemingly been a major factor drawing man's attention to various possibilities of survival. Belief in some kind of future life after death is among the most universal beliefs of mankind, ranking perhaps with the belief in a Supreme Being. It has been found among tribes and races of every stage of civilization or barbarism, and in every part of the earth. Sir James Fraser has stated: "On this point skeptical or agnostic peoples are nearly, if not wholly unknown."

Again, Fraser further points out:

It is impossible not to be struck by the strength, and perhaps the universality, of the natural belief in immortality among the savage races of mankind. With them a life after death is not a matter of speculation and conjecture, of hope and fear; it is a practical certainty, which the individual as little dreams of doubting as he doubts the reality of his conscious existence.

However, out of the general belief in future life by mankind, there developed various alternate ideas as to how the survival of death might be accomplished, and wherein such assurance could be centered. Perhaps the primary idea of future life is the notion that the dead body was revitalized to carry on a similar earthly, material existence as it had before death. Directly, and perhaps progressively related, is the idea that life is carried on by a spirit or ghost-like existence. It will be noted


Ibid., p. 460.
CHAPTER II

ALTERNATE IDEAS OF IMMORTALITY

I. REVITALIZED BODY, SPIRIT AND GHOST-LIKE EXISTENCE

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It is impossible not to be struck by the strength, and perhaps the universality, of the natural belief in immortality among the savage races of mankind. With them a life after death is not a matter of speculation and conjecture, of hope and fear; it is a practical certainty which the individual as little dreams of doubting as he doubts the reality of his conscious existence.²

However, out of the general belief in future life by mankind, there developed various alternate ideas as to how the survival of death might be accomplished, and wherein such assurance could be centered. Perhaps the primary idea of future life is the notion that the dead body was revitalized to carry on a similar earthly, material existence as it had before death. Directly, and perhaps progressively related, is the idea that life is carried on by a spirit or ghost-like existence. It will be noted

²Ibid., p. 468.
that the latter notion is primarily the concept held by existing primitive tribes. Because of archeological findings of mortuary remains, even of prehistoric peoples, it would seem that there is a definite relation between burial practices and the particular concept of survival. As thoughts and rituals connected with survival ideas develop, a mixture of concepts seems to occur.

E. O. James says that although prehistoric information gained through the study of archeology and anthropology cannot be expected to yield the precise beliefs and customs of "Early Man," it does afford a glimpse of the meaning and purpose of some identical practices in vogue under conditions not very different from those that prevailed at the dawn of human history. Because man has always been phenomenally conservative in his attitude towards death and the dead, it is very doubtful that the cultus in remoter regions on the fringes of civilization has undergone any fundamental change throughout the ages of time.  

Burial practices through time and across the world. Reference has already been made to the archeological record and the prehistoric methods of mortuary ritual in the form of the skull cults to "very Early Man" in the Middle Pleistocene period. It was also pointed out that such rituals significantly prevailed in the succeeding Palaeolithic, Mesolithic, and Neolithic eras. This is evidenced by such specific examples as these:

In a cave at La Ferrassie in the Dordogne, the remains of a man and woman of the middle Palaeolithic age were found. Nearby in trenches were the remains of four children. All the skeletons, which may represent members of one family, were oriented east to west, and associated

1 James, op. cit., p. 117.
with Mousterian implements. In front of the graves of the children there was a ditch containing bones and ashes that may have been a funerary deposit. However, perhaps the most convincing evidence comes from deposits near Nordlingen in Bavaria. In Ofnet, a nest of twenty-seven human skulls was found in a group embedded in ochre, the skulls looking west. A few yards away a second identical group of six skulls was uncovered. In some of them the cervical vertebrae were still attached, and from their condition, the heads must have been severed from the body after death with flint knives, and ceremonially preserved when they had been dried. Both of these groups were assigned to the Mesolithic period.¹

Soon after 4,000 B.C., from graves in Upper Egypt, it was found that in some instances the body appeared to be dismembered, and in certain cases the head was removed and preserved. For it, either a pot or an ostrich egg was substituted. Pots and animal bones occurred on the grave floors together with fragments of ivory, slate, palettes, mace heads, beads, shells, flint flakes, and malachite. A few traces of wooden coffins were also discovered in the later graves.²

However, the kind of care bestowed on the disposal of bodies leaves little room for doubt that a cult of the dead was definitely established in the Middle Palaeolithic period. At this stage the idea may not have gone any further than a belief in human survival under conditions in which food and implements would be required beyond the grave in a life like that lived before death. The evident attitude towards the dead which found expression in the funerary ritual may have

¹Ibid., p. 20. ²Ibid., p. 36; cf. pp. 36-57.
been a combination of respect, fear, veneration, and concern for their well-being. They all disclose a presupposition of a prolongation of existence after the dissolution of the body. Red was apparently, at least for some, the color of living health, and if the dead man was to live again in his own body, of which the bones were the framework, they were painted the ruddy color of life as an attempt to make the body serviceable for its owner's further use. Too, certain shells, such as the cowrie shaped in the form of the portal through which a child enters the world, were arranged on the body in such a way that such a distribution could hardly have been for any other purpose than to provide life for the deceased. Such was the case at Lauzirie-Basse, Dordogne. In some cases binding was done, and where this practice has been adopted by modern primitive people its normal purpose has been to prevent the return of the deceased to molest the living. Such a motive can hardly be eliminated from this practice of the Palaeolithic mortuary cult. Orientation of the body may also have some significance in prehistoric thought of future life, for modern primitive peoples bury their dead facing the native land or in the direction they conceive the abiding place of the dead to be. 1

It would be presumptuous to state that funerary customs always definitely imply a belief in future life, for such customs may not refer to survival ideas. However, neither would the lack of funerary customs mean the absence of survival ideas. There are known savages who merely throw their dead in the brush, but who nevertheless believe in a spirit

1Ibid., pp. 22, 23, 28, 29.
continuation of life after death. In spite of such possible exceptions, it does seem that the bulk of funerary evidence does definitely point to some prevailing idea of a hereafter. Moreover, although ideas of future life evidently appeared to affect the earliest known races of humanity, continuing to the present day, this is not absolute proof of the coexistence of such ideas with human life. Therefore, for the purpose of ascertaining a more complete realization of body disposal methods and the possible correlative notions of survival, we shall further examine data concerned with ancient peoples and contemporary, uncivilized tribes.

In ancient times inhumation in its various forms persisted everywhere as the basic funerary rite. Not infrequently incinerated ashes were buried with interments under barrows or cairns, suggesting that cremation was a new element superseding the earlier sepulture without completely eliminating it, except in a few localities. By the middle and late phases of the Bronze Age, cremation and burial in urnfields were widely adopted, becoming the predominant mode of disposal of the dead. This was especially the case in Central and Northern Europe from the Alpine region to the British Isles.

Although cremation has been a recurrent feature in the cult of the dead since the Bronze Age, the predominant and persistent tendency has been to give some measure of permanence to the mortal remains either in an 'everlasting tomb' or through a process of natural or artificial preservation of the body. This was most conspicuous in prehistoric Egypt, where frequently the dead were buried in the hot dry desert sand, which was often impregnated with noxious compounds, so that decomposition was arrested for an indefinite period as in the case of the natural mummies in the more recent salt petre caves in New Mexico. The continual discovery

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1 James Leuba, Belief in God and Immortality (Chicago-London: Open Court, 1921), p. 7.
2 James, op. cit., p. 108.
of corpses in this condition probably concentrated attention upon the physical survival of the body after death, which soon found expression in a more ample provision of grave furniture and eventually, as we have seen, in elaboration of tomb construction. But burial in more spacious bricklined graves removed the corpse from the desiccating sand, and, therefore, defeated the effects and the purpose of the interments and their equipment. It may have been, as Elliot Smith suggested, that it was as a result of this that attempts were made at the beginning of the Dynastic period to discover ways and means of artificially preserving the bodies of the dead.1

Desiccation and mumification have been often associated with the substitution of improvised portrait statues or images of the dead, either as the temporary abode of the ghost for ritual purposes during the period of mourning, or to become the surrogate of the body after the preserved tissues have decayed. This method was used extensively in ancient Egypt as well as other localities. For instance in Mexico, when a trader died away from home a figure of him was carved in wood. After the mourning ceremonies had been duly performed in conjunction with it, the carving was incinerated and the ashes were interred.2

However, from the Mousterian, (150,000 years back), onwards, the simplest procedure appears to have been interment either in the contracted or extended position in a trench or in a cist of stone slabs. Often, the graves were supplied with food and drink and other offerings, such as red ochre, shells, amulets, and ornaments. These were believed to be necessary for sustenance on the journey to the next world and efficacious for the renewal of the life of the body, or its spiritual counterpart, beyond the grave, and for its status hereafter.3

With the provision of substitutes treated as surrogates of the

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1 Ibid., p. 109.  
2 Ibid., p. 127; cf. 127-130.  
3 Ibid., pp. 130-133.
physical organism, this practice no doubt gave emphasis to the idea of
the existence of a spirit or soul separable from the body. The increasing
practice of cremation likewise facilitated the conception of man as a
psycho-physical duality of body and spirit, each independent of the other.
So long as attention was concentrated on the body, its burial and pres-
ervation in an "everlasting tomb" and imperishable mummy, the next life
was inevitably interpreted in terms of a continuation of the present
existence. Destruction of the corpse by fire no doubt tended to foster
the belief in the liberation of the spirit and regarded as an independent
entity only temporarily housed in the body. For if the life that survived
the dissolution was capable of transference to some other object, of trans-
migration to another body, or of returning to the spirit-world whence it
came in the smoke of its physical integument, the way was open for a less
materialistic doctrine of immortality. Furthermore, when peoples began
to move from one district to another the tendency seems to have been to
regard the original home as the land of the dead whither the ghost returned
at death.¹

Certainly no hard and fast rule may be applied concerning prehis-
toric treatment of the body and the situation of the abode of the dead.
Ideas became intermingled through culture contact and other causes, and
there was the confusion between doctrine and practice. The various cited
examples readily disclose the varied background upon which existing princi-
pal ideas may be based, as well as the thought of early civilizations.
This realization seems necessary to ascertain and trace the development
and growth of the various arising concepts of future life.

¹ Ibid., pp. 130-133.
It seems that the only common belief that can be gleaned from a synthesis of the many ideas is the basic notion that physical death does not end man's existence. In some instances the uncivilized savage may be convinced of future life by so-called facts which would be rejected by the civilized Christian, as well as by adherents of some other religions. Viewing the primitive concept, note, for example, the divergency James Leuba points out in discussing the savage concept of the "soul" or "ghost" in relation to the accepted Christian belief:

Most, perhaps all, savages believe in a plurality of souls. Each man may possess two or even a much higher number of souls. This belief is found among populations as primitive as those of Australia. Among the tribes of the Pennefather River it is believed that each man has two souls; one called 'ngol' resides in the heart; the other, 'choi,' dwells in the placenta. On the western coast of Africa, there is a belief in the 'kra' which exists before the birth of the man to whom it belongs, and will continue after his death. The 'kra' can absent itself from the living body and return to it at will. These same people believe also in the 'srahman,' a soul that begins its career only at the death of its possessors. The soul is variously described as small, like a grain of sand, or of any size up to that of a giant. Its shape is said to be round, featureless, or quite similar to that of the living person to whom it belonged, or of any conceivable appearance. It can pass through the smallest hole and crack, either because it partakes of the nature of the wind, or because of its smallness. It is, nevertheless, commonly represented as eating, sleeping, and performing most, or all, of the functions characteristic of this life.

There are also other representative aspects of primitive ideas concerning the relationship of the soul to the body. Such thoughts notably influence particular ideas of survival after death. This is evident in one Christian concept of the immortality of the soul. However, in the Solomon Islands, the soul of no account survives death only for further considering the primitive concern of the soul in relation to the body as well as the manner of continuing life, Leuba states:

Leuba, op. cit., pp. 7, 8, 9.
During the life of the body, the soul is variously thought to be diffused throughout the body, or to be especially connected with the blood, or the breath, the heart, the liver, or some other organ. Its connection with the body involves growth and decay; on leaving the body, the souls of the young and vigorous are also young and vigorous, and the souls of the aged and infirm also old and infirm. . . . For some, the bodily shadow is the soul; for others, the reflection of oneself seen in the water, or elsewhere, is the soul. . . . According to many tribes, the soul remains connected with the corpse until complete decomposition has taken place. When the bones have become clean, the soul is held to have become completely free. Until then it remained at or near the place of burial, now it can move to the land of spirits. It may, however, return to the living whenever it pleases or only on special occasions. This liberation of the soul from the dead body is such an important event in history of the soul that henceforth it bears a new name; it has become a spirit.1

Such examples are indicative of known primitive thought in relation to ideas of continued existence. However, this does not necessarily mean immortality to the savage. As a matter of fact, there are some instances that souls are not even ascribed to every individual. Leuba notes a tribe of Central Australia that believes that women have no soul.2 There are some other tribes among the Australians who admit the final annihilation of some souls or classes of souls, but at the same time they set no time limit to the continuation of other souls. Again, there are tribes who believe that the spirits of the departed may return from the island of the dead to live in their former families in order to perform various kindly functions, and finally be destroyed by a thunderbolt. In some tribes of North America one must be a chief or a shaman in order to gain access to the other world beyond death. There is also the belief among the Solomon Islanders that the souls of no account survive death only for a time, and soon turn into white ants' nests, which become the food of the remaining vigorous souls. Too, certain New Guinean peoples believe

1Ibid., pp. 9, 10. 2Ibid., p. 8.
that spirits grow old and die, but they are not annihilated, for they are changed into animals and plants.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 12, 13.}

There is also the belief among various primitive tribes that souls share the fortunes of the body, and most savages seem to assume that spirits do not age when they are detached from the body. This conception leads to the practice of some savages putting their relatives to death before they get too old and feeble so they would not be able to take care of themselves in the next world. The natives may kill their kin by strangling them or knocking them in the head, or perhaps by burying them alive. Fiji Islanders and some Australian tribes are known to indulge in such practices.

Yet, in spite of occurring conceptions of paradise and the fortunes of the spirits of the dead, there is almost a universal fear of their ghosts, or spirits, by primitive peoples. One of the chief concerns of the savage is to do his best to make it impossible for the ghost of the recently deceased to return to those he left behind in life, and to ward off nefarious activities, causing sickness, poverty, or death.

For example curious methods are used to confuse the ghost who might try to return to the body or hut just vacated. Among the Tuski tribe of Alaska, those who die a natural death are carried out through a hole cut in the back of the hut. Then it is immediately closed up so the spirit of the dead person cannot find its way back. Elsewhere, for the same reason, other peoples may let the corpse out through the floor, or carry the body around the house at top speed so as to bewilder the spirit. Still, there are some who do conceive of certain ghosts performing kindly
acts. In Australia, there are those who are looked upon as rather beneficent, especially for the members of their families. For instance, the soul of a father may be thought of as returning to help the growth of his children or grandchildren. ¹

There seem to be some apparent reasons why primitive peoples exercise such fear of their dead, even though a deep sorrow is evidently felt by those concerned. According to Leuba, man's "instinctive" response to the presence of things not clearly seen or understood, is the recoil of fear, which is perhaps sometimes mingled with curiosity. ² The fact that savages are known to connect the soul with a putrefying body has been mentioned, and certainly, such an association might easily cause at least a mental repulsion to the accompanying ghost. The corpse itself is credited with mysterious, impersonal, magical powers, and in conjunction with the unknown nature of the soul, or ghost, there tends to be an expectant attitude of fearful dread of even a deceased kinsman.

Also, many primitive peoples believe that most or all deaths are caused by malevolent spirits, and such a concept could only increase the repulsion and dread felt concerning spirits, or even perhaps the future abiding place. So far as the savage is concerned, the calamities of human existence provide ample proof of the evil propensities of such ghosts. It appears evident that there is an abiding liking for this life, and this could very well refer to all mankind in general. Therefore, finally, it would seem that the sheer love for life that the primitives have automatically produces a natural dislike for the unpleasant and mysterious circumstances surrounding death.

¹Ibid., pp. 22, 24. ²Ibid.
Yet, with the aid of transitional rituals from life to death, and from death to after-life, much of such tension and fear is alleviated. Death becomes the gateway to the hereafter, for the mortuary ritual liberates the deceased from his terrestrial existence and its associations, human and material, and provides the means whereby he may pass successfully through the dark and dangerous portal and be safely and securely launched on his new career. In this respect, the idea of survival appears not to have arisen from speculations about a separable soul and phantoms of the living, but from ritual organization. An ever-renewing life is the normal sequence of everyday experience and observation in which death is an intrusion caused by violence and vengeance that may be considered of a supernatural character. However, this intruder is overcome by revitalizing energy and life-giving agents such as red ochre, amulets, and all the various ritual devices. Thereby the well-being of the departed one is provided for in the spirit-world. Thus the conflict between the mortality of the physical body and the immortality of the spirit is variously resolved by the correct observance of the mortuary ceremonial connected with the disposal of the corpse and the accompanying eschatological beliefs.\(^1\)

To this point the writer has considered the alternate idea of immortality, revitalized body, spirit and ghost-like existence, as pre-historic and primitive, uncivilized man conceived and embraced it. Certainly one is struck by the diversity of belief, even within the general concept of a spirit or ghost-like existence in life after death. Still, it is interesting to note that even a general idea of continuance

\(^1\) James, op. cit., pp. 143-144.
of life after death, in some mode or manner, should prevail amidst such a variety of thought and practice.

However, in considering the alternative ideas of immortality, the immediate influential background of the Christian doctrine of personal immortality will be examined by considering Greek and Hebrew ideas as they may have influenced and produced the idea. Both the Greeks and Hebrews had early conceptions of a spirit or ghost-like existence following death. The writer will endeavor to trace this alternate idea as it was believed by the two peoples from the earliest times to the rise of Christianity. The fact that Christianity was born out of Judaism, the national religion of the Jews, and the fact of the influx of Hellenism upon the Hebrew culture are indicative of their varying influence upon the Christian idea that was finally developed. First of all, the Greek version of the alternate idea of surviving death by a spirit or ghost-like continuation will be considered.

Greek ideas. It seems that the belief in the spirit’s survival of the body was an ancient heritage of the Hellenic people. The writings of Homer seem to give sufficient evidence of the prevalence of the belief, reflecting the Hellenic society of the 11th and 10th centuries, and such beliefs do not grow up in a day. 1

But to penetrate to the pre-Homeric society, the evidence of the Minoan-Mycenaean monuments must be considered. The fact that Mycenaean burials in Greece were found near or within inhabited precincts, and funeral jars actually found in the niches of the walls of a pre-Mycenaean house suggest that this early people did not fear contagion of the dead.

Also, the Mycenaean shaft-graves reveal elaborate provision for the departed. Ornaments and weapons were buried, and the grave mound was so constructed that sustenance, especially liquids, could be conveyed down to the body. Such tendance may have engendered actual worship of the dead. There is one monument from the Minoan civilization that many archeologists regard as direct proof of an actual cult of the dead. It is the famous Hagia Trianda sarcophagus that was discovered near Phaistos by the Italians, on which is seen a procession of worshippers, some on the right bringing offerings to a tomb, before which is a mummified figure. This figure may, perhaps, be interpreted as that of the dead man who has come forth to receive worship. Other figures on the left are approaching the sacred altar and the axe of the High God with gifts. It seems, by the painting on the sarcophagus, as if the dead hero were being invited to a communion with the deity. However, it is difficult to tell whether the departed spirit was being revered as a hero or as an ancestor. The cult of the dead in Minoan Crete may have been exceptional, confined perhaps to kings who may have been regarded as semi-divine even in their lifetime. Ethnologists are still disputing as to whether the peoples of this Mycenaean-Minoan culture had any Hellenic strain. If not, their religion cannot be used as evidence of the early Hellenic, but later Hellenic practices and cults undoubtedly derived abundant inspiration and suggestion from it.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
the beliefs of his time. Because of the lack of sacred books or orthodox dogma as a controlling factor, one would expect the occurrence of many inconsistencies in their doctrine, especially concerning opinions of future life. Too, it must be realized that the development of such a belief proceeded from the ancestor cult, the hero cult, and the general religious tendency of the dead. Furthermore, one must be aware that all these are liable to blend, one with the other.\textsuperscript{1}

Notice, then, some reflections cited by Homer in The Odyssey, where he considers the state and attitude of those residing in the land of the dead. Odysseus sees the place to be under the shadow of unwholesome night. Milk, honey, rich wine, and water are poured into a trench, a white meal is scattered on top, as an offering unto all the dead. When Odysseus had thus worshipped the nations of the dead with prayer and vows, he took some sheep and pierced their throats, allowing the blood to flow into the trench. Souls of the dead appeared before him. The soul of his companion Elpenor, who was not yet buried, came first, and Odysseus asked how it was that he was here. Elpenor said it was the evil doom decreed by some divinity. He broke his neck in a drunken stupor, and his soul went down to Hades.\textsuperscript{2}

Tiresias, the Theban seer also approaches and comments:

\begin{quote}
Why, O unhappy mortal, hast thou left
The light of day to come among the dead
And to this joyless land? Go from the trench
And turn thy sword away, that I may drink
The blood, and speak the word of prophecy.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}William Cullen Bryant (trans.), The Odyssey of Homer (twelfth edition; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1871), Book XI, cf. lines 16-82.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., lines 112-116.
The words of Anticleia, the mother of Odysseus illustrate her reflections:

Believe not that Jove's daughter Proserpine Deceives thee. 'Tis the lot of all our race When they are dead. No more the sinews bind The bones and flesh, when once from the white bones The life departs. Then like a dream the soul Flies off, and flits about from place to place. 1

Women such as Tyro, Antiope, Alcmene, Chloris, Leda, and Iphidameia gave themselves to be mistresses of the gods: Tyro to the arms of Neptune, Antiope to the arms of Jove, Alcmene to mighty Jupiter, Chloris to Neleus, Leda to Jupiter, and Iphidameia to Neptune. Each brought forth sons of the gods, apparently finding solace in their relations. 2

However, the state of Agamemnon is thus described as Odysseus catches sight of his soul:

He came attended by a throng of those Who in the palace of Agamemnon met A fate like his and died. When he had drunk The dark red blood, he knew me at a look, And wailed aloud, and, bursting into tears, Stretched out his hands to touch me; but no power Was there of grasp or pressure, such as once Dwelt in those active limbs. 3

Again, in answer to Odysseus who speaks of his previous good fortune, Achilles speaks:

Noble Ulysses, speak not thus of death, As if thou couldst console me. I would be A laborer on earth, and serve for hire Some man of mean estate, who makes scant cheer, Rather than reign o'er all who have gone down To death. 4

On the other hand, Mimos and Orion apparently thrive in a better condition; their lot is described thus:

1 Ibid., lines 266-271.  2 Cf. Ibid., lines 284-397.
3 Ibid., lines 481-488.  4 Ibid., lines 601-606.
Minos, a golden sceptre in his hand,
Sitting to judge the dead, who round the king
Plead their causes. There they stood or sat
In Pluto's halls,--a pile with ample gates.
'And next I saw the huge Orion drive,
Across the meadows green with asphodel,
The savage beast whom he had slain; he bore
The brazen mace, which no man's power could break.' 1

Yet, others such as Tantalus and Sisyphus were undergoing torments
and suffering. Tantalus was athirst, although he stood in water up to
his chin. As often as he bowed to take a drink the lake was drawn away,
and sank into the earth; a god dried it up. Also, fruit laden trees
tantalized him, but when he reached to pick, the wind arose and whirled
them among the clouds. Sisyphus endlessly toiled to roll a huge stone up
a hill, but before he could get it across the summit some unseen power
always sent it rolling back. However, Hercules is favored to sit and
feast with the deathless gods. 2

Moreover, Homer conceives of the spirit world to be under the
control of certain deities. Besides Hades and Persephone, there is Hermes
who takes the ghosts under his escort, as the god of sleep and the herald
of death. Also, as some of the previous quotations indicate, Homer does
present material which at times suggests the possible mystic communion
between the human and the divine after death. 3

Homer apparently knew of the popular belief of man being able to
attain divinity or semi-divinity, although at times he dogmatically seems
to deny it. He probably did not accept the belief or did not wish to
encourage such self-exaltation of man. The Iliad does not give any def-
inite hint of hero-cult, but The Odyssey shows a different trend. Here

1 Ibid., lines 708-715. 2Cf. Ibid., lines 724-750.
3Farnell, op. cit., pp. 6, 9, 10.
Homer seems willing to admit the possibility of mortal becoming divine. For instance, Inc, once the mortal daughter of Kadmos, is raised to the rank of a sea-divinity under the name of Leukothoa. Without a doubt, the poet was also aware of the worship of Achilles, and Homer does allow Achilles a certain pre-eminence and rule among the shades.¹

It is of further note that prehistoric kingship was of divine character. The king had a sanctity even in his lifetime, and the king-priest might personate the divinity that he served. Salmoneus posed as Zeus. In The Iliad itself one finds the warrior-priest of Zeus-Idaios honored as a god among the people. Because the mortal king or priest was considered to be a supernormal being in his lifetime, it is natural to suppose that even greater powers would be attributed to his ghost. Thus the powerful priest or priest-king might be buried in the temple of the divinity to whom he was closely linked. From the exceptional privilege of burial within holy ground the idea could easily arise that the ghost of the buried king or priest partook somewhat of the nature of the divinity and should therefore share in his worship.²

The development of the Greek hero-cults progressed in a diversified manner, arising out of various emphases, for there are several types or classes of heroes and heroines that may be distinguished in spite of overlapping. These seven classes come to prominence: (1) the hieratic type of hero-gods and heroine-goddesses whose name or legend suggests a cult-origin; (2) sacral heroes or heroines associated with a particular divinity, as apostles, priests, or companions; (3) heroes who are also gods,
but with secular legend, such as Herakles, the Dioskouroi, Asklepios; (4) culture-and functional heroes, styled to meet a particular need; (5) epic heroes of entirely human legend; (6) geographical, genealogical, and eponymous heroes and heroines, derived as transparent fiction, such as Messene and Lakedaimon; and (7) historic and real personages. Reference shall be made to the various types of the cults only as they make a definite contribution to the study of Greek ideas on immortality. It would be superfluous to consider the many heroes and heroines individually. For instance, in the first type, the divine or hieratic hero, one is confronted with a crowd of figures of Hellenic cult and legend who were worshipped sometimes and in some places, and whose legend might be of the type of divine myth, or wholly or partly of the human epic-heroic type. The writer is more interested in getting at the ideas concerning immortality that these various hero-cults represent or motivated.

It seems evident that hero-cult idea generally carried the thought that numerous personages were immortal either because they were gods, or at least had become semi-divine. Thus, such heroes or heroines were worthy of worship. The idea of man becoming divine to an extent, by reason of his exploits, or because of divine connections, came to be utilized to the fullest degree, and finally all men were recognized to possess a portion of immortal divinity in their souls. In some respects this idea may have motivated ancestor worship as well as produce a hope of immortality for everyone.

However, it may be of value to consider some of the germane ideas that apparently did evolve out of the hero cults. For instance, concerning

\[1\] Ibid., p. 19.
the cult of Herakles, the Greeks viewed him as first a man, then a hero, and then a god. Homer reflects this thought by stating that the wraith of Herakles was in Hades leading the same shadowy and futile existence as the ghosts of other dead men, while his real self is happy at the banquets of the immortal gods, and has for his bride fair-ankled Hebe. Arrian states that it was a Delphic oracle that first confirmed his apotheosis some long time after his death. According to Pindar, who relates the prophecy of Teiresias; Herakles had aided the gods decisively, and because of this he was to attain everlasting bliss and repose and the hand of Hebe as his reward. There was the later development that Herakles was the terror and controller of the ghost-world.¹

The Dioskouroi cult is likewise an example of mortals attaining a blessed immortality. These twin heroes who were called the sons of God, named Kastor and Poludeukes, were said to be the secret offspring of Zeus and Leda. Homer states that they are riders of swift horses, and they were looked upon as Saviours of men. Their personalities came to support a later faith in a blessedness attainable by the individual soul after death. The dead were therefore occasionally committed to their care.²

Also, the cult of Asklepios is of salient interest, especially in relation to the establishment of Christian thought. According to accepted Greek tradition Asklepios was of mortal origin in respect of his mother Koronis, and he himself suffered death. Thus he is of the heroic-divine type, who like Herakles becomes a supernatural being after death, and finally clothed with the attributes of full divinity. Asklepios was

¹Ibid., pp. 98, 150, 171. ²Ibid., pp. 175, 182, 227.
a human physician of ancient fame, whom Zeus destroyed with a thunder-
bolt for raising the dead to life. He came to be considered a healing-
Saviour in the sense that he saved men’s bodies, for Asklepios was
reputed to have deep wisdom enriched by science and a love for mankind.
Thus apparently by virtue of the fact that Asklepios was born part
divine, and that he was a blameless healer, he took his place as an
immortal benefactor. 1

Certainly not all of the personages the Greeks worshipped were
mythical, for the numerous cults of epic heroes, of real persons, was no
doubt a factor in the actual establishment of ancestor worship. The fact
of the many cults immortalizing various famous personages such as Achille,
Helene, Hektor, et cetera, through the different rituals and ceremonies,
imply the belief in life after death. With the inclusion of the worship
of all ancestors, even those who had no heroic prominence, there was the
appearance of All Souls’ observations. These were a type of festival in
which food was cooked for the ghosts and Hermes, the god of the nether-
world. For example, the Athenian All Souls’ Day was observed by cooking
a cereal food intended for the ghosts, service was offered to Hermes, and
a sacrifice offered to mother-earth by throwing a honeyed cake into a
cleft in the earth near her shrine. The porridge-pot was tabooed and
reserved solely for the use of souls, and the whole ritual closed with a
ghost-riding formula: "Begone you ghosts; it is no longer Anthesteria." 2
There is no implication of actual worship, such as prayer to the dead, or
of any expectation of divine blessings they might confer. All that is

1 Ibid., pp. 234, 243.

2 Jane Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (New
done seems to be prompted by the belief in the continued life of spirits, in their dependence upon food and sustenance from the living, and by the desire of the surviving kin to minister to their needs and periodically invite them to a loving reunion with their old household. Another trait of the service is of note. The souls are not considered to be without hope, for as the special divinities of Hermes and the Earth-mother have charge of them, the living kinsmen can supplicate these powers on behalf of their loved ones.¹

The formula of exorcism recited at the end of the festival suggests a type of fear of ghosts. This feeling of fear does not necessarily imply that the ghost is malevolent, for the previous ceremony reveals an affectionate relationship between the living and the dead. However, it was thought that even the loving ghost brought pollution, an uneasy condition half-physical which rendered one unfit for intercourse with one's fellows or with the higher deities of the upper world. Hence arose the purification rites after funerals. This prevailing feeling that association with the dead was repugnant to the higher and deathless divinities sharpened the contrast between the upper and nether divinities. However, as the Greeks became more and more conscious of the miasma produced by the dead, the greater fear occurred, and such stimulus affected actual worship of the dead. The Eudemian treatise concerning the soul states, "It is a sin to belie the dead or to speak evil of them, as spirits are better and more powerful than we."²

Another aspect of belief was that the ancestral spirits fostered the life of each new generation, for offerings were brought to them on

¹Farnell, op. cit., pp. 343-346. ²Ibid., pp. 349-351.
the occasion of marriage. It was an Attic custom to bury the dead person with his face turned toward the east and to give the new born child the name of its deceased grandfather. There is the dimly recorded belief of the old Thracian-Frygian religion that the soul of the ancestor might be reborn in a new incarnation. In connection with such ancestor worship, there was also the expressed hope that the ancestor became semi-divine, combining the hero and ancestor cults.\footnote{\textit{Tbid.}, pp. 356-366. cf. \textit{Tbid.}, pp. 371-372.}

However, the idea of the heroized dead in Greece seems to have been more materialistic than spiritual. For example, the evil sailor-demon of Temesa is carnally robust, and the athlete Euthumos gives him a thoroughly corporeal thrashing. Thus, the hero-cults of Greece do not reflect the Homeric conception of the dead as mere frail and shadowy wraiths. Nor do they agree with the Homeric conception of the abode of the dead, with his picture of Hades or Elysium, or with the Hesiodic dream of the Happy Isles. Though unseen, the hero was a robust personage who could travel where he was needed or wanted.\footnote{\textit{Tbid.}, pp. 371-372. p. 150-162.}

Yet, aside from the hero or ancestor cults there were other ways whereby one might hope to attain a glorified existence after death. The ordinary Hellenes who could not look to receive posthumous divine honours from his fellow-men could initiate himself into one or more of the many mysteries of Greece. Most of these mysteries had probably begun from the 5th or 6th centuries onward. As early as the 7th century the Eleusinian Demeter proclaimed, "Happy is he who has seen these mysteries; he who hath had no share in them hath a worse destiny after death in the world below." The Eleusinian faith maintained that the mortal could secure a
happy immortality by entering into close contact with the powers of
death during his life, not that he himself could become a god. Such
contact with death was attained when the catechumen drank of the liquid
compounded of cereals that the goddess herself had drunk in her sorrow
when she first broke her fast. After partaking of the cup, applying the
occasion as a peculiar means of grace, the initiate felt himself to stand
in an intimate relation with the Mother and the Daughter, so that they
would be sure to extend their divine favor to him when he entered their
domain after death.¹

The mystic service of the Orphic-Bacchic sects also conveyed the
promise of a blessed immortality, but it was through the transcendental
concept of the union of the mortal with the divinity. There was the
prevalence of the idea that those who had religious genius might attain
real communion with the god through inspired ecstasy. Also this divinity
was in his aboriginal home and always in his later career he was a lord
of souls, a great deity of the land of the dead. But he himself also
periodically suffered death and enjoyed a periodic resurrection. Thus,
the "mystes" played a mystic part by partaking of the sacred body of
the dismembered deity and assisting in his resurrection. And, the claim
to immortality was based on the presence of the divine element in man's
soul. Orphic sectaries were known to write down their confessional and
place them near the head of the dead in the tomb so they may serve as
amulets for the saving of his soul. Having avoided the dangers of error
on the way, the soul is to address the divine guardians of the Lake of
Memory thus: "I am the son of earth and starry heaven, and by birth I

However, the soul of the initiated must even perform further ritual after death to attain a blessed immortality. He must drink of the cold waters of the Lake, which the guardians will give because he made the mystic claim, and he appeals further: "I am parched with thirst and perishing; give me quickly to drink of the cold water from the Lake of Memory." As his request is granted he becomes one of the blessed "heroes," (and no cult significance is now attached to the concept of hero.) The Orphic formula reveals the conception that memory, or the preservation of personal identity, is a necessary condition of a blessed immortality, and implies also that the uninitiated soul passes into self-unconsciousness. Two other points of Orphic eschatology were gained from an inscription on the Compagno Tablet found near Naples: (1) there is a doctrine of purgative punishments whereby the soul is purified—"I have paid the penalty for unrighteous deeds" is the confession of a purified soul; and (2) there is a doctrine of reincarnation through a cycle of existences at the end of which the soul may find deliverance and rest—"I have fled forth from the wheel of bitter and sorrowful existence." From fragments of mystic poetry it is gathered that the Orphic paradise was but vaguely conceived and that it was viewed in accordance with old Greek mythology, to the extent that the soul was thought to belong to the underworld and the powers of the underworld after death. The chief Orphic god was by origin a god of the underworld, and the sects practiced inhumation rather than cremation.

Orphic influences may be noted in the later writings of Pindar,

1Ibid., pp. 373-375.
especially in the second Olympian ode:

When men die, the souls of the wicked pay penalty, and the sins committed in this realm of Zeus (our upper earth), there is one below that judgeth, delivering the reward by stern necessity. But the souls of the good enter upon a restful life, blessed with a sun that shineth night and day, no longer rending the ground or ploughing the sea with toil of hand in niggard livelihood; but those who were oath-abiders and rejoiced in truth have pastures of bliss where no tears are; but the others endure an agony our eyes would turn from. And those who through their lives, both in this world and in that, can stand fast under trial, keeping their soul wholly aloof from unrighteousness, they then fare once for all by the road of God towards the palace of Kronos, where Ocean-aire are wafted round the islands of the blest, and golden flowers gleam, some earth-born hanging from trees of glory, others fostered by the water, with garlands whereof they crown their hands and heads.\(^1\)

Compare the preceding fragment with one of Pindar’s dirges to be chanted at funerals.

Of those from whom Persephone hath taken atonement for ancient sin, in the ninth year she sendeth back again the souls into the light of the Sun; from these are born glorious kings, men excelling in strength and mighty wisdom; and for all time hereafter they have the hallowed names of heroes.\(^2\)

It is discerned in the first and longer passage that Pindar apparently implies a doctrine of reincarnation, of a triple life of purification both in the upper and lower world, and some such dogma is expressed with less elaboration in the dirge. It also contains the Orphic concept of the soul as an exile from the Gods. Thus Pindar is recognized as the first great master of eschatological poetry.\(^3\)

However, Plato is another authority, a chief authority for this new lore of the soul, although perhaps he is indebted to Orphic teaching. In the Phaedo it is stated that death is the separation of the soul from the body; when the soul is released from the body. This is a purification

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 378, 379. \(^2\)Ibid. \(^3\)Ibid.
whereby one can attain true knowledge, for the foolish bonds of death can no longer detain nor detour the soul. ¹

Socrates is recorded as saying:

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body. . .the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?²

Furthermore, in the Gorgias, one reads,

. . . when a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view. . .and when they come to the judge. . .he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is; perhaps he may lay hands on the soul. . .who has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he has lived without truth.³

Thus, one receives the idea that every sin committed in the body imprints a stain on the man's soul. When the soul is dispatched from the body at death, it is judged accordingly, and undergoes the punishment which it deserves. However, the holy soul is looked upon with admiration, that is the soul who has lived in truth, most likely the soul of a philosopher, and it is sent to the Islands of the Blessed.⁴

Again, in the Phaedo, the discussion is evidently devoted to proving that the soul may survive death. The immortality of the soul is said to be implied by their preceding, and such prior existence is believed to be indicated by the sensation of recollection and the ability to formulate ideas. Thus, if the soul passes from death to

2Ibid., p. 80.
3Ibid., pp. 208-209.
birth, that is from pre-existence to existence in a body, it must also
exist after death as well as before birth.

... there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute
essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to
have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and
with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and
our inborn possession—then our souls must have prior existence,
but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the
same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born;
and if not the ideas, then not the souls. ... For if the soul
exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be
born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue
to exist, since she has to be born again?1

Also, it is further stated that the soul cannot be a harmony of
the body as the Pythagoreans taught, dependent upon the body as music
is upon the instrument. On the contrary, the soul is able to direct
and sometimes oppose the body, and is therefore independent of it.
Since the soul is invariable in nature, there is no reason to fear that
it may eventually run itself down and stop, even after wearing out several
bodies and passing through a number of reincarnations. The essential
nature of the soul is to live, for it participates in the idea or prin-
ciple of life. However, this idea logically excludes its opposite which
is death. Thus the soul can never be dead, any more than that which
participates in the nature of the odd can ever be even, or of the hot,
cold.2

After death the soul preserves for a time its personality and is
punished or rewarded according to its good or evil deeds on earth. The
common soul can only grow wings to return to the place from whence it
came in ten thousand years. However, others receive judgment as is

1Ibid., pp. 72, 73.

2B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt
described in the Phaedrus:

But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven where they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass again into the human form.¹

Such are the representative ideas that are supplied concerning the duality of man, the immortality of the soul, and intimations of the after-life as they are discussed in the Dialogues of Plato. However, perhaps the most important phenomenon of Greek society, as especially concerned with the spirit-existence aspect of this alternate concept of future life, was the spread of the Orphic societies and their doctrine. It familiarized the world with the conception of the divine element in the human soul, with a sense of kinship between man and deity. This sense was quickened by means of a mystic sacrament whereby man’s life was transcendently fused with the divine. It strongly marked the antagonism between flesh and spirit and insistently preached a doctrine of purity, and although mainly ritualistic it contained the spiritual idea of the purity of the soul from the taint of sin as well. The former concept was especially carried on by Plato. Finally, the chief aim and scope of Orphism was otherworldliness, its mission was preaching salvation, of an eschatology based on the dogmas of posthumous retribution, purgatory, and a succession of lives through which the soul is tried. Thus Orphism promised immortal bliss obtainable through purity and the mysterious

¹ Jowett, op. cit., p. 445.
magic of sacraments.\(^1\) is reminiscent of the earlier worship of trees. According to Hebrew ideas, in considering Hebrew ideas of immortality, scholars feel that the roots of ancient Hebrew religion extend to the common Semitic stock. Morris Goldstein says:

The religion of these Semites was as elementary as that which we trace in most primitive groups. We call it Animism—or Animatism, in the crudest stage. Anything, even a stone, which could affect their lives in any way was thought to be animated by a life and will—a spirit—similar to their own. These spirits could harm or they could help. Therefore, they were worshipped, that they should help, and not harm. . . . There is no conclusive proof to link the ancestors of the ancient Israelites to Animism, excepting this, that inasmuch as they were a part of the Semites it must be assumed that their religion was that of the Semites.\(^2\)

Moreover, some scholars also believe that they can distinguish remnants of the earlier animistic beliefs in the Bible. For instance, it is said that in Palestine, to this day, all springs are viewed as the abode of spirits, and permission is asked before drawing water. As an echo of this form of Animism in the Bible, attention is called to the names in Genesis 14:7. Goldstein says the place Kadesh (which means "sanctuary") is also called En-Mishpat (which means "the fount of decision"); hence there is the theory that the fount may have been a sanctuary at one time.\(^3\)

Trees were also thought to have spirits capable of producing life and energy. This was especially the case of evergreen trees, for they seemed to never die. In the manner of worship, pledged gifts were hung on these trees, with accompanying prayers. Thus, some students think that the sentence in Genesis 21:33, "And Abraham planted a tamarisk tree inera.

\(^1\)Farnell, op. cit., p. 402.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 6.
Beer-Sheba, and called there on the name of the Lord, the Everlasting God," is reminiscent of the earlier worship of trees. According to Animistic belief, the rustling of the leaves revealed the presence of the spirit in the tree. The manner of the rustle was carefully studied and determined as an oracular decision. Again, scholars believe they find a remnant of this in 2 Samuel 5:23, 24. Here David inquires of the Lord whether he should go to battle the Philistines; he is answered, "And let it be, when thou hearest the sound of a going in the tops of the mulberry trees, that then thou shalt bestir thyself; for then shall the Lord go out before thee, to smite the host of the Philistines."

The Animism of the Semites also involved sacred stones, rocks, and mountains. The fact that Jacob has a unique dream while sleeping on some stones at Bethel, and the fact that he erects one stone for a pillar and pours oil upon the top of it, has given rise to the theory that behind the incident described is a local tradition which held those stones sacred. Although such evidence is indicated, Goldstein implies that it is questionable whether it is sufficient to prove Israelitish Animism.²

Again, Goldstein says there are but few traces of Hero-Ancestor worship among the Semites.³ John Peters states that the worship of the dead was forbidden among the Hebrews from an early period. Necromancy was also forbidden, but he says that literature and discovered ritual show abundant evidence of a cult of the dead and of necromancy. It is said that such Hebrew graves as have been found in Palestine contain deposits similar to those found in Canaanite graves—food, drink, tools, weapons, et cetera.

¹Ibid., pp. 6-7. ²Ibid., p. 10-11. ³Ibid., p. 8.
Also, offerings to the dead are frequently mentioned. For instance, Deuteronomy 24:14; Jeremiah 16:5ff.; Hosea 9:4; and Psalms 56:28.1 Moreover, Peters indicates that the prohibitions in the Law of cuttings for the dead may show practices connected with the worship of the dead. The taboo of unclean is further evidence of such worship. Genesis 37:34, Leviticus 19:28; 21:1, 11, and Deuteronomy 14:1 are Biblical passages that are cited in support. Also, Peters calls attention to the reverence paid to or at the tombs of the ancestors, and the monuments, heaps of stones, and pillars ("mazzeboth"), erected by or over them. He notes the sanctity of Hebron, burial place of the Patriarchs, 2 Samuel 5:3; 16:7, 12; Joshua 20:7; the sanctity of Shechem, tomb of Joseph, Genesis 12:6 f., Deuteronomy 11:30; and, the tombs of the kings, as a place of worship in connection with the Temple, Ezekiel 45:7-9.2

E. W. K. Mould especially notes one allusion that seems to regard a grave as a sacred place; the grave of Sarah (Genesis 23), in the cave of Machpelah, which was according to Genesis 13:18; 18:1, a sanctuary. Another instructive instance is the grave of Rachel (Genesis 35:20), where "Jacob set up a pillar upon her grave," thus seeming to make the grave a sanctuary.3

Mention is also made concerning a chain of references to the consultation of the spirits of the dead, through a class of persons employed for that purpose. Peters cites 1 Samuel 28; Isaiah 8:19; Deuteronomy 18:11, among other passages, as indicating spiritistic tendencies. Furthermore, in connection with such a cult of the dead was the importance of

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1Peters, op. cit., p. 450.
2Ibid., of. Wright, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
3E. W. K. Mould, Essentials of Bible History (New York: Ronald Press, 1947), p. 120.
posterity. Sons conducted the cult, and offered the sacrifices without which the quasi-immortality of the dead could not continue. Hence, childlessness or the destruction of children meant the loss of such joy and such life as existed after death.\footnote{Peters, loc. cit.; cf. Mould, op. cit., pp. 120-121.}

It has been previously noted that the early Hebrews believed in the persistence of "nephesh" after death. According to James Strong the Hebrew word "nephesh" is from "naphash;" a primitive root; to breathe; passively, to be breathed upon, that is (figuratively) refreshed (as if by a current of air); (be) refresh selves (-ed). Thus, "nephesh" properly means a breathing creature, that is animal or (abstractly) vitality; used very widely in a literal, accommodated or figurative sense (bodily or mental); any, appetite, beast, body, breath, creature, dead (-ly), desire, (dis-) contented, fish, ghost, greedy, he, heart (-y), (hath, jeopardy of) life (in jeopardy), lust, man, me, mind, mortally, one, own, person, pleasure, (her-, him-, my-, thy-) self, them, (your) -selves, slay, soul, tablet, they, thing, (she) will, would have it.\footnote{James Strong, A Dictionary of the Words in the Hebrew Bible, in The Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible (17th edition; New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1947), p. 80.}

Thus, these various definitions are evidently attached according to the association of words with which the term "nephesh" is used. In translating what the Hebrews might mean by the use of "nephesh" relative to concepts of life after death, there is ample room for diversity of interpretation. Some of these are seen to be breath, body, ghost, spirit, personality, and inevitably, whatever man is conceived to be.

From what he considers to be the abiding Hebrew view of man, B. D.
Eerdmans states that physically man consisted of two elements, flesh and breath, "basar" and "nephesh." Moreover, Eerdmans indicates that "nephesh" (spirit) was taken as indispensable for life, and not completely annihilated by death. A good example is the story of Samuel's appearance at the behest of the witch (1 Samuel 28). The ghost of Samuel was called up from some place beneath the earth; he is a shadow of Samuel, resembling him as he was before death, an old man with a cloak; he is divine ("elo-him"), and possesses superhuman knowledge when brought back to life.

After death the "nephesh" was supposed to remain near the grave and to be in need of nourishment. Eerdmans says that for this reason the early Hebrews erected a "massebah," a piece of stone on the grave, which was called "nephesh" and brought food and water, or built some small dome of bricks, as a home for the soul. Homes of notable souls were sometimes of considerable size. I Maccabees 13:7 relates that Simon Maccabee built a great sepulchral memorial at Modein. On top were seven "pyramids" for the people buried there (one for his father, mother, and four brethren, the seventh in advance for himself). The Syrian translation of the term "pyramids" was "souls." Mishnah Shekalim advises that if there was no money left after the funeral was paid, the rest should be used for building a "nephesh" on the grave.

Sometime later the "nephesh" was believed to sink down into Sheol. Isaiah 14:9: "Yea, they shall go down into Sheol, the home of the dead, with those who go down to the pit."

Here the ghosts, or "refaim" dwelt, a place beneath the earth where differences of earthly rank were continued (Isaiah 14:9), and habitation differences of earthly rank were continued (Isaiah 14:9), and habitation

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2 Peters, loc. cit.

in which depended in general on proper entombment. 1 Peters further states:

Although possessing godlike powers, nevertheless life in Sheol is a miserable existence at its best, to which the worst lot on earth is preferable. But, evil as the state of the dead may be in Sheol, it is still much worse not to be in Sheol at all, which is the lot of those unburied or mutilated before death. 2 Hence partly out of piety, partly to prevent injury from or to secure through the dead, a son sought to give his parent a fitting tomb. While the dead rested in Sheol, he was also associated with the tomb in which his body was interred, and with that were connected, his power and propriate his favor. 3

L. E. Paton in The Hebrew Idea of the Future Life is said to express the opinion that original Hebrew and Semitic belief connected the dead only with the tomb, and that Sheol is of Sumerian origin, early adopted by the Canaanites, and from them by the Hebrews. John Peters does not think there is sufficient evidence on which to base such a conclusion. He says that for practical purposes Sheol and the tomb appear combined from the beginning of such knowledge; and they continue to be so combined in the worship at tombs and the belief in a future life in those same regions today. 4

However, Eerdmans describes Sheol in the following manner:

The name Sheol (probably, despite all criticism, a Sumerian term Shu-alu) was a land of darkness very deep under the earth. Amos 9:2, Deuteronomy 32:22, Isaiah 7:11. The Assyrians called it the land from where none returned (zirzu la taru) like Job 10:21. Isaiah described it as a monster opening the mouth without measure (Numbers 16:30). The shades, Rephaim, remaining there, held still their old emblems. The kings were sitting on thrones (Isaiah 14:9) and the

1 Peters, loc. cit.
2 (Cf. Isaiah 14:18f., Jeremiah 22:19, Joshua 7:15, 24f.)
4 Ibid., p. 451, footnote.
heroes had their arms (Ezekiel 32:17-32). The Rephaim were hidden from God (Job 14:13). God does not remember them any more (Psalms 88:6, Isaiah 38:11, 13).¹

Harry Buis points out that the etymology of the word "Sheol" is uncertain. Some scholars believe that it is derived from the verb "to ask," and connect this derivation with the practice of consulting the dead. Others consider this derivation as describing the insatiable nature of Sheol, always asking for more inhabitants, as is suggested by Proverbs 30:16. Then, still others believe the derivation comes from the verb "to be hollow," referring to the idea that Sheol is a hollow place under the earth.²

Moreover, Peters also indicates that there is considerable vagueness with regard to the exact character of Sheol, partly because it was never clearly defined in thought, ever remaining a land of darkness and confusion (Job 10:22); partly because different writers and different periods held separate views. However, in general it was conceived as a great pit or hollow beneath the earth to which all dead go: Deuteronomy 33:22; Job 7:9; Psalms 88:4; hence it was also called "Bor," "the pit:" Isaiah 33:16; Psalms 143:7; or "Shahath," a "cave:" Job 33:18; Ezekiel 28:9. It stands in contrast to "heaven," to indicate the depths beneath: Amos 9:2; Psalms 139:8. It is considered to be immediately below the earth, so that it may be entered by an opening of the earth: Numbers 16:30, 33; Proverbs 1:12. It is conceived of as very far away: Isaiah 57:9. The entrance to Sheol was thought to be in the distant west: Enoch 22:1-4. It is below or beyond the waters: Jonah 2:2, 3. It is

¹Serdmans, loc. cit.

guarded by bars: Job 17:16; and has gates: Isaiah 38:10; and gate-keepers: Job 38:17. It is divided into various chambers: Proverbs 7:27; finally defined as seven in number: 2 Esdras 7:8 Off. The ultimate place of misery was the lowest Sheol (hell): Deuteronomy 32:22.1

Furthermore, Peters describes the Hebrew view by saying:

Sheol is itself the grave: Isaiah 14:11; and dust: Isaiah 29:4; Job 7:21. On the other hand, in Sheol are the graves of the nations: Ezekiel 32:17-32. In Sheol all of every sort are together: Job 3:13-19; Isaiah 14:9; again the dead are divided according to race or religion: Ezekiel 31:15ff.; 32:21ff.; buried or unburied, whole or mutilated: Isaiah 14:19; Ezekiel 32:23; Psalms 63:9. Sheol tends to be more particularly the abode of the punishment of the wicked, or they are consigned to the lowest part of Sheol: Isaiah 33:18; Psalms 9:18; 28:17; 31:18; 49:15. On the other hand, under the prophetic teaching of the utter nothingness of Sheol (Isaiah 38:11, 17ff.; Job 14:21), it may even become a welcome place of rest for the oppressed and enslaved: Job 3:13-19; or for the righteous a place of refuge from the evils to come: Isaiah 57:1. As the place to which souls go, and as the hollow womb within the earth, it also comes to be the place where souls are formed: Psalms 139:15; so also 2 Esdras 4:41, and Apocalypse of Baruch.2

Hence, in the earlier thought Sheol was considered to be outside the authority of Yahweh. He was the God of the land of Israel, but other lands had their own gods. Sheol had no god of its own; it was in a sense godless, aside from considering the divinity of the spirits dwelling there. Thus, Sheol was considered to be beyond God's concern, and even when He is said to have created the world, Sheol is excluded. Wisdom 1:13 states, "God made not death." Therefore His rewards and punishments were reckoned to be given on this earth, not in the world beyond.3

Accordingly, Peters further states that from the outset the Hebrew religious leaders, and the official religion, taught monolatry. Yahweh

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1 Peters, loc. cit., footnote.
3 Ibid., pp. 451, 452.
was the god of Israel, and beside Him Israel could serve no god. Mosaism was modified in Canaan, taking over the Baals of the land, their shrines and cults, identifying them with Yahaweh, hallowing them by myths of His appearances and manifestations, and adapting them to its own religion and worship. Similar modifications took place with regard to the shrines of the dead ancestors, their cult, and the invocation of the divine powers of the beings of the underworld. The shrines of the great dead became shrines sacred to Yahaweh. Their marks and monuments were appropriated to Him, together with certain of their functions (cf. Genesis 12:6f.; Joshua 24:26f.). Some of the ritual connected with the worship of the dead was incorporated in His ritual; other parts, which were incompatible with that ritual, were prohibited, together with sacrifice to, or invocation of the dead.  

Sheol was made as it were a foreign land, excluded from the religion of Yahaweh like other foreign lands. The process was a long one, and the procedure was not altogether consistent. Moreover, in the popular religion the old practices and ideas persisted, prohibitions and denunciations notwithstanding, continually affecting the thought of the leaders and the official cult of Yahaweh, and receiving from time to time in some new guise recognition or sanction. 

Eventually the teaching of the prophets, with its emphasis on the moral attributes of Yahaweh and its increasing approximation to real monotheism, made itself felt in the conception of the state and condition of the dead. To the prophets all the gods of the heathen became "not-gods," mere vanities, and what was true of them was true of the shades of the dead. They lost both their power and their terror. 

Thus, according to John Peters, in the conception of the prophets, there was an intense reality in Yahaweh, as a living, present, acting God. 

1 Ibid. 2 Ibid., p. 452. 3 Ibid., pp. 452-453.
However, with the destruction of the Hebrew state, Israel

...
Israelite here, and the evil to the evil. According to Ezekiel 9:3-6; 16:5-32, they shall be punished or rewarded here; he mentions little of future reward or punishment.¹

Moreover, the prophet's message to a captive people was that their nation should rise again, its dry bones clothed with flesh. But this can only come through the repentance and reform of individual Israelites. Their sins prevent the consummation, but their righteousness shall establish the new kingdom of God on earth. Yet, in spite of all his individualism, the joy of the expectation of the fulfillment of the national hope was apparently sufficient recompense for Ezekiel's soul here and hereafter. But this national hope of resurrection and future life, because of this combination, was destined to be later developed, conceiving of individual resurrection and future life.²

As monolatry developed into monotheism, this process also exerted its influence. Beginning with Amos the prophets were denying the old view of the exclusive relation of Yahaweh to Israel and the land of Israel. The exilic and post-exilic prophets present the complete montheistic view of Yahaweh as the one God of all the earth, maker of all things, beside whom there are no gods, not even spirits of evil, for He is the creator of evil as well as good (cf. Isaiah 45:7; 44:25). This absoluteness of God, which makes Him lord of heaven and earth and beneath the earth, of visible and invisible, of good and evil, is also enlarged upon in the Book of Job. To such thinkers, Sheol is no longer possible in the older sense, nor that miserable continuation of existence remote from the influence of

¹Ibid., pp. 453, 454. ²Ibid., pp. 454, 455.
God; for all things are now in His presence. He can reach the fugitives in Sheol: Amos 9:2; the demons of Sheol obey Him: Hosea 13:14; His wrath reaches the lowest recesses of Sheol: Deuteronomy 32:22; Sheol is naked before Him: Job 26:5f.  \[^1\]

Thus, Leo Baeck indicates that with such thinking the reward of piety of which the Scriptures speak becomes transferred to a world beyond. The "length of days" it promises now appears as eternal life. To the hopeful mind eternal life was a spiritual kingdom, a life of the soul in a purity which seems to be denied man in this world. The reward thus becomes spiritualized. The spirit comes from God and returns to Him again. "And the dust returneth to the earth as it was, and the spirit returneth unto God who gave it" (Ecclesiastes 12:7). It unites man with God; God is spirit, and spirit is in man. God is "the God of the spirits of all flesh" (Numbers 16:22).  \[^2\]

It is to be noted that eventually there came to be a division in Hebrew thought concerning immortality. A conservative, priestly party continued to cling to the older preapocalyptic, and in some regards prophetic, view of the solidarity of the family and nation, of retribution and reward for the individual only in this life, and of immortality as existing only in the family and the nation. Sheol to them is an "eternal house" (Ecclesiastes 12:5), in which "the dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward" (9:5). "There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in Sheol" (9:10). This view is also tempered with the agnosticism in Ecclesiastes 3:21, "Who knows the spirit of the sons

\[^1\]Ibid.

of men, whether it descends downward to the earth?" What might be called
the apocalyptic, individualistic view was largely developed by the prophets
and taken up by the common people.\(^1\)

This division of view, according to Peters, ultimately coincides
with the sectarian division of the Sadducees and Pharisees, which dis-
tinctly began to show itself about 200 B.C. As the Sadducean view found
its expression in the Wisdom literature and the later parts of the Psalter,
the apocalyptic, Pharisaic view is reflected in the Apocalypses and the
first portion of the Psalms. A considerable number of psalms in the first
portion treat of, or refer to death and the after state, and in three of
these (16, 17, 36) commentators have found indications of a hope of per-
sonal immortality. In the Korahite Psalter a similar hope has been rec-
ognized in Psalm 49; in the prayers of David, in Psalms 61 and 63; and in
the Psalter of Asaph in Psalm 72. Later than this there does not seem to
be a glimmer of such hope.\(^2\)

From the material that has been presented, apparently in one phase
of Hebrew conception of life and death, there was the prevailing idea of
a continued spiritual existence after death. Variations of thought have
been noted along with the development of different influential ideas, but
evidently the early Hebrew notion concerning man was that death did not
mean total annihilation. The most common or basic teaching of the Old
Testament seems to refer to the form of existence in Sheol, perhaps
associated at first with the grave, where good and evil alike shared a
similar dreary fate. In a later section, the writer will further discuss

\(^1\) Peters, op. cit., pp. 462, 463.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 463, footnote.
the apocalyptic development of Hebrew thought, when the concept of resurrection is considered.

However, this discussion of the spiritistic concept as an alternate idea of life after death has considered the development of the notions of prehistoric and modern primitive man, especially in relation to early Greek and Hebrew ideas. Although particulars vary within the structure of the different concepts of spirit belief, the idea of a deathless counterpart to man's mortal body is seen to be basic to the general concept of an existence after death. Therefore as a static, undeveloped idea, it is an alternative to the Christian belief in personal immortality.

II. ABSORPTION INTO DIVINE BEING

This alternate idea of immortality is by and large a conception of the East, especially India, and it is dependent, in part at least, upon the doctrines of the transmigration of souls and reincarnation. Accordingly, belief in immortality became centered upon the aim of the human self being merged with or absorbed in a world soul, Brahma-Atman. Such an immortality is accomplished by realizing that the individual self life is illusory, and a gradual identifying of the false self with the "real" Self through various transmigrations and reincarnations.

In the Katha Upanishad, one reads:

Of the two selves—the illusory or individual self, of which all are aware, and the real Self which few know—it is as unchangeable being that the real Self is first recognized... That which is awake in use while we are asleep... That indeed is pure. That is Brahma, and That verily is called immortal! The wise man who sees Him revealed in his own soul, to him belongs eternal happiness; to none else, to none else.1

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1E. Wynne-Tyson, This Is Life Eternal (London: Rider and Co., 1951), p. 32.
Because this idea of immortality has had very little influence upon the Christian belief in personal immortality, it is only mentioned as an alternate idea to the finality of death and to the Christian doctrine. However, some reference has previously been made to glimmerings of the idea of absorption in discussing Greek beliefs in spirit immortality, especially Orphic eschatology. Along with a doctrine of transmigration and reincarnation of souls, Falto also affirmed that the proper destiny of the soul is to regain its birthright of reunion with the eternal to which it is akin, and from which somehow it had become separated. This destiny it (the soul) may fulfill by repeatedly renouncing the world of sense and taking refuge in the intelligible and the timeless, until at length it has sufficiently purified itself from the dross of this world. Thus, when the moment of release occurs, it escapes from the revolving wheel of reincarnation, completely passes out of time, ceases to be everlasting, and becomes one with the eternal.¹

Undoubtedly the concept of absorption into divine being as envisioned by Indian thought, at one time made a small inroad into the molding of Greek notions of immortality. It is also true that Christians have the conception of receiving eternal life because of the mystic oneness they have with God through Christ, but this is not absorption, for personal identity is retained. Whereas, in this particular alternate idea, self identity is lost.

III. PRESERVATION OF PERSONALITY AND SOUL

This idea of the continued existence of personality and soul after death is undoubtedly a more refined idea of the earlier notion of the

¹Fuller, op. cit., p. 152.
spiritual or ghostlike survival of man. It is generally conceived to be a Greek philosophical view concerning the avowed immortality of man. In general, this concept is recognized as containing similarities to some Scriptural assertions of personal immortality, the duality of the individual, and the sinful aspect of the flesh. Yet, the belief in immortality by the separation of the soul from the body is a distinct alternative to the extensive Biblical doctrine of immortality by the resurrection of the body, the preservation and restoration of the total person. The idea of the preservation of personality and soul does avoid the difficulties that may be involved in feasibly explaining bodily resurrection. Thus it is of great importance as an alternate idea.

Historically, this view makes a sharp distinction between the body and the soul; regarding the body as evil, earthy, corruptible, and the soul as pure, holy, and immortal. Human existence is thought of as an unfortunate and miserable episode in the life of the soul, whose true home is elsewhere. The escape of the soul from the body, and from defilement of matter in general, is to be accomplished by a rigorous suppression of the physical appetites and passions. It is commonly held that this "religious" anthropology originated in the Western world in the last three centuries before Christ, during the Hellenistic period, and that it was later imposed in strength on Western culture as it influenced Christianity.¹

The roots of this conception are seen to extend into the Orphic mysteries as early as the 6th century B.C., and because of numerous references by 5th century writers like Herodotus, Empedocles, and Ion

of Chios, they were evidently prevalent then. There is no philosophical or psychological analysis of human nature in this period, but there are myths and ritual practices which clearly imply a certain view of man's origin and destiny. The Orphic myth of man's origin tells how the Titans, who were the offspring of Heaven and Earth, slew Dionysus, the son of Zeus, and ate his flesh. Zeus immediately consumed them with a thunderbolt, and out of their remains arose the race of men. Thus man was born of the most wicked sons of Earth. The original, Titanic sin haunts him all his days. This sin is associated with his earthy, physical body which is by nature corrupt and evil. However, at the same time, man also possesses a divine and heavenly part. The Titans were sons of Heaven as well as of Earth, and the fragments of the divine Dionysus, which the Titans devoured, also went into the making of man. Thus, man is a dual creature, and strenuous efforts ought to be directed at purging away the earthy, titanic element so that the divine and heavenly portion may return to its godly home.  

In the development of such myths, a rational application follows the mythical suggestion, forming definite views. Man consists of two independent substances, a soul and a body. The soul comes from, and by nature belongs to, a higher, heavenly realm. Therefore, it is never at home in this physical world, but it passes through as an unwilling alien. Physical existence is a punishment and a misfortune; the bodily appetites and pleasures are evil and must be suppressed. According to Plato, the "Orphics" made their anthropology more explicit by asserting that the body is the prison of the soul; holding that the soul undergoes punishment with

\[\text{Ibid., p. 35; see also Farnell, op. cit., pp. 373-401.}\]
the body-husk around it as a prison.¹ Such are the earlier origins out of which later developed a philosophic concept of personal immortality.

The Pythagorean school of religion and philosophy came to adopt and assimilate a number of the "Orphic" ideas. As a religious order, the Pythagoreans adopted body-soul dualism, the heavenly origin and destiny of the soul, and those ascetic and purificatory practices which would quell physical appetites. Philosophically, the Pythagoreans rationalized the "Orphic" myths. They taught that there were three ways in which the soul could be purified of its bodily association—the ascetic, the aesthetic, and the intellectual. The intellectual way, in which the soul is subjected to rational form, was recognized as the highest and best. Thus the soul began to be associated with pure reason; its true end lay in escape from the body and in return to the higher, heavenly realm which was similarly defined in terms of pure, mathematical rationality.²

However, it is in Plato, perhaps the greatest of all Greek philosophers, that one notes the "Orphic" influence brought to rational fruition. His life is dated from 427 B.C. to 347 B.C.³ Even though the philosophy of Plato has previously been shown as being a contribution to the Greek concept of future life by a continued spirit existence, his thought concerning immortality bears extensive implications and assertions that outline the base for the idea of the preservation of personality and souls. His proofs of the immortality of the soul are mainly concerned to show its kinship with ultimate reality, the realm of the pure, eternal rationality. Thus the soul has always existed and always will exist. Plato affirmed

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¹Ibid., p. 36. ²Ibid., p. 37. ³Fuller, op. cit., pp. 123, 127.
that divine mind is the rational order of the universe, and because he reckons the soul of man to be co-existent with the Absolute, it is both pre-existent and immortal. He considers that pre-existence of souls is convincingly proved by what he affirms to be the fact that all learning is recollection; his doctrine of reminiscence. Plato thinks nothing could be learned if the ideas offered were not recognized by the soul (or individual mind) as something known before. Such pre-existence indicates that soul exists without the body. Therefore, Plato did not believe that disease and death of the body could injure the principle of life and destroy the soul, which was of divine origin and of incorruptible and immutable essence—an emanation of God.¹

This theory of the nature of the soul involves a radical dualism; the soul belonging to the higher, divine and rational realm, and the body to the lower and mortal sphere. It is evident that Plato carried on an aspect of body-soul dualism of Orphism and the Pythagoreans before him. In various passages this body-soul dualism is clearly stated. He maintains that it is the aim of the soul to escape from the body and from this world. The body and the world are not only hindrances and limitations but also the source of all evil and corruption. Therefore, the body and its desires must be suppressed as enemies of the soul. In the Phaedo Plato expresses such thoughts:

The true philosopher will despise (the pleasures of the body)... he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body. He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body... to dissever the soul from the communion of the body... Thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself... when she takes leave of the body and

¹ Wynne-Tyson, op. cit., p. 94.
has as little as possible to do with it. . . . And in this the philosopher dishonors the body. . . . While we are in the body and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire for truth will not be satisfied. For the body is the source of endless troubles. . . . diseases. . . . lusts. . . . fears, fancies. . . . fightings, factions. . . . It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body. . . . and then we shall attain the wisdom we desire. . . . not while we live but after death. . . . In this present life I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse with the body. . . . We keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body, we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure. 1

A little later in the same dialogue, Plato has Socrates say:

I go on my way rejoicing, and not only I but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified. . . . And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, the release of the soul from the chains of the body. . . . The true philosophers are always preoccupied in the practice of dying. . . . If they have been in every way enemies of the body, wanting to be alone with the soul (they will welcome death). . . . (true philosophers) despise the body. 2

On the other hand, Plato does not recommend the total neglect of the physical, but he does advocate the cultivation of the soul during bodily life as preparation for a worthwhile after-life. The asserted fact of the immortality of the soul is not license for careless living, but rather Plato's comments indicate that proper earthly experiences can be a contribution to the continuation of a fuller and more intelligent life hereafter. Likewise, a wasted physical life becomes a detriment. For he writes:

We ought to bear in mind that if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect for this time, which we call life, but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible. For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be

1 As quoted by Owen, op. cit., p. 39.
2 As quoted by Owen, ibid.
freed from their body and from their wickedness together with their souls. But now since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and as wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither.¹

After death the soul preserves its personality for a time and is punished or rewarded for its good or evil deeds on earth. This retention of personality lasts for only a thousand years. At the end of each thousand-year period there occurs what might be called a real death, involving a complete extinction of personality, at least so far as continuity of memory is concerned. Each soul is then given a free choice of the life they are to live in their new reincarnation. The souls of animals are also free to choose, and some animals select human, and some human select animal lives. Having chosen, the soul passes through the waters of the Lethe, forgets its past, and enters into its new reincarnation. Though all past existences have been obliterated, the soul's disposition for good and evil, and its moral fortunes for better or for worse in its new life, are a heritage from the soul's behavior in former lives. This is the only link that connects the individual with a pre-natal past and a post-mortem future.²

Plato illustrates this spiritual evolution by the story of Er, son of Armenius, who fell in battle and was taken up for dead, but after twelve days, revived on his funeral pyre and told the story of his experiences in the intervening period. In the after-life, he affirmed, souls were judged and punished for their sins, while the three Fates, Lachesis, Clotho, and

¹As quoted by Wynne-Tyson, op. cit., p. 77.
²Fuller, op. cit., pp. 151-152.
Atropos, daughters of Necessity, wove for them pattern-lives, which the souls may choose before returning to earth.\footnote{Wynne-Tyson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.}

However, the proper destiny of the soul is to regain its birthright of reunion with the eternal to which it is akin, and from which somehow it became separated. This destiny may be fulfilled by repeatedly renouncing the world of sense and taking refuge in the intelligible and the timeless, until the soul has purified itself from the dross of earth. Then, when the moment of release arrives, the soul escapes from the revolving wheel of reincarnation, and passes out of time altogether, ceasing to be everlasting, becoming one with the eternal. For Plato then, immortality is mystical, timeless, and super-personal in its climax.\footnote{Fuller, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 152.}

Thus, using Plato's theory as the foundational representative of this alternate idea of immortality, the characteristic points that affirm the preservation of the personality and soul after death are seen.

According to Plato, the soul is thought to be immortal by virtue of its pre-existence. Others, under certain aspects of Christian influence, might say the soul is immortal because it was so created by God. Consequently, it is assumed that the soul can exist apart from the body.

This obviously implies that a body-soul dualism is a necessary acceptance in necessity and in life. Moreover, sense is limited to corporeal things, seeing that in its sense and life it is despised and cultivated. Some type of dualism was included into the versions and emphases that developed from Plato's theory in accordance with the contact and influence of other philosophies, as well as the doctrine of the early Christian Church.
It is necessary to briefly examine some of the various thoughts growing out of this basic theory of Plato in order to get a broader view of this alternate idea of immortality which involves the preservation of the personality and soul. The Neo-platonists, beginning around the first half of the 3rd century A.D. continued Plato's lead, maintaining a similar dualism and system of reincarnation. For instance, Plotinus held that the soul was an incorporeal essence, the source and the substance of life and motion, and that souls were everlasting in character, existing before birth as well as after death.  

1 In conjunction with an extreme Neoplatonic body-soul dualism, one also finds Renaissance thinkers positing the idea that the soul, especially in its intellectual capacities, is completely separate and distinct from the body. This dualism anticipates the notion that the soul is free in its choices and decisions, while the body is under the compulsion of instincts and appetites.  

2 Thus Marsilio Ficino, a typical 16th century Renaissance philosopher wrote:

"Intecl. ... guides its own motion according to free choice. Sense, however, when reason does not exist, is always driven by the instinct of nature. ... The beginning of choice does not depend on the body. ... It is seen from this that reason is never subjected to bodily things in its motion, because in its speculations it transcends bodily things. ... Therefore, we say that intellect is much less subjected to any corporeal substance, in essence and in life. ... Moreover, sense is limited to corporeal objects; the intellect, in its inmost action, frees itself from all corporeal things, seeing that in its essence and life it has not been submerged."  

3 Later on, in answer to the attack of materialism against body-soul dualism, René Descartes, a 17th century French philosopher,
attempted to both embrace what the new science had discovered about the
mind is eternal, in so far as it involves the body's essence under
nature of matter and also to satisfy the "religious" insistence that man
defined by time or interpreted by duration... Our mind can only
possessed an immortal soul. Descartes said that the human mind was argued
to be entirely different and independent from the body. Thus the mind
could not be derived from and developed out of matter, but it had to be
created by God. Because the soul could by no means be deduced from the
power of matter, the fact of its creation indicated that the soul can
survive the body and is immortal. Cartesian dualism consequently gave
birth to the problem of body-mind interaction.

However, in the same century, Spinoza established his theory of
absolute monism in an effort to solve the problem. In his view there is
only one reality—the Absolute—which may either be called God or nature.
Hence, there is only one set of events, events that take place in the life
of the Absolute. However, the Absolute has as two of its attributes,
thought (mind) and extension (body). Events in the life of the Absolute
are apprehended by either attribute, but since there is only one set of
events in reality, the order and connection of events apprehended under one
attribute will be the same as that apprehended by the other.\(^1\) Still,
speaking of existence as modes of consciousness, and man's consciousness
as having its source in Divine mind, man is, as mind or consciousness
eternal. This is how he thinks of it:

It is impossible for us to remember that we had existence prior
to the body, since the body can have no vestige of it, and eternity
cannot be defined in terms of time or have any relation of time.
But nevertheless we have in our experience a perception that we are
eternal. For the mind is sensible no less of what it understands
than of what it remembers... Although, therefore, we do not

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 89.
remember that we existed before the body, yet we perceive that our mind is eternal, in so far as it involves the body’s essence under the category of eternity, and that this its existence cannot be defined by time or interpreted by duration. . . . Our mind can only be said to endure.1

Again, in Kant one finds perhaps an even clearer distinction made between the body and soul. He begins his argument for the immortality of the soul by defining the *Summum Bonum,* or highest good, as consisting of the union of virtue and happiness in the same person. Kant argues that the will to strive for this highest good is proof in itself of the immortality of the soul, for such attainment is not possible during a life-span. Therefore, if the will and the object of the will are not delusions, opportunity for the soul’s attainment must be given, and, in such case, the soul would live on after the death of the body.2

In *The Dreams of a Ghost-Seer,* he specifically writes:

Our body only is perishable, the essence of us is not perishable, and must have been existent during that time when our body had no existence. The life of man is dual. It consists of two lives—one animal and one spiritual. The first life is the life of man and man needs a body to live this life. The second life is the life of spirit; his soul lives in that life separately from the body, and must live on in it after the separation from the body.3

These are the tenets that reflect the basic grounds of this alternate idea of immortality, the immortality of the soul and its separation from the body. The immortality of the soul in this concept is dependent upon its pre-existence, its oneness with the divine, or its creation by God. Herein, the great influence of Platonic thought is evidenced in the later philosophic formulations. However, because the idea of immortality is of religious nature, and because of the proximity of Plato’s thought to the formulators

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1 Wynne-Tyson, op. cit., p. 103.  
2 Ibid., p. 105.  
3 Ibid.
of Christian dogma, there is the possible impact of the philosophic idea upon the early Christian idea of immortality.

Christianity may be considered as an outgrowth of Judaism, the national religion of the Jews, for its beginnings were among the Jews. There is a great contrast between the Jewish concept of man and the philosophy of body-soul dualism fostered by the Greeks. For the Jew man was a unit, and he could not be so sharply divided into body and soul, or flesh and spirit, as according to Hellenic and Hellenistic thought. Rather the self of man was identified with both aspects and centered in his will rather than in his soul or spirit. Furthermore, Amos Wilder feels that although the Bible does speak of man's "soul" or "spirit," the meaning of his life proper as a creature included the "body" as an essential aspect. He maintains that in such an outlook there is the understanding of man as a willing, acting being, and therefore personal in the sense that his life involves not only his "spirit" but his visible temporal expression, and not only his individual consciousness but his social interrelation. This realistic view of personal life carries with it that life beyond the grave assumes, in some sense, the resurrection of the body. Such a "psychosomatic" view of the person was carried over into Christianity, according to Wilder.¹

However, there are others who believe that the New Testament, in some notable passages, bears a Greek conception of the duality of man rather than the Hebrew view of the unity of man. It is true that during the inter-Testamental period, such Greek ideas flourished more vigorously in certain Jewish circles, especially in the Hellenistic Judaism of

Alexandria. Such was the background of Philo's notable attempt to synthesize Greek and Hebrew ideas. This kind of influence was undoubtedly present at the time when the New Testament books were written. Not only were these books written in the Greek language, but their authors were also exposed to the Greek way of thinking. Still, in spite of the influx of Greek influence, it would seem that for the most part the New Testament maintains the Hebrew concept of man.¹

For instance in the Synoptic Gospels and the sayings ascribed there shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall eat. Is not to the Lord Himself, there is the tendency to assume that the Greek words therefore, have no thought, saying, that shall be cast off, that in which these sayings are expressed must be interpreted in a Greek way. your Heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Jesus spoke Aramaic, and the meaning of His message must be sought in the Hebrew background out of which, humanly speaking, He came. In Hebrew

It is of note that the importance of the body and of physical needs thought the word translated "soul" regularly stands for the personal is general is by no means neglected here, and the body and its needs are far pronoun and means the self. Though its occurrence is rare in both Testa-ments, the phrase "body and soul" stands for the Jewish idea that man is a question of food and clothing, but it is of higher significance and an "animated body" and not for the Greek view that he is an "incarnated being. It is a question of putting first things first, and second place soul."²

Thus, it is in this way that one must understand the verse: "And Thus there are no deaths for their proper place they receive their greater satisfaction. These days not seem to be the slightest suggestion of any be not afraid of them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matthew 10:28). If this passage is interpreted in the light of its Hebrew background, the plain meaning seems to be: "Fear not man who can which can easily be interpreted as outright hostility to the world and the only bring your present existence to an end but cannot annihilate the flesh, according to the Jewish anthropogony. Perhaps the following are essential self; but fear God who is able to destroy the whole man

²Ibid., pp. 161-162.
eternally."

There is no reason of supposing that Jesus thought in terms of the Greek presupposition of the duality of body and soul.¹

There are just a few other passages in the Gospels that might be taken to imply a Greek-like depreciation of the bodily and earthy, or an exaltation of the "spiritual" and heavenly, along with a body-soul dualism that such a contrast implies. A portion of Jesus' Sermon on the Mount may be used as a typical example:

Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body more than raiment? ... Therefore, take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink; or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? ... for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.²

It is of note that the importance of the body and of physical needs in general is by no means denied here, and the body and its needs are far from being depreciated. Rather it is pointed out that life is more than a question of food and clothing, that it is of higher significance and destiny. It is a question of putting first things first, and second place things are not denied; in their proper place they receive their proper satisfaction. There does not seem to be the slightest suggestion of any rigid suppression of the physical demands as would be implied by the Greek view.³

Again, in the Johannine literature there are also some passages which may easily be interpreted as definite hostility to the world and the flesh, according to the Greek anthropology. Perhaps the following are

typical: (1) "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:6). (2) "It is the spirit that giveth life; the flesh profiteth nothing" (John 6:63). (3) "He that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal" (John 12:25). (4)

Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever."¹

These passages sound very much like the Greek denigration of this world that condemns it as ephemeral and evil in contrast to the purity and eternity of the "spiritual" realm. However, it may be of note that the Bible generally manifests an ambivalent attitude toward the world and the flesh. On the one hand, as they were created by God, they are evaluated as inherently good, and God has loved the world with an everlasting and unfailing love. This thought is thus recorded in John's Gospel, "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son," and also that "God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world through Him might be saved." (John 3:16, 17). On the other hand, the Bible regards this world as having fallen away from its Creator. It is considered a "fallen" world because of its rebellion against God. Thus is it opposed by God; and thus it should be resisted by man. The fact that it is "fallen" does not imply that God will utterly destroy the world. The New Testament teaching seems to be that God has taken decisive steps to re-create and save it.²

¹I John 2:15-17. ²Ibid., pp. 184-185.
Similarly, the flesh as made by God is good—toward the extent that it was used when the Word of God was made flesh. However, the flesh too is "fallen," and for that reason the Word was made flesh in order to redeem the flesh. Hence, followers of Christ are called, not to leave the flesh and the world and depart to some other realm, but rather to remain in the flesh and in the world. Thus Jesus prayed in His high priestly prayer: "I pray not that thou shouldst take them from the world" (John 17:15), but, "As thou hast sent me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world" (John 17:18, KJV). On the other hand He continues, "They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world" (John 17:16). Because of this ambivalent status of the world, as both created by God and "fallen," Jesus's followers find themselves in such a relation to the world: they are in, but not of, the world.  

Yet, in progressing to a consideration of the Pauline Epistles, there are frequent contrasts of flesh and spirit according to their English translation. In such occasions the tendency again is to interpret such references in a dualistic manner that typifies the Hellenistic concept. Therefore, however, we are precisely not to the flesh, but to the Spirit. It is therefore believed that Paul had some familiarity with Greek thought, 'through the Spirit to mortify the deeds of the body' and some feel there are traces of Greek ideas in his writings. However, Bultmann says:

1Ibid., p. 188.  
2Ibid.  
3As quoted by Wilder, op. cit., p. 35. 

Likewise, J. A. T. Robinson asserts that Paul's view of man is...
derived from Hebrew rather than Greek sources, and that Paul follows the Hebrew tradition as formulated in the dictum: "Man does not have a body; he is a body." This view of man is that he is "flesh-animated-by-soul," the whole conceived as a psychophysical unity. According to Owen, Paul's usage of the Greek word "soma" (body) is very nearly what is meant by personality; it stands for the whole man. If these were Paul's presuppositions, he could not have possibly adopted any form of body-soul dualism. The Greek doctrine of the immortality of a disembodied soul would be inconceivable to him. Also, it would equally be out of the question to identify the "body" and its appetites as the source of evil.¹

However, there are two well-known references that typify the interpretations of Paul's contrast between the "flesh and the Spirit." For instance:

For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the Spirit, the things of the Spirit. For to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace. Because the carnal mind is enmity against God. . . . So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit. . . . And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. . . . Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body ye shall live.²

This I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other. . . . And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts. If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.³

These two references in particular are generally cited to support the charge that Christianity, especially in the Pauline version, adopted

¹Owen, op. cit., p. 189. ²Romans 8:5ff., KJV. ³Galatians 5:16ff., KJV.
the Greek anthropology, and became responsible for spreading the doctrines of dualism, antiphysical asceticism, and "spiritual" other-worldliness in Western civilization. However, Owen points out that such an interpretation is mistaken, for he says that Paul, in these and other similar passages, never uses the Greek words for "body" and "soul" ("soma" and "psyche"). He states that Paul always employs a different pair of terms, "sarx" and "pneuma," which are translated as "flesh" and "spirit." It would seem that if Paul had intended to adopt the typical Greek body-soul dualism, he would have used the standard Greek terms, "soma" and "psyche," in his doctrine.\(^1\)

It is necessary to examine the definitions of these terms more closely, according to the meanings given in the Greek-English Lexicon:

1. "psyche"—breath, as the sign of life, spirit, the soul or immortal part of man, as opposed to his body as perishable part; the abstract notion of the soul or spirit of man, the seat of the will, desires, and passions, the heart; as the organ of thought and judgment, the soul, mind, reasoning; understanding.
2. "soma"—a body, the living body of an animal, or of a man, especially as the medium of human life.
3. "pneuma"—the wind, air, the breath of life, the human spirit, a living being.
4. "sarx"—the whole flesh, the human body, man, the substance of flesh.\(^2\)

Owen further declares:

What really clinches the argument against the dualistic and 'puritanical' interpretation of the Pauline contrast is the list of 'lusts' or 'works of the flesh' that he gives in... (Gal., ch. 5). There are seventeen 'works of the flesh' listed there, and

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\(^1\) Owen, op. cit., p. 190.

only six of them have any connection with the 'body,' as usually understood: 'adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, drunkenness, revellings, and such like.' And, of course, it is obvious that what is referred to here is the abuse of physical appetites and not the appetites themselves. But what is far more telling is that the remaining eleven 'lusts' have nothing whatever to do with physical impulses and desires. The other 'works of the flesh' are 'idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders.' In another place Paul writes, 'ye are yet carnal; for . . .there is among you envying, and strife, and divisions' (I Cor. 3:3). This is what it means to be 'carnal' and 'fleshly-minded'; this is what it means to be 'worldly,' and to 'live after the flesh.' These are 'the affections and lusts' of the flesh.\(^1\)

This seems to be conclusive proof that in Paul the phrase "the flesh" does not represent one part of man, such as his "body," nor does the phrase "the Spirit" stand for another part, such as his "soul," the former being thought of as evil by nature and the latter good. However, at the same time, Paul certainly seems to be making a very sharp antithetical distinction between "the flesh" and "the Spirit." According to the previous observations, "the flesh" and "the Spirit" stand for two different kinds of man, rather than two separate and opposing parts of human nature.\(^2\)

However, there are several passages in the writings of Paul that suggest the possibility of escaping from the body in a mystical fashion, that is in II Corinthians 12:2,3, and in II Corinthians 5:8. Paul speaks of a desire to be absent from the body. "We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Again, he writes, "We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that he would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might

\(^1\)Owen, loc. cit.; cf. KJV.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 190-191; see also pp. 191-197.
be swallowed up of life" (II Corinthians 5:4, KJV). It would seem here that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is being contrasted with the "religious" idea of the immortality of the "naked" soul, according to Owen.¹ The writer would consider another alternative interpretation as given by John Wesley:

... And we are here burdened with numberless afflictions, infirmities, temptations. 'Not that we would be unclothed'—Not that we desire to remain without a body. Faith does not understand that philosophical contempt of what the wise Creator has given. 'But clothed upon'—With the glorious, immortal, incorruptible, spiritual body. 'That what is mortal.'—This present mortal body. 'May be swallowed up of life'—Covered with that which lives for ever."²

In any case, it appears obvious, that even though the writers of the New Testament may have been exposed to the Greek concepts of body-soul dualism, antiphysical asceticism, and otherworldliness, the message of the New Testament easily lends itself to a Jewish interpretation. There seems to be an evident contrast between Greek philosophy, its "religious" view of man, and the Biblical concept of man in relation to his Creator, as the spirit of the Bible is manifested as a whole. Hence, it would appear, for the most part, that Greek thought made its inroads into Christian thought later, as dualism influenced a concept of immortality through the separation of the soul from the body. Herein, this alternate idea, propagated by Hellenistic influence, also was adopted by some Christian theologians.

The early Christian philosophers and theologians, commonly known as the Church Fathers, wrote in a period from the 2nd to the 5th centuries A.D. While they were trying to explain, defend, and propagate

¹Ibid., p. 197.
the Christian faith to a largely Greek-thinking world, they came to use current forms of expression, using Greek words and ideas. Perhaps it was inevitable that they should absorb almost unconsciously some of the elements of the Greek view of life. There are, therefore, some evident traces of the Hellenistic "religious" anthropology to be found among the writings of certain Church Fathers, and they became entrenched in Christian theology. However, it is noted that as long as the Fathers were faithful to the Bible, the body was not despised or vilified, nor was a conflict between body and soul set up.¹

Among the Fathers, there were those who were on the fringe of such orthodoxy, and there were "Christian Platonists" who eventually developed a certain suspicion of and hostility to the physical passions. This perhaps may partially be explained as a necessary reaction and opposition to the licentiousness and sensuality of the society in which they lived. Yet, some went beyond the proper demands of moderation and self-control, and slipped from the Biblical position and into the "religious" anthropology of the Greeks.²

Thus, for instance, Tatian, a second century writer who is rightly regarded as partly heretical, is said to have condemned marriage as 'defilement and fornication,' and to have pronounced 'all sexual intercourse as impure.' We find the same tendencies in Clement of Alexandria in his view that Christ's human nature must have been exempt from all carnal desires, even the most necessary and innocent, and in his suggestion that the sin of Adam and Eve may have been that they anticipated the time set for their marriage by God. An extreme case of antisexual puritanism is Origen's notorious act of self-castration. It is not surprising that in Origen's philosophy the physical appetites are very nearly condemned as in themselves evil.³

¹Owen, op. cit., pp. 50-51, 56.
²Ibid., p. 56.
³Ibid., p. 59.
Such an antiphysical view eventually implicated a body-soul dualism in conjunction with the doctrine of immortality of the soul in the Greek sense. As has been pointed out, this does not seem to be the general Biblical view, even though there are isolated passages that may suggest such an implication. The doctrine largely stressed in the New Testament is the resurrection of the body. The question arises as to why the Fathers leaned toward such an "un-Biblical" notion. Because of their expectation of the imminent end of all things, the New Testament writers never really faced the question as to what happens to the individual between the time of death and the time of general resurrection at the last day. They expected the end at any moment. However, as time went on and the end was increasingly deferred, the question became more pressing, and the answer was found readily available to the Fathers in the form of the prevalent Greek doctrine. Therefore, the soul was conceived of as an independent substance, immortal and surviving the death of the body.\(^1\)

The Greek view, however, was modified by the Fathers in two ways at this juncture. In the first place, the "religious" view of Hellenism held that the disembodied existence of the soul was its ultimate destiny. Of course, this could not be accepted by the Church Fathers because of the Biblical teaching of the resurrection of the body. Therefore, they endeavored to combine the "religious" and the Biblical doctrines by saying the disembodied soul awaits the recovery of its body in the final consummation of all things. The existence of the soul apart from the body was reckoned an intermediate state. In the second place, the Greek "religious" view of man taught that the soul was immortal by nature, and

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 60.

\(^{1b}ibid., p. 61.\)
therefore it not only always would exist, but it always had existed.

Once again, because of their faithfulness to the Biblical position, this doctrine of the pre-existence of souls was almost unanimously rejected by the Fathers. They maintained that souls, like everything else, are created by God, and thus they could not have existed eternally.¹

The next question that arose was whether souls, once they had been created, were then by nature immortal and imperishable. Here there was a difference of opinion. Justin Martyr argued that the soul was not necessarily immortal because, like all created things, it was liable to corruption. Most of the Fathers, however, believed that God created souls in such a way that they could not die. The favorite arguments that they employed to prove this contention were the three familiar Platonic 'proofs.' First, some activities of the soul, notably rational thought, are completely independent of the body; therefore, the soul is independent of the body and bodily death. Secondly, the soul is the very principle of life and, therefore, cannot know death, which is the opposite of life. And, thirdly, death is the dissolution of the elements of a composite substance; but the soul is a simple substance and, therefore, cannot be dissolved.²

Such a position clearly commits the Church Fathers to some form of body-soul dualism. This comes out distinctly in Augustine, who, in arguing for the immortality of the soul along the usual Platonic lines, does not hesitate to define man as "a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body," and definitely maintaining that the soul is a substance in its own right and with a nature of its own.³ Augustine's proof of the existence of the soul is akin to that later used by Descartes. To doubt the soul's existence is to assert it, since in doubting man must think, and if man thinks he must exist. Thus men are thinking beings, or souls, in other words. For Augustine the soul is an immaterial, spiritual entity.

This, as well as its immortality, is witnessed by the soul's power to grasp eternal and immaterial essences. However, the soul is not considered to be pre-existent as Plato and Origen believed. With regard

¹Ibid., p. 60. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 61.
to the soul's derivation, Augustine argues that it does not emanate from God, but that it is created by God along with the material universe. Each soul is unique, and each one mirrors the nature of God in its possession of three faculties: intellect, will, and memory. However, the content of consciousness all comes from sensible experience from the sensible world. Knowledge of the intelligible order from the world of Ideas is made manifest to man by the inner light vouchsafed him by God, and impressed upon him "a priori" quite independently of sensible experience.  

Although Augustine had once been a Manichaean, he severely criticized the philosophy he had formerly embraced on the grounds that it associated evil with matter. Both in the Confessions and in the City of God he emphatically states that sin is due to the misuse of free will, not to the body. In the latter work, he interpreted St. Paul's use of the phrase "the flesh" as meaning, not the body, but the whole man in his sinful condition. He declared that human vices do not proceed from the body alone, but from a misdirection and corruption of the whole personality: for the corruption of the body is not the cause but the punishment of sin.  

Yet, in spite of Augustine's Biblical understanding of the nature of sin, he seems to have a special horror of vices associated with the body, as well as the state, belongs to the essence of man's body, as part of the nature of the body, and this, along with the doctrines of creation and known excesses of the secular society with which he was familiar as well as the idea of the body as the abode of sin, certainly contributed to his harsh attitude toward bodily sins. It must not be supposed that Augustine believed that the soul is capable of being corrupted by the body, which would have been considered the case by the Manichaen sect. However, the doctrine of the mortification of the flesh, in the sense of the body, was undoubtedly an important one in the teaching of Augustine.

1 Fuller, op. cit., pp. 354-355.
3 Ibid., pp. 377-378.
as to the overindulgence of his own pre-Christian life. In any case, Augustine at times came close to Tatian's condemnation of sexual intercourse, even in marriage. Then, in the famous passage in which Augustine described his conversion, he pictured himself as struggling against his physical passions: "Why not now, even at this very hour, is there not an end put to my uncleanness? Thereupon I heard the voice of a boy or girl singing, 'Tolle lege, tolle lege,' (take up and read, take up and read)."¹

It is said he took up the Bible and it fell open to Romans 13:13: "Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying: but put ye on the Lord Jesus and make not provision for the flesh to fulfill lusts thereof." (KJV).²

Owen says that it is plain how Augustine is here interpreting "the flesh," and that it is significant that the preceding verse, so understood, should have been the immediate occasion of his conversion. In the midst of these and other tendencies of Augustine and other Church Fathers, the beginnings are seen of that exaggerated and fanatical asceticism that was to later characterize the so-called Christian solitaries and anchorites, and also the seeds of an anti-sexual bias that was at least a factor in the development of clerical celibacy.³

Nevertheless, in the orthodox eschatology of the Fathers a 'high' view of the body was once again asserted in the strongest possible terms. They all accepted the Biblical assurance of the resurrection of the body, and this, along with the doctines of creation and incarnation, made it quite impossible for them to succumb to the Gnostic, Neoplatonic, and Manichaean contempt for the earthy in general. The body, as well as the soul, belongs to the essence of man. And if the soul survives the body, as most of the Fathers believed, its existence in that state is incomplete; it must wait upon the recovery of its body at the last day before it can enjoy the fullness of personal being.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 60-61.
²Owen, op. cit., p. 58.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid.
In this regard, Justin Martyr asked:

For what is man but the reasonable animal composed of body and soul? Is the soul by itself man? No; but the soul of man. Would the body be called man? No; but it is called the body of man. If then neither of these is by itself man, but that which is made up of the two together is called man, and God has called man to life and resurrection, he has called not a part but the whole, which is the soul and body.1

As early as Justin Martyr the idea of the intermediate state eventually developed into the doctrine of purgatory. In Saint Augustine also, the idea of the intermediate state interpreted in unmistakable purgatorial terms is found. The interval between the death of the individual and the end of all things is said to be used by God to purge the soul that clings to it because of its earthly misdeeds. Augustine taught that during this intermediate time, between the laying down and receiving back of the body, souls will either be punished or rest in peace according to the deeds performed in their bodily existence.2

Thus the idea that the soul is a detachable part or substance, capable of existing independently of the body, was taken over from the "religious" anthropology and incorporated into Christian thought in the patristic period. According to Owen, this happened in spite of the fact that there is scarcely any Biblical basis for belief in the immortality of the soul in this sense, much less for its dualistic and puritanical implications. The idea may have been adopted chiefly because it provided a plausible answer to the question about the supposed interval of time between death and resurrection. In addition, the Fathers were undoubtedly impressed by the force of the arguments advanced by Greek philosophy to prove the immortality of the soul.3

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1 As quoted by Owen, ibid.  
2 Ibid., pp. 61, 62.  
3 Ibid., p. 62.
In tracing the extent of the influence of the Greek "religious" concept of the duality of man, especially the thought of Plato, the writer has considered first of all, his influence upon philosophical ideas of immortality. Secondly, the impact of Plato's theory upon the Biblical, Jewish position of the resurrection of the body has been considered. Thirdly, the adoption and modifying synthesis of Platonic ideas into Christian doctrine by certain of the Church Fathers has been shown. In so doing the writer has endeavored to call attention to the broad scope of this alternate idea of immortality, the preservation of personality and soul. The resulting dualistic concept of the immortality of the soul, as it was held by the Fathers, was a continuing contribution to the theology of later Church leaders as Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and even to modern times. It has been the purpose in this section to recognize the extensive fact of this particular alternative idea, even to the extent of affecting the Biblical doctrine of immortality by the resurrection of the body.

IV. RESURRECTION OF THE BODY AND TOTAL PERSON

Generally speaking, one primarily associated the idea of resurrection with Jewish and Christian cultures. Certainly the Judaistic and Christian religions were largely responsible for this alternate concept of immortality. However, perhaps it should be considered that there are various peoples. For instance there appears in Persian writings, in

\[1\textit{ibid.}, pp. 62-78.\]
connection with the close relation between man and nature, a description of the resurrection as follows:

At that time the bones will be demended back from the earth, the blood from water, the hair from plants, and life from fire, all these having been at the time of creation ordered to return to their respective sources after death.¹

In Egyptian mythology, the god Osiris was believed to be the lord of resurrection and the prototype of the dead who gain eternal life. This was the conception because he was held to be the king of the departed as well as the judge of their mortal past. Thus, it is only those accounted worthy that are resurrected and elevated to kings and judges.²

Again, in Hellenic tradition of the hero-gods there was the concept of ritual-death in conjunction with a resurrection of the undying power. In some instances this was associated with the god’s burning on a pyre, ritually by using an effigy, such as that of Hercules at Tyre. Also, there was the ceremony of the "awakening" of Hercules, suggesting a peaceful, temporary death or falling asleep. Such rituals were also enacted in Phoenicia and Cyprus, and in most instances, the worship included a periodical burning of the hero-god such as Hercules, Melqart, Sandan, or Dionysus, in effigy, followed by a resurrection or ascension.³

Similarly, in Armenian mythology there was a god named Zatik, being perhaps a vegetation god, like Adonis (Dionysos), whose resurrection began at the winter solstice and was complete in the spring. The spring festival of such a god furnishes a duplication in both the Jewish passover and the

² Ibid., XII, 97, 172. ³ Farnell, op. cit., pp. 167-168.
Christian Easter. It is known that the spring celebrations of the death and resurrection of Adonis were often intermingled by Christian Churches with the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 1

Again, there is a Sumerian myth concerning Tammuz, who summoned a king to worship the seven planets and the twelve signs of the Zodiac, and the king slew him, but he returned to life. The king repeatedly put Tammuz to death, but each time he returned to life until he was finally annihilated by grinding his bones in a mill. 2

Such mythical references indicate that the idea of resurrection was in no case restricted to Hebrew or Christian conceptions. Since Christianity is an outgrowth of Judaism, the Christian concept of the resurrection is functionally a projection of previous Jewish ideas concerning immortality. To a certain extent such early Hebrew concepts have been already considered, but their further development is also noteworthy.

Arising from the prophetic emphases relative to the concept of the national hope of resurrection and future life, there developed the idea of individual resurrection and future life. For instance, from Ezekiel's picture of the resurrection of a dead nation, there was apparently effected the apocalyptic idea that is reflected in Isaiah 24-27. The dead shall rise; the inhabitants of the dust shall awake and shout for joy, and "the earth shall bring the shades to life" (26:19). As John Peters points out, these are only the shades of the righteous, who are thus rewarded for their righteousness toward Yahweh by restoration to life on earth. The wicked remain prisoners in the pit, confined to punishment, and after many days, destroyed and their memory blotted out (24:22; 26:14). Thus, Peters says,

1MaoCulloch, op. cit., VII, 41. 2MaoCulloch, op. cit., V, 337.
the future life of the individual and the Messianic kingdom of Israel are combined. It is by the restoration to life of the righteous Israelites of past generations that the nation shall be enlarged and strengthened to rule the earth (26:15-19).  

However, the doctrine of future life in this apocalypse is still somewhat indefinite as regards the individual; he is yet at least subordinate to the fate of the nation. Thus, Peters indicates that it is with the latter apocalypses of Daniel, after the first triumphs of the Maccabees in the life-and-death struggle with the Syrians, that, following along the two lines originating with Ezekiel, of the retribution of a righteous God for the good and evil done by the individual, and the resurrection to life of the dead bones, that a certain picture of judgment and resurrection is combined. To those who lived so intensely in the struggle, it seemed unjust that they who had suffered and died heroically in the conflict, should not also participate in the triumph. Likewise, it seemed that those who had shamefully betrayed their nation and their faith should be punished by something more than sleep in Sheol. Thus, the God of justice and right was conceived as surely rewarding at least the distinguished righteous and punishing the infamous traitors. So, Daniel presents his revelation, (12:2): "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt."  

Again, in the book of Job there is noted the old and new view of sin and suffering in inevitable conflict. The author seemingly cannot escape the individual aspect of the question. It seems impossible for him  

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1Peters, op. cit., p. 458.  
2Ibid., p. 459.
to solve the problem from the view of this life only, and since all the
world, both the parts above and beneath the earth, evil as well as good,
are recognized as from God and in His sight, the question arises whether
a solution may not be found in the hereafter.¹ The following words
represent Job's climactic thought:

But as for me, I know that my Redeemer liveth, and at last he
will stand up upon the earth; and after my skin, even this body,
is destroyed, then without any flesh shall I see God; Whom I, even I,
shall see, on my side, and my eyes shall behold, and not as a
stranger.²

Also note the Revised Standard version of this particular passage:

For I know that my Redeemer lives, and at last he will stand
upon the earth; and after my skin has been thus destroyed, then
without my flesh I shall see God, whom I shall see on my side,
and my eyes shall behold, and not another. My heart faints
within me:

The meaning of the affirmation of Job in the preceding passage
is controversial, and there is a wide range of interpretation. Peters says
it is nothing but a suggestion of the restoration to life after death. To
him, it seems to carry out individually the idea which is expressed for
the nation in Ezekiel 37, and apparently for Job, it is merely a sugges-
tion not to be pressed, even though he suggested it; though he seems
reluctant not to make the suggestion, Job hardly dares to believe in its
real possibility, so alien is it from all other thinking of his fellow
countrymen.³

On the other hand, C. F. Burney says relative to Job's expression:

The idea of a future life using the expression in the sense
of an existence after death not wholly removed from the presence
of God--has been hinted at, as we have seen, earlier in the book,

though to the writer it seemed beyond the reach of aspiration. Here it bursts forth into expression as a conviction.\footnote{C. F. Burney, Israel's Hope of Immortality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 54.}

Samuel Terrien in The Interpreter's Bible says that the sense in which Job uses the words "my Redeemer liveth" should not be confused with the sense in which the Christian uses them. To "redeem" from the wrong done one's honor is far other than to redeem from guilt and sin. Job's sudden vision of one who stands between him and God—one who lives, and is not, as he is, to be accounted already dead—and stands there to vindicate him before the tribunal of God and man alike, is neither arrived at rationally nor grasped at frantically, a mere straw and trick of the fancy. Call it intuition, which to the man of faith is that something no longer seems the end; God is the end, as He was and is the beginning, and Job's faith anticipates man's fulfillment to enter His forever,\footnote{George Arthur Buttrick (ed.), The Interpreter's Bible, (expositor), Samuel Terrien (New York: Abingdon Press, 1954), III, 1051, 1052, 1055.} but know that there is more of response in it than of mere divination. Job's fortunes were laid waste; but there was One who stood guard in his soul. Was it not a whisper from this Other that even the evidence of the doctrine of a resurrection of the reanimated righteous and dead might live again? Was it not a whisper from this Other that one day mankind would develop in subsequent apocalyptic literature in Israel a belief in the universal resurrection of the dead? In 2 Thessalonians 4:13-18. Thus Job says, "In my flesh shall I see God" (KJV). Terrien feels this exegesis is confirmed negatively by the fact that the idea of a bodiless mode of human existence is totally foreign to the Semitic mentality (as indicated by the growth and development of the belief in carnal resurrection); and positively by the subsequent and emphatic assertion, apparently needed to convince the skeptical listeners that Job himself will see God with his own eyes (vs. 27).\footnote{C. F. Burney, Israel's Hope of Immortality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 54.}
Job was convinced that he would see God after his death; on the other hand, he knew that in Sheol human existence is no longer what might be called "life" and that there is for a dead man no hope of returning to earth, yet he believed that in some way he would receive new flesh for the specific purpose of the divine-human interview. It seems to be Job's dying thought that in order for him to be enabled to plead his defense before God, he will again be made fully alive, that his personality will be endowed with concreteness, the substantial reality, the "carnal" vitality and vigor of complete existence of a man breathing upon earth, not the shadowlike tenuousness and impossibility of the dead in Sheol. At this instant death no longer seems the end; God is the end, as He was and is the beginning, and Job's faith anticipates man's fulfillment to enjoy Him forever.\footnote{1} Whatever interpretation may be applied to the passages in Job, there was apparently the development of a resurrection doctrine. It is evident that the doctrine of a resurrection of the selected righteous and wicked speedily developed in subsequent apocalyptic literature into a belief in the general resurrection of the dead.\footnote{2} In 2 Esdras 4:41 it states:

In the grave the chambers of souls are like the womb; for like as a woman that travailleth maketh haste to escape the anguish of the travail, even so do these places haste to deliver those things that are committed unto them from the beginning.

Again, in 2 Esdras 7:32, the writer goes on to say: "The earth shall restore those that are asleep in her, and so shall the dust those that dwell therein in silence, and the chambers shall deliver those souls that were committed unto them."

\footnote{1}{Ibid., p. 1056.} \footnote{2}{Peters, op. cit., pp. 459-460.}
Also, Enoch 41:1 is of the same import: "In those days shall the earth give back those that are gathered in her, and Sheol shall restore those it has received, and Abaddon shall render up what has been intrusted to it."

Moreover, in the Apocalypse of Baruch 21:23 a similar deliverance of the dead is shown, accompanied with the idea that there shall be no more death. "May Sheol be sealed up henceforth, that it receive no more dead; and may the chambers of souls restore those that are shut up in them."

Thus, according to the trends represented by the previous Old Testament and Apocalyptic passages, it seems evident that not only was a form of existence in Sheol after death taught, but that there was also the developed thought of a resurrection, which implied a restoration of physical life, particularly a life of fellowship with God for the righteous. In discussing the early Hebrew ideas of a hereafter, the writer considered the meaning of the term "Sheol." According to Owen, the usage of the word "shades" in the Old Testament, speaking of existence in Sheol, signifies that what continues to exist is not a part of a man, such as his "soul," but that existence in Sheol lacks both body and soul, and has no vitality at all. However, in the previously cited Old Testament references, there appear intimations of a hope that transcends the earlier notion of the "shades" of the dead that were thought of as continuing to exist in Sheol. Thus, there seems to be indications of the idea of the preservation of the whole unit-man: referring not only to a

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hope for a nation of people, but to a hope of life beyond death individually.

Perhaps one may at least say that such outstanding passages as have been mentioned from the Old Testament are indicative of a growth of thought that was destined to develop into the concept of the resurrection of the total person of man. Thus, because of the contributive background of thought and the eventual development of the basic Hebrew concept of man as a total unit, the resurrection predominates the Jewish idea of how man may live after death.

H. Wheeler Robinson says the Hebrew idea of personality is an animated body and not an incarnated soul, as in Greek thought. He further says that the word "nephesh," translated "soul" in the English Bible, either means the personal pronoun, the self, the whole man, or it means the principle of life, breath or breath-life, and is quasi-physically conceived. In either case, Robinson says, a false "spiritual" tone is given when "nephesh" is translated "soul." On the other hand, he points out that there is no distinct word for "body" in the Hebrew language. He suggests that they did not need one because they maintained the unity of man.¹

A detailed review of the various stages in the development of the idea of the resurrection, and a careful discrimination of the minor differences in which the conception is worked out by different Hebrew writers, does not seem necessary. However, perhaps two points should be emphasized:—

¹ The belief in the resurrection of the body was in a sense a protest against the older idea of an empty and meaningless ghost existence, which survived among the powerful sect of the Sadducees. Compared with

¹Ibid., p. 175; cf. Peters, loc. cit.
existence in Sheol, the belief in the resurrection meant an immortality worth having. In Sheol, good and evil seemed to fare alike. But, the association of the resurrection with a judgment on every individual according to his deeds was a definite affirmation that the consequences of right or wrong choices extend into the next life. Thus, the belief in the resurrection was an immense moral and religious advance. 1

2. Without a return to life in the body it was felt that the righteous dead could have no part in the glorious Messianic Kingdom on earth, to which they were entitled. A common view of these writers was that the old body of flesh and blood would be raised up with all its wounds and weakness, but would shortly be transformed into something more glorious than the body of this life. 2 The amount of transformation thought to be required, and the conception of the life to be lived vary according to the insight of the different writers. 3

The Jews apparently did not seek to explain how the phenomena of resurrection would occur; it was sufficient for them that it had been promised. It was along with the development of the thought of a Messiah who would lead the captive Jews back to Palestine and there recreate the Jewish nation in an ideal kingdom under ideal conditions, that the belief in a resurrection occurred. The Jews visioned a reconstituted world where all the discord of life would vanish and all disappointment would disappear, and where the good and faithful who had suffered so much, would


3 Streeter, Clutton-Brock, Emmet, and Hadfield, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
come out of their graves to a life of peace and happiness.¹

Hence, especially when the Jewish national hope waned, and when
the idea of an individual future life beyond the grave came to the fore,
Hebrew thought developed along the lines of the preservation of the whole
man as a unit, in resurrection. And, as the previous Old Testament refer-
ences point out, especially Isaiah 26:19 and Daniel 12:2, their hopes are
founded not in an immaterial realm, but in a future Messianic kingdom to
be established in Palestine, with Jerusalem as its center. It was into
this setting that Jesus Christ came, the people looking for the Messiah,
the Kingdom of God, and the resurrection of their dead.²

At this time there were three important Jewish sects, the Sadducees,
the Pharisees, and the Essenes. The Sadducees rejected the belief in a
Messiah and the accompanying belief in the resurrection and future retribu-
tion. The Pharisees and the Essenes, along with the common people, deeply
believed in a physical resurrection. Many who had been bereaved held the
belief that along with the coming of the Messiah there would also occur
the resurrection of their beloved dead.³ Thus, at the time of Christ
there was quite a diversity of belief. On the one hand there was the
crude, popular Apocalyptic expectation of a flesh and blood resurrection;
whereas, on the other extreme, there was the Sadducean belief in an
unsubstantial life in Sheol.⁴ There was quite a variation concerning the

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¹Charles Schwartz and Bertie Schwartz, Faith Through Reason (New

²S. W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews (New York:

³Schwartz, op. cit., p. 134; cf. Millar Burrows, More Light on the

⁴Streeter, Clutton-Brock, Emmet, and Hadfield, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
concept of resurrection itself. Some believed that although upon death
the body and the soul were separated, resurrection would come only to
the spirit, and it would be clothed in a body of glory and light. The
Jews who devoutly believed in resurrection relied upon the fact that God
is a god of justice.¹

It is evident that the idea of resurrection was grounded in the
Hebrew culture, arising from their ancient view of man as a unit. Follow-
ing the occasional eschatological hope that shines in the Old Testament,
and the developed belief that existed at the time of Christ, the Christian
religion carries on the doctrine of the resurrection, the belief that the
whole man will be restored "in the last day," even though he die. The
Christian belief, following the death and the resurrection of Jesus Christ,
grew out of the Old Testament background and founded itself upon the actual
event of Jesus' resurrection from the dead, as well as Jesus' further
teaching concerning the belief. There are numerous passages in the New
Testament that reflect the "Biblical" Christian doctrine of the resurrec-
tion. The representative teaching of Jesus is noted in the following:

But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read
that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham,
and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of
the dead, but of the living."²

¶¶ for thou shalt be recompensed in the resurrection of the
just.³

Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is,
when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they
that hear shall Live . . . Marvel not at this; for the hour is
cometh in which all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, And
shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection

¹Schwartz, loc. cit.
of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of
damnation.\(^1\)

I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth on me,
though he die, yet shall he live; And whosoever liveth and
believeth on me shall never die.\(^2\)

And this is the will of Him that sent me, that every one which
seeth the Son, and believeth on him may have everlasting life; and
I will raise him up at the last day.\(^3\)

There is a matter of interpretation that should be considered in
relation to these references, especially the Johannine passages where the
phrases "everlasting life," or "eternal life," and "never die" are used.
Owen states that in the Greek, the adjective in phrases such as "ever-
lasting life" and "eternal life" is "aionios," and that the noun "aion"
in the New Testament very often means "the age to come." Therefore, he
says that the adjective "aionios" could very well mean, not "everlasting,"
in the sense of continuous, unbroken survival, but rather having to do
with "the age to come." If this were the case, "eternal life" would mean
the kind of life that belongs to "the age to come," and "everlasting" is
a mistranslation.\(^4\)

James Strong defines the word thus: the root is "aion;" from an
obsolete primary noun (apparently meaning continued duration); \(\text{ever};; \text{by}
qualification \text{regularly};; \text{by implication \text{earnestly}; -always \text{ever}.} \) The word
"aion" is properly an \text{age; by extension \text{perpetuity} (also past); by implica-
tion the \text{world}; specially (Jewish) a \text{Messianic period} (present or future);
\text{-age, course, eternal, (for) ever (-more), (n-) ever, (beginning of

\(^1\text{John 5:25, 26, 29.}\)
\(^2\text{John 11:25, 26.}\)
\(^3\text{John 5:40.}\)
\(^4\text{Owen, op. cit., p. 186.}\)
the world (began, without end). The word "ainios," a derivative, means perpetual (also used of past time, or past and future as well): eternal, for ever, everlasting, world (began). \(^1\)

Also, Strong defines the corresponding Hebrew word "olam" as properly meaning concealed, that is, the vanishing point; generically time out of mind (past or future), that is (practically) eternity; frequentative adverb (especially with prepositional prefix) always: always (-a), ancient (time), any more continuance, eternal, (for, n-) ever (-lasting, -more, of old), lasting, long (time), (of) old (time), perpetuated at any time, (beginning of the) world (in addition to without end). \(^2\)

Thus, Owen suggests that if one looks at the Greek of the verses translated, "Whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die" (John 11-26), and, "He that doeth the will of God abideth forever" (I John 2:17), it is found that in both instances the verses might literally be translated, "Will not be dead," or, "Will abide in the age to come." He refers also to two other passages in which the believer is promised eternal or "ainios" life:

And this is the will of him that sent me, that everyone which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting (ainios) life: and I will raise him up at the last day. \(^3\)

He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal (ainios) life; and I will raise him up at the last day. \(^4\)

The meanings here seem to be that the believer has "ainios" life, that is to say, "I will raise him up at the last day." Similarly, Owen


\(^2\) Strong, DWHB, op. cit., p. 86.

\(^3\) Owen, loc. cit., John 6:40.

\(^4\) Ibid., John 6:54.
noted that the saying translated, "Whoso liveth and believeth in me shall never die," is given in the context of the raising of Lazarus from the dead, and immediately follows the great declaration, "I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live" (John 11:25). Therefore, seemingly, in every case, and in "aionios" life is related to the resurrection of the body at "the last day," not to the immortality of the soul. The resurrection, then, is an eschatological concept developed from the Hebrew tradition, and not a metaphysical concept borrowed from the Greeks.  

Furthermore, Owen states that the Johannine record usually refers to eternal or "aionios" life as a present possession, implying that the believer has eternal life here and now. The question is, how could this be so if eternal is the life proper to the age to come? He suggests "Aion" that eschatological concepts like "the age to come" and "the last day" do not refer to the historical future; that they are not temporal concepts at all; rather it is the poverty of our language and thought-forms that makes it necessary for us to express them in a misleading way. Thus Owen indicates the New Testament teaching seems to be that in Jesus Christ the "last things" have broken into time and space so that the believer, in so far as he is "in Christ," has within himself a pledge and earnest of the final consummation.  

However, consider further the meaning and use of the term "aionios" in the Scripture. According to Harry Buis this Greek word is rendered accustomed to Jesus as revealer of God and nature of the world, eternal or, less frequently, everlasting. This word in turn comes from the idea of existence being planned and purposeful, the word "aion" meaning primarily "the age." The classical Greek writers

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1 Ibid., p. 187.  
2 Ibid.
such as Homer are said to have used it in reference to the period of a
man's life. However, by Plato "aion" was used of the Eternal Being as
compared with time. Aristotle is said to have used the word to describe
the ultimate principle of existence. The Hellenistic Jewish translators
of the Septuagint used the word in both the older classical sense and in
the later Platonic sense.\footnote{Buis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 48.}

Hence, the New Testament divides all of history into the present
"aion" and the "aion" which is to come. The Greek language, according to
Buis, contains no other word which better describes the concept of end-
lessness. "Aionios" is used in the New Testament sixty-six times; fifty-
one times of the life of the righteous, two times of the duration of God
and his glory, six other times where there is no doubt as to its meaning
being endlessness, and seven times of the punishment of the wicked. "Aion"
is used ninety-five times; fifty-five times of unlimited duration, thirty-
one times of duration that has limits, and nine times to denote the dura-
tion of future punishment. Buis says it is especially true of the writing
of the Apostle John that the word is often used to describe the quality of
existence, rather than as having a quantitative aspect. However, the very
nature of this quality pre-supposes endlessness.\footnote{Ibid., p. 49.}

Furthermore, consider the eschatology of the Gospel of John, which
Owen has particularly emphasized and interpreted. In comparison to his
interpretation "The Interpreter's Bible" comments:

The crucial importance of the Incarnation is that with the
appearance of Jesus as revealer of God and savior of the world,
'the age to come' is already here. Judgment is now at work, and
separation is taking place between those who are destined to life
and those who are heading for destruction (10:26-28). Eternal life is a present state. 'He who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has eternal life; he does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life' (5:24). Yet one of the undeniable features of this Gospel is the appeal to a future judgment. 'The hour is coming when all who are in the tombs will hear his voice and come forth, those who have done good to the resurrection of judgment' (5:28-29). This eschatological judgment is taking place here and now according to the nature of the human response to the divine call and demand given in Jesus Christ.  

It is further stated that this tension between the two conceptions of the kingdom of God, or eternal life, as present and as future, runs through the New Testament. However, perhaps this tension is resolved in the Johannine saying: "Beloved, we are God's children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is pure" (I John 3:20).  

Thus, the preparation for future life in God is seen to anticipate the resurrection in the last day.

In the Pauline Epistles, the concept of the resurrection is developed further, providing the stepping stone to later Christian theology. Again, it would seem profitable to consider the original meanings of the terms that Paul uses in connection with this doctrine. It is J. A. T. Robinson's view that in Paul's writings "soma" ("body") is used much in the same way as "personality" is used. The Hebrew word "nephesh" that the Lord for the body, and the path both raised the Lord, and stands for the personal pronoun is usually translated as "psyche." The terms "sarx" and "pneuma" are used as "flesh" and "spirit," as was previously pointed out, indicating that these four words are used to regard

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2 Ibid.
man from different points of view.¹

For instance, Robinson points out that Paul uses "soma" as the
virtual equivalent to "sarx" and stands, like "sarx," for the whole man
as seen in his weakness and sinfulness, over against the power and hol-
ness of God. Romans 8:13 speaks of "the deeds of the body," which must
be "mortified" as the results of living "after the flesh." In Colossians
2:11, the identification of "soma" with "sarx" seems complete, "the body
of the flesh," referring to the whole personality engaged in rebellion
against God. However, there is a second Pauline usage of "soma" that
means the whole man as destined for membership in the Kingdom of God,
standing for man as God meant for him to be. Thus it is pointed out that
while "soma" may become identified with "sarx," due to man's "fallen" con-
dition, it is by no means identical with "sarx." "Sarx" stands for man as
wholly perishable, as destined for death and destruction, but "soma" is
the carrier of man's resurrection, standing for man as wholly destined
for God. Thus, while "sarx" represents man, in the solidarity of creation,
in his distance from God, "soma" stands for man, in the unity of creation,
as made for the glory of God.² As Paul writes:

But the body is not for fornication, but for the Lord; and
the Lord for the body. And God hath both raised the Lord, and
will raise up us through his power.³

Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit
the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.⁴

Therefore, man as "sarx" cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, but
man as "soma" can. Owen says the fact that the "soma" is to be raised
indicates that it too must first die, for the resurrection is the

¹J. A. T. Robinson, The Body (Chicago: Alex R. Allenson, Inc.,
²Ibid., p. 31. ³1 Corinthians 6:13b, 14. ⁴1 Corinthians 15:50.
"resurrection of the dead." Thus, according to Owen, so also the "soma" to be raised will be a radically changed "soma." Such a change is described as a change from a "natural (psychikon) body" to a "spiritual (pneumatikon) body."¹ Paul gives the method of resurrection in the following verses:

But some man will say, how are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die: And that which thou sowest, thou soweest not that body that shall be. . . . But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body. All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men. . . . There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial. . . . So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption; It is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power; It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. . . . The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. (I Corinthians 15:35ff., KJV).

This indicates that the resurrection is a change from human personality in its weakness to human personality as God intended it to be. However, Owen suggests that this change, no matter how radical, does not involve a completely fresh start. The resurrection "body," or new man, is not considered new in the sense that it has no connection with the old. Rather, it is new in the sense that it is the old made new.² In Paul's analogy, in the previous reference, the change of body is like the relation between the seed and the full-grown plant; there is a great change, but it is a change that perfects and brings to maturity. Undoubtedly, this change is initiated through growth and development in the Christian life, but it is only finally and entirely completed at the resurrection.

¹Owen, op. cit., pp. 194-195. ²Ibid.
In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. . . and this mortal must put on immortality. 1

Thus, according to such interpretation and consideration, the belief in the resurrection of the whole self of man as a unit may very well be classified as a "Biblical" doctrine. Furthermore, it would seem that the apostolic faith in immortality, in the resurrection of the dead, stemmed directly from the asserted fact of Jesus' resurrection. This thought is especially clear in Paul:

Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith also vain. 2

Thus, in viewing the development and the teaching of the concept of the idea of the resurrection of the whole selfhood of man, including his body, it is to be recognized that this idea is definitely to be distinguished from the concept of the preservation of personality and soul. The former aspect of belief seems to be the more consistent "Bible" doctrine, whereas the latter aspect is primarily Platonic. However, both aspects have been considered to be Christian, and both emphasize the personal aspect of immortality.

In some respects it seems as though Christians, and even Jews, for that matter, have discarded the concept of the resurrection to quite a degree because they considered the idea of the "resurrection of the body" to be so irrational that they fled to the Hellenic conception of the "immortality of the soul." This immortality conceived by Plato was

1 I Corinthians 15:52, 53. 2 I Corinthians 15:12-14, KJV.
certainly not of the self, and it annulled man's collective history as well as his unique selfhood. Therefore, Niebuhr suggests that it is well to remember that all hopes and ideas conceived from within the temporal process of a system of meaning which transcends the temporal flux, are "irrational." At least they are not simply rational. With this in mind, it is well that we attempt an approach to the "Biblical" hope afresh to gain a clearer insight of what may properly be called the Christian hope.¹

The writer realizes that such a hope is derived from the so-called Christian revelation of the meaning in the divine mystery, and that revelation is centered in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. Thus, confidence that the crucified Savior was "raised again" became the very basis of the faith which gathered the first believing community together. However, the writer has chosen to deal specifically with the affirmed resurrection of Jesus in a later section, and there present it as an argument for the hope of the preservation of the whole selfhood of man. There, the writer shall also deal with the objections that may be raised concerning this base of Christian belief. Strictly speaking, it may thus be said that the Christian doctrine of personal immortality, as this writer applies the term, refers to the emphasis on the belief in the resurrection of the body and the preservation of the whole person.

V. OTHER CONTEMPORARY IDEAS

Although it would perhaps be impossible to exhaust the innumerable ideas concerning immortality as they exist in present society, even aside

from the alternative concepts already mentioned, the writer will discuss some of the more representative notions in contemporary thought. Especially since the break of civilization from religious dogmatism, there has been the manifestation of ideas that would be more acceptable in the light of current scientific opinion, than dubious beliefs such as the Christian doctrine of immortality based on the resurrection. Therefore, in a study of the Christian doctrine of personal immortality, it is well to also consider other contemporary ideas such as the immortality of influence, biological immortality, ideas of absorption and process, in lieu of the idea of the total extinction or annihilation of the person at death.

These concepts of immortality are current alternative notions to the Christian belief that the writer considers to contain truth which is not necessarily anti-Christian, but that they represent a body of truth less than the Christian idea of personal immortality. Certainly no study would be complete unless they were considered along with the previous historical alternatives. It seems that ideas concerning any belief in life after death, or even in the disbelief of it, are more personalized than generalized. People may follow a certain tack in a general manner or subject of belief, but individual expression still asserts itself, attaching its own satisfactory mold to a general belief. Hence, only general trends can be given, for there may be a number of individual versions of any particular generality and their accompanying reasons for belief. Thus, the writer considers some of the representative contemporary notions that may be substitutes for personal immortality.

Immortality of influence. The idea here is that personal existence
at death bursts as a bubble, but the memory of that bubble continues to float and glitter in the history and consciousness of the world, and thus its influence remains. It follows that the greater the personal achievements and the better their quality, the chances for influence of immortal nature are increased. The influential deeds of men and women of the past, and of those who have recently died, have left behind a heritage of illumination and inspiration. George Eliot wrote in this view:

Oh may I join the choir invisible
Of those immortal dead who live again
In minds made better by their presence: live
In pulses stirred to generosity,
In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn
For miserable aims that end with self,
In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars
And with their mild persistence urge man's search
To vaster issues. So to live is heaven.¹

Thus, according to this idea of immortality, men like Plato and Socrates still live on because of their impact upon the philosophic world; Shakespeare, Dante, and others still pour out their splendors of literary imagination; religious leaders such as Jesus, Buddha, and Mohammed live on in the fervor of their followers; musicians such as Handel, Beethoven, and Bach continue in the ageless inspiration of their immortal compositions; even military leaders such as Alexander the Great, Charlemagne, and Napoleon have undoubtedly induced others to hitch their wagons to the star of power; and scientists like Bacon, Galileo, Edison, and Einstein have illumined the world with their genius for generations to come. This is the case in every sphere of human activity, in art, in politics, in sports, and in innumerable others.

It certainly must be admitted that there is an immortality of influence, in that memorable deeds especially live on and on, whether they be good or evil. Notable people of history still influence and stir humanity with impulses for its own betterment. It seems the present world would be greatly impoverished if this accumulated wealth of influence were extracted from human existence. The immortality of influence is one of the greatest powers and possessions the world has, and perhaps each individual inherits some measure of this immortality. Humanity lives in a world that was moved by a Jesus, a Luther, a Washington, a Lincoln, and countless others.\(^1\) Certainly humanity has benefited by the continuation of such influence.

The immortality of influence satisfies some people. They contend that if a man makes the most of his life he will influence other men, and the contribution of his personality will live on after his bodily death. In connection with the immortality of influence, there is a variant which is known as institutional immortality. The man who founds a great institution or who works to make it a success builds into it something of himself which persists after he is dead and gives him a sort of immortality.\(^2\)

However, one should recognize the fact that such immortality is not the preservation of personal selfhood, but rather it is ultimately the impersonal continuation of one's influence. By admitting the reality of the immortality of influence, the question is raised if this is the only immortality man may expect. Most people who emphasize the immortality

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 148.

of influence hold that it is the only kind of life continuation (including biological influence) that a person can confidently anticipate. Therefore, it must be regarded as an alternate belief to the Christian doctrine of personal immortality for that reason. In such case, there is the substitution of the immortality of the deed, and at most, an impersonal continuation of life that is dependent upon the preservation of the physical realm of being and knowledge as it has been known, and is known today, rather than the preservation of the individual selfhood that is dependent upon the power of God.

**Biological immortality.** As has already been inferred, this concept of immortality is somewhat related to the idea of the immortality of influence. However, instead of notable deeds being the emphasis, biological immortality relies upon the continuation of one's life as it is passed on through hereditary factors that he has transmitted to his progeny. In this case, it is the germ plasm which is looked to for immortality. This idea is based upon the laws of heredity, the fact that chromosomes, the tiny genes within, as carriers of heredity, remain constant. Thus a man or woman may die, but still live in his children and in their children, and so on.

At the moment of conception, two living germ cells (sperm and egg) unite to produce an individual. Within both the sperm and the egg are found twenty-four minute rod-like structures called chromosomes. It is known that within each of the chromosomes a child receives from each parent are many still smaller parts called genes. Each microscopic gene carries some of the real determiners of heredity. That is, each gene is composed of some substance, or contains some structure, which is absolutely necessary
to the development of some trait of body or behavior, including mental and moral characteristics. The whole heredity of the individual consists of many traits, each determined by a gene, a pair, or a group of genes.¹

Immortality in a biological aspect, then, is dependent upon people having children and passing their hereditary traits from generation to generation. Though there are infinite arrangements, hereditary traits remain constant, although in dominance or recession, according to the mating factors involved. However, it is apparent that if any succeeding family component failed to have children, such immortality of reproducing hereditary life-factors would cease. Perhaps it is in this regard, the prospect of the failure in the reproduction of a family lineage, that some would unite the concepts of the immortality of influence and biological immortality in compensation.

Again, closely associated to biological immortality is the idea of material or chemical immortality which was based upon the supposed indestructibility of matter. Since the human body, like all other matter, is composed of chemical elements in various combinations, and since science at one time believed that no matter could ever be destroyed, that it changed its form, the body of a man never completely or utterly perishes. It decomposes and, in time, its chemical constituents combine with other matter, but they never pass away. Certain poets have seized upon this idea and have depicted the transformation of a man's body into a great oak growing over his grave, or have suggested that the soul of a maiden lives again in the rose nourished by her dust.² However, since the discovery of

¹Floyd L. Rusch, Psychology and Life (New York: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1948), pp. 82, 83.

²Potter, op. cit., p. 172.
the atom bomb, the development of nuclear physics and chemistry, science now believes that matter can be destroyed utterly, through a complete atomic cleavage. This new point of truth may or may not affect those who believe in chemical or material immortality, but the treat of nuclear destruction is very real.

In any event, it is evident that truth is present in the idea that a life continues through the progressive reproduction of hereditary traits and through the possible constancy of matter, but certainly, the preservation of distinct individual personality is impossible. These ideas are thus considered as alternate to personal immortality.

**Imortality of value (Whitehead's Theory).** To begin with, Whitehead refers to antithetical terms, "Immortality" and "Mortality" as two aspects of the universe which are presupposed in every experience which one enjoys. He terms these two aspects as the "Two Worlds," maintaining that they require each other, and that either "Mortality" or "Immortality" considered by itself is an abstraction. These "Two Worlds" together are the major examples of perspectives of the universe. The word "evaluation" thus expresses the elucidation of one of the abstractions by reference to the other. ¹

The "World" which emphasizes the multiplicity of mortal things is the World of activity, of origination, and of creativity. It creates the present by transforming the past, and by anticipating the future. Yet, this activity is said to lose its meaning when it is reduced to a "mere creation now" episode. "Creation Now" is a matter-of-fact which is one aspect of the Universe, namely, that of immediate origination, but the

absence of value destroys any possibility of reason.\textsuperscript{1}

However, the World which emphasizes persistence is the "World of Value." Whitehead considers such value to be timeless and immortal in its very nature because its essence is not rooted in any passing circumstance. The immediacy of some mortal circumstance is valuable only when it shares in the immortality of some value. On the other hand, the inherent value in the Universe has an essential independence of any moment of time; and yet it loses its meaning apart from its reference to the World of passing fact. Thus, Value refers to Fact, and Fact refers to Value, and value-judgment points beyond the immediacy of historic fact. The reason is that these Worlds of Value and Fact are abstractions from the Universe; and every abstraction involves reference to the totality of existence.\textsuperscript{2}

For Whitehead there is no self-contained abstraction.

Therefore, Value cannot be considered apart from the Activity which is the primary character of the World of Fact. Value is the general name for an infinite scheme of Values, partly concordant and partly discordant. The essence of these values is their capacity for realization in the factual World of Action. Such a realization involves the exclusion of discordant values. Thus the World of Values must be conceived as active with the adjustment of the potentialities for realization. This activity of internal adjustment is expressed by our moral and aesthetic judgments which involve the ultimate notions of "better" and "worse." Such internal activity of the World of Value may be termed "Valuation," and it refers to one meaning of the term Judgment. However, in its entirety, Judgment is looked

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 684.  \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 685.
upon as a process of unification, and it involves the necessary relevance of values to each other. A further intrusion of judgment is called Evaluation, which indicates an analysis of particular facts in the World of Activity to determine the values realized and the values excluded. For Whitehead, there is no escape from the totality of the Universe, and exclusion is an activity comparable to inclusion. Evaluation, then, is the interconnection of the World of Value and the World of Activity, whereby the former is modified by the latter World. Evaluation always presupposes abstraction from the sheer immediacy of fact; it involves reference to Valuation.\footnote{Ibid.}

Whitehead illustrates:

If you are enjoying a meal, and are conscious of pleasure derived from apple-tart, it is the sort of taste that you enjoy. Of course the tart has to come at the right time. But it is not the moment of clock-time which gives importance; it is the sequence of types of value—for instance, the antecedent nature of the meal, and your initial hunger. Thus you can only express what the meal means to you, in terms of a sequence of timeless valuations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 686.}

It is in this way the process of evaluation exhibits an immortal world of co-ordinated value. Thus the two sides of the Universe are the World of Activity or Origination and the World of Value. The Value is timeless, but by its transformation into Evaluation it assumes the function of modifying events in time. Either World can only be explained by reference to the other World; but this reference does not depend upon any explicit form of indication. Value issues into modification of creative action. Origination, or Creation, aims at Value, whereas Value is saved from futility of abstraction by its impact upon the creative process. In
this fusion, Value preserves its Immortality. The two worlds of Value and of Action are bound together in the life of the Universe, so that the immortal factor of Value enters into the active creation of temporal fact. The World of Activity is grounded upon the multiplicity of finite Acts, and World of Value is grounded upon the unity of active co-ordination of the various possibilities of Value. The meaning of the acts is found in the values actualized, and the meaning of the valuation is found in the facts which are realizations of their share of value. Thereby, each World is futile except in its function of embodying the other.  

This fusion involves the fact that either World can only be described in terms of factors which are common to both of them. Such factors have a dual aspect, and each World emphasizes one of the two aspects. These factors may be called "Ideas." An "Idea" is the entity answering questions which enquire "How?" seeking the "sort" of occurrence. Each "Idea" has two sides; namely, a shape of value and a shape of fact. The ultimate character of the Universe has two sides—one side is the mortal world of transitory fact for good or ill. This achievement is the essence of acquiring the immortality of realized value; and the other side is the timeless character of nothing apart from its mode of unity derived from a world of mere possibility acquiring temporal realization. The bridge between the two sides of the Universe is the "Idea" with its two sides.  

Thus, according to Whitehead, the topic of "The Immortality of Man" is a side issue in the wider topic which is "The Immortality of Realized Value," namely, the temporality of mere fact acquiring the immortality of value. There is the tendency of the transitory occasions of fact to unite themselves into personal identity. Each such personal sequence involves the capacity of its members to sustain identity of Value. In this way, 

1Ibid., pp. 686, 687.  
2Ibid., pp. 687, 688.
Value-experience introduces into the transitory World of Fact an imitation of its own essential immortality. The survival of personal identity within the immediacy of a present occasion is a remarkable character of the World of Fact. It is the introduction of stability by the influence of value. Furthermore, a whole sequence of actual occasions, each with its own present immediacy, may be such that each occasion embodies in its own being the antecedent members of that sequence with an experience of self-identity of the past in the immediacy of the present. Such is the realization of personal identity which varies with the temporal span.  

This problem of 'personal identity' in a changing world of occasions is the key example for understanding the essential fusion of the World of Activity with the World of Value. The immortality of Value has entered into the changefulness which is the essential character of Activity. 'Personal identity' is exhibited when the change in the details of fact exhibits an identity of primary character amid secondary changes of value. This identity serves the double role of shaping a fact and realizing a specific value... A unity of style amid a flux of detail adds to the importance of the various details and illuminates the intrinsic value of that style that elicits such emphasis from the details. The confusion of variety is transformed into the co-ordinated unity of a dominant character. The many become one, and by this miracle achieve a triumph of effectiveness—for good or for evil. This achievement is the essence of art and of moral purpose. The World of Fact would dissolve into the nothingness of confusion apart from its modes of unity derived from its preservation of dominant characters of Value.

However, personality is the extreme example of the sustained realization of a type of value, while the co-ordination of a social system is the vaguer form. Although Personal Identity is a difficult notion, Whitehead asserts it is dominant in human experience, for the very notions of civil law are based upon it. Every example of personal identity is a special mode of co-ordination of the ideal world into a limited role of effectiveness. This maintenance of character identity is the way in which the

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1Ibid., pp. 638, 639.  2Ibid., pp. 689-690.
limitations of the actual world embrace the infinitude of possibility. The scope of infinite possibility is recessive and ineffective in each personality until a perspective of ideal existence enters into the realm of finite actuality. This entrance involves grades of dominance and recessiveness. The pattern of such grades and the ideal entities which they involve, constitute the character of that persistent fact of personal existence in the World of Activity. The necessary co-ordination of values dominates the essential differentiation of facts.\textsuperscript{1}

The notion of "character" as an essential factor in personal identity, illustrates the truth that the concept of ideas must be conceived as involving gradations of generality. This variation may be further thought of as a spread involving an infinitude of dimensions, yet we can only conceive a finite fragment of this spread of grades. But as one chooses a single line of advance in such generality, he seems to meet a higher type of value. For example, Whitehead indicates, a color may be enjoyed, but the enjoyment of a picture—if it is a good picture—implies a higher grade of value. Thus values require each other, for the essential character of the World of Value is co-ordination. Its activity consists in the approach to multiplicity by the adjustment of its many potentialities into finite unities. While the World of Value emphasizes the essential unity of the many, the World of Fact emphasizes the essential multiplicity in the realization of this unity. Thus, the Universe, which embraces both Worlds, according to Whitehead, exhibits the one as many, and the many as one.\textsuperscript{2}

To arrive at his conclusions on the subject, Whitehead simplifies the complexity of the Universe by considering it in the guise of two

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 691, 692, 693. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
abstractions—namely, the World of multiple Activities and the World of co-ordinated Value. The prime characteristic of the former World is change, and of the latter World is immortality. But such an understanding of the Universe requires that each World exhibits the impress of the other. Thus the World of Change may develop enduring Personal Identity as its effective aspect for the realization of value. Realization is an essential factor in the World of Value, to save it from the futility of abstract hypothesis. Hence the effective realization of value in the World of Change may find its counterpart in the World of Value; which means that temporal personality in one world implies immortal personality in the other.¹

Thus it is suggested, the World of Value exhibits the essential unification of the Universe, and while it exhibits the immortal side of the many persons, it also involves the unification of personality. This conclusion has the advantage of unifying the personality of the personality, and the unification of the Universe is that of an abstraction requiring, for received from the Active World. In this way, the World of Value is the completion of its concrete reality. Value and Purpose. Whereas the conceived in the guise of the co-ordination of many personal individualities in the World of Value is the completion of its concrete reality, the immortality also equally thought to be a factor in each of the many personal existences in the World of Change.²

Though sense-experiences are superficial and fail to indicate the greater self-enjoyment derived from internal bodily functioning, human experience can be described as a flood of self-enjoyment, diversified by

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 694.
a trickle of conscious memory and anticipation. However, when memory
and anticipation are totally absent, there is complete conformity to the
average influence of the immediate past. There is no conscious confronta-
tion of memory with possibility. This produces the activity of mere
matter. But when there is memory, the average influence of the immediate
past, or future, ceases to dominate exclusively, and there is reaction
against mere average material domination. Thus Whitehead says the universe
is material in proportion to the restriction of memory and anticipation.¹

Whitehead further states:

According to this account of the World of Activity there is no
need to postulate two essentially different types of Active Entities,
namely, the purely material entities and the entities alive with
various modes of experiencing. The latter type is sufficient to
account for the characteristics of that World, when we allow for
variety of recessiveness and dominance among the basic factors of
experience, namely consciousness, memory, and anticipation. This
conclusion has the advantage of indicating the possibility of the
emergence of Life from the lifeless material of this planet--
namely, by the gradual emergence of memory and anticipation.²

As the basic elements in the World of Fact are finite activities,
the basic character of the World of Value is its timeless co-ordination
of the infinitude of possibility for realization. The status of the
World of Fact in the Universe is that of an abstraction requiring, for
the completion of its concrete reality, Value and Purpose. Whereas the
abstraction of the fact value, Whitehead would say that any per-
status of the World of Value in the Universe is also that of an abstrac-
tion requiring, for the completion of its concrete reality, the factuality
nature of God as well as being co-ordinated into the
co-ordination of all possibility for entry into the active World of Fact.³

According to Whitehead then, nature conceived as the unification

¹Ibid., p. 695. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., pp. 695, 696.
derived from the World of Value is founded on ideals of perfection, moral and aesthetic. It includes into its unity the scattered effectiveness of realized activities, transformed by the supremacy of its own ideals. The result is said to be Tragedy, Sympathy, and the Happiness evoked by actualized Heroism. However, individuals are unable to conceive the experience of the Supreme Unity of Existence. Rather these are human terms in which one can glimpse the origin of that drive towards limited ideals of perfection which seems to haunt the Universe. Therefore, Whitehead says,

This immortality of the World of Action, derived from its transformation in God's nature is beyond our imagination to conceive. The various attempts at description are often shocking and profane. What does haunt our imagination is that the immediate facts of present action pass into permanent significance for the Universe.

Whitehead is convinced that the insistent notions of Right and Wrong, Achievement and Failure, depends upon this background. Otherwise every activity is without meaning, being merely a passing vapor of insignificance.¹

Thus it seems that one thought especially may be important in our study of immortality; that value is the breeding ground for immortality. However, Whitehead's idea of process, the interplay of personality, factual activity, in relation to Evaluation and Valuation eliminates the abstraction of the term Value. Perhaps Whitehead would say that any personality that has entered the Life Process continues on, existing in the value nature of God according to his individual valuations, being represented as an individual entity as well as being co-ordinated into the very nature of God as a whole. Death would mean no radical change so far as the individual life is related to the underlying nature of God in the

¹Ibid., p. 698.
Universe. Personality takes its place in the nature of God as it emerges in the Life Process, and it becomes immortal as the World of Value is entered when the active World of Fact is realized. This is the primary function of life. Therefore, it would appear that as individual value is co-ordinated in Universal value, the nature of God, it becomes an immortal entity.

It cannot be said that such a scheme represents personal immortality in the strictest sense, and on the other hand, neither can we say it is distinctly impersonal. Although Whitehead's theory may be considered theistic, it cannot be classified as Christian, according to the Biblical usage of the term. Therefore, one again has an alternate idea of immortality in relation to the Christian doctrine of personal immortality.

Whitehead's ideas concerning immortality, as well as the nature of the Universe in general, have exercised no small influence upon contemporary thought. However, there seem to be some particular reasons why the Christian doctrine ought to be considered above the different alternative ideas, the more important of which we have reviewed. Having traced the growth and development of the general idea of immortality through the various alternative concepts, the writer shall set forth in this section the arguments in support of the Christian doctrine of personal immortality. As it has been previously noted, the concept of the resurrection of the body and the total person technically seems to be the Biblical Christian doctrine. Some of the arguments given may refer to and indicate personal immortality in a broad or unspecified sense, rather than directly to the Biblical doctrine. Yet, strictly speaking, the writer is ultimately concerned with accumulating support for personal immortality which is directly identified with the
CHAPTER III

ARGUMENTS FOR PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

Thus far this study of the Christian doctrine of personal immortality has been concerned with the background roots and the surrounding influences in connection with its growth and development. It has been shown that the unqualified terms "immortality," "future life," and others, that there could be personal immortality without the ground of God. If something altogether different from the present day Christian concept. Also, it is evident that the various ideas concerning life after death, as they exist today, are a result of a continuous unfolding of the idea of personal immortality and the concepts of future life will germinate from its earliest conception. The Christian doctrine of personal immortality is likewise the outgrowth of such ideas, the values of values, the fulfillment of religious personality, and the ideal services of man.

However, there seem to be some particular reasons why the Christian doctrine ought to be considered above the different alternative ideas, the more important of which we have reviewed. Having traced the growth and development of the general idea of immortality through the various alternate concepts being originated in the thinking mind, let us now consider the writer shall set forth in this section the arguments in support of the Christian doctrine of personal immortality. As it has been previously noted, the concept of the resurrection of the body and the total moral development that these concepts have ever existed with non-person technically seems to be the Biblical Christian doctrine. Some of the arguments given may refer to and indicate personal immortality in a broad or unspecified sense, rather than directly to the Biblical doctrine. Yet, strictly speaking, the writer is ultimately concerned with accumulative evidences that could carry forward in this same section, revealing support for personal immortality which is directly identified with the customs that definitely point to a belief in, or a desire to believe in.
resurrection of the body and the restoration of the total person.

The immediate objective is to see if there be any basis to believe in the Christian doctrine of immortality as opposed to the concepts of impersonal immortality and the annihilation of the total person at death. As it was previously mentioned, the belief in the Christian doctrine of personal immortality finds occasion in the supernatural, the extraordinary expression of God's purpose. It would indeed seem unfeasible to suppose that there could be personal immortality without the ground of God. If there be grounds to believe in God, perhaps there is warranty to believe in personal immortality. Along with such an inseparable relation of the idea of personal immortality and the concept of God, other arguments will be proposed by examining the primacy of hope, the prehension of faith, the value of values, the fulfillment of nature, personality, and the resurrection of Jesus.

I. RELATION OF THE IDEA OF GOD TO THE BELIEF

It is not known just how or when the idea of God, of some supreme, superhuman being, originated in the mind of man. Perhaps the concept of a God was slower in development than the idea of immortality, or it may be that these two complementary thoughts were conceived together. Again, there is the possibility that these concepts have ever existed with man. Such religious ideas are evidently peculiar to man, the religious animal. Early primitive funerary findings indicate that death at least in part motivated their thinking to consider prospects of future life. Numerous archeological findings, as were mentioned in another section, reveal customs that definitely point to a belief in, or a desire to believe in
the possibility of the continuation of life beyond physical death. However, it is somewhat more difficult to trace early ideas concerning God.

As Shailer Mathews says:

There is considerable discussion among anthropologists as to just what was the original intellectual content of such a religious attitude. On the one side, there are those who insist that primitive man—or, if they are theologically minded, Adam and Eve—had knowledge of the one true God. In the course of time this knowledge was lost, or degenerated into polytheism. On the other side, there are those who would hold that in primitive society inanimate objects were worshiped directly. Still others would find in the honoring and fear of the dead some suggestion of a supernatural power. Grant Allen believes that 'corpse-worship' is the 'protoplasm of religion' as folk lore is the protoplasm of mythology and theology. All such opinions are at the best conjectures. The only thing that we know with any degree of certainty is that men and women began to behave in a certain way in order that they might achieve certain ends, and meet certain needs by the aid of natural powers which they did not understand. It is in this behavior rather than in any organized system of philosophy or revelation that we must find the origin of the idea of God.

Thus, according to Mathews, man conceived of a God or gods to satisfy his human needs. Such satisfaction was sought through experience and cooperation with other human beings, and the group life was extended to include those mysterious powers that surrounded primitive life. Sometimes these powers might be regarded as the original ancestry of the tribe, and figures of animal ancestors or totems might become symbols of a common group loyalty. The initiative seems to lie in the social mind-set of humanity, and not in any philosophy. From their social experience, limited though it was, even early peoples set up customs which included the unseen powers. Hence, it may be that little by little, because of this practice and from these mysterious powers on the one hand, and from everywhere gods began to appear as distinct conception of human thought. That is, the


1 ibid., pp. 33-34.
practice of using social experience to put oneself in help-gaining adjustment with powers that were mysterious, and yet powerful, resulted in the giving of personal values to these powers. The various social acts in which they were included led to personification. Perhaps a tribe would hold a feast to which the supernatural person was invited and given a share. Sometimes the tribe would have a dance which was intended not only to symbolize the sort of power which they wished to make friendly, but was intended to please such a power. Since chieftains could be made friendly by gifts, it was also natural that gifts should be brought to the unseen chieftain. In the course of time these customs of group-behavior became systematized under the direction of persons who for some reason were regarded as being particularly competent to make approaches to the deity. Thus, from the behavior of the group were shaped not only a religion as organized group practice in the interests of getting help from supernatural powers for satisfying needs, but ideas of the powers themselves. The gods, so to speak, were conceived by the habit of using the customs of social life to make the mysterious but controlling powers friendly persons. Thus, if men approached the mysterious powers personally, it was because they expected to be treated personally in return.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 35-34.}

It seems that it may at least be argued, from an objective viewpoint, that when one consults primitive conditions and expressions where they exist today, group-behavior on the one hand, and a sense of need of aid from some mysterious power on the other hand, seem to be everywhere present. The word "God" apparently combines elements which are found in these two facts. From this point of view, not fear, but the establishment
of help-gaining personal adjustment to the elements of a conditioning environment is the real function of a religion. Hence, religion is an attempt to understand and to get personal help from that which, though unseen and unknown, is believed to be influential.\(^1\)

Thus humanity, even in its simplest days, found it impossible to face its problems and to satisfy its various needs without setting up adjustments with nature on the personal plane. The behavior which such needs demanded consisted in a more or less intelligent extension of social experience to nature. The gods, even a supreme god, appeared as aids in the experimentation which constitutes life. A functioning of the life process for the sake of help-gaining adjustment with elements of the environment was naturally and one might say irresistibly expressed in accordance with men's experience in social relationships... The one important thing to remember is that the organization of the ideas of gods and of a supreme being, in so far as it can be reached by anthropological discussion, lies in the human desire so to act as to utilize personal experience in getting help from those mysterious forces of nature upon which men feel themselves dependent and with which they feel personal relations can be established. Such behavior implies a belief that such personal relations and consequent personal response are possible. Social customs were patterns in which this belief was expressed.\(^2\)

In the meantime, early peoples for the most part, hardly without exception, were optimistic as to the continuation of life after physical death. Both the belief in God and the belief in immortality involve moral and social attitudes. Belief in immortality is not just a hope that may calm fears of death, but the idea seems also to have been inspired by man's realization that he is of potential infinite value by virtue of his moral personality. However, as D. C. Macintosh says, the chief factor of belief in immortality has been the idea of God. He says:

If we ask the secret of the persistence of belief in immortality in the absence of any absolute empirical demonstration of the truth of the doctrine, the answer is that, after an appreciation of the

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\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 34, 35, 36.  
\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 39-40.
worth of human personality, the chief factor in the belief has
been the idea of God, that is, of a Power great enough and good
enough to conserve the human individual in spite of bodily death.
If we can be adequately assured, through experience or argument,
of the existence of such a Being, we can at the same time be
assured of the truth of immortality. If we can be assured that
the Supreme Being in the universe loves man with an everlasting
love, we can be assured that man is intended for everlasting life.1

Thus, there is relation between these two ideas; interwoven in the
very core of human existence, bound together by the interrelation of moral
and social aspects of life from the beginnings of humanity. The crucible
of recorded human experience has persistently tied the ideas of God and
immortality together. From primitive times to the present day, the rela-
tion may be readily noted. Although the idea of God may be independent,
thoughts of immortality must necessarily include a concept of God, for no
doctrine of immortality can stand alone, and this is particularly true of
the Christian, Biblical doctrine. In spite of the fact that some people
may be more interested in some scheme of personal immortality than a God,
and although primitive ideas of immortality may have developed before the
idea of a God or gods, the concept of God is a metaphysical necessity for
the progression and survival of belief in immortality. Thus, the belief
in personal immortality is of such nature that it demands a foundation, a
reason on which to hinge any semblance of credibility. The person, then,
who believes in personal immortality basically presupposes the being, the
existence of a good, personal, intelligent, and purposeful God. Perhaps
it could also be said that unless such a God exists, neither does personal
immortality.

Because of opposing materialistic theory, and the lack of so-called
scientific evidence, those who believe in God and immortality are faced

1Douglas C. Macintosh, The Reasonableness of Christianity (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 72-73.
with the twofold task of producing warranty for such beliefs. Ever since the rebellion of science against the anti-naturalistic tendencies of Christianity, various theologians and philosophers have endeavored to establish convincing arguments for the existence of God. Of course the Bible makes no effort to prove the existence of God, for the Scriptures were written because of the belief that God did exist and that He was intimately concerned with the state of mankind. However, such arguments and Biblical authority are not recognized by the scientific measure of certainty.

There is another ground of belief. According to D. C. Macintosh, belief in God does not depend primarily upon argument, but upon personal experience. Such experience, he says, is not the contribution of philosophy, but of religion. It is based upon the individual experience of religious need and its satisfaction. He asserts that men are all aware, in that immediate cognitive experience which they sometimes vaguely call "feeling," that they are absolutely dependent. In this consciousness is included an immediate apprehension of God. By recognizing their absolute dependence there is included a recognition of a Reality upon which we are absolutely dependent, and that Reality is God, the God of universal experimental religion.

In apprehending the existence of God then, the aspects of feeling, impulse, and emotion are important to personal experience. Because of critical occasions, a crisis, or even a tragedy, man may recognize his insufficiency to cope with a number of the dire needs that arise in life. Such a recognition and realization have led man to God, for when man feels his own inability he grasps beyond human power to God that he may realize satisfaction of his need. Therefore, because humanity has a critical

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1 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
need of a power beyond itself, man dares to posit a God. The need of a Supernatural Power or Being is as basic and as real as the basic drives of life. God. (Then, it follows, that man may then be regarded as having been created in the image of God.)

For instance; The baby seeks almost intuitively and instinctively the mother's breast when hunger pangs are felt. The nature of life offers food and water to meet the basic needs of hunger and thirst. The growing boy and girl, from childhood through puberty, youth and maturity, increasingly feel the urge of sex, a basic drive that demands satisfaction. Again there are in existence the opposite sexes to satisfy this need. Also, man is a reproductive, social creature to help him meet his desire for security, by establishing a home and forming a society—be it a group, a tribe, or a nation. He finds these basic physical needs, definite urges of hunger, of sex, and of security, satisfied with more than figments and with more than mere, useless symbols. Rather, he sees that the very nature of things offers either the fulfillment of these needs, or the possibility of achieving their ultimate satisfaction.

Therefore, because of the intricate provision of nature to the demands of life, particularly in the realm of man's existence, offering the satisfaction of the basic drives of his physical life, it seems that man has the right to intuit a God. The need of a Higher Power is just as real, just as

basic, and just as critical as food is for hunger, and water is for thirst, and woman is for man, and society is for security. Thus when man realizes a supreme need for God, for superhuman help, he gropes for God and grasps Him by faith during such a critical moment. This faith comes when man

satisfies his need because the basic physical drives are satisfied and
fulfilled by similar experiential process. This seems to be sufficient reason for man to be at least "morally optimistic" concerning the existence of God. Then, it follows, that man may also be optimistic concerning immortality in a personal sense.

However, in following the cue of "moral optimism" further, Macintosh suggests:

If optimism is valid and there is an attitude and adjustment on our part which, when fulfilled, justifies freedom from anxiety about what is beyond our power and brings an inward or spiritual preparedness for anything that can happen to us, it logically follows that there must be among or above the powers at work in the world a Dependable Factor, conserving all absolute spiritual values beyond what man as a physically embodied and limited creature is able to do. This Power must be the ultimate power with which man has to do, the object of absolute dependence, and must be great enough and good enough--favorable enough to human values--to effect for man what man imperatively needs to have done, if he is to be justified in remaining a moral optimist. Preparedness of spirit for any disaster to physical existence which can come through the orderly operation of the forces of the natural world is logically possible only on the postulate of the ultimate conservation of all absolute or spiritual values; and if we are to have logical ground for this faith in the conservation of values, we must postulate a Conserver of values, an ultimately dependable Factor, completely favorable to the true interests of man, adequate in power, and able rightly to guide the exercise of that power. Such a Factor religion postulates and calls by the name of God.¹

Again, the God of moral optimism must be absolutely sufficient in power for man's imperative religious needs, especially his need for triumph over physical death. Such a God whose existence and absolute sufficiency for man's needs must be so related to the world and man so that the adequate power of God is available to man when he needs it, no matter where man might be. The idea of power, persistently directed toward an ideal end in which all spiritual values are fully included, reasonably suggests that this power is consciously guided and controlled, and that such an ultimate

¹Ibid., pp. 75-76.
Factor is essentially personal. However superpersonal God may be, He is most reasonably thought of as at least personal in the sense of being conscious, intelligent, purposive, working consciously and rationally toward an end in which the conservation of human personality and values is included.¹

Thus, according to Macintosh, the reality of the Ideal which religion demands can be found in the ideal character and will of God. Such an essentially personal God, who works dependably for ideal ends, remains adequate for man's absolute dependence and trust, must also be regarded as ideally moral, perfect in holiness and in self-giving love. With the voluntary co-operation of man the ideals of God may be progressively realized, transformed from ideal into actual reality. If God is perfect will, working for the realization of His ideal, then God is essentially personal.²

However, in further considering the evidence for belief in a personal God, let us consider the discussion of E. S. Brightman. His presentation is given in eight points:

1. The hypothesis of a personal God is coherent with the facts of personal consciousness in relation to man as an actual entity. All of the actual data empirically available to us are conscious experiences, and all that is inferred from those data must be consistent with and explanatory of conscious experience. The datum of self is considered an actual entity. Other selves, the world, and God are thus hypothetical entities. It cannot be proven that the hypothesis of God is more coherent with the facts of our personal consciousness than other alternative hypothetical entities, but the fact that every hypothetical entity is logically derivative from actual entities is undeniable. This fact, as far as it goes, is evidence for a personal God.

2. If physical causes are in the realm of the conscious will of God, they are not merely motion, and both the physical phenomena and

¹Ibid., pp. 77-78. ²Ibid., pp. 78, 79, 80.
their effects on human consciousness are intelligible. This argument starts from the hypothetical entities of physics (force, energy, work) and proceeds to the inference that all physical forces are known only in so far as, at some stage of their being, they act on and produce conscious experience. This fact is consistent with the hypothesis that physical forces are either the will of a personal God in action, or they are the creative effects of that will.

3. All evidence for law and order in the universe is evidence for a personal mind at work. While order does not necessitate mind, mind necessitates order, and order is coherent with mind.

4. All evidence for purpose, either as a psychological fact in man or other animals, or as a biological or physico-chemical fact of objective adaptation of means to ends in nature, or even as a directive force in the world process is evidence for a personal God. For accident to produce as much purpose as actually exists would be no less than magical.

5. The evidence of history of religion, with its trend toward mono- theism, of psychology of religion, with its goal in the integration of personality, and of sociology of religion with its ideal of co-operation and universal benevolence, is satisfactorily explained by the hypothesis that one supreme personal God is at work in all religious experience.

6. The whole domain of value experience is more explicitly coherent with the hypothesis of a personal God than are other facts of law and order. Value is inherently a personal experience, and if the cosmic source of value is itself a value it must be a person realizing ideals. However, any rational hypothetical entity--God, unknown power, blind force, must give an account of both the good and the evil in experience.

7. Especially, in opposition to the alternative of impersonalistic naturalism, personalistic theism may be shown to be rationally superior by its more inclusive coherence. Mind and religious faith are unexplained facts in a naturalistic world. However, if there is a personal God, both mind and matter are understood.

8. Finally, the evidence for God consists of empirical facts which survive all disbelief. The persistence of value experience when a personal God is denied is evidence for an 'axiogenetical' power in the universe.\(^1\)

If, then, man may reasonably posit a God, on the basis of the varied evidence the writer has discussed, a supreme, creative, cosmic person, that

\(^1\)Ebrightman, op. cit., pp. 227-232.
infinitely good Being is committed to the eternal conservation of values. Such a Being is the controlling and directing power in all natural processes and is engaged in a process of immanent co-operation with all other persons. Since all true values are experiences of the fulfillment of ideal purposes by persons, the existence of values depends on the existence of persons. Value may be regarded as personality at its best. Therefore, God, the conserver of values, must be God, the conserver of persons.¹

Thus, in Kantian fashion Brightman further states:

...Every argument for God, whether as absolute or as finite, is an argument for God's power to control his universe so as to achieve value; and every argument for God's goodness is an argument for his obligation to maintain persons in existence as intrinsic values that could not be lost without a total failure of God's good purpose. For if all persons were to perish with their bodily death, God would be in an unenviable position. He would either continue forever to create new persons, or he would give up the enterprise of creation. If he continued to create new persons, then he would be conducting a cosmic bonfire, with each new generation warmed by the burning of the previous one; God and man alike could look back on centuries of effort with no permanent results, no persons treated as ends in themselves, no life coming to full development. Or if he abandoned the enterprise of creation, then there would finally be no result at all from the entire race of personal beings except in God's memory; the eternal ideals would be as abstractly valid as they were before creation, a disappointed and frustrated God would remain—and all the intrinsic value of each person (except God) would be irretrievably lost. That the arguments for God are at the same time arguments for immortality is indicated by the fact that there has been only one well-known philosophical believer in immortality who denied theism, namely, J. M. E. McTaggart, and the correlative fact that substantially every theist has accepted immortality.²

However, the previous discussion concerning the affirmation of the existence of God, from a rationalistic base, hinges upon the validity of man's experience in conceiving the idea of God. Thus, the question may be asked whether man's idea of God is a real idea of an actuality or whether it is a hopeful illusion invented to satisfy man's formulated

¹Ibid., p. 401. ²Ibid., pp. 401-402.
concepts of life. On the other hand, proof versus illusion may be recognized as a true dichotomy only within the framework of a basically "rationalistic" system. There is the possibility that some may consider the "Christian Faith" as giving a different basis for affirming the existence of God, that is quite apart from either proof or illusion. In such instance, the possibility and probability of faith going beyond reason, in varying shades of irrationality, is asserted. Hence, proof may not be possible, nor is it necessary. Faith, then, is largely derivative of given religious experience, particularly on an individual level.

But, because the major opponents of belief in God and personal immortality, such as the psychological illusionists and the logical positivists, argue from a rationalistic base, we must also endeavor to give rationalistic reason for such belief in so far as possible. Charles Hartshorne, an able logician, has presented a formal study of the ontological argument for the existence of God, and his method shall be utilized at this point. In so doing, one obtains a logical affirmation that man's idea of God is and that God is actual. Thus, Hartshorne proceeds in the following manner:

1

Major premise. Whatever is coherently conceivable is either actual or an unactualized (but real, more than merely logical) potency, which refers to potentiality or possibility.

According to Hartshorne, this premise implies that meaning is a relation which requires a term, and this term must have some mode of

reality, which is the minimal alternative to actual existence, and consisting in real ontological potentiality. He refers to the real world as such that dollars or fairies might be given existence. The major premise asserts, however, that it is only because such a capacity to produce dollars is really there in present or past existence that one can have a coherent idea as definite possibility.¹

The following clarification of his position is given by the amplification of meanings: (1) Coherently conceivable means neither simply meaningless nor inconsistent in meaning. (2) An idea stands in relation to the actuality, or if not the actuality, then the possibility of that which it means; its objects, and not merely in relation to itself as actual or possible. Men are never thinking what merely may be thought of, but always what might, or what actually does exist, and therefore it can be coherently thought of. (3) Meanings are logically possible only because their referents are ontologically possible or actual. Possibility is verified when actuality is the datum—to deny this is to deny the possibility of predicting the future. Subjective, logical, or epistemological possibility, then, is sufficient evidence for the disjunction or separation of real existence, real possibility, or potentiality of existence. Thus, unless Hartshorne's whole major premise is true, God could not even be conceivable.²

Minor premise. God or Perfect Being is coherently conceivable.

The reason God is coherently conceivable is because: (1) Perfection can be meaningfully defined in terms that in so far as inquiry has gone, it does not yield any incompatible consequences. From this point alone the

¹Ibid., p. 226. ²Ibid., p. 227.
idea of perfection may be said to be probably coherent. (2) Logic and ethics inevitable make implicit use of the idea of perfection. Reasoning is sound in so far as it is capable of reducing discrepancy between logical knowledge and the ideal of perfect knowledge or omniscience. Ethical conduct is right so far as, within man's capacity, his motivation accords with the ideal of a wholly enlightened or perfect goodwill, such as the holiness or righteousness of God. Thus if one says that the idea of perfection is incoherent, nonsensical, it follows that the ideal to which all of man's striving necessarily refers is nonsense. In such case, everything becomes nonsense, since the ideal is necessarily involved in all striving and it cannot be given up. (3) The cosmological argument validly establishes the need for a perfect being. Thus, if it can be shown that one must admit a necessary being, if the ontological argument shows that perfection involves necessary existence (which it does whether or not the coherence of perfection be assumed), and if (as Kant admits) man has no conception of a character other than perfection which could render a being noncontingent, then the assumption of coherence for man's concept of perfection is the only way to meet the need whose validity the cosmological argument establishes.¹

In positing that God or Perfect Being is coherently conceivable, Hartshorne says that the idea of perfection, when coherently defined, requires that there be potentiality as well as actuality, and that every idea must have at least one of these as its referent. In the case of God, perfection cannot be unembodied as essence, for here essence and existence are inseparable. He further defines perfection absolute (Anselmian) and

¹Tbid., pp. 228, 229.
relative (non-Anselmian) which Hartshorne calls "reflexive transcendence." Both the absolute and relative aspects of perfection agree in regarding perfect being as such that no other being, actual or conceivable, can surpass it in say, power or knowledge. Such a Being is called the "self surpassing surpasser of all beings individually other than itself." Therefore, perfection is existent or nothing. Furthermore, if real potentiality means a capacity of nature or reality to produce something, then if there be potentiality of perfection, there is sufficient productive capacity to produce a perfect unsurpassable being. (Such capacity must be unsurpassable itself in its productiveness, and it seems it could not be distinguished from the perfect being it is able to produce. For as Anselm taught, a producible being, were it produced, could not be perfect nor omniscient.)

The primary conclusion is that God is actual or an unactualized potency.

Third premise. God is not unactualized potency ("potency of perfection" being meaningless or self-contradictory). Unactualized potency involves a conceivable transition to existence, but such transition could not terminate in a being unsurpassable, for nothing unactual is objectively possible unless an adequate cause of its actuality is actual. However, this premise is derived from two other minor propositions: (1) An adequate cause of an unsurpassable being must itself be an unsurpassable being. (2) A caused being could not be unsurpassable, for it is surpassed by a being that needs no cause because it is self-existent, and thus is self-determined and powerful in a sense that is contradictory to the notion of unsurpassability. This proves that there is no such thing as potentiality of

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1Ibid., pp. 227, 230, 231.
perfection.\footnote{Ibid., p. 232.}

Hartshorne's final conclusion is, therefore, that God is actual. This conclusion is made because if an idea is really nonsensical, it ought to be possible to find the features in it which, by their conflict, generate the incoherence. If this cannot be done, there is in this fact itself evidence that the idea is coherent, and in the case of God, there is evidence that the object of the idea of God is actual. Furthermore, perfection cannot be represented by any ordinary image. The idea of God implies that all beings who are aware of anything must be aware of God. He is "the all pervasive unsurpassable comprehensive being," absent nowhere, functioning in and through all things so intimately that in abstraction from Him (which is impossible) they would be nonentity. Thus, how can one then have datum and not have God as datum? He is not just behind or beneath or causally back of things, but He is unsurpassably direct in His relations with them. Finally, the idea of God is a reference to direct experience of humanity that God is actual. This is supported by the very definition of perfection as "superiority to all other beings that exist or could exist." What is the meaning of "all" and or "superior to?"

How are men able to refer to the entire sweep of existence? How are men able to speak of superiority, not in some utterly relative sense, but as unqualifiedly superior? Hartshorne says the only intelligible answer is in terms of man's direct experience with God.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 233, 235.}

The short form of this argument is given as follows:

Major premise:--Whatever is coherently conceivable is either actual or an unactualized (but real, more than merely 'logical') potency (or potentiality or possibility.)
Minor premise:—God or Perfect Being is coherently conceivable.

Conclusion:—God is actual or an unactualized potency.

Third premise:—God is not unactualized potency ('potency of perfection' being meaningless or self-contradictory.)

Conclusion:—God is actual.¹

Also, from the long and short forms of the argument that Hartshorne has given us, the writer has set up his logical proof for the existence of God symbolically. For his own purposes, the writer has assigned various key words symbolic letters and arranged them in accordance with the sequence of Hartshorne's propositional formulation. Therefore, let the following columns of symbolic letters represent the given key words:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R:</th>
<th>reality</th>
<th>B:</th>
<th>being</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A:</td>
<td>actual</td>
<td>C:</td>
<td>coherent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E:</td>
<td>existence</td>
<td>I:</td>
<td>idea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F:</td>
<td>potential</td>
<td>n:</td>
<td>nonsense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X:</td>
<td>anything</td>
<td>m:</td>
<td>meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G:</td>
<td>God</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

These symbols may be arranged in the succeeding logistic formulation:

Major premise

| R = AE or PE
| mP = AE or PE
| XCI = AE or PE

Minor premise

| XIP = AE or PE
| If: XIPm = nAE and nPE
| IpB or G = AE or PE
| IpB or G = CI

Conclusion

pb or G = AE or PE

¹Ibid., p. 225.
Third premise  

\[ p_B \lor G \Rightarrow n_E \lor n_F E \]

Final Conclusion  

\[ p_B \lor G = AE \]

Consider next the theology of Paul Tillich and his discussion concerning God. He says that God is the answer to the question implied in being. Thus the ontological question is:

What is being itself? What is that which is not a special being or group of beings, not something concrete or something abstract, but rather something which is always thought implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, if something is said to be?¹

The ontological question of being—itself arises out of the shock of possible nonbeing. Only man can ask the ontological question because he alone is able to look beyond the limits of his own being and every other being. From the standpoint of possible nonbeing, man views being as a mystery. Man is not bound to "beingness;" he can envisage nothingness. In so doing, he must also ask about that which creates the mystery of being, considering the mystery of nonbeing.²

There are thus three leading concepts in Tillich's system: being, nonbeing, and being—itsel. None of these concepts or realities are said to exist in isolation, but rather they exist in correlation and interdependence. Concerning this idea of correlation he says:

There is a correlation in the sense of correspondence between religious symbols and that which is symbolized by them. There is a correlation in the logical sense between concepts denoting the human and those denoting the divine. There is a correlation in the factual sense between man's ultimate concern and that about which he is ultimately concerned.³

² Ibid., p. 186.
³ Ibid., p. 60.
Hence, three pairs of correlation are discerned: being and non-being (finite being), being-itself and nonbeing (God), and finite being and being-itself. There is thus a dialectic in man, a dialectic in God, and a dialectic between God and man. All three are seen to be interdependent and interpenetrable. Being reveals nonbeing and nonbeing reveals being. Together they reveal being-itself and at the same time being-itself (God) reveals finite being.\(^1\) Therefore, God is that which ultimately concerns man. Apart from reference to religious life, one seemingly can only say that deity is "being-itself," or the power of being whereby it resists nonbeing. God does not merely exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence. Thus, for Tillich, to argue that God exists is to deny Him.\(^2\)

Furthermore, Tillich declares:

The question of God is possible because an awareness of God is present in the question of God. This awareness precedes the question. It is not the result of the argument but its presupposition. . . . The so-called ontological argument points to the ontological structure of finitude. It shows that an awareness of the infinite is included in man's awareness of finitude. Man knows that he is finite, that he is excluded from an infinity which nevertheless belongs to him. He is aware of his potential infinity while being aware of his actual finitude. If he were what he essentially is, if his potentiality were identical with his actuality, the question of the infinite would not arise. Mythologically speaking, Adam before the fall was in an essential, though untested and undecided, unity with God. But this is not man's situation, nor is it the situation of anything that exists. Man must ask about the infinite from which he is estranged, although it belongs to him; he must ask about that which gives him the courage to take his anxiety upon himself. And he can ask this double question because the awareness of his potential infinity is included in his awareness of his finitude.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Tillich, Systematic Theology, op. cit., I, 205.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 206.
In other words, the question of God can be asked because there is an unconditional element in the asking of any question. The question of God must be asked because the threat of nonbeing, which man experiences as anxiety, drives him to the question of being conquering nonbeing and of courage conquering anxiety. This question is the cosmological question of God. It is about that which ultimately makes courage possible, a courage which accepts and overcomes the anxiety and fear of finitude. Finite being includes courage, but it cannot maintain courage against the ultimate threat of nonbeing, in terms of death, meaninglessness, and condemnation. Finite being needs a basis for ultimate courage, and that source is being-itself, God.¹

Hence, although man is a finite being who is threatened by nonbeing, man lives in relation to God, the "ground of being," who is the answer implied in the finitude of being threatened by nonbeing. Tillich's concept of God goes beyond the affirmation of the existence of God, emphasizing that He is beyond the contrast of essential and existential being. He is the power of being in everything and above everything, the infinite power of being. Since God is being-itself, He is separate from nothing. He is the "absolute participant," hence He cannot literally be a self. He is superpersonal, but symbolized as personal. All descriptions of God are symbolic, for God is beyond finitude and infinity, and the same is true with respect to notions of "relative" and "absolute." Thus, as the power of being, God transcends all essential and existential being involved in finitude, as well as exceed the distinction between potential and actual. Therefore, according to Tillich, God cannot be spoken of as living in the

¹Ibid., pp. 208, 209; cf. Tillich, The Courage to Be, chaps. 2 and 3.
proper or nonsymbolic sense of the word "life." God lives in so far as He is the ground of life. "Ground" is neither cause nor substance, taken literally, but rather it is that something which "underlies" all things in a manner which can only be symbolized through concepts of causation or substantiality.¹

Again, Tillich says that life is the process in which potential being becomes actual being, but one can only speak of a process in God, of potentiality and actuality (life) in God, symbolically and analogically. Process, potentiality, and actuality are not really or intrinsically in God. Similarly, past and future are not really in God, though they have their roots in God. God is not a being, a person Himself, but He becomes such in the "I--Thou" relationship of man and God. Tillich is opposed to equating God with any object or with any anthropomorphic proposition, and to say that God exists, that He is a person, amounts to saying that God is a creature. Therefore, Tillich will speak of God, in human terms, only symbolically and metaphorically.²

The symbol "personal God" is absolutely fundamental because an existential relation is a person-to-person relation. Man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything that is less than personal. In that personhood includes individuality, the meaningful sense that God can be considered as an individual is in the sense that He is the "absolute participant." This means that both individualization and participation are rooted in the ground of divine life and that God is equally "near" to each of them while transcending them both. Thus God is the ground of

¹Cochrane, op. cit., pp. 84, 85. ²Ibid.
everything personal and He carries within Himself the ontological power of personality. He is not a person, but He is not less than personal. God is the principle of participation as well as the principle of individualization. The divine life participates in every life as its ground and aim; He has community with it; He shares in its destiny. However, God’s participation is not a spatial or temporal presence. It is meant not categorically but symbolically. It is the "parousia," the "being with" of that which is neither here nor there.¹

The divine life is also creative, actualizing itself in inexhaustible abundance. The divine life and the divine creativity are not different--God is creative because He is God. His aseity implies that everything which He is, He is through himself. He eternally "creates Himself," a paradoxical phrase which states God’s freedom. Nor is creation contingent. It does not "happen" to God, for it is identical with His life. Thus Tillich declares creation is not only God’s freedom, but it is also His destiny. One may thereby say, in at least a symbolic sense, that God has created the world, He is creative in the present moment, and He will creatively fulfill His "telos," His inner aim. Such a relationship implies originating creation, sustaining creation, and directing creation. This means that, according to Tillich, not only the preservation of the world but also providence is subsumed under the doctrine of the divine creativity.²

The creative process of the divine life precedes the differentiation between essences and existents. In the creative vision of God the individual is present as a whole in his essential being and inner telos and, at the same time, in the infinity of the special moments of his life-process. Of course, this is said symbolically, since we are unable to have a perception or even an imagination of

¹Tillich, Systematic Theology, op. cit., pp. 244, 245.
²Ibid., pp. 252-253.
that which belongs to the divine life. The mystery of being beyond essence and existence is hidden in the mystery of the creativity of the divine life.

Furthermore, Tillich affirms implicitly that man is the aim of creation, for it can be said of no other being known that finite freedom is actualized within it. No other being has a complete self and a complete world, and no other being is aware of finitude on the basis of an awareness of potential infinity. Thus it may be said that man is the image of God because in Him the ontological elements are complete and united on a creaturely basis, just as they are complete and united in God as the creative ground. Man is the image of God because his "logos" is analogous to the divine "logos," so that the divine "logos" can appear as man without destroying the humanity of man.\footnote{Ibid., p. 255.}

Therefore, man actualizes his finite freedom in unity with the whole of reality. This actualization includes structural independence, the power of relying upon one's self, and the possibility of resisting the return to the ground of being, remaining in a "fallen" condition. At the same time, however, actualized freedom is necessarily continuously dependent on its creative ground. Only in the power of being-itself (God) is the person of man able to resist nonbeing. Hence, according to Tillich, God is immanent in the world as its permanent creative ground and is transcendent to the world through freedom. Both infinite divinity and finite human freedom make the world transcendent to God and God transcendent to the world.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 258, 259.}

Yet, God is never just a spectator; He always directs everything toward its fulfillment. For Tillich, providence is thus a permanent

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 261, 263.}
activity of God which works through the polar elements of being. Providence works through the conditions of the individual, social, and universal existence, through finitude, nonbeing, and anxiety, through the interdependence of all finite things, through their resistance against the divine activity and through the destructive consequences of this resistance. Hence all existential conditions are said to be included in God’s directing creativity. Tillich further states that the man who believes in providence does not believe that a special divine activity will alter the conditions of finitude and estrangement. He believes, and asserts with the courage of faith, that no situation can frustrate the fulfillment of his ultimate destiny, that nothing can separate him from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus (Romans, Chapter 8).1

Therefore, God Himself is said to participate in the negativities of creaturely existence. God as being-itself transcends nonbeing absolutely. On the other hand, God as creative life includes the finite, and with it, nonbeing, although nonbeing is eternally conquered and the finite is eternally reunited with the infinity of divine life. The certainty of God’s directing and sustaining creativity is based on the certainty of God as the ground of being and meaning. The confidence, then, of man, his courage to be, is rooted in faith in God as his existential creative ground.2

Thus, the writer has been discussing the subject of God from several bases: teleological, cosmological, and ontological. It seems that whether one uses argument for the existence of God, or, with Tillich, affirm that God is, a reasonable conclusion may be derived from existential experience. The affirmation of a personal God is primarily founded on individual conscious experience which not only confronts man with the problem of being,

1Ibid., pp. 266, 267.
2Ibid., p. 270.
but also relates purpose and cause to his existence. The writer therefore concludes, from the assertions of the preceding discussion, that God is the logical answer to the ontological question. Furthermore, he proposes that God is the most reasonable answer from the standpoint of Cause and Purpose evident in the world. In other words, man's very existence bespeaks the necessity of a Cause, and the manner of his life intimates Purpose. Hence, the fact of man's being demands a Ground of Being, God.

Since God is thus so basically involved in man's existence, it seems He must of necessity be also intricately and unalterably involved in his future. The creative personality of God, with His apparent inner aim of purposeful sustenance, necessitates an involvement in man's personal destiny; for in the very activity of creation, God ascribes both value and meaning to the personal existence of the individual. Therefore, no argument or avowal for immortality which leaves out reference to God has any cogency. Moreover, belief in God appears fundamentally necessary for belief in immortality, and especially personal immortality. The relation of these two beliefs is plain; without a personal God, a belief in personal immortality would have no justification.

On the other hand, if one is warranted in assuming the existence of a personal God, he also has grounds from which he may project the Christian concept of personal immortality. The basis of the faith-claims of Christian doctrine rests upon the presumptive assurance of a personal God. However, the projection of belief in personal immortality will be intensified as the writer further considers the complementary elements of faith, hope, value, and the resurrection of Jesus Christ particularly. Therefore, in considering the inherent character of this asserted Christian doctrine, it
shall be shown that it is also immediately dependent on the emotive attitude of hope.

In a general sense, hope is said to be the primary attitude from which all ideas of future life arise. However, it likewise provides the necessary soil that man needs for growth, prosperity, and his own personal existence. Thus, such aspects of hope are adjudged to be more than mere fanciful or wishful thinking which has no "real" frame of reference. And although it is of emotive character, a particular attitude of hope maintains a plausible foundation with which the Christian hope of personal immortality is fundamentally associated.

II. THE PRIMACY OF HOPE

Dr. James H. Leuba makes the statement that "in so far as the most civilized nations are concerned, the modern belief in immortality costs more than it is worth."¹ He views any faith or optimistic hope, in regard to God and immortality, as a form of belief that could profitably be discarded for a newer and more valuable belief. However, in contrast, it is the purpose of this writer to show that the attitude of hope is not only of primary value in human physical welfare, but also that the persistence of hope concerning God and immortality is contributive evidence to their existence.

It seems that it is as Emerson wrote:

No sooner do we try to get rid of the idea of immortality that pessimism raises its head. . . . Human griefs seem little worth assuaging; human happiness too paltry (at best) to be worth increasing. The whole moral world is reduced to a point. Good and evil, right and wrong, become infinitesimal, ephemeral matters. The affections die

¹Leuba, op. cit., p. 290.
away—die of their own conscious feebleness and uselessness. A moral paralysis creeps over us.¹

Again, Emil Brunner declares that what oxygen is for the lungs, hope is for the meaning of human life. If oxygen is taken away, death occurs by suffocation, and if hope is taken away, humanity is constricted as through lack of breath. When hope is absent despair supervenes, spelling the paralysis of intellectual and spiritual powers by a feeling of the senselessness and purposelessness of human existence. Thus, as the fate of the human organism is dependent on the supply of oxygen, so the fate of humanity is dependent on its supply of hope.²

To put it a little differently, the necessity of hope is so primary in personal life because its vitality affords the will to face an unknown future. All plans, desires, and ambitions would be unrealized specters without the daring, optimistic presence of hope. Man’s continuing encounter with life therefore depends upon this sustaining element. Hope confidently and expectantly accepts the presence of the future, and becomes one of the ways in which what is merely future and potential is made vividly present and actual to us. Therefore, it may be said that hope is the positive, as anxiety is the negative mode of surveying and awaiting the future.

However, it should be pointed out that there is a hope based upon self-confidence, a confidence in man’s own powers to control and construct his own future. In this regard, Brunner says that the life and thought of modern Western Civilization is plainly distinguished from that of man in

other epochs and other culture cycles by the fact that this active attitude through which man seeks to control his future emerges ever more predominantly into the foreground. Yet, seemingly in proportion as man has the feeling that he has power over his future and can plan and determine it, occurring passive modes of realizing the future through mingled anxiety and hope recede into the background. For he who creates his future need neither hope nor fear.¹

It was perhaps at the time of the Renaissance that Western European man began to experience this strange confidence in his own powers of controlling and constructing his future. From that time onwards hope loses significance in proportion as self-confidence grows. Now, Western man has increasingly pictured himself as a man at the switchboard, regulating and determining his future. However, if man had his future in his own hands, he would need no longer to hope or to fear. But one cannot altogether conceal from himself the fact that man is very far from being the unqualified arbiter of his future. As Brunner says, man cannot remain unaware that his power and freedom to shape the future is limited because it is dependent on factors over which he has no control, such as nature and that which is not self.²

However, technology has assumed a dominant position in the structure of modern Western life to attempt to eliminate or at least to reduce man's dependence on nature. Since the degree of his control over the future has been increased by the invention and use of new means whereby his dependence and insecurity are progressively diminished...

¹ Ibid., p. 8.  
² Ibid.
and his power to determine the future is correspondingly increased. Therefore, it becomes hope which is at the same time a self-confidence, hope in the basis of self-confidence. Perhaps a more familiar term is belief in progress.¹

But so far as Europe is concerned, one might say that the belief in progress was, but no longer is, the hope of humanity in our time. Brunner says that the two world wars and the rise of the totalitarian state have destroyed it. They have shattered the two main pillars on which it rested, belief in technics and belief in the state and organisation as the means of guaranteeing man's progressive control of his future. Along with this, the belief itself has been shattered in the process. Belief in progress as hope resting upon self-confidence is the opposite of the Christian hope, which is hope founded upon trust in God and His holy purpose. It seems that just as belief in progress replaced and inherited the Christian hope which had once prevailed in Western Europe, so now, at a time when this belief itself which had become the hope of Western Europe is dying, there is witnessed the emergence of sheer hopelessness in the form of a philosophy of despair, of the nihilistic meaninglessness of life presently and in the future.²

Thus, Brunner says:

For a century now positivistic philosophy has not only expounded with paradoxical zeal, the thesis that to renounce inquiry into ends is the mark of a culturally mature mind. With the arrogance of the learned, it has preached to humanity metaphysical and religious abstinence. It has forgotten in the process that it was resigning only one of the two questions, that concerning ends, whereas it was urging the erudite world to pursue the inquiry into causes without setting any limits. But positivism lived in this matter—without

¹Tbid., p. 9. ²Tbid., p. 10.
being aware of the fact—a rich inheritance of Christian humanistic values and meanings which deceived it as to its own poverty so long as the source lasted. In particular, positivistic philosophy was one of the main supports of an optimistic conception of progress, hence of a universal hope. In proportion as this secret Christian heritage has become exhausted and the optimism of the idea of progress has been subjected to complete disillusionment, it has grown more and more pertinent to ask whether a life without hope is possible, whether the elimination of metaphysical and religious inquiries can be permanently maintained without surrendering life to a process of inner decadence.¹

It seems rather evident that humanity needs a different kind of hope than mere belief in progress, and unless man succeeds in grasping a hope other than that which is found in his technology and positivistic philosophy, he is universally bound for hopelessness. The writer suggests, therefore, that the Christian hope of personal immortality remains the answer to man’s perplexities and anxieties. But Brunner says that if the Christian hope is once again to be the hope of humanity, it can only occur in so far as the criticism of recent centuries is sincerely met and appreciated, and not simply a return to the faith of the Middle Ages or of the Reformation.² For this reason it is apparent to us that the basis of Christian hope cannot lie in mere dogma, but in the revelation of God given in Jesus Christ which is given through the witness of the Scripture.

Therefore, Christians affirm that the future is revealed to them and that revelation in the New Testament sense and revelation of the future is identical. Hence, Brunner declares, the Christian faith, which lives entirely in the power of revelation, is also expectation and hope of the future. However, Christian faith is so closely interrelated with the Christian hope of the future that faith and hope may be regarded as two aspects of one and the same thing—the revelation of Christ. Faith is

¹Ibid., pp. 13-14. ²Ibid., p. 28.
the foundation of hope, but hope is that which gives content to faith. Yet both faith and hope, in the Christian sense, are necessarily rooted in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.¹

Through this unity of faith and hope the revelation of the inscrutable Will of God in Jesus Christ becomes the answer to man’s deeply felt question as to the meaning of his existence; an answer which he himself is not capable of providing. For all man’s questions imply in the last resort the one question as to the telos, the final goal and meaning of life. As we saw, there is always the possibility of assimilating and expressing partial meanings. One can live on that level and even live humanly thus. And yet the partial meaning, just because it is only a partial meaning, is always at the same time a partial lack of meaning; he who cherishes merely partial purposes and never succeeds in believing them to be rooted and completed in an ultimate meaning must find his life as a whole infected with meaninglessness. These partial purposes may be never so highly valued, they may be called culture, humanity, world peace or world justice; the mere fact that they do not reckon with the phenomenon of death suggests behind the fulfillment of meaning a certain void. There are meaningful ends which open up to the individual man the vistas of eternity; but the mere fact that this fulfillment of meaning is only possible at the expense of solidarity with humanity as a whole again discloses the same void. The secret of the Christian hope is this, that it reveals an eternal purpose for the individual which is at the same time a purpose for humanity.²

There are some leading characteristics which seem to distinguish the hope of immortality as reasonable from a hope that would be a mere arbitrary fancy without any rational justification. A. E. Taylor suggests four such characteristics that distinguish the hope of immortality. (1) It is the attainment of a completed rational selfhood, or personality, that is conscious of itself and in harmonious possession both of all its own internal resources and of its "environment." (2) Immortality is a life communicated to those who share in it with the supreme personality presupposed by the very existence of the world and of selves. (3) The hope of immortality is no privilege reserved to an "elite" of the richly gifted, but a

¹ Ibid., p. 28. ² Ibid., pp. 28-29.
heritage open to all mankind, in virtue of their common endowment with the capacity for personality. (4) Although immortality is said to be an inheritance, it is also a gift which has to be appropriated by genuine effort on man's part.¹

Therefore, one would say that the distinction between the hope of life after death involves the whole personality and concern of man in relation to the problem of being. Other hopes do not involve the very core of man's existence. The question arises whether such a hope in immortality is illusory, having been born out of emotion and desire. The elements of emotion and desire may well be accounted as contributive to the development of the hope of life after death, but the base for the hope is personal concern for one's destiny. The Christian hope of immortality is an attempt to answer this concern.

The discussion thus far has pointed out the necessity of the element of hope throughout the activity of humanity, if individual life, or even human life as a whole, is to have meaning and purpose. The inadequacy and ineffectiveness of a mere belief in progress was also pointed out as ultimately leading to hopelessness by reason of its moral failure. It is therefore proper for the writer to consider the verity and certitude of this Christian hope based on the revelation of God through Jesus Christ. Again, as Brunner says, to wish to prove the revelation which is the foundation of the hope would mean that it had not been understood. Faith neither cannot nor is intended to be proved. Such proof implies a return to the universal and the timeless, and just that eliminates the very idea

of revelation and faith. Faith has the right to be incapable of proof because it rests upon truth which both precludes and forbids man the possibility of self-justification before the forum of scientific reason.\(^1\) This is also the type of certainty which characterizes the element of hope, the hope of personal immortality.

The faith or belief in which this hope is rooted becomes a matter of experience; not of the sense, but experience of true personal encounter with life. It would seem that to require proof in the sphere of an individual, personal encounter means to overlook the essence of personal being, and attempt to make an object of the person. Perhaps it may be said that the hope which springs from belief is so much a part of the life of faith that one must say: the future for which it hopes, is the present, or at least a part of the present, in which the believer lives.

Such hope has been the stabilizing factor for Christians across the centuries. It is an elementary attitude that can face the so-called unknown future with confidence, whether man's technology fails or not, and whether man's social progress ceases. The fact that the Christian hope is applicable to the anxieties of man's future, and the fact that this hope has consistently, again and again, repulsed hopelessness is at least an intimation of its worth-whileness. It would seem that it costs more not to utilize the Christian hope than to regard such belief in God and immortality as the guiding star through the future. Certainly progress cannot long exist in a pervading atmosphere of hopelessness such as exists wherever man's technology has failed or is now failing. Should progress automatically continue, that alone is not a satisfactory answer to the question of

\(^1\) Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
man's existence and his destiny.

Therefore, the writer maintains that the Christian hope is the only means whereby the necessary faith and idealism can be instilled in humanity as a whole as well as the individual personality, to anticipate man's reason and destiny satisfactorily. The living encounter of human personality demands a faith and hope that transcends all conveniences of government, of industry, or of science. They all may cease to be convenient. None but the hope of God through Jesus Christ can transcend death. The hope of immortality is basic to the present life of man because man presently wonders about the future. Ultimately that future is enveloped by death. Hope and faith alone remain.

Though some deny the need of such hope, and though some may actually despise it, they have identified the bare factor of hope, aside from the Christian sense, with something that can only lead to hopelessness. It seems that it has been the Christian hope of immortality that has contributed to the sanity of our cultural civilization. One may well ask if such a contribution can be supplied by falsehood. On the other hand, it may be asked if mere wishing for immortality will make it so. It has been the purpose of the writer to point out that the Christian hope of immortality transcends the utility of a wishful thought or mental hope. As it has been previously indicated, the structure of the hope of immortality is not to be confused with the fabric of common presumptuous wishes or hopes. The Christian hope of personal immortality is founded upon the involvements of existence rather than the certitudes of scientific test. Thus, in spite of the weight of its intellectual opponents, this Christian hope is not to be lightly disregarded, for it is concerned with man's
ultimate destiny in relation to his ordained presence in the realm of being.

Yet, hope is hampered by its own inadequacy to formulate doctrine. It depends upon the realization of other elements of support. Hence, in continuing the projection of the assertion of the Christian doctrine of personal immortality, the next consideration will be the contributive component of faith and its possible ability to grasp truth.

III. THE PREHENSION OF FAITH

It seems evident that God or the concept of personal immortality is not known by pure reason (formal logic, mathematics) or by mere sense experience apart from the agency of faith. If "pure" reason and sense data do enter into knowledge of God and immortality, they certainly do not yield such knowledge distinct from value experience. God is believed to be the supreme good, the immediate source and goal of human values, as well as the basis for belief in personal immortality. Brightman says our knowledge of values is different from our knowledge of logic or of sense data, so divergent that logical positivists hold that one cannot rightly speak of knowledge of values at all. However, religious experiences in all epochs have felt assurance of a religious knowledge concerning God and immortality through faith.  

Faith, according to Brightman, has been taken to mean: (1) acceptance of revelation, (2) a gift of God, and (3) trust or obedience. The first view is intellectualistic, for faith becomes cognition with assent;

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1Brightman, op. cit., p. 179.
It is knowledge of revelation accompanied by belief. As the first view regards man as active in accepting revelation, the second view regards man as passive in receiving it. Faith is thus counted as a supernatural gift, without human activity or responsibility, and if reason conflicts with it, reason must be wrong. The third concept faith relates trust or obedience to it. Both trust and obedience, as attitudes of the human will, are usually thought of as directed toward God. Religiously, trust is confident loyalty to what is believed to be true value. Obedience also relates to value, presupposing an authority that is acknowledged as justified in demanding obedience. Thus religious obedience means action in harmony with what is believed to be supreme authority.¹

According to this conception of faith, there is no reason why the religious man should regard any experience as a supernatural gift of God unless that experience commends itself to his reason as embodying ideal value. Then, and then only, does the attitude of faith set in; and its function is not to discover occult truths inaccessible to ordinary intelligence, but rather to act on the highest available truths about value. Faith in this sense is very close to what Kant meant by the practical reason; in spirit it is also akin to the scientific (and pragmatic) method—the method of trying loyally the best prospective experiment, and turning to a better if that fails.²

Therefore, Brightman says that all religious evidence, whether of revelation or of gifts of God or of the heart, must pass under the scrutiny of reason to test whether it introduces chaos or order into an experience. Faith, then, is not to be defined in contrast either to reason or to certainty, but rather in contrast to "unfaith," or disloyalty to the highest known values. Thus faith as conceived as trust and obedience appears also to be a form of knowledge in the outstanding "pragmatic" saying of Jesus,

¹Ibid., pp. 179, 180, 181. ²Ibid.
as recorded in John's Gospel: "If any man will to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God, or whether I speak of myself" (John 7:17). 1

With specific respect to the question of personal immortality, it seems evident that one may not demonstrate the immortality of the person so as to put it beyond the doubt of skeptical or scientific minds. But, on the other hand, it seems one may reasonably anticipate such immortality along converging lines of probability which meet in a focus of faith. It is the probability that leaves room for the exercise of faith, which in a sense is an adventurous step into the unseen and the unknown, so far as absolute certainty is concerned. This power of faith is one of the marks of greatness and uniqueness in man. Man apparently begins and ends with faith, of a sort, in all his beliefs and actions, for life is vastly more than mere logic. In some instances primal instincts and impulses push him into action before he reasons about them. Thus Benjamin Franklin said, "Man is endowed with reason in order that he can give reasons for what he wants to do." 2 Certainly, man must trust something before he can believe or know anything.

It seems that all the important relations of man to life are matters of faith, of trust, of confidence. The scientist manifests such an attitude when he trusts his senses, his instruments, the seeming universality of law and the integrity of the universe. Business is built on faith; and the lack of mutual confidence brings panic to the financial world. Faith seems to be the common ground under our feet, the mutual bond that binds and holds society together; it is the vital force of friendship and love.

1 Ibid., pp. 181, 182. 2 Snowden, op. cit., pp. 2, 6.
When this common bond of trust disintegrates, confusion and chaos result. Faith thus becomes a fact, an actual ingredient, a force that influences all of life.

Therefore, Snowden says:

Our faith in immortality is much older and deeper than our reasoning and proofs in connection with it. It is a constitutional instinct and impulse which begins to act with the beginning of human experience and grows with its growth as a practical necessity. Reason did not create it and reason cannot destroy it. God hath set eternity in the heart, and therefore, eternity comes out of the heart before the mind begins to reason about the grounds on which it rests. "We do not believe in immortality because we can prove it," says Dr. Martineau, "but we try to prove it because we cannot help believing it." 1

Furthermore, it seems rather improbable that man would long for that which has no existence. For instance, a man dying of thirst in the desert may believe you if you tell him that you have no water to give him, but he will not believe you if you tell him that no such thing as water exists. 2 Although it is likely that such a man's knowledge of the water refers to previous experience before the ordeal of the desert, the startling thought is that many sane people go about acting as though there were immortality and manifesting their expectation of it as an ultimate goal in life. Somehow, a faith to believe in the actuality of immortality has grasped the whole personality of individuals, giving rise to a hope that affirms the continuation of life after death.

The relation of faith to possibility cannot be denied, and it may be asked if man can desire anything that does not exist as a potentiality. There is a difference between what may be called our natural and reasonable anticipations and that which is mere fanciful imagining without any rational

1Ibid., p. 9.
2Harryankoock, And After This (New York: Longmans, Green, & Company, 1964), p. 27.
justification whatsoever. Man is certainly acutely conscious, at least in his more thoughtful moods, that there is a disturbing awareness of the incompleteness of physical life. Therefore, as a justification for an expectation such as life after death, it is significant to note that faith in immortality is bound up with man's belief in divine benevolence. Where the hope of immortality exists, along with the faith in its actuality, it is inseparably bound up with the belief that goodness is at the heart of things. Thus it is our faith in goodness that gives us faith in immortality. Such goodness alone could make immortality worth having. In this manner, life after death is a significant corollary of our faith in the goodness of God and the value of life.\(^1\)

Such an act of faith is a total and centered act of the personal self, an act of unconditional, infinite and ultimate concern. The reality of man's ultimate concern, about life after death in particular, reveals something about his being, namely, that he is able to transcend the flux of relative and transitory experiences of ordinary life. Generally speaking, man's experiences, feelings, and thoughts are conditioned and finite. They not only fluctuate, but their content is of finite and conditional concern—unless they are in some manner elevated to unconditional validity. However, many would seem to be saying is that faith is the natural result of the tension found in the divine existence of man and man's existence in the universe in which he lives. This is not to say that faith is an inchoate, disorganized affair. Rather, it is the necessary result of a concern for the infinite and unconditional, which are the infinite and unconditional, the absolute, and the infinite. This alone makes faith a human potentiality, and human potentialities are powers that drive towards actualization. Thus man is driven toward faith in immortality by his awareness of the infinite to which he belongs, but

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which he does not own as an absolute possession. In other words, man has a "restlessness of the heart" within the process of his life.¹

Furthermore, Tillich says:

Reason is the precondition of faith; faith is the act in which reason reaches ecstatically beyond itself. This is the opposite side of their being within each other. Man’s reason is finite; it moves within finite relations when dealing with the universe and with man himself. All cultural activities in which man perceives his world and those in which he shapes his world have this character of finitude. Therefore, they are not matters of infinite concern. But reason is not bound to its own finitude. It is aware of it and, in so doing, rises above it. Man experiences a belonging to the infinite which, however, is neither a part of himself nor something in his power. It must grasp him, and if it does, it is a matter of infinite concern. Man is finite, man’s reason lives in preliminary concerns; but man is also aware of his potential infinity, and this awareness appears as his ultimate concern, as faith. If reason is grasped by an ultimate concern, it is driven beyond itself; but it does not cease to be reason, finite reason. The ecstatic experience of an ultimate concern does not destroy the structure of reason. Ecstasy is fulfilled, not denied rationally. Reason can be fulfilled only if it is driven beyond the limits of its finitude, and experiences the presence of the ultimate, the holy. Without such an experience reason exhausts itself and its finite contents. Finally, it becomes filled with irrational or demonic contents and is destroyed by them. The road leads from reason fulfilled in faith through reason without faith to reason filled with demonic-destructive faith. The second stage is only a point of transition, since there is no vacuum in the spiritual life, as there is none in nature. Reason is the presupposition of faith, and faith is the fulfillment of reason. Faith as the state of ultimate concern is reason in ecstasy. There is no conflict between the nature of faith and the nature of reason; they are within each other.²

What Tillich seems to be saying is that faith is the natural result of the tension found in the dipolar existence of man. In such an existence man takes part in finitude and infinity; in nonbeing and being. Thus, in spite of its finitude, reason is also aware of its infinite depth. This

²Ibid., pp. 76-77.
is illustrated by the fact that even though infinitude cannot be expressed in terms of rational knowledge, there is the "real" knowledge that it is impossible to give such expression. Under such conditions of existence the structural elements of reason are said to move against each other. The polarity of structure and depth within reason produces a conflict between what is called autonomous reason and heteronomous reason. Out of this tension arises the quest for theonomy, from which faith is derived.1

Autonomous reason is that which affirms and actualizes its structure without regarding its depth. It is the obedience of the individual to the law of reason, which he finds in himself as a rational being. It is the law of subjective-objective reason; it is the law implied in the "logos" structure of mind and reality; that is, the grasping and shaping character of mind and reality in both aspects of the subject-object relationship. Autonomous reason is the opposite of willfulness; it is obedience to its own essential structure, the law of reason which is the law of nature within mind and reality, and which is divine law, rooted in the ground of being. Heteronomy would impose a strange law on one or all functions of reason, issuing commands from "outside" on how reason should grasp and shape reality. Yet, it represents, at the same time, an element of reason itself, the depth of reason. Thus the problem of heteronomy is the problem of an authority which claims to represent reason against its autonomous actualization. Both autonomy and heteronomy are rooted in theonomy, and each goes astray when their theonomous unity is broken. Theonomy means autonomous reason united with its own depth. In a theonomous situation reason actualizes itself in obedience to its structural laws and in the

1Tillich, Systematic Theology, op. cit., I, pp. 81, 83.
power of its own ground. God is the law for both the structure and the ground of reason; they are united in Him.1

However, Tillich states that there is no complete theonomy under the conditions of human existence. The elements of autonomy and heteronomy are essentially in a struggle in an effort to destroy each other. Therefore, the quest for a reunion of what is seemingly always split in time and space arises out of reason and not in opposition to reason. In other words, this quest for revelation, the manifestation of faith, is not contrary to reason, but it is in conjunction with reason.2

The "hiddenness" of revelation is called a mystery. A mystery, in Tillich's use of the term, appears when reason is driven beyond itself to its "ground and abyss," referring to that which "precedes" reason, to the fact that "being is and nonbeing is not," and the original fact that there is something and not nothing. This negative side is always potentially present, and it can be realized in cognitive as well as communal experiences. It is a necessary element in revelation and to faith. Without the "I am undone" of Isaiah in his "vocational vision" (Isaiah 6:5), God cannot be experienced. The positive side of the mystery, which also includes the negative aspect, becomes manifest in actual revelation as the mystery appears as ground of being and not only abyss. It appears as the power of being, conquering nonbeing, becoming our ultimate concern.3

Thus, revelation is the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately, and the mystery which is revealed is of ultimate concern to man because it is the ground of his being. Therefore, Tillich says, there is no revelation "in general," for revelation grasps an individual or a

1 Ibid., pp. 83, 84, 85.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., pp. 108, 109, 110.
group, usually a group through an individual; it has revealing power
only in this correlation. There is no revelation if there is no one who
receives it as his ultimate concern.¹ Faith, then, is the state of being
grasped by an ultimate concern, the concern about one's existence in its
ultimate "whence" and "whither." This concern, or situation of faith,
arises as a person is grasped by the elements of "ground and abyss" in
relation to his existence. It is the concern of the whole person, for it
is the most personal concern and that which determines all others. Hence,
it is not something that can be forced upon man, or which he can produce
by the will to believe, but it is that by which he is grasped. It is as
man is confronted and gripped by the threat of nonbeing that he is shaped,
motivated to behold the ground of being, or God. In Biblical terminology,
it is the divine Spirit working in man which creates faith.² Therefore,
Tillich asserts:

Faith, in the biblical view, is an act of the whole personality.
Will, knowledge, and emotion participate in it. It is an act of
self-surrender, of obedience, of assent. Each of these elements
must be present. Emotional surrender without assent and obedience
would by-pass the personal center. It would be a compulsion and not
a decision. Intellectual assent without emotional participation
distorts religious existence into a nonpersonal cognitive act. Obe-
dience of the will without assent and emotion leads into a deperson-
alizing slavery. Faith unites and transcends the special functions
of the human mind; it is the most personal act of the person. But
each function of the human mind is inclined to a kind of imperialism.
It tries to become independent and to control the others. Even bib-
lical religion is not without symptoms of these trends. Faith some-
times approaches the point of emotional ecstasy, sometimes the point
of cognitive subjection to an authority.³

This ecstasy ("standing outside one's self") points to a state of

¹Ibid., p. 111.

²Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate

³Ibid., p. 53.
mind which is extraordinary in the sense that the mind goes beyond its ordinary situation. Ecstasy is not to be considered a negation of reason; it is rather the state of mind in which reason transcends itself, beyond its ordinary subject-object structure. In such a situation, reason does not deny itself. Thus, "ecstatic reason" remains reason; it does not receive anything irrational or antirational, for it could not do this without self-destruction. Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery, namely, by the ground of being and meaning. It transcends the psychological level, although it has a psychological side. Ecstasy reveals something valid about the relation between the mystery of our being and ourselves. Hence, ecstasy is the form in which that which concerns us unconditionally manifests itself within the whole of our psychological conditions. It is a situation of faith which involves the whole of one's person. Therefore, in revelation and in the ecstatic experience in which it is received, the ontological shock is preserved and overcome at the same time. It is preserved in the annihilating power of the divine presence ("mysterium tremendum") and is overcome in the elevating power of the divine presence ("mysterium fascinosum").

Ecstasy united the experience of the abyss to which reason in all its functions is driven with the experience of the ground in which reason is grasped by the mystery of its own depth and of the depth of being generally.

Tillich, therefore, asserts that there is knowledge that is derived from such experience, from a situation of faith. He says that revelation is the manifestation of the mystery of being for the cognitive function.

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of reason. It mediates knowledge—a knowledge that can only be received in a revelatory situation. Knowledge of revelation is knowledge about the revelation of the mystery of being to us, not information about the nature of beings and their relation to one another. Thus, knowledge of revelation can be received only in the situation of revelation, and it can be communicated only to those who participate in this situation. The truth of revelation is not dependent on criteria which are not themselves revelatory. Knowledge of revelation, like ordinary knowledge, must be judged by its own implicit criteria. The use of finite materials in their ordinary sense for the knowledge of revelation destroys the meaning of it and deprives God of his divinity.1

In this manner it seems that faith carries its own validity, being a part of reason, yet transcending the criteria of ordinary autonomous knowledge. From the subjective side one must say that faith is true if it adequately expresses an ultimate concern. From the objective side, faith is true if its content is really the ultimate. The subjective perspective acknowledges the truth in all genuine types and symbols of faith. It justifies the history of religion and makes it understandable as a history of man's ultimate concern, of his response to the manifestation of the holy in various occasions. Whereas, the objective perspective points to a criterion of ultimacy by which the history of religion is judged in terms of a yes or no, and faith in terms of assent and dissent, rather than in terms of rejection.2

From a psychological standpoint, G. W. Allport says that faith is

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1Ibid., pp. 129, 130, 131.

2Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, op. cit., p. 96.
basically man's belief in the validity and attainability of goal or value. This goal is set by desires. However, such desires are not to be considered as merely drive ridden. They include such complex, future-oriented states as longing for a better world, for one's own perfection, for a completely satisfying relation to the universe. Furthermore, Allport suggests that this "forward thrust" in desires emanating from mature sentiments is so important that the term "intention" is proposed to depict the dynamic operation of faith. Intention designates, better than "desire," the presence of the rational and ideational component in all productive striving. Thus he says that some sort of idea of the end is always bound into the act itself. It is this inseparability of the idea of the end from the course of the striving that he calls faith.²

Concerning intention, it is stated that the pursuit of meaning is the heart of religious intention in many individual instances. However, one is cautioned to bear in mind the individual differences that characterize the operation of religious sentiment. Eduard Spranger, on the other hand, attempts to identify subjective religion with the longing for unity--complete unity of thought, feeling, and deed. The sum of religious intentions is said to represent a desire for total harmony, meaning thereby the individual's successive efforts to complete the incomplete, to perfect the imperfect, to conserve all values, eliminate all disvalues, to find permanence in the stead of transitoriness.²

Again, in considering how the religious individual justifies his faith, it is stated that even while his religious intentions are active he

2 Ibid., pp. 132, 133, citing Eduard Spranger, Types of Men, part II, chap. 6.
is capable of cross-questioning himself. A certain measure of confidence in the intended object is necessarily resident in every intention. Man knows his striving is real, and he suspects, from repeated experiences of reaching goals, that an appropriate object resides at the terminus of any persistent striving. For instance, Allport indicates: "Is he thirsty? There is water to assuage his thirst. Is he tired? There is rest to be had. Cold? There is such a thing as warmth."\(^2\) Extending this reasoning to the religious striving, C. S. Lewis adds:

> If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world. If none of my earthly pleasures satisfy it, that does not prove that the universe is a fraud. Probably earthly pleasures were never meant to satisfy it, but only to arouse it, to suggest the real thing.\(^2\)

However, Allport says that an individual is likely to accept several forms of validation, finding them in combination sufficient to sustain the faith that he has achieved. Modes of validation do not clash, but rather, they are mutually supportive. Both reason and pragmatic sanction, for example, may harmonize in the individual's mind with memories of his own mystical experiences. The latter, in turn, may persuade him that divine grace is in fact available from above to help one's unbelief, and to enable one to complete the "edifice of faith" that no aspirant can build entirely alone. Therefore, how the individual justifies his faith may be a variable matter, and the certitude he may achieve is his personally. A man's religious faith is the audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and to the Creator. "It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 135-136.

own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs.\textsuperscript{1}

Thus, with respect to man's faith in personal immortality, it can hardly be regarded as a meaningless or futile attitude. Because of its close association with reason, even though it transcends reason to cope with matters of ultimate concern, faith in God and immortality cannot be rightfully called irrational. As one is grasped and shaped by such matters involving his existence and possible nonexistence, he in turn must respond with a grasping, shaping experience that is likely to be one of faith in the ground of being and faith in one's ultimate destiny. Of course, it is possible that one also can choose to renounce his existence and his destiny. Still, there appears to be no strictly rational ground for assuming that physical death is necessarily the final end of a human life, nor does there seem to be any logical or demonstrable reason why one should accept nonexistence rather than have faith in the reality of being and its ascendancy over nonbeing (to use Tillich's terminology). This is especially so if the existence of God is related to the belief in personal immortality, as it is.

Also, the Christian faith is seen to be associated with reasonable revelation, the knowledge of the fact man exists, the knowledge there must be a ground or basis of his existence, the threat of not existing, and the fact that there is something and not nothing indicates the power of being over nonexistence. However, there is another aspect of revelation that the Christian faith rests upon, and that is the revelation of God in Jesus

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 141, 142.
Christ and His message. As the Son of God He negated Himself without losing Himself, becoming completely transparent to the Father. Yet, in being able to surrender Himself completely, Jesus had to possess Himself completely. And only one such as He can possess—and therefore surrender—Himself completely, who is united with the ground of His being and meaning without separation and disruption. It is because of these qualities that Paul Tillich says that Jesus as the Christ may rightfully be acclaimed the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation, which is the criterion of all others.¹

Though the Christian faith derived from such revelation cannot profess scientific certainty that may be demonstrated and proven, its warranty is found in personal existential experience as one is involved with matters that concern him ultimately. Such faith is necessitated by the limits of reason, for the questions of life, the "whence" and the "whither" are not satisfactorily answered by autonomous reason alone. This involvement of faith may reasonably be assimilated in personal living because it is not contrary to one's autonomy, and it is vindicated by the theonomous situation.² Therefore, the writer considers the Christian faith in personal immortality a testimony in itself, derived from individual concern, being grasped and shaped by the revelation of "the mystery" that was beheld. The fact that some men may have faith in the reality of immortality does not necessarily validate or actuate the belief that others may "will to believe" in a purely rational sense. However, it must be kept in mind that in order to have such faith, the personal experience of

¹Tillich, Systematic Theology, op. cit., I, 133.

²See Tillich, Systematic Theology, loc. cit.
the individual is indispensable. To denounce the reliability of faith concerning God and immortality is to beg the question.

Unless we are prepared to admit that human life and history constitute the one utterly meaningless muddle in an otherwise perfectly ordered and orderly universe, whose chief characteristic is intelligent and purposive design, then it would seem that such evidence as is available is more in favor of Christian faith than against it. 1

IV. THE VALUE OF VALUES

The Christian faith-claim of personal immortality becomes even more intensified through a perspective of individual human worth. Value concepts presuppose both an originator and experiencer of valuations. However, there are perhaps at least three alternative views that may be followed in relating value, worth and "unworth" to individual personality: (1) God creates values; therefore, they are all good and eternal. (2) God creates values, but unless there is eternal life or personal immortality, then God's created values are not as permanent as one would expect. (3) Values have worth--whether God creates them or not. But before one confines himself to any particular viewpoint in this regard, he should first consider that man himself may be reckoned as an experiencer of value, and in some respects he forms and shapes what he considers valuable.

Man is not a passive knower, but he is a knower who feels and acts, who judges the objects he knows to have various degrees and kinds of worth and "unworth." Thus he strives to alter or to maintain the interaction of his surroundings and himself so as to remove the experiences that have "unworth" for him, and to maintain and increase those experiences that have worth. The objects of human knowledge may be physical things, the

1 Hancock, op. cit., p. 26.
groupings of qualities apprehended through man's perceptive mechanism. Furthermore, they may be relations between physical objects and events, laws of nature generalized by the mind from the analysis and comparison of sense perceptions; or they may be selves and their actual relations to the physical order and to one another. Finally, the objects of human knowledge may be the appreciations or valuations with which man marks the objects known, and the aims and ideals by which he determines his active relations to the whole of nature, and especially to other selves. Valuation is thus said to be the most persistent and characteristic resident in human nature.¹

However, there is an important distinction in human values between instrumental or mediate values and intrinsic or immediate values. Position, wealth, manual skill, tools, knowledge of foreign languages, and the like, are usually means to an end, serving as instrumental values. On the other hand, to love and be loved, to have friends, to be esteemed by one's fellows, are values in themselves; they are intrinsic values. To live in these experiences is to enjoy immediate values. Some people relate intrinsic value to knowing the facts and laws of nature, historical facts and relations, or even to philosophical principles. One may value knowledge for its own sake, because one feels that an essential demand of one's life is being satisfied by knowing. Also, certain kinds of knowledge give aesthetic satisfaction. Yet, other people may have no joy in knowledge for its own sake, and knowledge, for them, has no immediate worth. Hence, not only is valuation persistent and characteristic in human nature, but it is also a variant according to personal interest in his surroundings.²


²Ibid., pp. 459-460.
Joseph Leighton says that in spite of the fact of variation and preference and interest, there is one type of values which is seemingly universal in its appeal to mankind. It consists of the fundamental valuation of preference of human persons as individuals and as social beings. Apparently every ordinary human being desires the companionship, esteem, friendship or love of other people. Every individual who has any self-respect desires the respect of others. Everyone desires to satisfy the fundamental interests of his being, desires to feel and act in the ways that express and realize what he esteems his true selfhood. ¹

However, an extraordinary person such as the "suffering servant," who is depicted in Isaiah 53, finds the realization of his selfhood in the emptying of himself and by total submission to the purpose of God. Though "He was despised and rejected of men," and for a season, "smitten of God, and afflicted," the "Servant of Jehovah" is to have his "portion with the great." Instead of having what might be called the common socio-egoistic desires most men manifest, his consuming urgency was to accomplish the will of God, being "wounded for our transgressions," "bruised for our iniquities," and thus making "intercession for the transgressions." The "servant's" joy was not the mere accomplishment of ordinary human desires, but rather, on a higher plane, he satisfied himself in the fulfillment of a Jehovah-directed life.

But again, on an ordinary human level, ethics is the scientific study of fundamental types of human value and of the principles of social organization by which the achievement and permanence of value is furthered.

¹Ibid.
The terms honesty, integrity, justice, fair-mindedness, active sympathy, kindness, conscientiousness, and the "spirit of service" connote qualities of selves which constitute fundamental ethical values. They are basic, because they are not only indispensable means to the maintenance of a social order in which "selves can be truly selves," but they are also intrinsically worthful qualities of human nature. "If 'love is the fulfilling of the law,' that is because love is taken to include all the other qualities in the presence of which man's higher selfhood can come to its full expression." Furthermore Leighton declares:

And all the movements which have aimed at social justice, at the bettering of the economic, industrial, educational, and political conditions of man's social life, are to be judged by their serviceableness in promoting the realization of the fundamental human values. It follows that all intrinsic values are located in the conscious lives of selves or persons. It is nonsense to talk about values that no self feels or seeks, about preferences that no self prefers. The status of values in the universe of reality is the status of selves. For selves alone feel, enjoy, suffer, strive for, and win values. If selves, with all their strivings, sufferings, and enjoyments, with all their poignant feelings and unremitting efforts, are but evanescent spume cast up by the waves of the blind and chartless ocean of being, then certainly love and justice, integrity and loyalty, and the other ethical qualities which lend dignity and worth to human life are equally transient. The world is not just and not rational, much less kind, if the whole sequence of human life, in which alone, so far as we know experimentally, justice, reasonableness, kindness, are to be found in finite and imperfect but ever present and ever growing forms of realization, is doomed to extinction. Indeed, if the life of selfhood, the life which is now throbbing in humanity, does not endure and grow permanently the very norms of thought, the logical values themselves, are homeless in the universe and there is no universe, only a hideous bedlam.2

The crux of the matter refers to the responsibility of God concerning the presence of man in a value scheme, or whether there be a God, if He is indeed accountable for worth and "unworth" at all. If all value

1Ibid., pp. 460-461. 2Ibid., p. 461.
is conceived as the immediate structural arrangement of preferences and interests by mankind concerning the relational factors of his world; if he implicates that values have worth—whether God made them or not, it seems he remains confronted by the problem of being. Although the principle of valuation resides within intelligence, the question is whether values originate primarily from the intelligence of man. Certainly, it might be asked why valuations exist at all, as well as why man exists at all. The root problem, as Tillich suggests is: Why is there being instead of nonbeing?¹ This ontological question, as this writer has already asserted, seems to remain unanswered unless God is posited.

Therefore, in that case, if God is the ground of being, as Tillich asserts, then by God's very Being He is creative; and if God is the creative ground of being, then He is also the primordial source of value. Again, Whitehead states that God is the intangible fact at the base of finite existence, that God's existence is founded in value, and that it is to be conceived as persuasive towards an ideal co-ordination of value.² Moreover, Hartshorne affirms that God is "the all pervasive unsurpassably comprehensive being," absent nowhere, functioning in and through all things so intimately that in abstraction from Him (which is impossible) they would be nonentity.³ Thus it would seem that such involvement of God necessarily includes relatedness to ideal value structure, while remaining the originating frame of reference for value.

Perhaps, then in a basic sense, one might say that all value exists because of God, but man may largely mold many values to his own individual or collective liking. Again, if God were not creativity

¹Cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology, loc. cit.
²Cf. Schilpp, loc. cit.
³Cf. Hartshorne, loc. cit.
personified, if He were not the sustaining ground of existence, it seems
that there would be no value as well as no human being, and thus no permanence of existence at all. Furthermore, as Brightman has pointed out, the whole domain of value experience is explicitly coherent with the hypothesis of a personal God. Value is inherently a personal experience, and if the cosmic ground of value is itself a value, then it must be a person realizing ideals. This also suggests that values cannot persist unless there is enduring personality, which assertion the Christian doctrine of personal immortality presumes, positing a universe of order that possesses the quality of achieving justice.

Although this seems to be a sane approach to life, the question is whether it is a realistic one. Leighton says that science and logic similarly postulate the rationality, and in a broad sense, the justice of the universal order. Furthermore, science and logic are said to presuppose the validity of the fundamental intellectual values; the ability to observe carefully, to think clearly, disinterestedly, and persistently about whatever subject matter with which man may be concerned. Ultimately, science, logic, and ethics appear to rest upon the same postulate—the rationality and justice of things, the permanence of fundamental values in the order of reality. Unless this is true, it seems useless to speak of reason; for otherwise, all selves are ephemeral phenomena. Moreover, it is asserted that to consider a scheme of eternal values, which rule serenely in a timeless world of being, without the endurance of intelligent personality as an essential and worthful constituent in the universe of reality, is to oversimplify human life now and render it nonsensical.

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1Brightman, loc. cit.  
Science, a better social order, a freer, fuller life for human personality, beauty, philosophy itself, are all vain dreams which man conjures up to hide from his gaze the reeking shambles of reality which he fears to face, unless the fundamental human values endure through the permanence of rational and ethical spirit.¹

It should be recognized, as has already been intimated, that there is a broad range of human value experience. Therefore, in order for clarification, the writer uses a table of values set forth by E. S. Brightman.² The table is roughly arranged in ascending order of intrinsic importance because no absolute order seems possible. The values are grouped under three major headings, instrumental values, lower intrinsic values, and higher intrinsic values, as follows:

1. Wholly Instrumental Values
   a. Natural values. These are the forces of nature, such as life, gravity, and light. Inasmuch as they operate causally and are accessible to all, such forces are considered instrumental to intrinsic value experience. The intrinsic values to which natural values give rise apart from control by purpose are usually bodily or aesthetic.
   b. Economic values. Economic value is exchange value. These are comprised of physical things, processes (like power), human labor, or human services, in so far as their possession is a socially recognized property right, acquired or surrendered by exchange for equivalents or supposed equivalents. No economic possession is an intrinsic value for the normal person; one who regards economic value as intrinsic is a miser. However, abundance or deficiency of economic wealth has a profound effect on the quantity and quality of realizable intrinsic values. Since economic values presuppose labor, they are more personal than natural values.

2. The Lower Intrinsic Values. (This group is so named because its values are narrower, more partial than the 'higher' intrinsic ones. They include a smaller area of value experience, and they are more dependent on other values for their own worth.)
   a. Bodily values. These values include only the enjoyment in consciousness of the well-being from satisfactory bodily functioning. The feeling of being in good health, the joy of living, the pleasures of sex, and the delights of successful athletic

¹Ibid.
²Brightman, op. cit., pp. 95-100.
athletic endeavor all belong to bodily values. Although bodily values constitute only one limited realm of intrinsic value experience, they are instrumental to an incalculable amount of weal and woe among the higher intrinsic values.

b. Recreational values. These are the chief values of childhood, but they are essential to a healthy mind at every age. They are comprised of satisfactions that come from play, humor, or mere amusement. Recreational values are instrumental, but they are lost if one does not enjoy them as intrinsic.

c. Work values. The mere fact of being employed should itself be a satisfaction. The production of instrumental values is itself an intrinsic value, especially in a reasonably just economic order. Satisfaction in usefulness is a very slender value by itself because its justification lies chiefly beyond itself in the intrinsic worth of what is being produced.

3. The Higher Intrinsic Values. (This group is called 'higher' because it represents broader values, more inclusive of experience as a whole, more independent, and more coherent.)

a. Social values. This term refers to the special values that are experienced through the consciousness of association, cooperation, or sharing. It seems apparent that many of life's greatest values can be experienced only thus; and social values should be called 'higher' is only because they embody the worth of personality. Every true value is enhanced when experienced as a social value. However, social values are classified as the lowest of the higher values because mere association with others is almost completely devoid of worth unless some other value besides social is being sought. Social relations depend largely upon the presence of truth, goodness, beauty, and religion for their value. Even without this presence, social value adds a luster that could never be experienced as an isolated individual.

b. Character values. This term designates the experience of a good will, the conscious choice of what is believed right and best. Kant regarded such experiences as possessing the only intrinsic value. He said, 'Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.' However, there seem to be other values that are also as 'good without qualification' as is a good will, such as the values of truth and beauty. Yet, a good character is indeed a value that has worth in its own right. It is so necessary that without the control by good will all other values would become disorganized, incoherent, and self-destructive.

c. Aesthetic values. The values of aesthetic satisfaction include the beautiful, the sublime, the comic, the tragic, and many other gradations. The aesthetic, whether in nature or in art, is an experience in which there seems to be an adequate expression of purpose in such a way as to stir feeling and

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1 As quoted by Brightman, op. cit., p. 98.
achieve harmony. Like character values, aesthetic values are experiences in which the whole of life is organized from a special point of view.

d. Intellectual values. The intellectual values are the experiences of truth-loving and truth-finding. It is an empirical fact that truth is valued, no matter how uncomfortable the truth may be. The joy of knowing, the mere satisfaction of curiosity, the 'wonder' which according to Plato and Aristotle is the beginning of philosophy, are experiences common to every human being. These constitute the intrinsic aspects of the intellectual values.

e. Religious values. These are the values which are experienced when man takes an attitude toward value experience as a whole and toward its dependence on powers beyond himself. Insight into this dependence elicits feelings of reverence and acts of worship, and the special quality of the whole which is deemed worthy of worship is called holiness. Religious values, like the other higher values, are an organization of the total value experience from a special standpoint. Social values organize the whole from the standpoint of sharing; character values, from the standpoint of control by good will; aesthetic values, from the standpoint of appreciative feeling of harmony; intellectual values, from the standpoint of knowledge; and religious values from the standpoint of worship of and cooperation with the objective cosmic source of values.

It is apparent that each of the intrinsic values has a dual character: each has a unique quality of its own to contribute to the total value experience of the individual, and each also tends to "coalesce" or "interpenetrate" with the others. Without the unique contribution of each of the values, value experience would have no variety. On the other hand, no single value can be defined or be experienced without some reference to all the other values. In reality, there is, then, a system of various unique value experiences. But in the coalescence of the system, the values listed in the table are more like whirlpools or eddies in the sea of experience than like distinct, separate units. However, it must be noted that such interpenetration of values is a normative ideal rather than a universal experience because the lack of innate ability in certain fields of value experience, and defective education, may cause the omission of whole areas
of potential value from an individual or group. Also, there may be
resulting complexes which lead to fanatical devotion or fanatical hatred
toward some value or set of values, or in a life in which the relations
of values are never clearly seen.¹

The purpose at this point has been to recognize, if only in a brief
manner, the vast scope of values, and the writer would point out the uniqueness of religious values in relation to the conservation and continuation of human personality as a value. Although it may be somewhat difficult to identify clearly the unique contribution to the realm of value, Brightman points out numerous marks of religious value that distinguish it from other types. He says:

These may be summarized as follows: a unique sense of dependence
(unique, because the sense of dependence on the ground of the universe
is radically different from our dependence on particular local
conditions in our environment); a mystical experience of worship and
prayer; awareness of illumination or revelation; a consciousness of
divine aid (cosmic support, salvation, atonement); acknowledgement
that God does for man what man cannot do for himself (divine initiative,
grace); consciousness of cooperation with or submission to
the cosmic purpose (the will of God). Belief in the uniqueness of reli-
gious value is one of the most potent factors in man's religious
consciousness: 'To whom then wilt ye liken me, that I should be
equal to him? saith the Holy One.' (Isaiah 40:25).²

It is a known fact that religious values exist and have existed
throughout history. Man experiences ideal aspirations toward goodness,
truth, beauty, and holiness. Such ideals are implicit in moral, intel-
lectual, aesthetic, and religious experience. However, religious ideals
are not merely definitions of possible value experience; as religious,
they are also assertions about the future continuation of value experience,
and about ideal attitudes toward the source of cosmic value, thought of

¹Ibid., pp. 100, 101, 102. ²Ibid., pp. 103-104.
as God.  

Hence, it is evident that the idea of God is very necessary to the continuation and conservation of value, even to the source and guarantee of the highest values—at least what the religious person values most highly. In this manner, faith in immortality is directed towards an assertion of, or a search for, the power on which value depends. Furthermore, no religious person hardly thinks of God except in terms of the highest values accessible to him; and religion has apparently always conceived of God as something assuring or symbolizing the permanence of those values. Thus, whenever men have taken a religious attitude toward a God they have entered into a relation with the highest value known to them.  

In other words, God means that toward which man moves when he rises in the scale of value; God is also viewed as the source of such movement.  

However, an irreligious atheism may exist when there is complete skepticism about any value at all in life. The thorough-going atheist believes that there is nothing worthwhile, and for him there are no values whatsoever. In such a case, it would be useless to indicate the relation of value to the existence of a Supreme Being, or to the Christian belief in personal immortality. On the other hand, the sincerity of the atheist’s valueless position seems highly questionable. Most people apparently recognize the existence of values by adjusting their lives to some sort of value scheme. Again, a kind of agnostic position, such as Philip H. Fenton suggests, points out that value need not imply the existence of a God-Being, referring instead to the immediate relative valuations

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1Ibid., pp. 105, 106.  
2Ibid., p. 137.
of human personality within the process of life.\(^1\) Similarly, Whitehead seems to indicate that God is the product of eventual valuations rather than the necessary existential ground of value.\(^2\)

Yet, to base valuation upon the individual or collective preferences and interests of human personality does not seem to answer the problem of being, to justify existence. The problem seems best resolved from an existential ground—God, the ground of all being. Hence, if there are values, God is the source or ground of value existence. The writer thus refers to the following statement of Brightman:

> If there is a God—a supreme, creative, cosmic person—then there is an infinitely good being committed to the eternal conservation of values. That being is the controlling and directing power in all natural processes and is engaged in a process of immanent cooperation with all other persons. Since all true values are experiences of the fulfillment of ideal purposes by persons, the existence of values depends on the existence of persons. Value is personality at its best. God, the conserver of values, must be God, the conserver of persons.\(^3\)

Thus, it seems that a potent argument for personal immortality is the ethical argument from "values" or "goods," the "value of values" which are realized and enjoyed by persons, which exist in persons, and which are ways of conceiving the reality and worth of personality. Although some are willing to admit the continuation of value emanating from the worth of some individual personality, even after the physical death of the person, they do not want to admit the continuation of the value found in personality itself. However, the true meaning of postulating a God, the animating principle of faith in God and the higher order of values of which He is the sustainer, is the affirmative response to the cry of mankind for the


\(^2\)Cf. Schilpp, loc. cit.

\(^3\)Brightman, loc. cit.
assurance of the permanence and the preservation of personal life which bears the most worth.\footnote{Leighton, loc. cit.} Religion has therefore, been the agent of the recognition of all the higher values, and the Christian Religion, in particular, is reputed to stand for the eternal worth of individual personality. Therefore, this argument from the "value of values" posits that humanity and its values are essential features of our universe, and because of their essential character, it is believed they may endure in spite of the apparent wastefulness and cruelty of the natural order. Thus the idea of God is referred to as that Supreme Reality, in and through which human personality and its values are sustained. God is said to be the cosmical ground of values, the ground of human personality, the "overself" which is the source and goal of all selfhood. Because, then, of this ground of God, it seems man may have a rational faith that human values, the value of personality, transcends the apparent curtailment of death. Such faith also seems rational because values and selves, persons, are the offspring of the very universe in which reason appears to live and work.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 469, 470.}

Religion, being faith in and devotion to a Supreme Reality, the ground and goal of life's highest values, has its roots deep down in man's emotional and volitional life. Faith, then, is the dynamic expression of the total man, for the deep springs of human nature are the feeling-impulses. Hence, faith, faith in the eternal worth of personality, springs from the need for action or endurance. It is the dynamic urge of life become conscious and therefore able to make planful, intelligent choices and resolves. Also, faith is the personal resolve to take risks, to venture forth on the hazardous quest of living. He who has confident faith is willing to wager
all upon this hazard. Faith thus becomes the loyal and courageous affirmation of the highest values that man envisages. Although it may be a bold and risky confidence, it is the response of reality to man's deepest needs and highest interests. Faith presupposes trustworthiness and dependability in its object. It is the evidence of things not seen, the substance of things hoped for.¹ Faith does not profess to be based entirely upon reason; but the content of faith must not contradict the findings of reflective experience. Certainly science and philosophy involve the intelligibility of the world, and practical human conduct involves a reasonable faith in the supremacy of those values that are accounted preferable—the worth of individual personality in particular.²

Not only is man value conscious, but he can have no intelligent and fruitful individual self-direction or social control without a clear-sighted and comprehensive doctrine of human values. This is to admit that there are possibly individuals who may reject this argument on the basis of a different value structure. Still, it is to be noted that no valuation may logically ascend higher than the personality that does the experiencing. Because every value needs an experiencer, the worth of the experiencer is greater than the worth of that which is being experienced. If values endure, then so does the experiencer. If value is said to end (as is stated by Bertrand Russell, whose argument the writer shall record in the summary of objections), then there appears to be little hope for progress, and certainly no reason for progress. Furthermore, it seems that man as a whole cannot desert either his collective or individual quest to understand the meaning of human life as a whole, and a continuing search presupposes the

¹See Hebrews 11:1.

endurance and permanence of meaning and value—consequently, the endurance and permanence of the experiencer.

The continuing question is: does death end it all? A ready comment would be the admission that values last for a person just as long as he lives, but at death all value ends for him. Also, it is evident that values created or enhanced by the lives of individuals may continue on after they have died. One of the outstanding laws of nature is that what is sown is also reaped. Can it be that much of man’s striving is in vain, apparently spending the greater part of his lifetime sowing, only to have the harvest curtailed? The suggestion that such is the norm of possibility, that an individual’s harvest may be sudden and partial, fails to satisfy man’s expectancy. For not only is man a part of nature, he is unique in it, being capable of complex value judgments.

Thus, the question arises: why does man have such value judgment responsibility? There are longer lived organisms than man, and none manifest any such value consciousness as man does. Was such value responsibility given to man for so short a span of years? Of course, there is the trite saying that "human life is so valuable because it is short," attaching worth to scarcity or brevity instead of endurance. Yet, it seems apparent that the human deeds of greatest worth were done with the "long-view" in mind, with endurance and a lasting quality of value as the goal. Moreover, it is Edwin E. Aubrey who says that man cannot live except for values, and man’s sanity demands that he have some sense of the achievement of value.¹

He further states:

To be without meaning is to be insecure in the world, for then a man does not know where he stands, what he is, or where his destiny lies. There is no center of balance in one's life without a fulfiller of meaning; and there are no criteria of judgment, and interpretation by which he can find his place in the world.

Thus, the indispensable relation between value meanings and the experiencing personality is indicated, and the worth of personality seems most clearly defined from the Christian standpoint. Paul Tillich makes the assertion that "Biblical religion" discovers the full meaning of the personal. This refers to the situation in which God's self-manifestation moves to confront man through the Word, and when man responds with religious aspirations.  

It is the unconditional character of the Biblical God that makes the relation to him radically personal. For only that which concerns us in the center of our personal existence concerns us unconditionally. The God who is unconditional in power, demand, and promise is the God who makes us completely personal and who, consequently, is completely personal in our encounter with him. It is not that we first know what person is and then apply the concept of God to this. But in the encounter with God, we first experience what person should mean and how it is distinguished from, and must be protected from everything a-personal.

Such an "ego-thou" correlation affirms the individual value of personality. On this basis the writer maintains that if one may say God made man in "His own image," with the possibility of divine-human reciprocal relationships, the experiencing personality may properly be expected to transcend death. The writer thereby asserts that unless the God who made the value of personality valuable, also sustains such value, there appears to be no ultimate worth in it. Although values may be presently worth whatever one experiences them to be now, regardless of what the future may

1Ibid.


3Ibid., p. 27.

4Cf. Ibid., pp. 29-31.
assimilate, the worth of human personality deteriorates to oblivion unless its relationship with God somehow endures even physical death.

From this viewpoint, it would seem that the Christian doctrine of personal immortality is a warranted expectancy. Perhaps it is too dogmatic to declare that, if God made values and there be no eternal life, God's created values are not really valuable. However, the point the writer wishes to make is that if one may posit an intelligent ground of being—a God, He is unresolvably bound up with the existence of value, especially in the unique presence of personality. The correlation of divine-human personality indicates particular and peculiar value as an experiencer, and thus it seems that except there be personal immortality, God's created value of personality is not as valuable as there seems reason to expect.

V. THE FULFILLMENT OF NATURE

The writer has been previously concerned with the thought that God is the ground and sustainer of value, indicating the particular worth of human personality. The argument may be carried further by stating that if God is the ground and sustainer of value, if He is the unified ground of all existence, then God is in some sense related to or concerned with everything in the nature realm. Every event in nature, to some degree, embodies rational law, beauty, and relation (or at least possible relation) to the interests of human consciousness. Thus, as George F. Thomas says, Christianity is opposed to the naturalistic view of nature as all-inclusive and self-explanatory, the product of blind purposeless forces moving by necessity. Neither does it view man as simply a child of nature, a mere species of the
animal kingdom whose destiny is fulfilled entirely on earth. Christianity
affirms that nature as a unified and orderly whole owes its existence to
the wisdom and power of God, and that man both belongs to nature and tran-
scends nature.¹

Paul Tillich indicates that such Biblical personalism is most
obviously distinguished from the personalism of other religions by the
doctrine of creation. This doctrine is the one on which the doctrines of
Christ, of salvation and fulfillment, depend. According to Tillich the
doctrine of creation has two main functions. First, it is said to emphasize
the dependence of everything created on God, and thus, consequently, the
essential goodness of creation. This protects the Christian interpretation
of existence against a dualistic split of worshiping a good and an evil
god, preserving the personal unity of the one God. Second, it emphasizes
the infinite distance between the Creator and the creature, placing the
created outside the creative ground. Furthermore, Tillich says it was
correct and proper when Jewish and Christian theologians spoke of creation
out of nothing. This is an implication of creation through the word. It
means that there is no substance, divine or antdivine, out of which finite
beings receive their being. They receive it through the word, the will of
God and its creative expression. Hence, the doctrine of creation through
the word denies any substantial participation of man in God, and it replaces
substantial identity by personal distance.²

Thus, the Biblical account of the creation serves the double reli-
gious purpose of affirming the "value of the world and of man" and of

¹Van Dusen, op. cit., p. 107.

reminding man of his "dependence upon and responsibility to his Maker."

Again, Thomas further states:

Nature as a whole, matter and form, body and spirit, has been created by the eternal Source of all good for a good purpose. This means, on the negative side, that every ascetic idea of the evil of the body and its appetites is ruled out. It means, on the positive side, that human interest in the order of nature, enjoyment of her beauty, and grateful use of her resources are wholly justified. In more religious terms, it means that nature as a whole is a 'sacramental' system, a worthy vehicle for the communication of the Divine Spirit with human spirits and for the fulfillment of the purposes of both.

Of course, this is conditional upon man's 'acknowledgment of God' as the Lord of nature and as the Father to whom he owes filial obedience. And it is distinctive of man, not only that he depends upon God for his creation, preservation, and "all the blessings of this life," but that he can gratefully acknowledge his dependence and his responsibility. This capacity indicates man is a spiritual being. As such, he is able to transcend nature, enter into communion with God, and freely subject himself to His will. Thus the foundation of the spiritual nature of man in his capacity to apprehend supersensible "Reality and Good." Through this ability man lays hold of the revelation of God.

God has revealed Himself to man in many different ways—in the world of nature, in man's basic human experience of being a finite self-transcending creature, in the distinctive religious experiences of mystics, saints, and prophets, and particularly, in the individual and corporate experiences recorded in the Bible, culminating in man's encounter with the historical Jesus and continuing in the recorded testimony of the Christian Church. So it is that Tillich says that Biblical personalism comes to its

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1 Van Dussen, op. cit., pp. 107-108.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid., p. 71.
fulfillment in the message that the divine Word was incarnate in a personal
life, in the life of Jesus, who is thus called the Christ. Biblical reli-
gion in the Old and New Testaments is a religion of personalities who, in
the power of the Spirit of God, mediate the will of God and preserve the
covenant between God and all mankind. For the God who is encountered as
a person acts in history through persons and their inner experiences.¹

The criteria of the reality of any such "object" of experience are
named by Theodore M. Greene as: (1) coerciveness, (2) coherence, and
(3) publicity. First of all, he says man accepts as "objectively real"
whatever intrudes itself upon his consciousness with a character of its
own which he himself cannot change but must accept for what it is. Thus
it is the coerciveness, as in sense experience, which compels us to take
an experience seriously as being in some sense an experience of reality.
But mere coerciveness is not enough, for dreams, illusions and hallucina-
tions may be coercive and also misleading. What is misleading in such
cases, however, is not the coercive "given" but the interpretation placed
upon it. Only that which man can make coherent with some order of reality
should be accepted as objectively real. Thus, reliable sense experiences
are judged to be trustworthy clues to what one regards as "real" physical
objects, whereas other equally vivid and coercive experiences are called
dreams, illusions or hallucinations. Finally, Greene says there is no
reason why any given individual should not have a perfectly valid experi-
ence of the real which is quite unique, wholly private, and unshared or
even unsharable by other men. It is pointed out that new discoveries are,

¹Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality,
op. cit., p. 37.
at the outset, the private and unique insights of single individuals, and the fact that some of these insights are hard to communicate to others does not in itself invalidate them.\footnote{Van Dusen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 72.} Greene notes that in secular life authority has a dual meaning; on the one hand, it signifies the compulsion to assent which characterizes whatever is, to any given individual, simultaneously coercive, coherent, and sharable. On the other hand, it signifies what is more or less blindly accepted at second-hand. A scientist accepts as authoritative in the first sense what he himself has verified and confirmed. The common man accepts the pronouncements of scientists as authoritative in the second sense. He does so despite the fact that he may not be able to verify or even understand them, partly because he has indirect evidence, because, in the practical applications of science the scientists apparently know what they are talking about, and partly because he is convinced that as a group they are both honest and able.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 73.}

Hence, despite the contrary belief of dogmatic naturalists, the authority of Christian revelation should be interpreted along these same lines. In direct proportion as Christians have shared at first-hand experience and have thought through the Christian interpretation of this experience, it is accepted as authoritative in the first sense. The large measure of agreement among the prophets, evangelists and saints of the Hebraic-Christian tradition is impressive; they confirm one another's testimony again and again. They agree that the God whom they claim to have encountered presented Himself coercively to them with a character of His own; they agree in broad
outline in their interpretation of these coercive experiences. In short, such religious experiences, though necessarily private in the sense in which all experiences are private, are sharable, communicable and verifiable. Thus God's revelation of Himself to man need not be interpreted superstitiously, for it is not incredible. It has been profoundly meaningful and convincing to countless Christians.¹

Such faith may be defined as whole-hearted belief on the basis of evidence, but not necessarily wholly conclusive evidence, and of interpretation which is reasonable, but which falls short of absolute scientific proof. In this sense, faith is never entirely blind, since it can be evoked only by what is at least to some extent experienced and apprehended. Nor is it ever completely enlightened, for that is the prerogative of omniscience, not of finite man. Thus, faith is always somewhere between these two extremes--more or less informed, more or less blind and credulous. So defined, faith is apparently essential to all human existence. For life necessitates continual decision and action, a continual taking of sides, in the absence of complete evidence and absolute scientific proof. Hence, man must decide and act on faith, in every secular sphere as well as religion. Even the scientist cannot prove with absolute certainty that the observed regularities of nature will prevail in the future; he has to accept the natural order on faith if he is to investigate it. Moreover, the humanist cannot be absolutely sure that man can improve his lot on this earth; only faith in the possibility of such improvement can inspire him to continued humanistic effort. Secular or religious faith involves a "psychological" certainty when it is accompanied by no conscious doubts.

¹Ibid., pp. 73, 74, 75.
Again, it amounts to "moral" certainty when it is sufficient "for all practical purposes" and if it is resolute and unswerving. But it is never "logically" absolutely certain because faith and knowledge are not coterminous and because man's knowledge is so finite that complete understanding is beyond his grasp. 1

Yet, Christian faith differs from secular faith primarily in the nature of the "object" to which it is directed and the resultant trust in and love for this "object." The "object" of Christian faith is not nature, or man, but God. Because God is the "object" of religious and Christian faith, and not merely one among other created things, the relevant experiences are correctly described as "encounters" with the Deity in direct communion with Him and through His revelation of Himself to man in Jesus Christ. The relevant interpretation of these encounters is theological interpretation. In theology, reason goes as far as it can to give the most reasonable interpretation of God's nature and His relation to man. God's revelation is believed by Christians to be absolute in the sense of being wholly adequate to human needs, but men can only understand this revelation as finite beings—never absolutely. 2

However, God's reality may be said to be indubitable in a philosophical sense if He is defined from the outset as the ground of all being, the source and basis of all reality. Greene says only the extreme solipsist can deny the reality of God conceived as the underlying condition of all existence and the "That" to which all human inquiry is ultimately directed. 3 It is in this manner, through belief in God as the personal ground of all being, as the base and sustainer of value, as the ground of personality,

1Tbid., pp. 76-77. 2Tbid. 3Tbid., pp. 77-78.
man, having experienced the threat of nonbeing, dares to hope, to have faith on the basis of the revelation of God through nature and through the ultimate personality of Jesus Christ. It is from this perspective that man ventures to put his final hope, not on time, but eternity. Such an attitude of faith is derived from the manner in which God has revealed Himself through the general order of nature with its seeming inherent aim or "telos." Furthermore, the apparent value that attends personality is verified by the revelation of God in Christ, and points to an ultimate goal for human personality that defies the limits of time.

Thus, the Christian doctrine of personal immortality is based fundamentally upon the assertion that God is the ground of all existence, and functionally upon the intrinsic value experience of personality—especially as revealed through Jesus Christ. As upheld by God, nature points to a continuing value experience, having provided such aspirations within the grasp of the human mind in spite of suffering, sorrow, and death. When such tragedy comes, particularly when death has curtailed the apparent promises and possibilities of life, man is "instinctively" prone to feel that this cannot be the final end. It seems difficult for most people to accept the thought that a loved one is ultimately dead. Certainly this has been the testimony of burial practices which have been discussed. The apparent reflections of most men have suggested that a person lives on even as before, only in a different realm. In the Christian sense, the proposition may be put forth that if God is, and He is the ground of being, there will be fulfillment of all nature, including human personality.

Although the Christian doctrine of personal immortality cannot be proven scientifically, the hope becomes a faith and manifests itself as an
assertion, because of what man knows about nature and about himself, because of the ultimate worth of human personality as revealed through Jesus, and because of the love of God for his children in providing salvation. Even in doubt man has spoken and acted as though a person must live are not. of what people hold dear and lovely, affections and lover somewhere. Professor William James has suggested that such a experiences without deeper significance, then the normal sense of feeling of "must" is just as much a part of man as reason. He says that fantastic and queer that we cannot think of it except from a would there is another side to human nature other than mere logic. Furthermore, he states that no reason is fully "rational" unless it takes into itself, compass the whole life of man, his demands and his feelings as well as his intellect.  

Also, one of the basic features of Immanuel Kant's great philosophy is centered upon the thought that man's innate moral sensibility makes him assert a positive statement about life and its character. It will not naturally reduce itself to nothing; human life demands respect to itself. He says that man may not know by logic that he is free, but he is morally certain he must be. Furthermore, he may not know by logic that there is a God, but he is morally certain that there must be "Something" which will eventually bring justice and happiness into harmony and straighten out the injustice and unhappiness of people who morally deserve a better fate. Ethical

Again, Kant suggests that man does not know that there is a life to come by logical methodology, but he is morally certain that there must be such a life since "fourscore-years-and-ten" are too short a span to fit the natural urge, that lies within him, to perform endless tasks.  

Therefore, in view of the Christian concept of God as the ground of


2Ibid. pp. 203-204.
all existence, as having revealed Himself through the personality of Jesus, and the ontological shock of threatened nonexistence which Kant reflects, note the following statement of Ferm:

Either we are living in a world of meaning and significance or we are not. If what people hold dear and lovely, affections and devotions that lift themselves beyond time and space, are but passing experiences without deeper significance, then the world which has produced them only eventually to destroy them becomes a thing so fantastic and queer that we cannot think of it other than a world that is, in the long run, meaningless.¹

The definite implication here is that the concept of no immortality, or annihilationism, ultimately engenders meaninglessness. Ordinarily, value and meaning may be expected to increase according to their persistence and permanence, or decrease in conjunction with their insignificant, ephemeral character, whichever may be the case. In the event that value and meaning do not endure, it seems they are lost; and although they may render a present temporary contribution, unless worth and significance persist, the ultimate end is degenerating unworth and meaningless. Likewise, a similar proposition also seems to apply in regard to the permanent or transitory character of human personality. However, in conceiving of value and meaning, especially in relation to personality, one may attach the ethical or moral aspect of man's experiential existence. Such involvement of ethical morality, associated with value and meaning, undoubtedly gives dimension to personal life. Hence, in combining moral value with personality, (conceived as derived from the ground of God), one is faced with assessing the ultimate worth of morality without enduring personality, and, on the other hand, he is confronted with evaluating the meaning of personality without morality. Except such value and personality endure together, the apprehended termination testifies only of a meaningless void. Therefore, from this perspective,

¹Ibid., pp. 197-198.
the writer posits the necessary correlation of meaninglessness with the concept of annihilation.

Again, from an atheistic base, there is said to be an existential consequence without the concept of personal immortality—the consequence of no morality without immortality—the elemental consequence of meaninglessness without immortality. Professor Paul Ramsey points out such an ultimate result of atheism and the absence of a concept of immortality. In other words, he indicates that the lack of morality breeds ethical unworth, yielding a life void of meaning. Considering the atheistic premise, the question is: What does it mean for a human being, possessed as he is of "finite freedom," to attempt from his heart to live by and live out the thought that for him there is no God and no immortality? Ramsey notes that God is more than the upholder of personality and value, but that there is another primary meaning of God in human experience: "He is the one who, on account of the dynamic upthrust of human freedom, alone can put a limit upon man and set boundaries that they may not be removed."

Thus it was the theist Kierkegaard who wrote: "Without God man is (not too weak, but) too strong for himself," in contrast to the comment of the atheist Nietzsche, who exclaimed, "If there were a god, I could not endure being he."¹

Hence, this is the mode of free personal existence in this world when one actually lives by the thought that there is no God. Without God, there is no limit fixed to the "ever renewed and restless deployment of human freedom." A limitless exercise of freedom is the meaning of atheism

when one actually lives by the thought that there is no God and no life after death. Professor Ramsey points to the writings of Dostoevski in portraying this consequence—which ultimately ends in self-destruction. Dostoevski teaches in various characters and situations he portrays, that without God there is no limit upon the exercise of human freedom, and the chief channels of employment are: (1) individual, (2) social, and (3) in general or universally.¹ Concerning such abandon, Ramsey states:

Freedom in the heart of a person attempting to live by the thought that there is no God cannot, in principle, stop short of deploying itself against the conditions of its own existence in the world, against every structure of social existence, and against every moral norm. Without God, there is nothing a man is bound not to do.²

Thus, according to this mode of individual human freedom, saying in its heart there is no God, Dostoevski depicts the person of Kirillov in The Possessed. Suicide is shown to be the inner logical consequence of this "vital" atheism. Kirillov says in his heart there is no God, and amidst his good physical health, his fondness for life, he is going to commit suicide; he wants to live and die by what this means:³

If there is no God, then I am God. . . . If God exists, all is His will and from His will I cannot escape. If not, it's all my will and I am bound to show self-will. . . . I want to manifest my self-will. . . . I am bound to shoot myself because the highest point of my self-will is to kill myself with my own hands. . . . without any cause at all, simply from self-will. . . . I am bound to show my unbelief. . . . I have no higher idea than disbelief in God. . . . to recognize that there is no God and not to recognize at the same instant that one is God oneself is an absurdity. . . . The attribute of my godhead is self-will: That's all I can do to prove in the highest point my independence and my new terrible freedom. For it is very terrible. I am killing myself to prove my independence and my new terrible freedom.⁴

Then, in short, when God is dead, at the same instant one becomes God himself; and when one is like God, fully free, at the same instant he commits suicide, being no longer bound to accept the conditions of his own existence. So also perishes the pre-eminent value of the experiencer; and of what worth are the values such an individual experienced? Of what meaning was his life as an experiencer? Of course, there is still a higher manifestation of freedom to come, namely to recognize that one is "sovereign" and yet not deploy the terrible freedom which one has. Perhaps this greater glory is reserved for future generations: whether they live or whether they die will be up to "Lord Freedom."  

It is pointed out the French neo-Thomist Jacques Maritan accepts the complete validity of the foregoing analysis. He writes: "Every absolute experience of atheism, if it is conscientiously and rigorously followed, ends by provoking its psychical dissolution, in suicide." Thus absolute humanism wills its own freedom; it must subordinate everything else to this absolute freedom; and the last thing which must be subordinated if one is to have no God is one's own being. To live atheism means subordinating one's own existence to one's own absolute independence.  

Socially, or with reference to others or to the social order, finite freedom, which attempts to "live by" and "live out" the thought that there is no God, cannot stop short of deploying itself against every existing condition of social existence. Dostoevski depicts this channel of human freedom in the revolutionaries in The Possessed, especially in their leader Fyotr Stepanovitch and his theoretician Shigalov. Again, without God,

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1Ibid., p. 93.

freedom is boundless; and boundless freedom inevitably demands boundless submission from the weak. This is the essence of revolution, of atheistic social liberalism.¹

Here, too, is evidenced inward self-contradiction in the working-out of unlimited social freedom. The character Shigalov pronounces:

I am perplexed by my own data and my conclusion is a direct contradiction of the original idea with which I start. Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrived at unlimited despotism. I will add, however, that there can be no solution of the social problem but mine.

And another member at the meeting is quoted as explaining:

He suggests as a final solution of the question the division of mankind into two unequal parts. One-tenth enjoys absolute liberty and unbounded power over the other nine-tenths. The others have to give up all individuality and become, so to speak, a herd... through boundless submission.²

The techniques of the revolutionaries are described by Pyotr Stepanovitch after his arrest:

When asked what was the object of so many murders and scandals and dastardly outrages, he answered with feverish haste, that it was with the idea of systematically undermining the foundations, systematically destroying society and all principles; with the idea of nonplussing everyone and making hay of everything, and then, when society was tottering, sick and out of joint, cynical and skeptical though filled with an intense eagerness for self-preservation and for some guiding idea, suddenly to seize it in their hands.³

Therefore, the conviction of the heart that there is no God, with reference to the self's asserted freedom, in relation to itself, the social order, and finally in general, has a devastating effect upon the valuable moral principles of every level of human existence. Without God, the

¹Ibid., pp. 94-95.
²Ibid., citing Fedor Dostoevski, op. cit., Part II, Chap. 7, Sect. 2, and Conclusion.
³Ibid.
ultimate consequence is no moral obligation. Ramsey asserts that
Dostoevski clearly saw that "an immortal human soul" is the only ground
for the truth of morality or for integrity of conscience. Thus, as
Gabriel Marcel also puts the point, "man depends to a very great degree,
on the idea he has of himself and...this idea cannot be degraded with-
out at the same time degrading man."1

Furthermore, in his book Man against Mass Society, Marcel employs
an insight which in reality refers to a bit of Biblical wisdom reflected
in Proverbs 23:7, "As a man thinks in his heart, so is he." The inference
of Marcel is that a person sinks to the most pitiable and miserable level
of human existence especially when he is degraded in his own eyes, when he
himself accepts the judgment that "he is nothing and worth less than nothing."

Therefore, by such representations, it is good to say that, even if there is one such idea, or if there is not, one ought to believe that it is a good idea.

This was the technique of degradation reportedly used in concentration camps.
The aim was said to be not simply to transform men and women little by little
into human waste products, but to transform them into beings who in the very
depths of their own selves became conscious of themselves as valueless, as
merely waste, and thus meaningless.2 Therefore, Marcel writes:

The persecutor...sets out to destroy in another human being
that being's awareness, whether illusory or not, of having a value.
He must become for himself what those who judge him, or claim to
judge him, say he is in reality; the person who is worth nothing
must recognize his own nothingness, and it is not enough that he
should do so intellectually; it is necessary also that he should
sense his nothingness, as we sense an odour of decay... But why
...is this necessary?... Because this is the sole means of
having this other human being wholly at one's mercy; a being who
retains even the smallest awareness of his own value remains
capable of reacting against us in a way which, if not dangerous,
is at least vexing.3

Again, Professor Ramsey states that Dostoevski further expresses

2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 96.
himself through one of the characters in his book *The Brothers Karamazov*, who roundly declares that without belief in immortality there would be no basis at all for morality. He affirms that there is no law of nature that men should love mankind, and, if there has been any love on earth hitherto, it is not due to any laws of our human nature, but simply because men have believed in immortality. ¹ Moreover, in his *Diary of a Writer*, Dostoevski wrote:

> Neither a man nor a nation can live without a 'higher idea,' and there is only one such idea on this earth, that of an immortal human soul; all the other 'higher ideas' by which men live follow from that . . . Following on the loss of the idea of immortality, suicide appears a complete and ineluctable necessity for every man who is the slightest degree above the level of the beasts of the field. . . . The idea of immortality is life itself, the definitive formulation and the first source of the truth and integrity of conscience.²

Therefore, by such representation, the writer indicates that meaninglessness and no immortality do go together. It has been shown how human attitudes and emotions concerning belief in God and immortality distribute value and meaning to personal life, the social order, and universally. Likewise, the converse of disvalue and meaninglessness is exhibited as being the ultimate result when an atheistic, materialistic attitude is taken. The assertion of Dostoevski that, "the idea of immortality is life itself, the definitive formulation and the first source of the truth and integrity of conscience," seems conclusively indicative that such human beliefs have accounted for worth that is necessary to give life meaning.

Then, in another respect, human emotions and attitudes must

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¹Ibid., p. 97.
seemingly be counted for something in regard to actual living; they have also meant much in the very struggle of man to exist personally and individually in his social world. As it has been pointed out, the very fact of any existence whatsoever presupposes a ground of being, a God, and such a force so related to nature supposedly introduces moral order to the universe. Such an order is not only contributive to purpose and meaning, but it is also indicative of what man may naturally expect of life itself—particularly in an ultimate sense. Thus, this concept views the very nature of things as seeming to suggest a certain necessary attitude for the promotion of any vital existence. Human personality is considered to be the some of creation, as an individual experiencer of worth and unworth, and as secondary creator of significance and value in the molding of rational events. Such stature in the realm of existence predicates extraordinary meaning to humanity—even as an individual. However, humanity is not the only example of the seeming necessary predisposition of nature. There is also indication of "telos," or purposive aim in other aspects of the realm of existence. For instance, animals do not live by intellectual process, but rather they accomplish survival on inner, sub-rational promptings. Nature has not mocked such promptings. If it had, the biological realm of existence would have worn itself to a futile end long ago.

Thus, Ferm says:

What makes the mother of any offspring (and in some cases the father) fight to the death for those in the nest or in the trunk of the tree? It is instinctive, so we say. But that instinctive urge is shot through with feeling; it is emotive. Were that mother to consider in deep reflection the worth of that struggle to defend the offspring, if she were to go to an animal school and learn the reasons pro and con, she might, with Schopenhauer, find good reasons to put down her emotional nature and say that it is all vain and futile; for will not her offspring someday have to go through the
same struggle? In the struggle for existence emotions have played an enormous role. Is it not reasonable that they should not only condition our beliefs but that they should serve as valid grounds for beliefs along with those beliefs which move solely in the realm of logic?\(^1\)

Surely, nature, if it is fundamentally moral, cannot be mocking man when he feels deeply that those who are closer to him than anything in the world must live on. Must not the nature of things expand itself to actualize the continuing destiny to which man feels he should aspire? This is reaffirmed when the reality of God and His place in the universe as the source, the sustainer of value is considered in relation to the fulfillment of nature, satisfying the needs of man. The writer has previously discussed man and his meaningful value experiences. It should be noted that nature has manifested survival value, giving meaning to the emotions found far down the biological scale from man. Then, as Ferm asks: "May we not reasonably believe that, at the human level with their grasping into the far outreaches of time and space, such emotions have significance?"\(^2\)

In other words, arguing from the nature of things, the way things are, the emotions lower life has and is satisfied, it also seems that nature, in order to be true to itself, must also fulfill the rendezvous with emotion which indicate the possibility of personal experience after death. Hence we have the conclusion that there must be the natural side of the destiny of man in which destiny there must be the rational side of the destiny of man. When we say man is inherently terrestrial, we are affirming that the habitat is found in the world.

\(^1\)Ferm, loc. cit.  
\(^2\)Ibid.
of man, if the terrestrial sphere be all that is appointed for him, seems clearly a vast over-provision.\(^1\)

What use does man have for all the extraordinary mental and moral powers which distinguish him from other animal life? If survival upon this earthly planet is the only question concerning man's life, he would do well to prefer other attributes than he does. There seems to be a fundamental lack of adjustment between the endowment of man and his temporal habitat unless there be a continuation of life after death to fulfill the potentiality of the nature of man. Otherwise, the universe exhibits an unparalleled violation of its order and economy. Again, Martineau asserts:

Some sort of proportion we expect, and never fail to find, between the endowment of a nature and the persistence and range of its achievement; just as in human productions, the material selected and the refined pains spent in perfecting them are no uncertain index of the service expected from them. . . . For a week's encampment, you spread your canvas and do not build of stone. When on this principle you place side by side the needs of human life . . . and the scope of the intellectual powers of man, I shall be surprised if you do not find the latter to be an enormous over-provision for the former.\(^2\)

Therefore, it is the writer's assertion that because of the natural equipment of man that projects his experience (especially value experience) beyond the physical, space-time order, man has apparently been provided with endowments which indicate the possibility of personal experience after death. Either man has been overstocked with potentiality and capability, or there must be the natural fulfillment of his seeming infinite potentialities in the continuation of life after death. Again, it is noteworthy that nature has supplied all other organic life with the necessary


\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 34-35.
provision to supply their needs for existence in the scheme of the universe. Then, might not man also assume that the very nature of humanity and its unique position in the physical realm has been endowed not for time, but for eternity? The needs and satisfactions of human nature far exceed the seeming allotted span of life. Thus, it seems that the purpose and reason of man's unique destiny cannot be explained or intelligently understood unless he admits the consistency of nature in completing its furnished possibilities.

Furthermore, if God is admitted to be the ground, the upholder of the universe, the source and sustainer of value, then the strength of the position set forth here is reinforced. Moreover, if one also proceeds to say that God is unsurpassably direct in His relations with nature, and especially man, then such a being or ground of being may be expected to be a conserver of value instead of a "waster" of value. The idea of a perfect being or God is direct indication that man may not only logically conceive of a God, but that he may conceive of a God who in His unsurpassable perfection will sustain the highest value of nature, personality, and fulfill the endowments of nature in man.  

Perhaps in spite of what has already been said, the question can be raised as to whether value survives only if there is personal immortality. A counter argument might press the point that values survive, but that this survival does not necessarily involve the survival of a particular system of values; that is, as a continuation of the present personal value scheme. Such would be representative of the thinking of

1 The writer refers back to Hartshorne's logical proof for the existence of God in the section concerning the relation of the idea of God to the concept of life after death. Also, the entire section supporting the existence of God should be considered in this regard.
men such as Whitehead, Wieman, Hartshorne, Tillich, and others. However, from a more traditional, and perhaps Biblical standpoint, it seems one may rightfully speak in more specific terms of expectancy.

As the writer has previously indicated, the Christian concept of personal immortality is founded upon the thought that man was created in the image of God, as a personality, for the purpose of glorifying God and having fellowship with Him. There seems to be no implication to cause men to believe that he could better glorify and commune with God than on a personal level. Secondly, the doctrine of personal immortality is, at least partially, the outgrowth of the concept of the worth of individual personality according to the teachings of Jesus, as in Mark 8:36: "For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul" (KJV). Then, again, the Christian doctrine of personal immortality seems greatly dependent upon the example of Jesus Christ, exhibiting the fulfillment of human personality as God intended it.

Furthermore, Christ gave witness to the means whereby this fulfillment could be accomplished—by complete surrender to the will of God, and yet, not to the loss of personal identity. Hence, through the faultless death and the victorious resurrection of Jesus Christ, sinful humanity was given the earnest of redemption and resurrection. If the life of Jesus holds any relevance for man's situation, it seems man may reasonably expect that His personal teaching and witness are significantly consistent with God's intent for the future of all mankind. On these bases, the writer therefore ascribes the necessity of the survival of personality to the survival of value.

The next concern will be the problem and meaning of personality.
As it has been previously inferred, the element of personality is implicit in what man actually is. It is apparent that the hope of personal immortality is terminally involved with the nature of the selfhood of man. In a general sense, man is an autonomous animal; he is also a religious animal; but the anticipated question seems to be: Is man a theonomous animal who maintains his selfhood after death?

VI. PERSONALITY

Religion is particularly involved with human experience, for apparently the lower animals have no religion. The writer has also indicated that religion is man's aspiration toward the source of his highest values, and his sense of cooperation with and dependence on that source. Thus, religion is man's concern about his own value and destiny. Every religion, then, has required a conception of the religious subject, man, as well as of God who is the religious object.\(^1\) Because of this relationship between God and man, the writer is necessarily involved in the investigation of human personality. Having affirmed the existence of God and realizing the close association between the idea of God and that of personal immortality, a further examination of the value and destiny of the religious nature of man, the answer is 'less then we might man will be carried out by a study of his personality.

In considering the problem and meaning of man's personality, one sentiment, we are not in a position to understand, the anthropologist is immediately faced with a mass of ideas offered especially by psychology and philosophy. However, Brightman says that many psychological details and philosophy. However, Brightman says that many psychological details about personality are unrelated to a philosophy of religion. He further states that "experiments on the knee jerk or Weber's Law or conditioned

\(^1\) Brightman, op. cit., p. 342.
reflexes are irrelevant to one's understanding of man as a religious
being and an experiencer of ideal values. C. C. Pratt is mentioned
as stating that psychology has shed practically no light on "the deter-
minants of man's higher activities." Exception would have to be made of
psychology of religion in this regard. However, much of the technical
research of psychology concerning personality is irrelevant to our purpose.
The religious interest in personality is not an interest in the sense
organs as such, the brain and nervous system, or any isolable conscious
process or response to stimulus. Rather, our interest is in the per-
sonality as a whole, and in an evaluation of the ideals for which the
individual strives.2

Although the religious problem of personality may be closer to
philosophy than it is to psychology, it is the writer's intention to deal
with the philosophical presuppositions and implications of psychology,
making use of psychological data wherever it applies to our problem. In
recent years there has been modest scientific advance in working out a
psychology of the more complex aspects of human nature. Thus, Gordon
Allport says:

If we ask what psychology has contributed to our understanding
of the religious nature of man, the answer is 'Less than we might
wish.' We can explain and to some extent justify this backwardness
by pleading the inherent difficulties in working out a scientific
psychology of the more complex stages of growth. The religious
sentiment, we are now in a position to understand, has attachments
to the most elusive facets of becoming, including 'appropriate
striving, generic conscience, and intentionality.'

Furthermore, Allport mentions three points of advance in scientific

1Ibid., p. 344. 2Ibid.

3Gordon Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955),
p. 93.
understanding of man's religious nature during our present century. First, he refers to the examination of the varieties of religious experience by William James as providing an excellent typology. Secondly, he believes modern polling methods and questionnaires give reliable, if only superficial, data on the extent of religious beliefs and opinions. Thirdly, he says depth psychology has made man aware of the important role of unconscious processes, particularly of those that impede normal integrative growth. One of the chief merits of depth psychology is its wholesome warning against projecting one's sentiments into scientific discussions. The danger of such projection is said to be especially acute in discussions of religion where ambiguities of meaning are so prevalent.¹

In any event, it is evident that to oversimplify the problem of personality would be to make a gross mistake. We are aware that we cannot, within limited space, deal completely with every aspect of the numerous ramifications of the many theories of personality. However, it is the purpose here to reinforce the Christian belief in personal immortality by showing an abiding unity of man's individual identity. But before launching into the complexity of the problem, the writer will briefly consider the background and some definitions of personality.

In ancient Rome, a century before Christ, the term "persona" was already in use. It was originally used to designate the theatrical mask introduced from Greek drama to convey to the audience the character of an actor. According to Professor Paul Johnson, the term was probably derived from the Latin "per sonare," meaning "to sound through," which evidently referred to the large mouth of the mask through which the voice of the

¹Ibid.
actor sounded. At first the term was applied directly to the mask, and then it came to mean the actor behind the mask. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) employed the term "persona" in at least four different ways: (1) external appearance, (2) the role one plays in life, (3) personal qualities that fit a man for his work, (4) the dignity one bears. Thus, from these uses emerged other meanings that extended through many realms of discourse among theologians, jurists, sociologists, and psychologists.¹

Behind the mask, so to speak, is something real and vital which especially concerns religion, philosophy, and psychology. According to funerary evidence, even prehistoric man was interested and pondered over the hidden relation of life and death, as well as the apparent relatedness of visible and invisible powers. In his dreams he may have followed adventures that led him far afield, and waking to find his body reposing at home, he came to identify the soul as distinct from the body. Primitive man was so occupied with the inner side of causation that he projected a soul into every living thing and held the spiritual in priority over the physical.²

As the Hebrew tribes formulated religious concepts, they noted breath ("ruach") as the essential condition of life—that invisible yet pervading stuff moving within every creature so long as he remains alive. This conception symbolized the spirit of man, the mysterious vitality that enables him to live and act with energy. The creation story, recorded in Genesis 2:7, portrays the coming of life to Adam by means of the Creator's breathing into his nostrils the breath of life, making him a "living soul."


²Ibid., pp. 22-23.
In this religious view, spirit is considered the essence of reality, whether in God or man, creating and sustaining the entire universe as well as the life within us. Man is recognized as a living soul who is distinct from animal life in his capacity to know himself and other creatures by name, and to be conscious of himself in relation to other selves.¹

Again, the Hebrews believed the seat of life was also located in the heart, "lebab." This was a reasonable conclusion, for the beating of the heart is a well-known indicator of continued living. The heart refers to the center of one's being in more than a spatial sense; it is the moving source of life-giving vitality in the pulsating circulation of the bloodstream to nourish growing cells and carry off waste products. Although the ancients may not have comprehended the details of blood circulation, they did recognize the heart as the dynamic center of healthy vitality empowering life to outgoing activity. In a greater symbolic sense, the heart also came to mean the inner life in contrast to the external appearance, the personal sense of how life feels to the one who is living it. "The heart is deep" (Psalms 64:6 KJV) and not easy to understand, yet it is decisive in providing the motives for good or evil in life. "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life" (Proverbs 4:23 KJV). Then when Samuel was searching for a successor to Saul, one finds this recorded instruction from God: "Look not on his countenance, or on the height of his stature; . . . for the Lord seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord

¹Ibid., p. 23.
looketh on the heart" (I Samuel 16:7 KJV).  

From this religious perspective, the outer appearance is considered a deceptive mask, not to be taken at face value. Thus, if one is to understand a person there are deeper characteristics to be known. One could well say that religion, like love, is an affair of the heart, prompted by one's deepest feelings and arising by inward response to another being.  

However, in defining personality, it seems that any number of definitions could be given. An individual's personality may be assessed by the effectiveness with which he is able to elicit positive reactions from a variety of persons under different circumstances, by social skill or adroitness. This is sometimes known as the biosocial definition. Then there is the biophysical definition which emphasizes the characteristics and the qualities of the individual subject. The omnibus definition of personality embraces personality by enumerating everything known about an individual. Also, another view equates personality to the unique or individual aspects of behavior, things that are distinctive and set one apart from all other persons. Other theorists, such as Allport, consider personality to represent the essence of man. He defines personality as what a man really is, as "the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment." In view of the many possible definitions, it seems that it is impossible to define personality without coming

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1Ibid.  
2Ibid., p. 24.  
4As quoted by Johnson, loc. cit.
to agreement concerning the theoretical frame of reference within which personality will be viewed.

It does seem evident that one may say that personality is more than a mask of external appearances, that there is a deeper inner reality to understand if he is to know the essential nature and dynamics of personal life. On the other hand, personality also seems to expand into a broadening field of active relationships to fulfill inner needs and to realize values with other persons. Thus Johnson uses the term "person" to denote the self or soul as perceived from within, and he employs the term "personality" to denote the total functioning human individual as perceived from without. The internal view will arise either from introspection of one's own conscious experiences, or from empathy by which one puts himself in another's place to sense how it feels to be that person and see what life means as through his eyes. Admitting that consciousness is not the whole of personality, it may be identified as the awareness a person has of the meanings that provide the continuities of memory and intention, the relationships which he can recognize, and the efforts to make sense and value out of his experiences. A person, then, from the internal aspect, is a unique center of experience seeking values through dynamic relationships.¹

The external view of the total functioning human individual may begin with the physical appearances of stature, build, facial expression, gestures, speech, manner of behavior, et cetera. All of these manifestations are taken as symptomatic of the individual's character, that is, of the essential inner man behind the mask of his persona. Other clues such

as family history, previous events, reactions to a variety of situations, performance in school or vocation, and test scores should be sought in reference to goals and purposes. Thus personality is seen to be more than the core of self-conscious experience. It is seen to include unconscious processes, behavioral stimuli and responses, the imprint of environment and culture, and the inner meaning of face-to-face relations with individuals and groups, as well as the genetic unfolding of all past experiences in the developing process of one's life. From this approach of an external perspective, personality is a developing integration of goal-seeking life processes, arising from multi-dimensional needs and persisting through interacting relationships to experience meaning and achieve a community of values with other persons. Thus, personality is an intricate system of relationships whose focal center is a conscious "I," the subject of experience. This unique self has been recognized as the "person" who is aware of his relationships through many dimensions that radiate from his self-experience.

The aspect of personality that the writer is interested in is self-consciousness. To regard personality as consciousness is not to deny the body or to minimize physiological psychology or behavioristic method. This is merely asserting the most fundamental fact of experience, which is its consciousness. A philosophical approach to personality reveals that psychology presupposes the same ingredients that religion affirms, when the psychologist conducts an experiment. Such experiments do not occur in a vacuum; they are initiated, observed, and reported by a mind.

1 Ibid., pp. 26, 233.

2 Brightman, op. cit., pp. 345, 347.
Furthermore, Brightman says:

Every experiment presupposes, therefore, at least the following items: (1) a self or person, (2) the unity of the self during the entire experiment, (3) data of consciousness which are the observable aspect of the experiment, (4) a purpose, (5) the validity of reason, (6) memory, (7) the experience of time, (8) the acknowledgment of an objective world, and (9) society. In short, if any experiment is to produce valid results, it is necessary that there be a unitary, purposeful, rational, self-remembering personality, interacting with its environment. Just such a personality is also presupposed by religion. Any experiment which seems to question this personality is a "self-refuting system," for it denies the very condition on which it depends for its validity.¹

Therefore, because the process of experiencing is always a conscious process and the actual empirical situation, it seems one may define personality in terms of consciousness. Each individual experiences his own consciousness, and that experience is private and cannot literally be shared by anyone else. Individuals know their own consciousness directly, but technically, they must infer the consciousness of others from certain appearances in their own consciousness, either their sensory consciousness of the other's body or the more complex consciousness of the other's language. To infer from reference to the other's body, as Watsonian behaviorists do, that the other person is a mere body and not a consciousness is as unreasonable as it would be to infer from the reference to speech that the other person is a disembodied language. As a matter of fact, the experiences of body and of language lead to the definite conclusion that the other is a person. Such experiences indicate that one's mind is not alone; one is an experiencer, and there are other experiencers.²

No state of affairs can be a datum of self unless it is actually present in consciousness. Experience is given only as a conscious

¹Ibid., p. 345. ²Ibid., p. 346.
situation, for to experience is to be aware. One experiences a situation only when it makes a perceptible difference to his conscious experience. The only situation experienced by anybody is his own consciousness. From this, he is able to observe and reason the presence in his environment, of the situations he believes in because of their relation to him. The only basis man has for any knowledge, belief, faith, truth, or error is to be found in the data of self—the situations experienced. Whatever is not immediately in the datum of self is considered a situation believed-in or disbelieved in—for example, a person's brain, or the bottom of the ocean, or God. As this writer has indicated, a situation experienced is a self, a person, or an experient, because it is a self-experiencing whole which includes thinking, choosing, remembering, anticipating, and purposing, as well as feeling and sensing. A whole self is said to be all those situations experienced which are related by self-identifying memories and anticipations. However, for any present experient, its own past is no longer a situation experienced, but the past becomes a situation believed-in. Still, the belief that it was once a situation experienced by the experient may be well grounded in coherent interpretation of experience.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 347, 348.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 348.

Many of the situations believed-in, and also many unknown situations,
exert their energies on us. However, only chaos ensues if man identifies himself with the energetic influences that affect us. One's brain, the stimuli which give impulses to one's nervous system, the sun in the sky, and God are all essential to one's continued existence in this world. Yet, I—the experient, the person, the situation experienced, the data of self—am not to be identified with what sustains my being. Each individual is what he experiences himself as being—a conscious self. Such a point of view, which takes man's personality to be his consciousness, is the view of religion, for Christianity is concerned with man's conscious experience of values, with his spirit, and with religious experience. The goal of the Christian religion is the development of worthy consciousness.

Therefore, one may define personality as the quality of being a person. Such a definition still demands further explanation. What is a person? Is any consciousness whatever to be regarded as a person? Is the consciousness of an ant, a dog, or an ape personal? These questions indicate the necessity of making a distinction in terminology. For instance, the word "self" is used for any and every consciousness, however simple or complex it may be. A self is said to be any conscious situation experienced as a whole. All consciousness is self-experience, but self-experience may not be properly called self-consciousness (reflective consciousness) unless the self in question has the special attribute of being able to think about the fact that it is a self in addition to the actuality that it experiences sensations and desires. A "person" is said to be a self that is potentially self-conscious, rational, and ideal. This means that when a self is able to reflect on itself as a self, to

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1Ibid., p. 349.
reason, and to acknowledge ideal goals by which it can judge its actual achievements, then that self is called a person. Brightman says that there is no reason on the basis of known evidence to make a sharp division and say that only human beings are persons; animals such as dogs, horses, and apes seem to be at least elementary persons. Whether such "subhuman" persons are immortal is another question, and one which lacks evidence. However, as far as man knows, human persons are the only ones who have religious experience.\(^1\)

Again, individual psychology indicates a great variety of persons, and comparative psychology makes it probable that self-experience, if not reflective self-consciousness, extends to the lowest forms of animal life. One can barely surmise how the consciousness of a dog or a cat feels to the animal that has it, and to conceive the consciousness of a protozoan goes beyond one's imagination; yet there is good reason to believe that every living being experiences itself as a self. Hence, the various levels of selfhood and personality merge into each other and defy classification. However, Brightman says it is possible to indicate the range of these levels by noting the chief characteristics of the most elementary type of self that can be and contrasting the marks of this minimum self with the chief characteristics of a person.\(^2\)

Thus, Brightman lists the characteristics of a minimum self, the simplest possible consciousness, as follows: (1) Self-experience, a unified complexity of consciousness where every item of consciousness is owned, and belongs to a whole. (2) "Qualia"--distinguishable qualities, at least sense qualities and perhaps other qualities of feeling. (3) Time and space.

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 349-350. \(^2\)Ibid., pp. 350-351.
All selves must necessarily experience time because this is a world of process and movement. It seems highly probable that some kind of space-consciousness is also universal in this respect. (4) Transcendence of time and space. The complexity of the plausible present and memory of the past (however dim) elevate every self above time to some extent; and probably the humblest self transcends space both by its ability to aim at distant spaces and by its nonspatial experiences such as its unity. (5) Process and conation. All selves are in constant process of flux, which includes striving for ends (conation). To be a self is to experience a desire for future experience, if only the eating of food and the continuance of life. (6) Awareness of meaning. The simplest self treats its experiences as signs of further experience; thus it is in an elementary way aware of meaning. Even the humblest paramecium experiences objective reference in every one of its pursuits and avoidances. (7) Response to environment. Every self lives in an environment which is constantly stimulating it. Although a "minimum self" may have no awareness of the causal relation or of reasoning processes, and is thus not conscious of a difference between itself and its environment, its "animal faith" leads it to respond to the effects of the world in its experience. (8) Privacy. Every self is directly experienced only by itself. However, a minimum self is not aware of this property of its experience, since any understanding of the concept of privacy presupposes reasoning processes.  

In contrasting a minimum self with a person, Brightman indicates that each of the eight characteristics just mentioned has been developed to a higher level. (1) Self-experience is for more complex and highly

1 Ibid., pp. 351-352.
organized; reference to past and anticipation of the future plays a much larger part in the present experience of the self. (2) New "qualia" emerge, such as feelings of moral obligation, of aesthetic taste, and religious obligation, which become recognized as imperative norms. (3) Also, the realm and range of time and space experience is vastly extended. (4) Time-transcendence is extended by the development of a more complex sphere of attention and of a fuller and more accurate memory accompanied by recognition. The self of the present is thus identified and associated with the self of past and future. Space-transcendence is increased by a multiplication of non-spatial interests in spiritual values and abstract ideas. (5) Conation rises to the level of free purposive self-control and control of environment. The self desires, and the person is, within limits, freely selective and critical of its desires. (6) Awareness of meaning becomes conceptual thought and reasoning. Although this has been given as the unique attribute of man, it seems that it is present in some degree among other higher forms of life. Reflective self-consciousness, as distinguished from mere self-experience, arises on this personal level. (7) The response to environment is increasingly a response to a social and ideal environment, and the responses are more freely selective rather than mechanical.

(8) Although privacy is in a way transcended by language and understanding, it remains a fact that all communication is sent by and received in private experience; and developed persons respect the fact and the rights of privacy. ¹

It is further pointed out that among these emergent traits of personality, the most important are the consciousness of imperative norms,

¹Ibid., pp. 352-353.
freedom and reason. By reason is meant the power of testing truth-claims by logical and empirical standards; the principles of deduction and induction, along with the perception of the relations between parts and wholes (analysis, synthesis, synopsis). Coherence, which is the principle of reason, is the same whether its subject matter be the physical world, the realm of values, or social relations. The consciousness of imperative norms is man's experience of his destiny as obligation to pursue the ideal values. Thus personality grows as these ideals are transformed into concrete value experiences. Freedom is the power of saying yes or no to given experiences—it is the power of choice. Reason, imperative norms, and choice enter into every higher personal experience, especially into religious experience. For instance, "I will pray with the understanding," "love your enemies," and "choose you this day whom ye will serve" are typical religious expressions of reason, imperative norms, and choice, as principles of personality.¹

Furthermore, it is important to consider the unity and identity of personality in relation to religion. If a person is not a true identical unity through all the changes in his experience, then spiritual development is impossible. Moral growth, for example, rests on the postulate that I am responsible to myself for my past purposes and contracts. If I am not the one who entertained those purposes and made those contracts, I do not experience responsibility or continuous growth. Unless an individual is one person, identical through change, all hope for personal immortality becomes irrational, especially if the apparent unity which one experiences be traced completely to physiological causes, materialistically interpreted. Hence, Brightman says that the unity of human personality is apparently due

¹Ibid., p. 253; cf. I Corinthians 14:15, Matthew 5:44, Joshua 24:15.
to a cause beyond man. He indicates that the nervous system is the area where that cause operates. However, if the nervous system is said to be material substance, independent of any mind, then personality is an "epi-
phenomenon" and its unity is only that of a shadow. On the other hand, if the nervous system is what idealism and theism take it to be, an expression or creation of mind, then the dependence of human personality on its nervous system is an instance of the dependence of human mind on cosmic mind or God. Thus it is also evident that if personality is not a true identical unity, it is absurd to regard God as a person, infinite or otherwise. 1

Concerning the problem of the unity and identity of personality, Brightman considers four outstanding theories: epiphenomenalism, the analytic theory, the substantialist point of view, and the organic theory. Epiphenomenalism regards consciousness as effect, never as cause. Consciousness is here understood to be a physiological product; thus any unity or identity it may appear to have is illusory. The real unity is that of brain and nervous system, not of consciousness. The analytic theory says the complex structure of mind is revealed by analysis to consist of simple elements, either sensations (impressions as Hume called them) or neutral entities (as modern analytic realism views them). Thus, those who follow this theory view the unity and identity underlying mind in the simple elements of mind, not personality as a whole. The substantialist point of view is based upon the thought of Aristotle and the scholastics. It rests on the postulate that every real object is a substance, either material or spiritual, and that substance is a necessary category, although not an object of sense perception nor discoverable in consciousness. Because substance is con-
ceived as being other than experience, the spiritual substance is called a

1Ibid., p. 354.
transcendent soul. For substantialists, then, the unity and identity of personality are found neither in the brain nor the elements of consciousness but in the soul as a spiritual substance, which underlies and produces the phenomena of consciousness. The organic theory, which points out the wholeness of personality, posits an immanent self as distinguished from a transcendent soul. The self of the organic view is a living whole of conscious experience, whose parts have no existence in isolation from the whole and whose nature is to be conscious as a whole. This view of the self is closely related to Gestalt psychology, purposive psychology, and so-called "personalities." According to it, the unity of the self or person is the wholeness and indivisibility of its consciousness, its identity is the experience of self-identification in immediate experience and in the processes of memory and anticipation.¹

Having thus viewed the theories, consider their utility. The assertion of epiphenomenalism, that the underlying unity of a person is of brain and nervous system, and not of consciousness, goes beyond our present physiological knowledge. Also, as it has been pointed out, all experimentation presupposes a unified and identical self as observer and interpreter of the experiment. Hence, in so far as physiological psychology is experimental, it presupposes the unitary self which epiphenomenalism denies. Therefore, the theory is self-contradictory. There are also two main objections that can be urged against the analytic theory. First, it seems highly improbable, both psychologically and logically, that the "elements" of mind enjoy any separate and continuous existence apart from the self to

¹Ibid., pp. 354, 355, 356, 357.
which they belong. It is even more improbable that purely subsistent, neutral entities can account for any actual existence whatever. Secondly, although analysis is important and necessary, it is not a method suited to discover and interpret the properties of wholes as such. The unity and identity of personality may well be not elements or relations of elements, but pervasive properties of each personality as a whole. The substantialist point of view that the unity and identity of personality are found in spiritual substance called a transcendent soul, points to the inadequacy of both epiphenomenalism and analysis.\(^1\)

However, there are cogent objections to it. In the first place, when one asks exactly what is meant by this transcendent soul substance as distinguished from consciousness, one does not receive a satisfactory answer. He is told the soul is "that which" supports or causes consciousness. As distinguished from matter, it is a spiritual "that which," and it is equipped with the faculty or power of doing whatever appears in consciousness as its deed. Thus, many thinkers regard the soul as an empty concept and reject substance as a mere abstraction lacking any concrete definition. Secondly, Brightman says even if there is such soul substance as is alleged, it is of no philosophical or religious importance in interpreting personality. All that is needed for the philosophical understanding of personality is the experienced reality and unity of consciousness and its interaction with its environment. He further feels that to add to consciously experienced unity and identity the further unity of a soul substance is to create a needless hypothesis. Religiously, it may be said that it is only our conscious experience of ourselves as realizers of value that is of

\(^1\)Ibid.
any importance. Thus, what happens in a supposed soul substance is not of religious moment until conscious experience of God occurs. And if a soul were to be immortal, the only possible value in its immortality would lie in its conscious experiences, not in the persistence of a mere substance after death.¹

The organic theory remains. This view recognizes the interaction of the unitary personality with the bodily organism and thus finds partial truth in epiphenomenalism. Too, it insists on the need of analysis for understanding, but it supplements analysis by synopsis. Also it grants that substantialism is right in seeking for a unity, but holds it to be wrong in the unempirical unity asserted. The objections and arguments against the organic theory are primarily made by those who are in favor of the opposing views. Secondly, it is asserted that the self cannot be found by experimental psychologists. In this regard, Brightman makes two defensive remarks. First, he says that if the methods of experimentalists are directed toward objective phenomena of behavior, as they usually are, it is obvious that they are not looking for the self in the right place, and thus will not find it. Secondly, it is reaffirmed that the unity and identity of self are employed empirical presuppositions of every experiment. If one does not experience himself as one identical mind, he cannot conduct any experiment. Thus, the organic view of self psychology seems to be the most tenable theory of personality, precisely from the experimental standpoint.²

In any event, it seems the empirical situation remains a source of evidence for belief in society, the world, God, and personal immortality.

¹Ibid., p. 357.
²Ibid., pp. 357-358.
However, it is evident that the actual experience of man's self which he has at any given moment is far from being his whole self. The empirical situation is always a self; it is an experience of wholeness and identity, of complex unity, of purpose, and of an awareness of an environment. But every datum self contains signs of a larger self to which it belongs; memory and anticipation assert the identity of the present person with the person that has been and a person that will be. Hence, the whole self, or person, is said to be a total conscious process which is never present to itself in one single experience, but which is aware of its identity and unity by means of its backward-looking memories and its forward-looking purposes. The whole self, or person, then, consists of all the conscious experience that is, has been, or will be present in all the empirical situations that make up the history of the person. Therefore, the unity of personality is the unity of consciousness; personality includes consciousness only, and does not include any of its environment—physiological, sub-conscious, or social—as part of it.¹

However, it is not the bare existence of conscious selves in the universe that is the source of religion and the evidence for a God; it is rather the fact that there are persons—selves who are able to develop ideal values. It is true that humanity is confronted with the facts of social, economic, and political injustice in the world, to say nothing of the private miseries and futilities of countless individuals. Yet over against all that seem to make man's higher values seem unreal is the fact that they have survived despite the injustices of nature and man's inhumanity to man. Wherever humanity exists, some moral, scientific, philosophical, artistic, and

¹Ibid., p. 358.
religious ends are sought in one manner or another. Spiritual ideals are
thus far from being unreal, for they are what make men human, as well as
akin to the divine. Without these spiritual values man would be deper-
sonalized and dehumanized; he would be a mere brute. Man's desperate
wickedness is often due to the rejection of, the inaccessibility to, or
the unjust distribution of these precise ideal values. For all their
seeming fragility, these spiritual values are the only clue to any real
meaning in history or in individual life.¹

From a psychological viewpoint, the healthy person in possession of
normal intelligence, insight, and emotional maturity knows that he cannot
solve life's problem by wishful thinking or cure his own partialness by
fictionizing. To cure his partialness he must find something more con-
vincing than partialness itself. Thus the developed personality will not
fabricate his religion out of some emotional fragment but will seek a
theory of "Being" in which all such fragments are meaningfully ordered.
He learns that to surmount the difficulties of a truculent world he needs
also faith and love. Thus religion, engaging as it does reason, faith,
and love, becomes for him morally true. Most religious people claim that
it is also metaphysically true because they feel that outer revelation and
mystical experience have brought them supernatural assurance. Thus Allport
says the warrant for certitude comes from the total orientation that the
person attains in his quest for a comprehensive belief-system capable of
relating him to existence as a whole.²

In relating the concept of personality to the idea of personal
immortality, one should further recall that the person is essentially

¹Ibid., pp. 361, 362. ²Allport, Becoming, op. cit., pp. 94, 95.
focal in one's experience, yet this experience is actually of relationships that enrich and complicate his goal seeking. The writer has acknowledged the various relationships of self, and specifically the "I-We" relation of body and mind that Freud and psychoanalysts emphasize; furthermore the "I-It" relation of self to the environing field of interacting forces that Lewin and field theorists maintain is admitted; also, the truth of Sullivan and the interpersonalists who point out the relation of personality in the "I-We" relation of group membership is affirmed; but the writer also maintains with Allport and the personalists the "I-Thou" relation of man and his values in their ultimate meanings.\(^1\) Special reference here is made to the necessity of man's personal relationship with God.\(^2\) Yet, as is known, the writer would relate Allport's "propriate striving" to the "I-Thou" relationship of man. Allport says that "propriate striving" distinguishes itself from other forms of motivation in that, however beset by conflicts, it makes for unification of personality. When the individual is dominated by segmental drives, by compulsions, or by the winds of circumstance, he has lost the integrity that comes only from maintaining ultimate, major directions of striving. The possession of long-range goals, regarded as central to one's personal existence, distinguishes the human being from the animal, the adult from the child, and in many cases the healthy personality from the sick. He further states that it is apparent that striving always has a future reference. As a matter of fact, a great many states of mind are adequately described only in terms of their futurity.\(^2\) In other words, it is man's direct relation to God,

\(^{1}\) Johnson, op. cit., p. 235. \(^{2}\) Allport, Becoming, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
on a personal basis, that gives dynamic to his continuing expectancy of future life. Without the "I-Thou" relation, all ultimate strivings would be useless. The fact that man does strive for values in their ultimate meanings seems itself to be an intimation of personal immortality.

Again, Allport gives another suggestion that applies to the problem. He points out that the self is also knower, for no mere series of experiences can possibly turn themselves into an awareness of that series as a unit. Nor can passing thoughts possibly regard themselves as important or interesting. The only possible and ultimate monitor of experience, and especially value experience, is a personal self. However, it is true that cognition of one's knowing self is always indirect, similar to a presupposition. Yet, on the other hand, all features of the empirical self are known directly, through acquaintance, as any object is known which falls into time and space categories. Man not only knows things, but he is acquainted with the empirical features of his self-enhancement. For instance, it is I who have bodily sensations, I who recognize my self-identity from day to day; I who note and reflect upon my self-assertion, self-extension, my own rationalizations, as well as upon my own rationalizations, as well as upon my interests and strivings. When one thus thinks about his own 'propriate' functions he is likely to perceive their essential togetherness, and feel them intimately bound in some way to the knowing function itself.\(^1\)

Since such knowing is seemingly beyond any shadow of doubt, one may logically conceive of immortality in a personal manner. It seems rather evident that there must be an integrating, conscious self upon which even

\(^{1}\) Ibid., pp. 52, 53.
personal development must depend. It is the self as knower, thinker, feeler, and doer, blended in a single unit that achieves personality.

Biblically, Christianity affirms the central importance of faith, Personality is, of course, achieved on many different levels, through Jesus Christ and His resurrection. It is evident that the Christian sharp and prolonged conflicts, through dialectical struggles, through sin, hope of the resurrection and redemption, that the person of resurrection through forgiveness and redemption by God. It is apparent that the reality of spiritual values measures the evils as well as the goods of personality.

Paul makes a cogent observation in I Corinthians 15.3-5: "And if the dead rise not at all, why then are they raised? Why do we then suffer persecution? If we have hoped in Christ in this life only, we are more than ever miserable. For we are of good will, if the resurrection of Christ be not come to pass." This may also be considered a preliminary indication that the Paul suggests that the self, the person, as knower, thinker, feeler, and doer— that the belief in the resurrection of Christ is so essential that it is one blended unit—related to the whole of existence, including God— Christianity argues, and it becomes the key without foundation, will by its very nature guarantee the continuance of all "becoming," of its future consciousness. 1

Whatever seeming discrepancies may be raised and whatever incredulity may be attached to the dyptic aspect of the resurrection, one goes further and declares that it is impossible to conceive of the survival unshakable that is manifest—there is a unified faith in His resurrection of personality in a disembodied sense. It rather contends for the survival that is represented by the New Testament writings. However, it is to of the whole, self-conscious personality after death, and this by the admitted that one becomes entangled in any controversial issues when the resurrection of the body. Without a body the human self or personality is held to be incomplete. Not only is it deprived of any means by which to translate its thoughts, desires, and will into action, but also it is sense. Yet, without some way to communicate with others or to express itself in any way. 2 Hence, the writer’s next consideration shall be the Resurrection of Jesus Christ happened as an integral part of the Christian message, which must be interpreted in relation to the possible resurrection of the believer.

1 Ibid., pp. 53, 54; cf. Brightman, op. cit., p. 382.

VII. THE RESURRECTION

Biblically, Christianity affirms the central importance of faith in Jesus Christ and His resurrection. It is apparent that the Christian hope of the restoration and preservation of the whole person by resurrection is dependent upon the acclaimed resurrection of Jesus. The Apostle Paul makes a cogent observation in I Corinthians 15:13-14, "But if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither hath Christ been raised: and if Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain, your faith also is vain." This may also be considered a typical indication of the fact that the belief in the resurrection of Christ was the vitality of the early Christian creed, and it became the New Testament foundation for doctrine.

Whatever seeming discrepancies may be raised and whatever incredulity may be attached to the Synoptic account of Jesus' resurrection, one unshakable fact is outstanding—there is a unified faith in His resurrection that is represented by the New Testament writers. However, it is to be admitted that one becomes entangled in many controversial issues when one attempts a survey of the series of events surrounding the Resurrection; the only thing attempted was an attempt to set forth the predictions, the burial, the empty tomb on the third day, and the appearances. Yet, without becoming involved with the functions of Biblical criticism at all, one may certainly state that something extraordinary happened as an integral part of the message of the life of Jesus to originate and perpetuate such a faith as the "Resurrection faith."

Moreover, the early followers of Christ apparently did not think of the resurrection as merely a mechanistic occurrence, but it was considered as an event in the history of the world.
considered as an event in which they also became participators. Bishop Westcott, referring to New Testament Christians is quoted as saying the Resurrection "was not an article of their creed, but the life of it." Seemingly the most important thing about being a Christian was that it meant that a person has become a partaker of Christ's resurrection, so that you too "were raised with Christ" (Colossians 3:1).  

It is interesting to note that the New Testament speaks of Jesus "being raised" rather than of His "rising." This indicates that the Resurrection is to be considered as a mighty act of God, something which God's power accomplished in Christ. Thus one reads of Christ being raised from the dead through the glory of the Father in Romans 6:4, "...that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father ...," and it is expressed as being "according to that working of the strength of his might which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead..." (Ephesians 1:19b, 20a). For the Christian, then, God was preeminently "He who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead" (Romans 4:24).  

Williams says that this giving of life is obviously an act of creation--that which the Creator alone can do. Inevitably the raising up of Jesus from the dead came to be thought of as a second creation comparable to the one when God made the world. Hence, the risen Christ is described as "the last Adam," "the second man," and as such is set in contrast with "the first man, Adam." Furthermore, Williams points out that just as in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth and made man to dwell thereon, so now

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3 I Corinthians 15:45-47.
again, in His raising up of Jesus, His divine creative energy issued forth to accomplish His purpose. Thus, to become a Christian is to be caught up in the wave of divine creative energy. It is to be swept into life by that power of God which raised Jesus from the dead.\(^1\)

St. Paul describes this "creative act" as our "calling." For instance, it is again noted that when he says to the Corinthians, "Behold your calling, brethren" (I Corinthians 1:26), he is referring to their having been called by God into "the society of the Redeemed."\(^2\) Moreover, Christians are characteristically described as those who are "called to be Jesus Christ's" (Romans 1:16), and God can be thought of as "He that calleth you" (I Thessalonians 5:24). This calling of God is said to be the divine initiative of the Christian life. If one is a Christian, it is because God called him "into the fellowship of His son, Jesus Christ our Lord" (I Corinthians 1:19).\(^3\) Thus, the Christian doctrine of life after death is correlatively involved with belief and trust in God and the efficacy of Jesus Christ. Because of His affirmed mediatorial position, the resurrection of Christ is accounted as the earnest of the ultimacy of the redemption of man. However, the significance of the alleged event of Jesus' resurrection is not necessarily dependent upon the verification of the surrounding circumstances; the fact of the resultant faith from His example implicates internal as well as external meaning. Perhaps to some men, the faith that became universally attested by New Testament Christians everywhere seems of more dependable character than the detailed events that were asserted as proof of the Lord's resurrection. In this manner, one may be warranted to

\(^1\)Williams, op. cit., p. 4.  
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 5.  
\(^3\)Ibid.
believe in Christ's victory over death because of a faith that arose in spite of the hopes that perished when Jesus died. Thus it is possible to apprehend the occasion of the Resurrection without asserting predictions of the event, without referring to the manner or place of burial, or indicating the time as occurring on the third day, without the confirmation of the empty tomb, or the affirmation of the physical appearances of Jesus after His crucifixion.

Perhaps most critical Bible scholars will admit that some decisive experience or experiences took place. Otherwise, it is difficult to account for the faith and hope that was vitally instilled in the lives of Jesus' followers. Yet, it is also affirmed by others that the "Resurrection faith," as the writer now views it, would be greatly impoverished if it were completely divorced from the associated events as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. In this connection Richard R. Niebuhr says:

For in the primitive church the resurrection served just that functioning of revealing Jesus in his true stature and of correcting and completing all the premature and partial interpretations of him. When the resurrection texts are set aside, as distorting rather than revealing the true dimensions of the historical Jesus, a basic error has been committed, for historical thinking cannot go behind the New Testament; it can only penetrate it. . . . The resurrection was the event that the primitive community in all of its confusing diversity of perspectives used to interpret everything else: the true identity of Jesus, the meaning of his ministry and his death, his coming again, and finally, his birth.¹

Therefore, due consideration should be given to the implicit relation of the Scriptural account to the asserted resurrection of Jesus Christ. This includes a survey of the predictions of the event, His death and burial, the empty tomb on the third day, and the record of His post-resurrection appearance.

appearances. Any Biblical passages used as reference are for the initial purpose of suggesting at least an external relevance to the issue, never as a proof-text. The internal matter of interpretation must be left to the individual.

The predictions. Such passages are rather numerous, and they are said to occur in the earliest form of Gospel tradition. However, for various critical reasons, they do not all stand upon an equal level of accept- ance. There are those which are attended by some uncertainty and those which, at least superficially, seem indisputable.

Those predictions which use the sign of the Temple and the sign of Jonah the prophet are held by many modern expositors to be uncertain. The first reference contains the words of Christ spoken at the cleansing of the Temple. When the Jews demanded a sign, Jesus' answer was: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." The immediate criticism of the Jews was that "this temple" had been forty-six years in building; it was incredible that it could be raised by Christ in three days. But the Evangelist says, "He spake of the temple of his body." "When therefore he was raised from the dead, his disciples remembered that he spake this; and they believed the scripture, and the word which Jesus had said" (John 2:19-22).

Critical writers emphasize that the occasion was the Temple-cleansing; that the words were spoken in the Temple; that the Temple building was the subject of conversation so far as the Jews were concerned, and that if the answer does not relate to it then the conversation was at cross purposes, and Christ's reply had no bearing on the Jew's objection.
Moreover, this destruction and rebuilding of the Temple was the very charge brought against Jesus in His trial before Caiaphas: "We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another not made with hands" (Mark 14:58). And further, this thought became a part of the reviling when Jesus was crucified.¹

The second sign which is related to the predictions of Jesus concerning His resurrection is that of Jonah the prophet. It too is held to be uncertain by many scholars. In Matthew 12:39-41 one finds a comprehensive report of Jesus' words referring to Jonah:

Then certain of the scribes and Pharisees answered him, saying, Teacher, we would see a sign from thee. But he answered and said unto them, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given it but the sign of Jonah the prophet; for as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale; so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. The men of Nineveh shall stand up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: for they repented at the preaching of Jonah; and behold, a greater than Jonah is here.

The corresponding passage in Luke 11:29-30 is different. Nothing is said of the resurrection, and the contrast between the men of Nineveh and Jesus' contemporaries is drawn as follows: "The men of Nineveh shall stand up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: for they repented at the preaching of Jonah; and behold a greater than Jonah is here."

Sparrow Simpson suggests that when the Jews would not recognize the divine authority and nature of Jesus' work, He condemned their sensational search for signs as an evidence of the "unspirituality" of the generation desiring them; and expressly refuses to satisfy any such craving. The only sign of Jonah; that is, the non-miraculous utterance of a prophet and a preacher which was sufficient for people of Nineveh. Hence, the sign of

¹Cf. Matthew 27:40.
Jonah is not the miraculous, but the commonplace. Jonah was a sign to the Ninevites, not as a worker of miracles but as a preacher of repentance. The parallel suggested is thus thought to be moral, not miraculous: a parallel in outward appearance of humiliation and insignificance; not in their miraculous experiences. Therefore, because of the seeming disunity of circumstances that are involved, the signs of the Temple and of Jonah are recognized as uncertain predictive material.

However, according to the Marcan narrative, in the earliest tradition, there are a series of three leading occasions in which Jesus unquestionably predicts His resurrection. The first of these was after the great confession of Peter that Jesus was the Christ: "And he began to teach them, that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again" (Mark 8:31; cf. Matthew 16:21; Luke 9:22). The second prediction by Jesus was after the Transfiguration experience: "And as they were coming down from the mountain, he charged them that they should tell no man what things they had seen, save when the Son of man should have risen from the dead" (Mark 9:9; cf. Matthew 17:9). The third prediction is recorded as occurring at Christ's final ascent to Jerusalem. Mark's account is extraordinarily graphic. Jesus walked before them; not with them as usual. The disciples followed with grave forebodings. Then Jesus turned, rejoined them, and instructed them, saying:

Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man shall be delivered unto the chief priests and the scribes; and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him unto the Gentiles.

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and they shall mock him, and shall spit upon him, and shall scourge him, and shall kill him; and after three days he shall rise again (Mark 10:33-34; cf. Matthew 20:18-19; Luke 18:32-33).

It is remarkable that all three of the predictions agree in declaring not only the coming resurrection, but also its occurrence on the "third day." Critics generally admit that Jesus predicted His own death, if only as the result of the natural psychology of the situation. However, on the other hand, if Jesus predicted His death, He must also have predicted His resurrection as the Biblical record testifies; for only thus could He reconcile His death with His Messianic claim. Hence, Simpson declares, if Jesus claimed to be the Christ, and also anticipated with certainty His own death, the contradiction could only be solved by the equally confident certainty of His resurrection. Thus the prediction of His resurrection seems confirmed by the requirements of His circumstances. If Christ-hood was Jesus' mission, and His death an essential condition of its fulfillment, the vindication of God's chosen must lie in reversing His death, that is, by His resurrection.  

However, according to Professor Guignebert, the most rational approach is to recognize the presence of such predictions as a sign necessary for the expansion of a legend. He believes that the opposition the followers of Jesus encountered by the fundamental affirmation, "He has risen again," gradually forced Christians to develop the legend of the Resurrection. It is further stated that this process must not be confused with the clever creation of fictive narratives, deliberately intended to deceive. Instead, each added detail represents a conviction however ill

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1 Ibid., pp. 8, 11, 12.
founded, unverified and supposedly unverifiable, which in the mind of the apologist is sufficiently justified by its necessity and its logical probability. The inevitable effect of the Jewish environment is seen in the tendency to render the fact of the Resurrection more acceptable by seeking to prove, by various means, the reality of the glorification of Jesus by a preliminary Resurrection conformable to popular ideas. The Greeks, though willing to accept the apotheosis of Jesus, were averse to the idea of a resurrection of the flesh. Hence, it became necessary to multiply irrefutable proofs for their benefit.¹

On the other hand, in order that the question of credibility be placed in its proper perspective, James Orr suggests that it should be recognized that the Gospel narratives, on Apostolic testimony, aim primarily at telling how events came about, rather than producing proof of accepted facts. Moreover, it is maintained that the accounts of the Gospels show good reason for considering them as eye-witness reports, testimony resting upon first-hand reports, and in every instance the writers apparently considered themselves as "transmitters" of the accounts rather than "originators." Furthermore, it should be considered that the Apostles, with numerous other eye-witnesses, lived together at Jerusalem, continuously engaged in the work of teaching and preaching; that during this period they were in constant communication with each other, with their converts, and with the churches which they founded. Hence the witness which they bore necessarily acquired a familiar and fixed form. The deposit of this common tradition one has in the Gospels has the weight of this constituent testimony behind it, especially in its main features. Therefore, Orr feels

that such testimony of common knowledge is of extreme value as evidence of the actual life and teachings of Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{1}

However, men such as Guignebert do not share this kind of presump-
tive view. Professor Guignebert states:

Synoptic tradition believed that devout hands took the body of Jesus down from the cross and laid it in the tomb on the Friday evening; that Jesus came forth triumphantly on the Sunday morning, and that after an earthly sojourn, during which his disciples may have seen him several times, he ascended to heaven, and returned to God the Father who had sent him to men. By combining the different statements in the four Gospels, the Acts, Paul's Epistles and the first Epistle of Peter, the Christian creed has constructed an account of these essential events, that seems at first fairly consistent. But this impression disappears before the most super-
official examination of the texts and reveals instead a mosaic artificially composed of contradictory fragments, which have only been combined in disregard of their discrepancies by exhibiting as a sequence what are really alternative narratives.\textsuperscript{2}

Again, contrarily, James Orr contends that the chief points involved in the Resurrection story be taken in order, and their credibility examined. In this manner, he feels that the force of the objections of a destructive historical criticism can then be tested. In tracing the Resurrection account of the gospels, he finds that the detailed story of the women that went to the tomb on the Sabbath and prepared for Jesus' body. Then he took it down from the cross and wrapped it in a linen shroud. The women then went to the tomb, where Jesus' body was placed. At the Resurrection Day, the stone was just beginning. The women who had seen Jesus' body the day before was not touching the stone, and the stone was rolled away. The women then entered the tomb and saw the body of Jesus. The women then told the disciples that Jesus was alive. The disciples then went to the tomb and saw the body of Jesus. The women then told the disciples that Jesus was alive. The disciples then went to the tomb and saw the body of Jesus. The women then told the disciples that Jesus was alive. The disciples then went to the tomb and saw the body of Jesus. The women then told the disciples that Jesus was alive.

Death and burial. The primary fact that Jesus died and was buried is attested by all Biblical witnesses. Paul sums up the unanimous belief of the early Church by saying: “That Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that he was buried” (I Corinthians 15:3-4). How Jesus was buried is told by the Evangelists. The facts must have been well known to the primitive community, and the accounts in all four Gospels

\textsuperscript{1} James Orr, The Resurrection of Jesus (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1908), pp. 85, 86.

\textsuperscript{2} Guignebert, op. cit., p. 490.
are in apparent agreement.\footnote{Orr, op. cit., p. 92.} Let us consider, then, the Scriptural record, as given in the four Gospels, concerning the burial of Christ, according to the Smith-Goodspeed translation.\footnote{J. M. Powis Smith and Edgar J. Goodspeed, The Complete Bible (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).}

Matthew 27:57-61:- In the evening a man named Joseph, from Arimathea, who had himself been a disciple of Jesus, came. He went to Pilate and asked him for Jesus' body. Then Pilate ordered it to be given to him. And Joseph took his body and wrapped it in a piece of clean linen, and laid it in a new tomb that belonged to him, that he had cut in the rock, and he rolled a great stone over the doorway of the tomb, and went away. And Mary of Magdala and the other Mary remained there, sitting before the tomb.

Mark 15:42-47:- Although it was now evening, yet since it was the Preparation Day, that is, the day before the Sabbath, Joseph of Arimathea, a highly respected member of the council, who was himself living in expectation of the reign of God, made bold to go to Pilate and ask for Jesus' body. Pilate wondered whether he was dead already, and he sent for the captain and asked whether he was dead yet, and when he learned from the captain that he was, he gave Joseph permission to take the body. And he bought a linen sheet and took him down from the cross and wrapped him in the sheet, and laid him in a tomb that had been hewn out of the rock, and rolled a stone against the doorway of the tomb. And Mary of Magdala and Mary, Joses' mother, were looking on and saw where he was put.

Luke 23:50-56:- Now there was a man named Joseph, a member of the council, a good and upright man, who had not voted for the plan or action of the council. He came from the Jewish town of Arimathea and lived in expectation of the Kingdom of God. He went to Pilate and asked for Jesus' body. Then he took it down from the cross and wrapped it in linen and laid it in a tomb hewn in the rock, where no one had yet been laid. It was the Preparation Day, and the Sabbath was just beginning. The women who had followed Jesus from Galilee followed and saw the tomb and how his body was put there. Then they went home, and prepared spices and perfumes.

John 19:38-42:- After this, Joseph, of Arimathea, who was a disciple of Jesus, but a secret one, because of his fear of the Jews, asked Pilate to let him remove Jesus' body, and Pilate gave him permission. So Joseph went and took the body down. And Nicodemus also, who had first come to Jesus at night, went, taking a roll of myrrh and aloes weighing about a hundred pounds. So they took Jesus' body and wrapped it with the spices in bandages, in the Jewish way of preparing bodies for burial. There was a garden at the place where Jesus had been
crucified, and in the garden was a new tomb in which no one had yet been laid. So because it was the Jewish Preparation Day, and the tomb was close by, they put Jesus there.

Orr combines these passages and derives that Joseph of Arimathea, "a rich man," "a member of the council," "a good and upright man," one looking for the "Kingdom of God," a secret disciple of Jesus, asked Pilate for the body of Jesus. Given permission to take it, Joseph wrapped it in a linen cloth, buried it in a new rock-tomb belonging to himself, in the vicinity of the place of crucifixion, and closed the entrance with a great stone. St. John further informs us that Nicodemus assisted in the burial, bringing with him costly spices. Phraseology differs in the accounts, and slight particulars furnished by one Evangelist are lacking or unnoticed in the others. Mark alone tells of Pilate's hesitation in granting Joseph's request, and alone relates that Joseph "bought" a linen cloth. Yet the story, on the face of it, appears to be harmonious throughout, and what any Evangelist fails to state, the rest of his narrative may very well generally imply. Both Luke and John do not mention the rolling of the stone to the opening of the tomb, but they later tell how the stone was removed on the Resurrection morning.¹

Further analysis shows that while Mark describes Joseph of Arimathea as a member of the council, presumably the Sanhedrin, he omits mentioning discipleship. Then Luke, supposedly the later form, omits Joseph's membership in the council, but describes him as a disciple. Simpson notes that there has been criticism which strangely suggests that such alteration was due to Christian feeling which preferred to believe that their Lord was buried by a disciple. However, considering that John states without

hesitation that Jesus was betrayed by one disciple, and denied by another, it is difficult to see why the thought of burial by an apparent stranger should have distressed him into a preference for fiction over the truth. Certainly there seems to be no tendency to idealize in his own version of the conduct of Judas and Peter. If such a motive existed, one might ask why it confined itself to the detail of burial, especially when the more serious instances of betrayal and denial are evidently left untouched.\(^1\)

However, it is admitted that the Gospels which ascribe councillorship to Joseph omit discipleship, and vice versa, but the two are not necessarily incompatible ideas. The existence of secret discipleship in the Sanhedrin cannot be called impossible. Whatever the explanation may be, Simpson says it does not seem to be accounted for by so-called idealizing tendencies, exchanging pleasing fiction for unpleasant truth. Again, one may ask if there be any solid ground for the supposition that the alteration was intended to substitute a new version for the former Gospel instead of supplementing it.\(^2\)

Also, discipleship was a term capable of many degrees, especially at that period. John's statement, that Joseph's allegiance was secret for fear of the Jews, may account for Mark's ignorance of the fact, or for his first attempt to the Corinthians as an answer to the Jews' inquisitive, to have expressed a condition which Mark himself is free to speak of as common to all Christians. It seems therefore as if in the case of Joseph of Arimathea was in sympathy with the disciples in their hopes concerning the kingdom of God. Mark makes no attempt to determine what Joseph's mental condition in reference to Christ really was--such analysis of spiritual state is not his scope at all. Orr says one would expect to find such in John's Gospel, which one actually does. It is hypothetical, but conceivable, that John

obtained the information of secret discipleship from Joseph himself. Thus, Orr declares one has no right to propound a hypothesis which makes the Gospel statements inconceivable, and then declare that one or the other must necessarily be false.¹

On the other hand, Guignebert notes, in comparison with the "embellished" narrative of the Gospels, that Paul simply says, (I Corinthians 15:3-4), that "Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried; and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the scriptures." He says that for all the Apostle tells us Jesus might have been thrown into the common grave of executed criminals. There is seemingly no hint that Paul knew of the Synoptic account. Thus, Guignebert notes that in connection with Jesus' burial the Apostle is recorded in Acts 13:29, as making this reference to the Jews, "And when they had fulfilled all things that were written of him, they took him down from the tree, and laid him in a tomb." Apparently, because Paul makes no mention of Synoptic tradition, it is felt that this might be an earlier form of the tradition than even the Marcan one.²

However, perhaps one is justified in asking if Paul's brevity in his first epistle to the Corinthians and his address at Antioch recorded in Acts represents as conclusive a discrepancy from the Synoptic account as Guignebert suggests. It seems that one need not expect to find detailed narrative in letters or sermons which are primarily intended to relate the heart of the matter under discussion. In both instances that have been mentioned, the climax of the subject is the fact of Jesus' resurrection, and the

¹Ibid., pp. 19-20. ²Guignebert, op. cit., p. 492.
Apostle may have passed sketchily over the circumstances of Jesus' death that the fact of resurrection might be established. If this be the case, one would have no reason for disregarding the Synoptic Gospels just because they were not verified in every detail by what might have been an earlier record. Furthermore, one need not necessarily expect Paul to be fully acquainted with all the details of Jesus' burial, and his presumption that the Jews buried Jesus is legitimate. Again, *The Interpreter's Bible* suggests that Joseph of Arimathea may have been thought of as acting on behalf of the Sanhedrin.\(^1\) In any event, Paul is evidently more familiar and concerned with the basic fact that Christ "hath been raised." On the other hand, one finds what one would naturally expect in a type of record such as the Gospels, a detailed account of the important events of the life of Christ, climaxing in His death, resurrection, and ascension.

Still, other possible details are offered concerning the disposal of the body of Jesus. Ernest Renan states:

According to Roman custom, the body of Jesus should have remained suspended in order to become the prey of birds. According to the Jewish law, it would have been taken away by night and deposited in the place of infamy set apart for the burial of executed criminals.\(^2\)

Renan does admit the part of Joseph of Arimathea in procuring the body of Jesus from Pilate, stating that Joseph was a rich man and a member of the Sanhedrin. The possibility of Joseph's ability to procure the body is further emphasized by the fact that Roman law at that time required the delivering up of the body of an executed person to any who claimed it.\(^3\)

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3. Ibid.
Another similar and interesting comment is given by Robert Graves and Joshua Podro:

Under Roman law the body of a crucified felon was the property of his next-of-kin, but since Jesus had ceased to be a member of Joseph the Carpenter's family, his Galilean brothers did not come forward to assert their claim. This was done by the head of the Levite family into which he had been adopted (see VIII. r-s and u); namely, Joseph, brother of Mary the Braider and of Cleophas, and father of 'James the brother of our Lord.' Joseph is here distinguished from other Josephs as being of Arimathaea, probably Ramathaim-Zophim, near Lydda (I Samuel 1:1 and I Maccabees 11:34). The use of 'just' in Luke 23:50—as well as his description in the next verse: 'who also himself waited for the Kingdom of God'—suggests that he was an Essene apocalyptic. He would have been simply called 'The Essene' (Alpheus), if his son and namesake had not also belonged to this sect.\(^1\)

In following the Synoptic account, there are some important points to notice in the evidence for the burial of Jesus. First, the identification of the place of burial is significant. Apart from the controversial story of the guards, it is recorded that a number of people knew the grave in which the body was placed. If attention be confined to what is considered as the earliest form of tradition, certainly Joseph of Arimathaea knew in what grave he placed the body. And the same early Marcan tradition expressly states that the women "beheld where he was laid." Among these women is named Mary Magdalene. This should dispose of the criticism that the women in their confusion on Easter morning, not knowing among the multitude of graves which was the real burying-place, looked into an empty tomb by mistake where a gardener was at work, who could have corrected their blunder had they waited for him to finish his sentence.\(^2\)


disposal of the criminal dead, such as we have already mentioned, that of leaving the victim of crucifixion hanging on the cross to become the prey of birds, and being cast into a common pit, or on the trash heap outside the city, the discovery of the empty tomb has been discredited.\(^1\) However, Simpson says that such inferences from supposed general practices to a particular instance are precarious, especially in the face of evidence to the contrary, and there are known exceptions to what might be called prevailing practice. For instance, Simpson points out that according to the autobiography of Josephus, Josephus induced the Emperor Titus to have three crucified persons taken down from the cross while they were still alive. Moreover, the Jewish practice was the burial of the condemned; it was their law. But Josephus is quoted as giving evidence that even the Jews themselves broke the law of burial at times. Simpson quotes Josephus as thus writing in the \textit{Wars of the Jews}:

\begin{quote}
They proceeded to that degree of impiety as to cast away their dead bodies without burial, although the Jews used to take so much care of the burial of men, that they took down those that were condemned and crucified, and buried them before the going down of the sun.\(^2\)
\end{quote}

It is further stated that Loisy thinks it probable that Jewish law would be observed in Jerusalem even in cases of those condemned by Roman authority.\(^3\) Also, Graves and Podro pointed out that under Roman law the body of a crucified criminal belonged to the next of kin. This information suggests that one would have no reason to assert with any degree of certainty that the body of Jesus would have been cast into a common burial pit.

\[^{1}\text{Cf. Guignebert, loc. cit.};\text{ Renan, loc. cit.};\text{ Simpson, loc. cit.}\]

\[^{2}\text{Simpson, loc. cit.}\]

\[^{3}\text{Cf. Deuteronomy 21:22-23.}\]
Furthermore, the three crucified men who were delivered into the hands of Josephus are stated to be only his friends, former acquaintances. Because the authority of Josephus seems to be commonly accepted, it may then be asked why Joseph of Arimathea cannot be conceived as making a similar request from Pilate, whether he be relative or friend of Christ. Loisy says it is because the whole Sanhedrin had decided the death of Jesus, and it is inexplicable, so far as he is concerned, how a member of the same council could have concerned himself in the burial. \[1\]

However, such a difficulty seems expressly anticipated and met by Luke's assurance that Joseph of Arimathea had not consented to their counsel and deed. Simpson declares the implication is, as Loisy admits, that Joseph had been present at their deliberations, and had refused to vote with them. It may also be asked how Luke learned what passed in the discussions of the great Council. Simpson suggests that the most secret decisions of conferences leak out, and that Joseph himself could have informed the followers of Christ. Moreover, why Joseph could not act independently against the Council's decision, so far as to intervene in the burial, is also inexplicable, especially if, as the record indicates (Mark 15:43), Joseph was a courageous person. \[2\] One implication from Mark may be taken that the death of a righteous man such as Jesus could instill courage.

The empty tomb. This fact is also attested by the Gospel witnesses. The contemporary idea of resurrection at that time seems to require an empty tomb. Simpson says one of the most extreme negative critics, Arnold

\[1\] Simpson, loc. cit.

Meyer, recognizes that the empty grave not only harmonizes with the entire New Testament miraculous element, but with the whole contemporary Jewish view of the world. A resurrection without an empty tomb would have been unthinkable to popular Judaism. The Jewish and Christian conceptions presented in Daniel 12:2, II Maccabees 7:11, and John 5:28 clearly demonstrate the inseparability of the empty grave from the idea of resurrection. Hence the empty sepulcher was a necessary and natural postulate for the disciples of Jesus.  

The question, of course, is whether there actually was an empty tomb, or whether it is merely a necessary component to make a credible story.

The testimony of the Synoptic Gospels is that on the morning after the end of the Sabbath a particular group of women came early to the sepulcher, and upon their arrival they noticed that the great stone which had been placed at its entrance was rolled away; the body of Jesus was gone. There is entire unanimity among the witnesses concerning the fact that they found the stone rolled away and the tomb empty, (Matthew 28:2-7; Mark 16:3-6; Luke 24:2-6; John 20:1, 11-12). Matthew alone tells of how the stone was removed—of "a great earthquake," and the descent of an angel of the Lord, who rolled away the stone, and sat upon it, before whose dazzling aspect the guards became as dead men. All the Evangelists agree that the stone was found rolled away, and that the tomb was empty when the women arrived. In Mark's words: "And looking up, they see that the stone is rolled back; for it was exceeding great" (16:4). Again,

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1 Ibid., citing Arnold Meyer, Die Auferstehung Christi, pp. 13, 14, 121.

according to Luke, "they found the stone rolled away from the tomb. And
they entered in, and found not the body of the body of the Lord Jesus"
(24:2-3). Also, according to John, the emptiness of the sepulcher was
subsequently verified by Peter and John himself, (John 20:3-9).\(^1\) While
Matthew alone gives the story of the rolling away of the stone by the
angel, the implication in all the other narratives is that the stone was
removed by supernatural power. Hence, it is stated that Matthew narrates
in objective fashion—a reflection, perhaps, of the terrified imagination
of the guards—what the other Evangelists postulate. The women soon
learned what had happened from an angelic messenger, "He is not here; for
he is risen, even as he said" (Matthew 28:6).\(^2\)

However, Guignebert comments that his mistrust of the Synoptic
account increases when Matthew 27:62-66 tells us that the chief priests
and the Pharisees ask Pilate to place a guard before the tomb so that
the disciples of the impostor cannot come and take away the body in order
to claim afterwards that he had been raised as he had predicted. Moreover,
mistrust arises not only from the fact that Matthew is the only canonical
Gospel which contains this information, nor from the fact that the apo-
cryphal Gospels have more of the same kind of information, but because
the episode is thought to display a tendency to make the discovery of
the empty tomb more convincing.\(^3\)

Furthermore, Guignebert also says that the discovery of the empty

\(^1\) Cf. Luke 24:12.


\(^3\) Guignebert, op. cit., p. 493, citing "Gospel of Peter," pp. 29-34;
tomb must be connected with the account, in Matthew 28:11-15, of the
bribing of the soldiers who had been on duty at the sepulcher to keep
silent. It is recorded that the chief priests and elders, having heard
from the soldiers themselves what had happened, pay them heavily to lie;
they are to say that it is Jesus' disciples who removed His body during
the night while the sentinels were sleeping. This bargain, however does
not remain a secret: "And this saying is commonly reported among the Jews
until this day" (Matthew 28:15). This last phrase is said to reveal that
the object of the redactor who composed these two independent sections,
namely, the placing of the guard at the tomb and the bribing of the sol-
diers, was to counteract a Jewish allegation against the Resurrection:
to hide the fact that Jesus' disciples did remove His body.¹

Still, it seems that agreement with such suspicions engender other
difficulties, rather than eliminating the problem. Although the account
of the placing of the guards has been discredited as a purposive and decep-
tive appendix to what actually happened, perhaps closer scrutiny may
indicate that such recorded action is not so preposterous after all. In
viewing the frenzy of the prosecutors in activating the crucifixion of
Jesus, considering their charge of blasphemy, that He professed to be the
Son of God, and noting the miracle stories that surrounded the life of
Christ, including the predictions of His death and resurrection, whether
such are regarded as factor fiction, one certainly is impressed with the
idea that such conditions could reasonably motivate the setting of a guard
before the tomb. Even though the supposed allegation of the Jews that

¹Ibid., pp. 495-496.
the disciples might steal the body be disregarded as possible justification for the guarding of the tomb, it seems to this writer that the potent existence of these other motivating elements should not go unnoticed.

Thus if a guard were posted, the possibility of the disciples stealing the body of Jesus becomes more remote. To do so, would mean robbing a grave before the eyes of feared Roman soldiers, and such activity involved in such a task could not have been very easily carried out even if the sentinels slept. Hancock comments that if the Apostles did somehow succeed in removing and concealing the body of Jesus without a trace, this would make them deliberate liars and parties to a most heartless hoax. One is then faced with the problem of explaining why the disciples should have persisted in a fraud which only brought them danger, persecution and frequently, death.¹ Too, reason should be given as to why the men who fled from Jesus, their beloved friend and teacher, in terror, at the time of mortal danger, should suddenly be daring and fool-hardy in propagating a hoax. Moreover, the deliberate perpetuation of such a deception by the Apostles is utterly inconsistent with what is known of their lives and character.

However, the attested fact that the tomb was empty on the third morning is challenged by other suggested alternative explanations. Again, for example, it has been suggested that the Jews removed the body of Jesus from the sepulcher by order of the Sanhedrin.² If this were true, it is evident that the Jews had only to produce the body of Jesus and His resurrection would have immediately become an exploded myth. Certainly, the

¹Hancock, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
²Orr, op. cit., p. 128. This opinion is said to be held by A. Reville Schwartzkopff.
Sanhedrin, who were apparently interested in ridding themselves of Jesus Christ, would have done this if it had been possible. 1 Also it has been suggested that the Roman soldiers removed the body from the tomb. If this had been the case, Pontius Pilate would surely have nipped Christianity in the bud by exposing it as a hideous fraud as soon as the preaching of the Resurrection began. 2 However, apparently no effective exposure was ever made, either by the Jews or the Romans.

Another alternative explanation is given by Arnold Meyer and O. Holtzmann who admit the emptiness of the tomb, but both suggest that Joseph of Arimathea was responsible for removing the body. It is thought that, after reflection, Joseph felt that it would not do to leave the body of a man who had been crucified lying among the dead in his respectable family vault. Therefore, when the Sabbath was past, he had the body of Jesus secretly removed and buried elsewhere. 3 However, Meyer, at least, seems confused within himself; in one place he denies that Joseph's grave could be at Jerusalem, that the family grave must obviously be at Arimathea, miles away. Elsewhere, again, Meyer is said to declare that the difficulty of the narrative suggests that the grave was not empty at all. 4

There is still another interesting proposed explanation of the empty tomb, that is known as "The Swoon Theory," and is attributed to the Jewish scholar Klausner. It suggests that Jesus did not actually die on Rejoice on the third day, at the end of the Sabbath (John 20:1-10). Although there is some

2Hancock, op. cit., pp. 46-47.  
the cross, but fell into a deep state of coma or catalepsy, which is quite easily mistaken for death; and then, in the cool interior of the rock-tomb, revived and made His escape, perhaps with the help of some of the Apostles.\(^1\) Graves and Podro offer a similar solution, proposing that while it was still dark, and their officer lay asleep, the soldiers were inspired to break into the tomb. They were in search of loot, probably the precious ointment, which could be sold at a very high price in the brothels. As they rolled away the stone and, as they stood listening to make sure their officer had not been awakened by the rumbling noise, "a rustle and a groan from inside the tomb scattered them in terror."

Thus, Jesus, "recovering from his trance, slowly emerged from the low entrance, clad in pall and headcloth, and sat on the stone in the moonlight."\(^2\)

However, Hancock says that no other explanation of the empty tomb, save the Resurrection, has ever been found to fit all the facts; and every suggested alternative to the preaching of the first Apostles has been found to raise more difficulties than it solves.\(^3\) Whereas, Dr. Rashdall is quoted as saying that "were the testimony fifty times stronger than it is, any hypothesis would be more possible than that"--of a physical resuscitation.\(^4\)

Nevertheless, in connection with the witness concerning the empty tomb, let us further consider the visit of the women to the tomb of Jesus at early morning on the third day, at the end of the Sabbath (Matthew 28: 1-15; Mark 16:1-11; Luke 24:1-12; John 20:1-18). Although there is some

\(^1\)Hancock, loc. cit. \(^2\)Graves and Podro, op. cit., p. 72. 
\(^3\)Hancock, op. cit., p. 49. \(^4\)Orr, loc. cit.
variation in the details of the record, there is a substantial nucleus of agreement. Orr says that even among the more extreme critics, the greater number admit that the women—the same named in the Gospels—did go and visit the tomb on that memorable morning. Of course, those who doubted the previous fact of burial cannot admit such a visit. But most who allow that Jesus was laid in a tomb admit that the sorrowing women who had followed Him from Galilee, and had witnessed the crucifixion and entombment, did the natural thing in going to the sepulcher on the morning after the close of the Sabbath, as day was breaking, for the purpose of anointing the body. James Orr says that critics such as Professor Lake, H. J. Holtzmann, and O. Holtzmann admit it; even Arnold Meyer, although he disconnects the incident from the third day, concedes that visits were made.

For instance, Professor Kirsopp Lake suggests this possible reconstruction of what perhaps really happened, reading between the lines of the Gospel accounts:

The women came in the early morning to a tomb which they thought was the one in which they had seen the Lord buried. They expected to find a closed tomb, but they found an open one; and a young man, who was in the entrance, guessing their errand, tried to tell them that they had made a mistake in the place. 'He is not here,' said he; 'see the place where they laid him,' and probably pointed to the next tomb. But the women were frightened at the detection of their error, and fled, only imperfectly or not at all understanding what they heard. It was only later on, when they knew that the Lord had risen (from the visions of the disciples in Galilee), and—on their view—that His tomb must be empty, that they came to believe that the young man was something more than they had seen; that he was telling them of their mistake, but announcing the Resurrection, and that his intention was to give them a message for the disciples.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Ibid.

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 130-131, citing Kirsopp Lake, The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, pp. 251-252.
On the other hand, Guignebert remains very suspicious of this supporting testimony to the empty tomb, of the witness of the visiting women. Concerning the various Gospel accounts, Guignebert asks:

Who is right?--How many women come to the sepulcher? One according to John; two, according to Matthew and Mark; three and others with them, according to Luke. . . . According to John, Mary Magdalene is commanded to go and tell the disciples something, but not what is commanded in Mark and Matthew. --What are the results of the message entrusted to the women? None, according to Mark, since they say nothing; according to Matthew 28:16, the disciples obey and go away into Galilee; according to John, the first announcement made to Mary brings two disciples to the tomb; we do not know what effect the second has since it is not translated into action; according to Luke, the disciples do not believe the women's story.1

Even so, it seems very unlikely to this writer that such a mistake of a few women, and such apparent discrepancies could be the foundation on which the Christian Church has built its immortal hope, nor do such allegations afford an adequate explanation of the revolutionary effects in the faith and hope of the disciples, which are evidently derived from the surrounding events. In this regard, Professor Lake cautions that his remarks "are not to be taken as anything more than a suggestion of what might possibly have happened." Simpson points out that Lake holds that it is not necessary to base the Resurrection on an empty tomb, as the Gospel version does. Professor Lake is quoted as saying:

Those who still believe in the necessity are justified in making the same inference; but those of us who believe that the Resurrection need not imply an empty tomb are justified in saying that the narrative might have been produced by causes in accordance with our belief, and that the inference of the women is one which is not binding on us. The empty tomb is for us doctrinally indefensible, and is historically insufficiently accredited. Thus the story of the empty tomb must be fought out on doctrinal, not on historical or critical grounds.2

Simpson declares that the important consideration, in relation to

1 Guignebert, op. cit., p. 496. 2 Simpson, op. cit., p. 45.
Lake's statement, is that the story of the empty grave is rejected on
dogmatic presuppositions; because it does not harmonize with the critic's
view of the real nature of the Resurrection. The question is whether such
criticism is justified, on such grounds, in asserting, in spite of all the
Gospel statements to the contrary, that the first believers either looked
in the wrong grave; or never looked at all; and, without verification,
inferred the emptiness of the grave from their assurance that Christ was
risen. However, on the other hand, it should be recognized that the
emptiness of the grave does not alone necessarily prove the Resurrection.
But here is a recorded fact; a fact to be accounted for. The explanation
must ultimately be either human action or divine. ¹ Thus the manner in
which the empty tomb is accounted will predispose one's opinion and senti-
ment concerning the Resurrection tradition as a whole, as well as the
supplementary implication of the credibility of the immortality of the
individual believer by means of resurrection.

However, historically, Simpson relates that Jewish anti-Christian
propaganda, as far down as the 12th century, still circulated a version
in which the empty grave was admitted and the removal explained. It is
said that when the queen heard that the elders had slain Jesus and had
buried Him, and that He was risen again, she ordered them to produce the
body within three days or forfeit their lives. ² Simpson then gives the
following quotation:

Then spake Judas, 'come and I will show you the man whom ye
seek: for it was I who took the Fatherless from His grave. For
I feared lest His disciples should steal Him away, and I have

¹Ibid., pp. 45, 46, 47, 48. ²Ibid., p. 41.
hidden Him in my garden, and led a waterbrook over the place.\footnote{1}

The story goes on to describe that the body was actually produced. It would seem that this daring assertion of the actual production of the body has never obtained a credence anywhere outside a fiercely hostile Jewish propaganda. Simpson says the Palestinian explanation in the Gospel of Matthew could not conceivably have been written, if contemporary opponents had then asserted it.\footnote{2} Too, it is stated that Justin Martyr, who wrote in the middle of the 2nd century, also noted that the Jews unjustly charged the Christians with having robbed the grave of Jesus.\footnote{3}

Harold Sloan says that historically there is one further piece of evidence which witnesses to the reality of the empty tomb. Jerusalem was destroyed in the year 70, when the Christian Church was forty years old. If tradition is correct, the place of the crucifixion and entombment of Jesus, just outside the walls of the city in the year 30, was brought within them when the new walls were built some distance farther north, in the year 40. Sloan says there is no reason why a rock-hewn grave could not survive the violence of an ancient siege. Such would probably be the case especially if, as tradition says, the new wall had brought the grave within the city's defenses.\footnote{4}

This case is said to be more than mere probability. According to Sloan, there seems to be a definite record that the site of Jesus' crucifixion and entombment did survive, and that Christians visited it during the sixty-odd years that Jerusalem lay in ruins. Furthermore, when Hadrian was planning a new city, which was to rise above the old ruins,

\footnote{1}{Ibid., pp. 41-42, citing Baring Gould, "Toledoth Jesu," Lost and Hostile Gospels, p. 88.}
\footnote{2}{Ibid.}
\footnote{3}{Sloan, op. cit., p. 49.}
\footnote{4}{Ibid., p. 51.}
it is said he took pains to violate two sacred spots—the hill of the Temple, and the site of the crucifixion and entombment of Jesus.

Eusebius, Bishop of nearby Caesarea, tells the story in his Life of Constantine. Eusebius is mentioned as saying that Constantine felt led of the Saviour to erect a monument in Jerusalem in honor of the Resurrection. Concerning this, Sloan quotes Eusebius as writing:

"Godless persons had thought to remove entirely from the eyes of men (the sight of the sepulcher), supposing in their folly that thus they should be able effectually to obscure the truth. Accordingly they brought a quantity of earth from a distance and covered the entire spot; then, having raised this to a moderate height, they paved it with stone, concealing the holy cave beneath this massive mound. Then... they prepared on this foundation a truly dreadful sepulcher of souls, by building a gloomy shrine... to the impure spirit whom they call Venus, and offering detestable oblations on profane and accursed altars."

This temple, so erected by Hadrian two hundred years before with the alleged purpose of stopping the worship of Jesus there, Constantine orders removed. Consequently, the pavement is torn up; the fill of dirt is dug away; the timbers and dirt are carted out of the city. Again Eusebius is quoted:

"As soon as the original surface of the ground beneath the covering of earth appeared, immediately, and contrary to all expectation, the venerable and hallowed monument of our Saviour's Resurrection was discovered."

Sloan explains that what Eusebius means by "contrary to all expectation" is not that Constantine was uncertain of the spot, but that he had little hope of finding the "hallowed monument" of Jesus intact after Hadrian's desecration of it, and its burial for two hundred years. However, when the dirt had been removed, and the virgin rock was uncovered,

1 Ibid., citing Eusebius, Book III, chaps. 25ff.; Book IV, chap. 40.
2 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
the sepulcher was found intact. Eusebius adds that Constantine immediately ordered the erection of a noble structure over the tomb, to be known as the Church of the Anastasia (Rising). The order was carried out by Marcarius, Bishop of Jerusalem; and Eusebius himself took part in the dedication.\footnote{Ibid.}

On the other hand, Guignebert remarks that there is no reason whatsoever to confirm the 4th century belief that Hadrian's great religious buildings arose from the desire to profane the holy places of Christianity. Furthermore, it is bluntly stated that the whole of Christian antiquity, as far as is known, was ignorant of Jesus' tomb, and it was only rediscovered under Constantine in 326, "by the inspiration of the Saviour and as the result of a divine revelation."\footnote{Guignebert, op. cit., pp. 480, 493.}

However, Sloan feels that there is presented a seemingly unanswerable argument establishing the circumstances of the tomb. It is that, notwithstanding the explicit Christian tradition as to the condition of the sepulcher, neither Christian preaching nor the official summary of evidences of the risen Christ makes any appeal to it. Apparently the empty grave was an admitted fact; but its evidential value was obscured because of the Jewish explanation, which charged the disciples with having stolen the body of Jesus. Thus, Sloan says the Jerusalem church made no apologetic use of this notable circumstance even though every visitor to the city was in a position to see the empty grave for himself.\footnote{Sloan, op. cit., pp. 53-54.} Rudolph Otto, in his Leben und Wirken Jesu, very aptly comments: "It can be
firmly maintained; no fact in history is better attested than, not indeed the Resurrection, but certainly the rock-fast conviction of the first community of the Resurrection of Christ.\textsuperscript{1}

The \textit{third day}. It is also a definite part of this traditional conviction that the Resurrection occurred on the third day. The testimony of all the witnesses is that the event known as "the Resurrection" happened on "the first day of the week," or the third day after the crucifixion, corresponding with Christ's predictions. Whatever their other divergencies, the four Evangelists are agreed concerning this aspect also: Matthew 28:1; Mark 16:2; Luke 24:1; John 20:1. Again, the Apostle Paul confirms the statement, and implies that it is the general belief of the Church "that he hath been raised on the third day according to the scriptures," (I Corinthians 15:3).\textsuperscript{2}

Guignebert declares this portion of tradition to be a part of the growth of the legend. He traces the addition of the time detail in the following manner:

\begin{quote}
As soon as the assertion was made, \textit{He has risen again, even if in the spirit were understood, the objection arose: But was he really dead?} And no doubt the best reply that could be given was: \textit{He was actually buried.} But then it became necessary to state at what time and under what conditions He came out of the tomb. \textit{It was obviously impossible to rely upon facts in making such a statement.} That is why Paul makes the burial and the resurrection on the third day (I Corinthians 15:3) clearly dependent on the scriptures.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

Our attention is then called to two Old Testament passages that give an answer to the question: "at what time?" In Jonah 1:17, one reads, "And Jonah was in the belly of the fish three days and three

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item Orr, \textit{op. cit.}, footnote, pp. 91-92, citing Otto, \textit{Leben und Wirken Jesu}, p. 49.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 115; Simpson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 49-51.
\item Guignebert, \textit{loc. cit.}
\end{enumerate}
nights," and in Hosea 6:2: "After two days will He revive us; in the third day He will raise us up, and we shall live in His sight." It is noted that although the Christians may have had some difficulty in subordinating the first Scripture to the second, on the whole the third day seems to be indicated by both. However, Guignebert then asks: "If Jesus came out of the tomb on the third day, must He not have been interred on the first day? and must not the antecedent condition have been as definitely guaranteed by scripture as its consequence?" He further states:

Once launched the legend naturally fed on elements borrowed from its environment; and thus it remembered that Adonis and Osiris rose again on the third day, and details were taken from the myths of the dying and rising gods.2

Also it is pointed out that in the time of Jesus there was a popular belief that the soul of a dead person remained in or near his body for three days, at the end of which time it departed and decomposition began. Then, since Psalm 16:10 asserts that God will not suffer His Holy One to see corruption, Jesus, it was thought, could not remain any longer than three days "in the heart of the earth."3

In answer to this question concerning the day of Jesus' interment, the writer suggests that just because it is said that Christ arose on "the third day" does not necessitate His burial on the first day of the week. It seems obvious that one could count three days from the middle or the end of the week, as well as beginning with the first day of the week, which Guignebert does. So far as the Scriptural record is concerned, the Synoptics are agreed that the tomb was found empty "on the first day of the week," (Matthew 28:1; Mark 16:2; Luke 24:1; John 20:1). Thus Jesus

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1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 531. 3Ibid., pp. 531-532.
is said to have died and been buried on Friday, the day before the Jewish Sabbath, which is Saturday, and on the third day from Friday, which is "the first day of the week," Christ is acclaimed risen.

Again, it is apparent that Guignebert does not recognize the credibility of the recorded predictions of Jesus concerning His resurrection on "the third day," especially Mark 8:31 and Mark 10:33-34. However, Bernard Weiss is quoted as saying: "The tradition that Jesus rose from the dead on the Third Day can only have arisen in virtue of the fact that appearances occurred on that day."¹ Hence, this statement leads this writer beyond the assertions that Jesus died and was buried, that He arose on the third day, leaving an empty tomb, to the vital attested fact that He revealed Himself to His followers.

The appearances. They are perhaps the foundational affirmation concerning the Resurrection faith. Guignebert points out that the appearances of the "Risen Lord" alone can prove the reality of the Resurrection, and so far as he is concerned, the belief in the Resurrection was founded first on the appearances.² Thus, because of their obvious importance to the Resurrection faith, the writer will consider the witness to these manifestations. It is interesting to note that all of the recorded appearances of Christ in the Canonical New Testament are reported to be after He was risen, and not at the immediate instant of the Resurrection. Simpson feels this seeming reserve is significant. He indicates that if the narratives were merely imaginary, it is not likely that they would show any restraint, for it is the nature of imagination to appropriate

¹ Simpson, op. cit., p. 61, citing Weiss, Life of Christ, III, 389.
² Guignebert, op. cit., pp. 600, 501.
even more extreme measures of verification.\textsuperscript{1}

Therefore, according to Orr, because of his acceptance of the New Testament record and his acknowledgment of the reliability of the Gospel witnesses in particular, he supports the accounts without criticism. For him, the primary object of the witnesses is to supply information, each in accordance with his particular aim. Every writer gives his own selection of incidents, and no single narrative makes any pretense to be complete. Also, from Orr's perspective, the writers recorded facts already believed by the whole primitive church.\textsuperscript{2}

Hence, James Orr has arranged the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus as follows: (1) The appearance to Mary Magdalene (Mark 16:9 and John 20:11-17). According to Mark this appearance was the "first." (2) The appearance to the women on their way to the disciples (Matthew 28:9). (3) The appearance to Peter (Luke 24:34; I Corinthians 15:5). (4) The appearance to the disciples on the road to Emmaus (Luke 24:13-31 and Mark 16:12). (5) The appearance to the assembled disciples in the evening (Luke 24:36-45; John 20:24-29; I Corinthians 15:5; Mark 16:14). (Orr says that the previous five appearances all occurred on the day of the Resurrection). The following occurred afterwards: (6) The second appearance to the eleven, "eight days after" (John 20:24-29). (7) An appearance to seven disciples at the Lake of Galilee (John 21:4). (8) The appearance to five hundred brethren at once (I Corinthians 15:6). The two previous instances are thought to be possibly identical with the "appointed" meeting in Galilee, when the eleven received their Lord's great commission (Matthew 28:16-20). (9) An appearance to James (I

\textsuperscript{1}Simpson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 83. \textsuperscript{2}Orr, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 155.
Corinthians 15:7). (10) The final appearance to the eleven which is identical with the meeting of Jesus and His disciples prior to His ascension (Mark 16:16-20; Luke 24:46-52; Acts 1:8-9, and in I Corinthians 15:7). Also, in speaking generally of these post-resurrection appearances of Christ, Acts 1:3 says, "To whom he also showed himself alive after his passion by many proofs, appearing unto them by the space of forty days, and speaking the things concerning the kingdom of God."

From his enumeration of appearances, it is obvious that Orr considers the Gospel accounts of the Jerusalem-Judean manifestations, (Numbers 1-6), to be genuine. He cites them as previous to the so-called Galilean appearances, aside from the latter appearances to James and in relation to the Ascension. A controversy exists as to whether the disciples immediately fled to their home section of Galilee after Jesus had been crucified, or whether they remained in Jerusalem to behold the Resurrection manifestations that are recorded to have taken place in the vicinity. What is known as the Judean series is recorded in Luke, John, and the appendix to Mark; the Galilean accounts are in Mark and Matthew. It is interesting to note that Orr combines the two, attaching the Galilean manifestations to those involving the locale of Jerusalem, concerning particularly the appearances on the Resurrection day and the stories relating to the empty tomb. Thus, for him, there is no need to exclude the Jerusalem-Judean accounts because of the Galilean appearances, or vice versa. Orr apparently conceives that the Gospel record involving two vicinities, where the manifestations take place, is not necessarily contradictory.  

1 Ibid., pp. 155-156.  
However, critics such as Guignebert maintain that there can be no doubt that the earliest tradition assigned the appearances of the "Risen Lord" to Galilee. Attention is called to Mark 14:27ff., where Jesus says to His disciples on their way to the Mount of Olives after the Last Supper: It is written; "I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered. But after that I am risen, I will go before you into Galilee." Guignebert is of the opinion that these words alone are sufficient to establish the only valid hypothesis in relation to the locale of the manifestations. Furthermore, he points out that if the disciples saw the "Risen One" in Jerusalem, as Luke claims, it is incomprehensible that an angel, and Jesus Himself, should tell the disciples to go into Galilee to see Him (according to Mark and Matthew). Thus it is noted that the first and second Gospels recorded the dispersal of the disciples at Gethsemane after the arrest, while Luke, supposedly conscious of the difficulty that this created, has carefully omitted it in order to keep his witnesses close at hand. Hence it is considered that the earliest tradition regarded that the disciples were no longer in Jerusalem at the time of the Resurrection and had already returned to their homes in Galilee.\(^1\)

The substitution of the tradition of the appearances in Jerusalem for those in Galilee arises purely from apologetic requirements. At a certain stage it seemed advantageous to place the appearances nearer to the time and place of death and to link them up with the discovery of the empty tomb which, if it were to prove anything, could not be left isolated and in the air. It is possible that the earliest tradition occupied an intermediary position; Christ first showed himself in Galilee, later in Jerusalem; because it is natural that the belief that Christ was alive should have prompted them to return to the City and to wait there the imminent parousia. Mark would not clash with this arrangement which at least presupposes the priority of the Galilean appearances.\(^2\)

\(^{2}\) Ibid.
Moreover, Guignebert seems convinced that the earliest source to mention the appearances is the Apostle Paul who records them in the form of a catalogue in I Corinthians 15:3ff:

For I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received: that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried; and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the scriptures; and that he appeared to Cephas; then to the twelve; then he appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then he appeared to James; then to all the apostles; and last of all, as to the child untimely born, he appeared to me also.\(^1\)

Thus, it may be noted that the critical conclusion from such an interpretation of this evidence is that the Galilean series represents the earlier tradition, being supported, as it were, by the witness of Paul; that the Judean series arose later, and does not possess the same historic worth. It is rather considered to be the product of apologetic requirements, or perhaps devout reflection, in the developing Christian community. Hence, it is asserted that the first appearances happened far away from the neighborhood where the Christ was buried, and certainly at a later period than the third day from the death.\(^2\)

On the other hand, Simpson says that when it is reported that all the disciples forsake Jesus and fled, the obvious sense of the words is that they continued their flight until they reached the safety of their Galilean home. On the contrary, it is expressly noted, in Mark 14:54, that Peter followed afar off to the high priest's palace. And the message entrusted to the women (Mark 16:7), "tell his brethren that he goes before them into Galilee," indicates that early tradition recognized the fact that the apostles were still waiting in Jerusalem. The German critic, Loofs,

\(^{1}\text{Tbid.}, \text{cf. pp. 502-510.} \quad \text{\(^2\text{Cf. Simpson, op. cit., pp. 63-64.}\)}\)
admits this.\(^1\) It is also said that Wellhausen recognizes that (according to Mark 16 and Matthew 28) the disciples did not flee from Jerusalem on Friday, but were still there on Easter Day. However, it is stated that Wellhausen thinks the disciples then left, according to the order to go to Galilee, with a view to seeing the "Risen One" there.\(^2\)

Again, Simpson states that it is maintained by the critic Spitta that the promise "I will go before you into Galilee" does not necessarily denote an appearance in Galilee to the exclusion of one in Judea. Rather the inferred meaning could be that Jesus will collect His scattered flock after His resurrection, and precede them into Galilee. This implies a work in Judea first of all.\(^3\)

The question is, therefore, if one is to regard the two series of appearances, the Judean and the Galilean, as alternate versions that must be chosen between, or whether one might accept them both. Some critics prefer the Galilean series alone, some the Judean, while others combine the two. Among the critics who decide for the Galilean series as the original tradition is Loisy. He maintains it first on the ground of literary criticism, that Luke depends upon Mark; from whom Luke is supposed to have arbitrarily departed. Secondly, Loisy concludes, on the ground of historic criticism, that the apologetic preoccupations of the Evangelists make it incredible that, having described appearances in Jerusalem within three days of the passion, they would omit this, and say that the first appearances only took place in Galilee after the disciples

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 65, citing Loofs, *Auferstehungsberichte*, p. 19.

\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 71, citing Spitta, *Streitfragen*, pp. 74-75.
return to that country.\(^1\)

Another critic Rohrbach, who would confine the appearances to Galilee, feels constrained by the Apocryphal Gospel of Peter to imagine that the disciples remained eight days in Jerusalem, to the end of the feast, without any knowledge of the Resurrection. This view at least denies that the disciples immediately fled to Galilee.\(^2\)

However, Simpson gives several reasons why the Galilean series is dependent upon the Judean series. The Galilean series of appearances cannot account for the following: (1) It cannot account for the early tradition which has deeply imbedded itself in the whole apostolic literature that the Resurrection took place on the third day. This would have no basis and no meaning unless it was ascertained by manifestations on that very day. (2) It cannot account for the tradition of the empty grave. Mark, which is supposedly the earliest narrative one possesses, affirms a visit to the grave on Easter morning. (3) It cannot account for the return of the Apostles to Jerusalem, making their headquarters there. In other words, the Galilean series cannot answer why the Church was founded in Jerusalem instead of Galilee.\(^3\)

On the other hand, in order to incorporate the Jerusalem-Judean series of appearances at all, it must be answered how the words of Jesus, locating His return and meeting with the disciples to Galilee, can be ignored. Simpson answers this difficulty by quoting Professor Rordam, who says:

The answer to this objection is easy, owing to the strange fact that we have to deal with events from real life, and not logically constructed accounts. The key is that human nature is

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\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 75-76, citing Loisy, Les Evangiles Synoptiques, p. 728.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 76-77.

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 77-78.
always the same. The women doubted the angel’s word. Thereupon Christ appeared Himself to the women and removed their doubts. The women then told the tidings to the disciples, apostles included, but none of them believed. Thereupon Christ appeared to the Eleven...removing their doubts and indicating a certain mountain in Galilee as the place for the general meeting predicted by the women.¹

Thus, to Rordam, it seems the Marcan account, as the original Lucan source, went on to relate that the doubt and unbelief of the disciples caused the place of Christ’s first appearances to be changed from Galilee to Jerusalem. There have apparently been other times in history where the divine plan was affected by human infirmities. In such case, the contradictions, between the message to go to Galilee and the narratives relating appearances in Jerusalem, are seen to be not between the accounts, but as conflicts between the plan of Christ and the doubting wills of His followers.² Viewing the matter in this light, it seems there is no proven reason why the writer should not consider all the diverse appearances of Jesus after His resurrection, as they are variously recorded, recognizing the likelihood of manifestations in both Jerusalem and Galilee, and not the one excluding the other.

Even more important than the location of the appearances is the nature of the attested manifestations themselves. Generally speaking, the details of the Gospel accounts offer a contrasting view of the "Lord’s Risen body." On the one side, the greatest pains are taken to indicate that the body in which Jesus appeared was a true body—not a spirit or phantom, but the veritable body which had suffered on the cross, and had been laid in the tomb. It could be seen, touched, handled. To leave no room for doubt of its reality, it is told that on at least two occasions,

¹Ibid., p. 80. ²Ibid., pp. 80-81.
Jesus ate with His disciples. Again, with this accords the fact that the grave in which the body of Jesus had been buried was found empty.¹

However, on the other hand, the record emphasizes that the resurrected body of Jesus was not simply natural. It seemingly had attributes which were beyond tangible properties. The Resurrected Christ was apparently not limited by space, time, or matter; this is especially noted according to His transcending physical limitations, that is, in appearing to His disciples within closed doors, or being found in different places at short intervals, and finally, in supposedly ascending from earth to heaven in visible form.²

But, to imagine an appearance which should reveal itself to human senses, suggesting the ideas of identity and superiority, and yet present no contradictions, is hardly possible. This is the essence of paradox as well as contradiction, and although the antithetical ideas may not be comprehended, it seems they reveal a purpose. Simpson notes a twofold purpose that is thus bound up in the paradoxical appearance of the "Risen Lord." First, it is apparently the purpose of the appearances to establish His identity, and the immediate simultaneous purpose was to establish the superiority of His new condition.³ It seems obvious that without the fulfillment of this twofold purpose there would have been no Christian faith which accepts it rests on a reality. But this is not the case as an

Thus, one may then ask: what is the explanation of the apostle's assurance that they had seen the Risen Lord, and what caused these appearances? It seems that there are two ultimate answers: either they were

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³Simpson, op. cit., p. 90.
visions that were generated by the disciples, or they were brought about by the Risen Christ. In other words, either they were the product of reflection, the natural issue of emotional strain and desire, projected unto transient reality, or else they were the action of the Risen Christ on His followers. This is perhaps the essential distinction between the non-Christian and the Christian explanations.1

Denials of the Resurrection are as old as Christianity itself. The Christian first of all had to face Jewish skepticism, and then a little later he found himself confronted by pagan unbelief. In this manner it is recorded that Celsus asks whether the story of the Resurrection could not be explained by visions produced from the agitated brain of Mary Magdalene or one of the disciples; there is also the suggestion of deliberate fraud.2 Since that time the attested miracle of the resurrection of Jesus Christ has encountered the most strongly attested fact in history, and that only the rationalist's prejudice has the best reasons for not accepting the dogmatic assertion of the believer. He says the sober critic disclaims rationalistic prejudice but believes it also necessary to mistrust religious prejudice, yet realizing that nothing should be rejected without adequate grounds.3 Thus, Guignebert comments:

To explain the fact of the Resurrection is to admit that the faith which accepts it rests on a reality. But this is not the same as an explanation of the kind of reality upon which it rests. When once the purely miraculous hypothesis has been discarded, support for all kinds of hypotheses may be found in the sources, because they favour none of them. It becomes a question of showing that out of certain assumptions, whose elements are taken in their natural order, the faith in the Resurrection could have grown and the story of the Resurrection taken shape. This is a problem which every student solves according to his understanding of it, with varying degrees of probability; but the point must be emphasized that these probabilities

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1 Ibid., p. 100.
2 Guignebert, op. cit., p. 513, citing Origen, Contre Celsus, II, 55.
3 Ibid.
themselves depend on a process of imagination; the sources neither give nor suggest them; and it is no argument to say that they do not reject them, because accounts created by belief, with the sole purpose of proving the reality of the Resurrection, are by their very nature unfitted for any other purpose.  

For instance, Ernest Renan apparently manifests this kind of critical approach to Gospel tradition when he says:

For the historian, the life of Jesus finishes with his last sigh; but such was the impression he had left in the hearts of his disciples and of a few devoted women, that for some weeks longer he was for them a living comforter. Who had taken away his body? Under what conditions did enthusiasm, always credulous, create the group of narratives by which faith in the resurrection was established? In the absence of opposing testimony we shall never know. Let us say, however, that the vivid imagination of Mary Magdalen, (she had been possessed by 'seven demons'), played in this circumstance an essential part. (In John 20:1, 2, 11, 12, 18 Mary of Magdala is also the first and solitary witness of the resurrection.) Divine power of love! Sacred moments, in which the illusion of an impassioned woman gave to the world a deity risen from the grave!  

Furthermore, Simpson admits that it is said that religious history furnishes numerous illustrations of self-generated visions; that the apostolic age in particular was fertile in producing them; that the men of Galilee were, according to the Acts, liable to such experiences. Moreover, it is asserted that the borderline between inward vision and ordinary sight was neither defined nor understood; that Peter himself is reported as subject to such visions. Thus, if, as on one occasion, when he experienced deliverance from prison, he "wist not that it was true but thought he saw a vision," he may have formed a contrary inference concerning the Resurrection, and have been equally mistaken. Again, it is stated that the disciples believed in spirits and were convinced that the souls of men who have met a premature or violent death wander restlessly and terrify the

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1Ibid., pp. 513-514.

2Renan, op. cit., p. 402; parenthetical remarks inserted from his footnotes.

3Simpson, op. cit., p. 110.
living. Luke 24:37 tells us that the disciples thought they saw a ghost when Jesus appeared in the guest-chamber, just as they thought they saw a phantom when he supposedly walked on the water and joined them in their boat (Matthew 14:26). Thus Guignebert says a spirit, a phantom, a ghost, are kindred conceptions, and at that time there was a general belief in them.\(^1\) He further states:

We may add that people then were generally incapable of distinguishing a subjective experience, an hallucination or even a dream from a really objective experience implying a basis of tangible reality. A nightmare is still commonly considered as a revelation from the other world. In particular they had not the slightest idea of the mechanism of hallucination.\(^2\)

Still, it is admitted that the disciples believed in the reality of the appearances, and it cannot be easily denied that they possessed some kind of reality, but Guignebert says that it remains to be discovered what kind of reality. He notes that in this case, "to see" and "to believe one sees" are two separate "facts" which tend to coalesce, but one cannot think he sees without some cause, and every appearance possesses material or spiritual, objective or subjective reality. It is his opinion that the disciples' state of mind must have inclined them to accept a vision as a necessary phenomenon, and their mistake was the almost inevitable realization of an inner expectancy; in other words, it was caused and authenticated by this expectancy.\(^3\)

Yet, it seems questionable whether visions of this nature would be an adequate foundation for the "Easter faith." It is stated that the majority of the independent critics, such as Strauss, Renan, and others

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\(^1\) Guignebert, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 516.


\(^3\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 517.
would reply in the affirmative. Scriptural support is cited for the hallucination idea from Acts 10:41, where it is said that God, after raising Jesus, did not manifest Him to all the people, but only to those witnesses whom He had chosen beforehand. Thus Guignebert says one should be well aware that "in the history of religious enthusiasm nothing appears more contagious than visions." It is said to be enough for just one in a small circle of enthusiastic believers to say with the ardor of conviction that he has "seen" the object of the collective mystical desire, and the rest will see it also. Furthermore, Guignebert points out that even in our times the Roman Catholic Church has to be cautious in the matter of apparitions of the Virgin, the reality of which is readily attested by enthusiastic groups of people. Such are supposedly the phenomena of mental contagion.¹

But it may be also asked: "Why did this supposed exaltation of the disciples subside after having engendered some ten visions at the most?" Guignebert notes that some reputed "visionary" sects such as the Montanists, Jansenists and Camisards were much more prolific. In their case visions and ecstasies were considered a manifestation of the Spirit, an answer to their perplexities. However, he says it was logical that the visions should cease for the disciples, once the affirmation of the Resurrection--"He lives"--had been made. Christ appears often enough for His followers to be convinced; but His glory prevents Him from multiplying those appearances which were reserved for the "parousia." In Acts 2:32-36 it is related that the apostles did not merely say: "He lives," but: "He lives in the glory of God." He is "exalted." Thus, as far as the apostolic group was

¹Ibid., p. 518.
concerned, a sad and agonizing crisis which might have ended in the abandonment of their hope, found its completion in exaltation; there it must rest. According to this attitude, if apparitions of Jesus rose before the "mind's eye" of the disciples and created the illusion of "physical vision," the explanation may be realized in considering such as an escape from their demoralized state of mind.\(^1\) Moreover, Guignebert further declares:

If they had considered him during his lifetime as the present or future Messiah, their reaction and its direction would perhaps be more easily explained, although the fact of the death of the Messiah—of which Israel had not the slightest idea—must have been singularly embarrassing to them. Indeed, it might be supposed that they would bring him to life so that he might assume his Messianic role... this conviction arose from the Resurrection itself according to the pattern of the belief expressed in Acts 2:22-4 and 32-6: "God hath raised that same Jesus to make him... both Lord and Christ.\(^2\) The disciples must have reasoned as follows: We have seen him, therefore he lives; if he lives it is because God has raised him for no less a purpose than to be the Messiah. They could assign no more "exalted destiny to him and it must have been the first which occurred to them... .\(^3\)

Again, the critic, Keim, considers it natural that the picture of the living invincible Jesus should hover before the disciples most vividly during the first few days.\(^4\) He is quoted as saying:

In reality He was not dead to them; nor to the women under the Cross; still less to the apostles, since they had seen Him only as living, as strong to the last moment, since they had not witnessed His passion, His disgrace, His dying, His burial, since, finally, they in Galilee, far from the disasters and the graves of Jerusalem, stood again entirely upon His ground and theirs, the ground of His successes, of His strength, of His triumphs... . In such a flood of unbounded excitement, intensified by abstention from food, and by the feverish moods of evening, it is quite in harmony with experience that the boundaries of the inner and the outer world should disappear.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 518-519.  \(^2\)Ibid., pp. 520-521.
\(^3\)Simpson, op. cit., p. 113.
\(^4\)Keim, Jesus of Nazara, p. 345, cited by Ibid.
Although Keim seems to yield assent to the theory of self-generated visions, he immediately appears to withdraw his adoption. Keim is said to reject the "self-generated visions" theories concerning the Resurrection appearances for the following reasons, which Simpson records: (1) Though visions were reportedly numerous, they are carefully distinguished from the Resurrection appearances. "Otherwise it would have been impossible for the Apostle Paul to close his list with the fifth or sixth Appearance of Jesus." (2) Though the apostolic age "is full of more or less self-generated human visions...there is still more of calm consideration and sober reflection." (3) That the appearances were self-generated is "at once contradicted by the evidently simple, solemn, almost lifeless, cold, unfamiliar character of the manifestations." (4) Then, there is the sudden cessation of the appearances. Keim seems to be deeply impressed by the "reserve and reticence" of the disciples "in the face of the strange phenomenon." Whereas, he observes that self-generated visions tend to become irregular and exuberant. Keim concludes his criticisms by stating:

All these considerations compel us to admit that the theory, which has recently become the favorite one, is only an hypothesis which, while it explains something, leaves the main fact unexplained; and indeed subordinates what is historically attested to weak and untenable views.¹

Hence, the practical result of the appearances may be reckoned as no less significant when they are considered as creative appearances that are on a permanent and practical scale, and not as mere emotional results. From this perspective, if the "Christophanies" were not self-generated, then they were the operation of God. Apparently, because of the inadequate

¹Ibid., pp. 113-115, citing Keim, Jesus of Nazara, pp. 353-357.
character of the theory of self-generated visions, a number of writers
acknowledge that the appearances were created by the personal action of
the glorified Jesus on the minds of his followers. Simpson says this is
maintained from different points of view, sometimes philosophic, sometimes
religious, by Hermann Lotze, Hermann Fichte, Keim, Riggenbach, and Fernand
Méndez. Thus, the conception of the Resurrection appearances as created
from without rather than from within, as corresponding to realities of the
spiritual order, commends itself to the philosophical mind of Lotze in the
following quotation:

Rationalism, in interpreting these circumstances, which are
described to us as external facts, as visions of those who describe
them, has overlooked the point which can here give more worth to
visions than to actual external facts. Rationalism supposes that
out of mere psychological trains of ideas there arose in excited
minds fancies due to memory and subjective conditions, which had
nothing objective corresponding to them; the very thing that it had
to take account of was this spiritual world, which, though unseen, is
everywhere, and in which that which has no corporeal existence is
present and none the less real. Between this world and the world of
sense actions and reactions might take place which are foreign to
the ordinary course of nature; and from these, which are true, real,
living impressions upon the soul of something divine and actually
present, those visions might arise, being apparitions, not of the non-
existent, but of something really existing, and (as the divine inward
action of the Deity) not mediated by help of the course of physical
nature, which has no independent worth, or by disturbances of that
course which are incomprehensible to us. The significance of the
Resurrection lies not in this, that the soul of the risen person now
as heretofore inhabits a body which is visible to the eyes of men,
but in this, that without any such mediation, his real, living person,
and not the mere remembrance of him, takes hold of men's souls, and
appears to them in a form which has greater strength and efficacy of
influence than the restoration of the actual bodily presence would
have.

Again, Méndez, in his Certitude de la Foi, insists that Chris-

__1__Ibid.

it is inseparably bound up with the fortunes of "Person." The separation of Christianity is said to be impossible; it is founded in the very nature and construction of Christianity. Ménégoz points out that there never has been a serious conflict in any but the Christian Religion between religious and historic certainty. The explanation of this remarkable feature is that Buddha, Zoroaster, and other founders of religions primarily drew their disciples to their principles but not to their persons. Therefore, it is, according to Ménégoz, a psychological mistake to endeavor to base Christianity on a principle, for piety is not born of abstract principles, and neither can it be nourished by them in any real sense. It is when the abstract theory of righteousness is replaced by the living personality of Jesus Christ, that a love of the heart and energy of the will are created. Otherwise, this seems impossible. Even the history of the Church shows that there is no evangelic piety without contact with the person of Jesus. Thus, the experience of Christians seems to prove, in spite of assertions to the contrary, that the personality of Jesus has a unique and eternal worth.\(^1\)

Furthermore, concerning the resurrection appearances of Christ, Ménégoz believes that there was an intervention, unexpected and sudden, of the Spirit of God in the soul of the disciples. This spiritual experience caused them to project externally the figure which formed itself within them. He also suggests that the manifestations may have been telepathic phenomena, awakening the powers which the influence of Jesus had accumulated within them during His earthly ministry. In other words, God awakened the courage of the disciples by a psychological phenomenon.\(^2\)

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Simpson declares that such and similar positions still fall short of the apparent primitive belief. Although it is admitted that an external explanation of the phenomena is not sufficient, thus far a belief in bodily resurrection has been evaded. Here, if the term "Resurrection" is employed, it simply means "exaltation." The appearances of Christ still remain mere certificates of the satisfactory condition of Jesus of Nazareth in the other world. They are, according to Keim, evidence that Jesus was alive, that He lived as Messiah in the bosom of God. Yet, this is obviously beneath the fullness of the apostolic conception as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, and as seemingly inferred by the doctrine of the primitive Church. The Christian belief extends itself to maintaining not only that the appearances of Christ were the work of God, but that they were real bodily appearances. The critic, Schwartzkopff writes favorably:

So far as I can see, no one can maintain the impossibility of bodily Appearances of Christ. . . . Human knowledge is too defective to be allowed to contest the possibility of supersensuous spirits being able to act upon our sensuous world.

Moreover, he thinks that experience cannot furnish us with any clearly proven analogy to the bodily appearances of Christ. Still, neither can the appearances be regarded as definite historical certitudes. On the other hand, Schwartzkopff says, "If the belief in Christ is a truth, then it can only have been awakened in man's heart by the immediate intercourse of the living God or of Christ." The rationalistic theory that the longing to see Jesus was again strengthened by devotional reading of the Psalms, intensified by abstinence from food, until it burst forth from the disciples in enthusiasm, "not only denies the significance of the Lord, but

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1Ibid., p. 119.

2A. Reville Schwartzkopff, Prophecies, p. 92, cited by Ibid., p. 120.
also the inner truth of all prophetic revelation, according to which
the living God does really enter directly into converse with the pious."
Thus, to consider the early Church, with all its exemplary love and truth,
as founded upon enthusiastic self-deception "is a historical absurdity."
However, it is admitted that the prevalent idea of Resurrection as a rela-
tion of the soul to its body would dispose the disciples to regard any
appearances as in bodily reality. But that the appearances actually did
assume external bodily substance is said to be a conclusion reached on
religious and dogmatic grounds.¹

Hence, Schwartzkopff says that by Jesus revealing Himself externally
in bodily form to His disciples, whose faith greatly needed strengthening,
He gave them not only a spiritual guarantee of His heavenly Messianahship, but
also one that was corroborated by the senses. Love must have impelled the
Lord to do this if He could; and it must, on the other hand, have moved God
to confer on Him the power of doing so. Thus Jesus revealed Himself to His
friends in a spiritual body, in order to root that conviction in their
minds, and so found His Church on a basis that could not be moved. This
seems to be the dogmatic train of thought by which Christianity reached
the conclusion that the appearance of Christ was a bodily one.²

Furthermore, Schwartzkopff indicates that this dogmatic train of
thought represents the truth because it is confirmed by the character of
the resulting sober and practical faith. The remarkably transparent
sincerity of the disciples does not in the slightest sense suggest that
these appearances of the "Risen Christ" rested upon inference or imagina-
tion. "A product of fancy, even though its contents be true, has not in the

¹Ibid., pp. 120-121, citing Schwartzkopff, Prophecies, pp. 100, 110,
142, 144.
²Ibid.
long run the power of a real outer event.\footnote{Ibid.}

Moreover, Simpson declares that the nature of God corroborates such a view. For God is said to be not only immanent, He is also transcendent; and His activities partake of this double character. He not only relates Himself to the self within, but also from without. Thus, since external nature is part of His self-manifestation to the human soul, or self, the view of external bodily Resurrection appearances is in keeping with such analogies. Also, there is a religious superiority in a bodily appearance of the "Risen Lord" over and above divinely-created objective visions. For there is all the difference between a signal given from a distance to certify survival and success and an actual personal reappearance of the Master in the midst of the disciples on earth.\footnote{Ibid., p. 122.}

Regardless of one's views concerning the Resurrection, one is bound by integrity to consider the experiences of a group of men as well as the interpretations given to those experiences. What has complicated our inquiry is the practical impossibility of separating the "content" of the experience from the "interpretation" of the content. To merely say that the disciples were deluding themselves thus seems to be a hasty and partial judgment—not a scientific statement. For how can one accurately judge the "content" of a particular experience, especially when it supposedly occurred about two thousand years ago? On the other hand, one cannot technically assert "as a fact" that they experienced the risen Christ. Such is both an interpretation and a judgment. Perhaps the one fact one can definitely assert, is that something unusual did happen to the disciples, that they
did have an extraordinary experience. Even though one accepts the Syn-
optic account, one may never know as a scientific fact precisely what
the detailed nature of those experiences was. It seems that neither the
agnostic nor the believer can definitely prove by science that these
experiences were nothing but illusion, or nothing but the risen Christ. 1

Again, however difficult it may be to explain how such an event
as the Resurrection could have occurred, it would be illogical to deny
from the outset its possibility, especially since the power of God is
concerned. What is here involved is a control of matter and possibly a
recreation of it; but if one believes that all material things were created
by God, have their origin from Him and are dependent upon His will, it must
follow that such an act of re-creation is no more incredible than the
original act of creation or the continued upholding of the material
universe. 2

Ultimately, one's decision as to what he believes about the Resur-
rection of Jesus depends upon his own faith, his own personal experiences
with and of God and Christ. Thus, as other tenets of Christianity, it is
a matter partly of faith, partly of experience, and partly of interpretation
and faith. Then, in a very real sense, faith in God must necessarily
include conceptions about Him. For trust in God must surely mean trust in
Him as being what He is; besides a mere feeling of dependence, trust on
certain intellectual grounds. As Hebrews 11:6 indicates, "... for he that
cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them
who seek Him." 3

1 William A. Spurrer, Guide to the Christian Faith (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. 141, 142.

2 Smothurst, op. cit., p. 219.

3 Spurrer, loc. cit.
that seek after him." Such belief is the great venture of faith. Trust in God is inseparable from faith in His existence and in His character.¹

Likewise, faith in Jesus Christ, the "Logos," the "Son of God," is an essential presupposition, and thereby the Christian attitude becomes one of faith in Jesus Christ as "Risen." Just as one could not exercise trust in God, except by the presuppositions, first that He exists and secondly that He is perfect, so neither can one exercise Christian trust in Jesus Christ, except on the presupposition that he passed through the experience of the Resurrection, and as "Risen" is the object of human faith.²

Implications of the resurrection. Hence, it is an essential doctrine of the "Christian Faith" that the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the pledge and guarantee of our own. Hancock says the reason for this is that in the life and personality of Christ, not only the self-revelation of God in terms of time and space is seen, but also the revelation of the nature and character of man as God intends him to be. Thus the Apostles and Nicene creeds insist that Jesus Christ is not only true God but also true man, the archtype and representative of humanity created in the image of God. The Christian belief, then, is that, as with Christ, so also with man, nothing that belongs to the completeness and perfection of his nature and personality will be finally lost through physical death.³

This, then, is the revelation dynamically set forth in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead: that, although as a man Jesus suffered the mortality of sinful humanity, God raised Him from the dead and granted

¹Simpson, op. cit., p. 455. ²Ibid., p. 456. ³Hancock, op. cit., pp. 60, 61.
(or restored) unto Him "life in Himself" (John 5:25) so that He, the Redeemer of mankind, might become a "life-giving spirit" (I Corinthians 15:45) to all who are joined to Him in faith. Thus, the one who is united to Jesus Christ puts on an immortality which he did not formerly possess (I Corinthians 15:53, 54). Though man is now mortal by nature, he may receive from God the gift of immortal life through faith in Jesus Christ. Therefore, the Christian's hope of eternal life rests not on the immortality of his own soul, but on the immortality of his God and Saviour, who, refusing to let him sink into nothingness, holds him in unbroken fellowship with Himself until the day of resurrection when he shall be restored to a life that is fully personal, truly human, and in a body of glory suited to the conditions of that realm.¹

Moreover, the Apostle Paul writes: "It is Christ Jesus that died, yea rather, that was raised from the dead..." (Romans 8:34). "Who was delivered up for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification" to (Romans 4:25). And Peter says: "Who through him are believers in God, that raised him from the dead, and gave him glory; so that your faith and hope might be in God" (I Peter 1:21). These passages connect the assurance of justification--of forgiveness--of freedom from all condemnation--with faith in the Resurrection. The ground of acceptance was the obedience of Jesus unto death upon the cross, but it was the Resurrection which gave the joyful confidence that the work had accomplished its result.²

²Orr, op. cit., pp. 271, 277-278.
Furthermore, it is the testimony of New Testament writers that the Resurrection, Ascension, and Exaltation go together as parts of the same transaction.¹ Thus, the Resurrection was a change of state—from the temporal to the eternal, from humiliation to glory, and from a condition of taking away sin, to one which is "apart from sin" (Hebrews 9:28), and is marked by the plenitude of spiritual power. This view is especially reflected by the Apostle Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Paul says: "He died unto sin once: but the life that he liveth, he liveth unto God" (Romans 6:10). "The last Adam became a life-giving Spirit" (I Corinthians 15:45). In Hebrews 1:3, we read: "When he had made purification of sins," He "sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high." "Having been made perfect, he became unto all them that obey him the author of eternal salvation" (Hebrews 5:9).

This view of Jesus as having died to sin, and risen in power to a new life with God, having become the principle of spiritual quickening to His Church, is based upon what is spoken of as Paul's "mystical" doctrine of the union of believers with Christ. Through faith, and symbolically in baptism, the Christian dies with Christ to sin—"is thenceforth done with it as something put away and belonging in the past—"and rises with Him in spiritual power to "newness of life."² Christ lives in him by His Spirit. The Apostle in Romans 8:9-11 declares:

But ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus

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²Ibid., p. 280; cf. Romans 6:3-11.
from the dead dwelleth in you, he that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall give life also to your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwelleth in you.

Again, man is recognized as a compound being, giving due place to the body in the constitution of his total personality, for the body as well as the soul (or self) enters into the complete conception of his nature. The redemption of the whole man is, as Paul phrases it in Romans 8:23, "the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body." Thus, from this standpoint, it may be said that the Resurrection was essential in that the redemption of man apparently means the redemption of his whole personality, body and soul as a unit. Hence: "He who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus and bring us...into his presence" (II Corinthians 4:14). Essentially, this indicates the replacement of one solidarity with another—the body of the old mortality, the body of Adam, by the body of Christ, the body of the resurrection. Thus, according to the New Testament the resurrection "at the last day" will be a corporate experience of the new humanity redeemed in Christ.1

However, there are a number of difficulties that are generated by the affirmation of the resurrection of the body. An immediate question is: How is a resurrection possible for those whose bodies have utterly perished? The Apostle Paul does speak of the bodies of those who are alive at the Parousia as being "changed," (I Corinthians 15:51-52; cf. I Thessalonians 4:15-18). But this does not touch the mystery of the dead. The major portion of difficulty seems to be in conceiving the resurrection of the body as the raising again of the very material form that was deposited in the grave. Although this notion has been defended, it adds an unnecessary burden on the doctrine of resurrection.

1Heller, op. cit., p. 227.
Also, man is confronted with considering what takes place concerning the person from the time of physical death to the event of the resurrection "in the last day." The following questions may thus be asked: Is there an intermediate state? Does not the existence of the self in a disembodied state run counter to the unitary nature of man? At this point one might follow Paul Althaus, who simply says, "Wir wissen vor der Auferstehung nichts als den Tod und dass die Toten in Gottes Hand sind. Das ist genug." ("We know nothing before the resurrection other than death and that the dead are in God's hand. That is enough.") On the other hand there are many who feel that Scripture warrants saying more about this state, but there seems to be little agreement on what should be said. However, this much seems clear: whatever existence man has between death and the resurrection of the dead will be a condition of life given to him by God and will not depend on a self-sustaining natural capacity of his soul.

Professor Oscar Cullmann further indicates that the Christian's confidence in Christ's proximity is also grounded in the conviction that the "inner man" is already grasped by the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he states that since the time of Christ, the living do indeed have access to the Holy Spirit. If He is actually within us, He has already transformed our "inner man." The Holy Spirit is conceived as the power of life; and if this is so, death can do Him no harm. Thus, something is changed for the dead, for those who really die in Christ, that is, in possession of the Holy Spirit. The horrible abandonment in death, the separation from God no longer threatens if men are partakers of His Spirit. Therefore, the New Testament

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1Heller, loc. cit., citing Paul Althaus, Die letzen Dinge, p. 159.
emphasizes that the dead are indeed with Christ, and so not abandoned.¹

In II Corinthians 5:8, it even appears that the dead are nearer Christ: "We are willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be at home with the Lord." For this reason, Paul indicates in Philippians 1:23 that he longs to die and be with Christ. Thus, Cullmann says that a man who lacks the fleshly body is yet nearer Christ than before, if he has the Holy Spirit. It is felt that the flesh, bound to our earthly body, is the hindrance to the Holy Spirit's full development. Death is said to deliver us from this hindrance even though it is an imperfect state inasmuch as it lacks the resurrection body. The Apostle, however, limits himself to assuring his readers that this state, anticipating the destiny which is theirs once they have received the Holy Spirit, brings them closer to the final resurrection. ²

Here we find fear of a bodiless condition associated with firm confidence that even in this intermediate, transient condition no separation from Christ supervenes (among the powers which cannot separate us from the love of God in Christ is death—Romans 8:38). This fear and this confidence are bound together in II Corinthians 5, and this confirms the fact that even the dead share in the present tension. Confidence predominates, however, for the decision has indeed been made. Death is conquered. The inner man, divested of the body, is no longer alone; he does not lead the shadowy existence which the Jews expected and which cannot be described as life. The inner man, divested of the body, has already in his lifetime been transformed by the Holy Spirit, is already grasped by the resurrection (Romans 6:5 ff., John 3:3 ff.), if he has already as a living person really been renewed by the Holy Spirit. Although he still 'sleeps' and awaits the resurrection of the body, which alone will give him full life, the dead Christian has the Holy Spirit. Thus, even in this state, death has lost its terror, although it still exists. And so the dead who die in the Lord can actually be blessed 'from now on'. . . . as the author of the Johannine Apocalypse says (14:13). What is said in I Corinthians 15:54b, 55 pertains also to the dead: 'Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting? So the


²Ibid., p. 54.
Apostle in Romans 14 writes: "Whether we live or die, we belong to the Lord" (verse 8). Christ is "Lord of the living and the dead" (verse 9).\footnote{Ibid., pp. 54-55.}

Again, the writer may be asked concerning the character of the "resurrection body." Paul writes in Romans 8:11: "If the Spirit dwells in you, then will He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead call to life your mortal bodies also through the Spirit dwelling in you." In Philippians 3:21: "We wait for the Lord Jesus Christ, who will conform our lowly body to the body of His glory." Also, in II Corinthians 3:18 one reads: "We are being transformed into his own likeness from glory to glory." The transformation of mortal body into the spiritual body does not take place until the whole creation is formed anew by God. Then, there will be nothing but Spirit, the power of life, for death is destroyed—conquered with finality. Cullmann says there will then be a new substance for all things visible. Instead of the fleshly matter there appears the spiritual. That is, instead of corruptible matter there appears the incorruptible. The visible and invisible will be spirit. Hence, the Christian hope involves a new creation, a resurrection of the body, not of the flesh. For in the flesh dwells the power of death, but in the spiritual body dwells the power of God-given life.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 45, 46.}

Thus, the New Testament declares that mortal, Adamic solidarity is not the ultimate destiny of man. Through faith in a "Second Adam," the "Man from heaven," he may enter into a new and transcendent relationship. As the "Old Adam" inaugurated the natural order of human life and brought upon it sin and death, so Christ as the "New Adam" inaugurates the order of redeemed humanity, which overcomes the powers of sin and
death and fulfills the goal of perfect fellowship with God, for which
the first Adam was created, but from which he and all mankind in corporate
solidarity with him fell. Therefore, according to the New Testament, the
resurrection at the last day will be a corporate experience of the new
humanity redeemed in Christ. Heller says that the real object, then, of
the resurrection is not each individual believer in his separate existence,
but rather as he is a part of the "Body of Christ," the Church.

It seems that the whole scheme of God's redemption is embraced as
I Peter 1:3, 4 declares: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ, who, according to his great mercy, begat us again unto a living
hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, unto an inher-
ance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away."

The material analysis of science that seeks to be the frame of
reference for every serious objection against immortality in a personal
sense. Consequently, it is readily seen that the most formidable arguments
against the belief in God and personal immortality will come from physico-
logical psychologists and the material positivistic interpretations of the
Heller, loc. cit.
In various instances, the writer has already considered some of
the arguments against the belief in God and the Christian doctrine of
personal immortality. However, summarily, note further some important
representative challenges. This writer pointed out in the introductory
section that at one time the tenets of Christianity were believed without
question, but as men increasingly assumed an attitude of natural inquiry,
many commenced to question and to reject their previous mystical religious
knowledge. This present century remains largely involved in following the
assumptive scientific knowledge obtained by "putting nature to the ques-
tion." This method is generally known as the experimental or scientific
method of inquiry. Hence, to those who rely upon scientific analysis for
knowledge, for warranted belief, the mystical, the supernatural, or the
extraordinary other-than-that, which cannot be proven by experimentation,
is inexpressible. The Christian belief in God and personal immortality
is therefore considered as illusory; a faith that is without reason; a
belief that has no warranty.

The material analysis of science thus seems to be the frame of
reference for every serious objection against immortality in a personal
sense. Consequently, it is readily seen that the most formidable arguments
against the belief in God and personal immortality will come from physio-
logical psychologists and the logical positivists who interpret man from a
materialistic and wholly rationalistic approach, and who declare that their
method is the only means of ascertaining truth. Also, under the materialistic and rationalistic attack of the scientific method, some religionists followed the cue and rejected the traditional Christian views of a personal God, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the ensuing hope of the resurrection of the righteous unto eternal life, while the wicked were resurrected to eternal punishment.

I. THE OPPOSITION OF MODERNISTS AND JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES

Rejecting the traditional Biblical views of redemption, the modernist advocates a God who is a transcendent Being, infinite, immutable, and impassive. His relationship to His creatures is not of the kind existing between a father and his children; He manifests Himself in the form of laws, physical and psychical. God is a "Creative Power," the "Power" that has issued in spiritual life, and therefore immortality is interpreted in terms of spiritual life, for Jesus Christ is reduced to mere human proportions. 1 One recognizes such tendencies in men such as E. S. Brightman, Shailer Mathews, A. Loisy, and others. Also, their particular interest is in the bearing of divine goodness on immortality—not in the redemptive plan of God through Jesus Christ.

For instance, Brightman says that those persons are immortal whom God judges to be capable of developing worthily at any time in their future existence. By developing worthily is meant realizing and choosing ideal values, individually and socially. Such a view considers the possibility

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that some conscious beings—such as imbeciles—may be hopelessly unable to appreciate ideal values. Hence, it is thought to be more just to let them enjoy what they can while they live and to let them die when their time comes, rather than to preserve them as aimless immortals. Moreover, it is conceivable to men such as Brightman that some individuals, once responsive to the divine impulse, may become so vicious that even God may despair of arousing them to any higher aspirations. This hypothesis of conditional immortality leaves everyone to the goodness of God and the probability that God will in some way preserve persons of value.\(^1\) It therefore denies the resurrection of the dead and the redemptive work of Christ to that end.

Again, to avoid the repulsive traditional teaching of eternal punishment, the Jehovah’s Witnesses also assume a position of conditional immortality which affirms future life for the righteous, but asserts the annihilation of the wicked. Although the Witnesses’ concept of future life for the righteous involves a flesh and blood bodily resurrection in the last day, it is directly opposed to the personal “spiritually embodied” resurrection affirmed by traditional Christianity. On the other hand, whereas the contemporary positions of immortality of influence and value and biological immortality assume a concept of conditional life after death, with tendencies to impersonality, the Jehovah’s Witnesses posit a conditional, but fleshly concept of immortality. Hence, because of the nature of their assertions, though the comparative beliefs of the modernist and the Jehovah’s Witness are remote, both must be considered as contradictory to the Christian doctrine of personal immortality.

\(^1\)Brightman, op. cit., p. 408.
Each of the aforementioned opponents, the psychological illusionist, the positivist, the modernist, and the Jehovah's Witness object to the Christian doctrine of personal immortality which represents the personal, "spiritually embodied" resurrection of the dead, with eternal life through Christ for the righteous and eternal punishment for the wicked. However, the writer shall further consider this diversified opposition, continuing with what is thought to be the strongest argument against personal immortality.

II. THE ARGUMENT OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Brightman says that such a materialistic interpretation of physiological psychology is the only real strong argument against immortality. According to him, this argument is developed from the premise that consciousness is injured, and the contents of consciousness are determined by bodily states or external stimuli which in turn are communicated to the brain. When the brain ceases to function, consciousness ceases. Hence, the death of the body destroys the cause of the "soul" or "self," and it is absurd to suppose an effect to continue after its cause has perished. The strength of this argument is said to be the logic of its premises and because of the fact that its premises seem to have the full support of empirical science.¹

Thus, according to Corliss Lamont, the basic issue is monistic psychology as opposed to a dualistic psychology. The question is whether the relationship between the body and personality is close, fundamental, and indissoluble, or whether it is a partnership so vague, loose, and

¹Ibid., p. 395.
inconsequential that the personality may be conceived of as a separate and independent entity. He further states that it is known from ordinary experience how closely the personality is actually tied up with our body. Bodily changes are said to almost invariably carry with them mental and emotional changes. For instance, coffee is known to stimulate the mind; morphine dulls it; alcohol may do either, depending upon the quantity and quality imbibed. The personality is well when the body is well; sick when the body is sick. However, it is admitted that under certain circumstances, one's state of mind can effect one's state of body, either for better or for worse. In this event, it still does not in any way indicate the disunity or dissociation of the personality from the body.¹

This monistic psychology, which asserts the indissoluble union of the personality with the body, obviously implies that, in a basic sense, personality is simply a function of the body, lasting as long as the body lasts and disintegrating as soon as the body ceases to be a living organism.² Bertrand Russell, a noted philosopher, who also represents the logical positivist view, makes this statement:

Persons are part of the everyday world with which science is concerned, and the conditions which determine their existence are discoverable. A drop of water is not immortal; it can be resolved into oxygen and hydrogen. If, therefore, a drop of water were to maintain that it had a quality of aqueousness which would survive its dissolution we should be inclined to be skeptical. In like manner we know that the brain is not immortal, and that the organized energy of a living body becomes, as it were, demobilized at death and therefore not available for collective action. All the evidence goes to show that what we regard as our mental life is bound up with brain structure and organized bodily energy. Therefore it is rational to suppose that mental life ceases when bodily life ceases. The argument is only one


² Brightman, loc. cit.
of probability, but it is as strong as those upon which most scientific conclusions are based. ¹

Again, Lamont in discussing the "verdict of science" with regard to the integrate unity of personality and body says:

In other words, modern science convincingly sustains the fundamental principle of the monistic psychology. No one science, perhaps, alone proclaims this conclusion. But the sciences of the modern world, taken together and as a whole, most certainly do create an overwhelming presumption in its favor. Again and again their findings have inevitably led to the proposition that mind or personality is a function of the body; and that this function is, if we pay attention to William James' distinction, productive and not merely transmissive. Now function means, in the first place, the characteristic activity of any distinguishable entity. But there is an additional meaning of the term which has come to be uniquely significant in the methodology of modern science. When one thing is so related to another that it varies in some determinate way along with the other thing, then either thing may be called a function of the other. As between the body and personality, the body seems to be the prior and more constant entity whether we consider the process of evolution, the development of man from conception to maturity, or the daily round of human existence, during which the personality or mind is for considerable periods asleep or unconscious while the body is as alive and real as ever. And for this reason, it has been customary to regard the body as primary and to call the personality its function rather than the converse.²

This functional relationship is established in four main ways, by showing: (1) That in the evolutionary process the power and versatility of living things increase concomitantly with the development and complexity of their bodies in general and their central nervous system in particular. (2) The genes from the germ-cells of the parents determine the mental and physical characteristics of the individual, including those of sex. (3) During the existence of a human being from conception to birth, from youth to maturity, from old age to death, the mind and personality grow and change as the body grows and changes. (4) Specific alterations in the


physical structure and condition of the body, especially in the brain and its cerebral cortex, bring about specific alterations in the mental and emotional life of a man; likewise, specific alterations in his mental and emotional life result in specific alterations in his bodily condition. Thus Lamont concludes that such a close and intricate functional relationship which has been "proven" to exist between personality and body makes it difficult to conceive of them as other than an inseparable unity, inevitably sharing each other's fortunes, for better and for worse, in life and in death.  

Another methodological tool of science that Lamont believes is of paramount importance concerning the conflict between monistic and dualistic psychology is the "law of parsimony" or economy of hypothesis. "This law requires that any scientific explanation be based on the fewest assumptions possible, and therefore implies a law of economy in the selection of hypotheses. It is said that the law of parsimony does not deny that nature often works in a most complex manner, but it stands for simplicity in that it shuns every tendency to consider nature unnecessarily complex. However, when this law is disregarded, the door is thrown open to ridiculous hypotheses and impossible vagaries "ad infinitum." Furthermore, Lamont explains:

Now the particular significance of the law of parsimony for the argument between the monistic and dualistic psychologies is that it rules out dualism by making it unnecessary. In conjunction with the monistic alternative it pushes the separate and independent supernatural soul into the limbo of unneeded and unwanted hypotheses. I have previously described ... the extraordinary complexity of the human body, its gradual evolution through hundreds of millions of years, and the infinite intricacy of the structure underlying the intellectual and emotional activities of human beings. In view of these facts it is surely not rash to claim that no supernatural soul is required to explain the great and varied achievements, powers

1 Ibid., p. 97.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., p. 98.
and potentialities of man illustrated...throughout the vast panorama of history. For the personality, which usually receives the credit for these things, is in truth hardly more remarkable than the body which is its base.1

To further reinforce his argument, Lamont quotes Dr. John H. Randall and Professor John H. Randall, Jr., from their book, Religion and the Modern World, as saying:

There is no room for an immortal spirit in man's frame that can leave its earthly habitation to dwell in any heavenly habitation beyond the limits of Space-Time... It is not that any scientific faith could conceivably disprove such possibilities; it is rather that it makes them irrelevant. The man who thinks in terms of modern psychology simply does not entertain the notion of an immortal soul; it does not figure among his concepts.2

Moreover, Lamont asserts that the orthodox reliance on the resurrection is not much assistance in making personal immortality seem plausible. Though the resurrection concept, by promising man that he will get back his former body, may appear to be consistent with monistic psychology, in reality it is not. This is because monism declares that it is the human personality and this natural body that are one and inseparable, and therefore implies that the "supernatural" body of the resurrection is not acceptable. Also, since the resurrection is yet to take place, some provision must be made for the long intermediate period between death and the rising of men from the grave.3 Of course, this is assuming that there were a personal God and that a real resurrection could be expected in the "last day."

In agreement with the criticism of Guignebert, Renan, Loisy, Wellhausen, and others concerning the alleged resurrection of Jesus Christ, Lamont also states that there are any number of hypotheses based entirely on natural cause and effect that could account for the

1Ibid., pp. 98-99.  
2Ibid., p. 110.  
3Ibid., p. 107.
He might have been taken from the cross and buried apparently
dead, but actually only in a state of suspended animation; his
dead body might have been taken away from the tomb by his followers
and deposited elsewhere; his disciples might have permitted their
desires and imaginations to get the better of them in claiming that
they saw him and talked with him after his death. After all, the
appearance of ghostly apparitions among the living has been one of
the most common, though always unverified, experiences of mankind.
It is to be remembered, too, that the myth of a resurrection is
found among many ancient peoples and is just a kind of religious
fable that might be expected to arise in a primitive civilization.
In the case of Jesus' resurrection Hume's classic formula for testing
miracles is decidedly applicable: "No testimony is sufficient to
establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its
falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors
to establish." 1

Hence, for the monistic psychologist, all theories of personal sur-
vival violate the tenets of his science and lead one into the most unreas-
sonable extremes. Therefore Corliss Lamont says, "... we cannot do
otherwise than give up entirely the idea of immortality." 2 It is clear
that monism in psychology, insisting as it does on the intimate and
indissoluble unity of body and personality, "ipso facto" rules out the
possibility of a life beyond the grave. Lamont further suggests that
modern science, in establishing the monistic view on a firm basis, actually
disproves the idea of immortality; just as in affirming the soundness of the
evolutionary concept it disproves the theory of the separate divine creation
of each species; and just as in showing insanity to be due to natural and
ascertainable causes it disproves the notion that possession of devils
accounts for this disorder. 3

Again, Bertrand Russell declares that if one is to believe that a
person survives death, he must believe that the memories and habits which

1 Ibid., p. 108.  2 Ibid., p. 109.  3 Ibid., p. 110.
constitute the person will continue to be exhibited in a new set of
occurrences. He admits that no one can prove that this will not happen,
but he states that it is easy to see that it is very unlikely. Russell
compares our memories and habits as bound up with the structure of the
brain to the manner in which a river is connected with the riverbed. Though
the water changes, it keeps to the worn channel. Likewise, as previous
thoughts have worn a channel in the brain, our thoughts flow along this
channel and bring about memory and mental habits. But because the brain
as a structure is dissolved at death, memory may also be expected to be
dissolved. Therefore, Russell says there is no more reason to think other-
wise than expect a river to persist in its old course after an earthquake
has raised a mountain where a valley used to be.\footnote{Russell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 89.}

Furthermore, Russell states that it is not rational arguments but
emotions that cause belief in a future life, the most important of which is
fear of death. Also, another emotion which encourages the belief in sur-
vival is admiration for the excellence of man. It is stated, however, that
it is only when man thinks abstractly that he has such a high opinion of
himself. He points out that concretely, the vast majority of humanity is
very bad. Civilized states spend more than half their revenue on killing
each other's citizens. Too, Russell would have us consider the long
history of activities inspired supposedly by moral fervor: human sacrifices,
persecutions of heretics, witch-hunts, pogroms leading up to wholesale
extermination.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 90, 91, 93.} Thus, Bertrand Russell comments:

\begin{quote}
Are these abominations, and the ethical doctrines by which they
are prompted, really evidence of an intelligent Creator? And can
we really wish that the men who practiced them should live forever?
\end{quote}
The world in which we live can be understood as a result of muddle and accident; but if it is the outcome of deliberate purpose, the purpose must have been that of a fiend. For my part, I find accident a less painful and more plausible hypothesis.¹

In considering the common arguments for immortality, Lamont points out their failure. Concerning the ethical arguments, he says they naturally point to universalism, and affirms the irrationality of giving unlimited expression to evil along with the good. If the human self possesses infinite possibilities, wickedness as expressed on this earth is one of them. On the base of ethics, no human soul can be judged as completely irredeemable. Likewise, the value argument is declared to necessarily refer to the inherent preciousness of every human personality. Lamont states that such a doctrine is "impious," for its inferences maintain the permanent and ineradicable character of evil in the constitution of the universe. The instinct-fulfillment argument is pointed out to lead to the same dead-end. Furthermore, it is stated that the fact that immortality descriptions vary so widely and radically, not only according to the actualities and ideals of each culture concerned, but also according to the arguments put forward to prove the hereafter, is a general indication of the weakness for the whole case for immortality.²

Moreover, in connection with discussion of immortality, one is cautioned that the existence of God is not to be lightly assumed. It is asserted that the same difficulties apply to the establishment of God as a metaphysical ultimate of the universe as to the elevation of good and rationality to that position. Ethical arguments for the proof of God are no more sound than in reference to immortality, and they make the

¹Ibid., p. 93.
existence of God a corollary of future life. Such arguments are said to turn wishes for a hereafter into alleged proofs, and this procedure is illegitimate as a demonstration of either God or immortality. Thus, Lamont states:

Men may yearn for God, cry out that life is empty without him, lament that marriage and morals will collapse unless supported by his divine hand. Yet no amount of human anguish and desire will make actual a non-existent God. To emphasize the supposed uselessness of God in relation to the hope of immortality, Lamont declares it would be impossible for a rational God to confer upon men the privilege of an after-life. For if God obeys the natural laws which He, assumingly, established, He does not possess the power to extend the existence of conscious personalities beyond the grave. In short, the monistic relationship between personality or mind and body is, according to Lamont, an established psychological law. In the face of this law a God could only bring immortality by becoming a miracle-worker in the "old style," only by violating His own considered rules and laws. Hence this study was undertaken to examine the effects of this law on human society, the first of its kind in the world, the first of its kind in the world. In conclusion, the author of this study feels that the implications of his findings are of great importance for man. As for an emphasis on the uselessness of religious beliefs, Lamont states that it is of primary importance to understand the religious implications of belief in God. The knowledge that immortality is an illusion frees man from any sort of preoccupation with the subject of death, making death, in a sense, unimportant. It liberates all man's energy and time for the development and extension of

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1 Ibid., p. 187.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., pp. 171, 172.
the good potentialities of this earth. It is said to engender a hearty belief, when they have any, are superficial and unsustained in those who believe so ill, and few seem disturbed as being able to hold side of an otherwise dangerous situation.

The second phase of area of Leuba's investigation was concerned purported to bring strength, depth, and maturity, making possible a philosophy of life that is simple, understandable, and inspiring. Thus, Lamont concludes:

We do not ask to be born; and we do not ask to die. But born we are and die we must. We come into existence and we pass out of existence. And in neither case does high-handed fate wait on our ratification of its decree. But between that birth and death we can live our lives, work for and enjoy the things that we hold dear. We can make our actions count, contribute our unique quality to the unceasing human adventure. We can endow our days on earth with a scope and meaning that the finality of death cannot detract from or defeat.

In connection with the argument of Corliss Lamont, let us also briefly consider the method of Professor James Leuba who comes to similar conclusions. Aside from the psychological means, Leuba also uses statistical methods in his investigation. He accumulated by circulating questionnaires concerning belief in God and immortality. Although this study was made in the earlier part of this century, in 1914, the indicative results may be interesting to note. Investigations were conducted in three general areas, the first of which was concerned with the belief in God among American college students. Tabulation of the results showed that 57 per cent had some sort of belief in the existence of God. The remaining 43 per cent apparently thought themselves morally independent of belief in God. Leuba makes the following comments concerning his findings:

The deepest impression left by these records is that, so far as religion is concerned, our students are groveling in darkness. Christianity as a system of belief, has utterly broken down, and nothing

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1 Ibid., pp. 243, 244.  
2 Ibid., p. 244.  
3 Leuba, Belief in God and Immortality, op. cit., p. 211; cf. pp. 184-212.
definite, adequate, and convincing has taken its place. Their beliefs, when they have any, are superficial and amateurish in the extreme. There is no generally acknowledged authority; each one believes as he can, and few seem disturbed at being able to hold the tenets of the churches. This sense of freedom is the glorious side of an otherwise dangerous situation.¹

The second phase of area of Leuba’s investigation was concerned with the belief in immortality in an American college. This survey revealed that 80.3 per cent of the freshmen, 76.2 per cent of the sophomores, 60 per cent of the juniors, and 70.1 per cent of the seniors believed in immortality. It is Leuba’s opinion that the chief influence of the decrease of belief among the older students should be ascribed to the gain in independence which is a normal result of growth and education. Thus the powerful impulse to self-affirmation and independence is said to be a contributive influence to the detachment of unwarranted traditional beliefs.²

The third area of Leuba’s investigation was a survey made concerning the belief in God and immortality among American scientists, sociologists, historians, and psychologists. Out of one thousand scientists who responded to the questionnaire, only 50.6 per cent expressed belief in immortality, and only 41.8 per cent expressed belief in God. Among the more eminent of these men the percentage of believers in immortality was 36.9 per cent, while among the less eminent it was 59.3 per cent. Comparable results were also revealed with respect to belief in God. This apparently indicates that the greater the scientist, the greater the likelihood of rejecting faith in God and immortality. Further inquiry into the various branches of science indicated that the highest proportion of skeptics and disbelievers was among the biologists, sociologists, and

¹Ibid., p. 212. ²Ibid., pp. 213-218, 282, 283.
psychologists. The psychologists took the lead here in rejecting belief in God and immortality with 75.6 per cent disbelieving the existence of God and 81.2 per cent disbelieving immortality. Professor Leuba explains this fact on the ground that these classes of scientists more than any others recognize the ruling presence of law in organic and psychological life.¹

It may be of further interest to note, as Corliss Lamont mentions, that Professor Leuba repeated his study of the scientists in 1933, and he found that a considerably higher proportion of scientists disbelieved in or doubted immortality than in 1914.² Thus Leuba points out that when grounds of belief are insufficient to meet the requirement of an independent mind, then independence leads either to the rejection of the belief or to agnosticism. He further comments that if the number of persons disinclined to an eternal future existence is considerable, as it is, then those who are simply indifferent, or nearly so are legion.³ Therefore, Leuba pointedly remarks:

Immortality is not only abhorrent to many and unattractive to a much larger number, but the desire for it is condemned as morally inferior and reprehensible. This is a relatively new phase of the controversy; it marks, it seems, the passage from the defensive to the offensive on the part of the disbelieving moralists; the abandonment of the belief has become for these a condition of the attainment of the highest moral end.⁴

Hence, it is the opinion of Professor Leuba that not only does belief that God and immortality lack sufficient grounds of assurance, but that moral life is not dependent upon this united belief. Rather, he

¹Ibid., pp. 247, 251, 267, 279; cf. 219-280.
²Lamont, op. cit., p. 230.
³Leuba, Belief in God and Immortality, op. cit., pp. 287, 303.
⁴Ibid., p. 306.
affirms that moral ideals and moral energy have their source in social life. Thus as participants in the life of a family and of wider social groups, men are said to draw directly at the "original fount" of moral discrimination and inspiration. Such belief in God and immortality is therefore denounced as a hindrance to true spiritual progress.¹

Although the writer has thus far been primarily concerned with the standpoint of the psychological illusionist, the similar reasoning of the logical positivist has also been intimated. For instance, Bertrand Russell not only manifests the attitudes of the physiological psychologist, but he also may be considered as a representative of positivistic thought. The conclusions drawn by psychological illusionists and logical positivists concerning the existence of God and personal immortality are identical, only the methods of arrival may vary. However, the discussion will be continued by examining the position of logical positivism more closely.

III. THE ARGUMENT OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

Briefly, to deepen an understanding of the implications of the positivist argument, consider the background of the method. The word "positivism" is no new thing, for it was coined by Auguste Comte in the 19th century. The essence of all forms of positivism is that the adherents will not accept anything which cannot be proved by empirical observation based upon the senses.² Thus, W. T. Stace notes that the original slogan of logical positivism, which has in principle remained the same, was "the meaning of a statement is identical with its method of

¹Ibid., pp. 320, 321. ²Smethurst, op. cit., p. 251.
verification." The apparent implication is that a statement for which there is no possible method of sense verification, either by direct observation or indirect inferences from such observations, is meaningless.\(^1\)

But whereas the old positivism was based upon the idea that 19th century science was the one method by which human beings could acquire certain knowledge, logical positivism arose not out of physical science so much as out of mathematics.\(^2\)

Early in the present century Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead carried out an examination of the foundations of mathematics, and claimed to have succeeded in showing that the whole of arithmetic could be deduced from the principles of logic. Moreover, they maintained that the propositions of arithmetic and logic could be expressed in a set of symbols, so that it was impossible to say where logic ended and arithmetic began.

Russell and Whitehead published their noted book, *Principia Mathematica*, around 1913. In it they set out a number of symbolically expressed deductions obtained from a limited collection of primitive ideas and propositions. It is pointed out that the account of mathematics there given could not be deduced without the introduction of an axiom called the "Axiom of Reducibility." Smethurst says this was not to be deduced from the premises which underlay the work, *Principia Mathematica*, and therefore its truth could not be satisfactorily demonstrated. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Russell's pupil, attempted to remedy this defect by using a new method. Whereas Russell gave his attention to the ideas to which the symbols pointed, Wittgenstein developed the "analysis of language," for symbols are in themselves a form


\(^2\)Smethurst, *loc. cit.*
of language, even if an artificial or arbitrary one, and a language which

The first type of statements—empirical hypotheses—must be open to question, since the language or set of symbols

Wittgenstein expounded his views in a

very complex work called *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, published in

1922.¹

Meanwhile, G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad and Susan Stebbing at Cambridge

had also been developing analytical philosophy and giving their attention
to the study of symbolic logic, and they also were primarily concerned with
the language in which ideas were expressed and the analysis of this language.

Wittgenstein's ideas were eventually adopted and developed in 1930 and there-

after by a number of philosophers in Vienna and in Berlin. The Vienna

group, particularly Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and K. Gödel, became

perhaps the most characteristic exponents of this new philosophy which they
called "logical positivism," at Berlin, Hans Reichenbach was also working

on similar lines. Thus, starting from Wittgenstein's point of view, they

agreed that the first and essential thing was to analyze the structure of
the language which is used in philosophy or logic. They combined this with
the positivist idea that metaphysics and abstract speculation is pointless;

but their standpoint led them to declare that metaphysics is meaningless
because its propositions arise from misuse of language.²

Therefore, so far as the logical positivist is concerned, language

can only have two functions: one is to give expression to what they call
"empirical hypotheses," and the other is to state formal rules. These

formal rules simply define the way in which symbols are used, that is,
such as the use of symbols in a science and the use of words in a language.

Statements of this type are described as "tautological," indicating that

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 252.
they add nothing to knowledge of the external world, but merely set forth rules according to which the language or set of symbols is to be used.¹

The first type of statements—"empirical hypotheses"—are what would usually be called statements of fact; but the logical positivist immediately asserts that not all apparent statements of fact are empirical hypotheses. For example, it is pointed out that when one is confronted with a sentence which is an ostensible statement of fact, there are two questions which he may ask about it. He may ask, "Is it true?" or he may ask, "What does it mean?" The logical positivist argues that one rarely stops to ask the second question and consequently he attempts to answer the first question with reference to statements which are really meaningless. Therefore, such statements cannot be either true or false, because they express nothing, being a misuse of language.²

In other words, it takes more than a grammatically correct statement to be significant; man must begin by asking of every apparent statement of fact, "Is it significant or meaningful?" The decision, according to the logical positivist, that a statement is meaningful and can be called an empirical hypothesis, depends upon whether the statement can "in principle" be verified by human sense experience. Thus, any statement which cannot be tested by empirical observation, by experiment or human experience, cannot be regarded as a meaningful statement. Metaphysical statements cannot be so tested; therefore, they are declared meaningless. A. J. Ayer, a leading English exponent of logical positivism, in his early book, Language, Truth, and Logic, quotes an example of such a meaningless metaphysical statement from F. H. Bradley's book, Appearance and Reality: "The absolute

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., pp. 252-253.
enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress." Ayer says a statement of this nature is not even in principle verifiable, for "one cannot conceive of an observation which would enable one to determine whether the absolute did or did not enter into evolution and progress." 1

Divergences arose among logical positivists as to the exact meaning of the word "verifiable." Some held that a proposition can only be said to be verifiable if its truth can be "conclusively established" in experience. Others held that it is verifiable if it is possible for experience to render it even "probable." Smithurst says the tendency has been to accept the weaker definition of verifiability. But, it is evident that it is not only the propositions of metaphysics which are held by the logical positivists to be meaningless or "nonsense." They also hold that theological and ethical statements are similarly meaningless, since it is the function of language only to give expression to such things as may be empirically verified, and, they maintain, ethical and theological statements are not of this character. 2 Hence, positivists hold that moral utterances do not state facts, but merely express emotions, feelings, or attitudes. Religion, morals, and values are thus held to be dependent upon human feelings, emotions, or other psychological states. Therefore, such a theory is subjectivistic in that it plainly implies, since religion, morals, and values are only the expression of human feelings, that they have no basis in the world outside the human mind. 3 For example, H. Veithinger, who calls himself a "critical positivist," writes:

From the standpoint of critical positivism, then, there is no Absolute, no thing-in-itself, no subject, no object. All that remains is sensations, which exist, and are given, and out of which

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1 Ibid.        2 Ibid.        3 Stace, op. cit., p. 176.
the whole subjective world is constructed with its division into physical and psychical complexes. Critical positivism asserts that any other, any further claim is fictional, subjective, and unsubstantiated. For it only the observed sequence and coexistence of phenomena exist, and upon these alone it takes its stand. Any explanation going beyond this can only do so... through fictions. 1

Hence, it is observed that the philosophy of logical positivism raises very serious problems for the Christian religion, especially the belief in personal immortality, which also involves the doctrine of God. It is obvious that the Christian beliefs in God and immortality are not directly empirically verifiable in human sense experience, and by their very nature cannot be. Therefore, the logical positivist argument against such Christian doctrines is projected from the bases of empirical human experience and language analysis; from the postulated assertion that only observed sense experience is verifiable as probable, Christian beliefs are rated as fictitious nonsense; and from the judgment of the set rules of linguistic analysis, doctrines such as the existence of God and personal immortality are declared to be pointless misuses of the function of language along with rational speculations.

Thus, the rootage of the positivistic premise is seen to be in naturalistic philosophy. Furthermore, one may also note the varying derivation that theological "modernism," the Jehovah's Witnesses, physiological psychology, and logical positivism have had from naturalism in the diverse formation of their views. Each, in a little different manner, to a certain modified extent, manifest concepts which apparently mirror the influence of a general materialism. The writer will thus further investigate the basic implications of such a "Weltanschauung."  

1Ibid., p. 171.
Because there seems to be this sense in which all of the foregoing arguments against the Christian doctrine of personal immortality are derived philosophically and scientifically from a naturalistic or a general materialistic base, the challenging tenets of materialism itself ought to be considered. It is to be recognized that materialism may be considered a form of naturalism, the type of philosophy which takes nature as the whole of reality. Naturalism denies the existence of anything above, beyond, behind, or other-than-nature, such as the supernatural, the extraordinary, or any unheralded intrusion into this system, in the form of new energy or new stuff, creation new or old, spontaneous beginning, or "accident" in a literal sense. Nature is thus held to be the total system of causes; each phase of the universe leads to and explains the next phase. Hence, nature as it is now is completely explained by nature as it has been; and, to ask for a cause of nature outside of nature, a "first Cause," a "God," is meaningless because it is viewed as unnecessary.\(^1\)

Like positivism, materialism rests on the postulate that sensation is the gateway to knowledge. However, while the positivist limits his statements to what he can verify by empirical observation, the materialist may go beyond the verifiable, for he declares that the universe consists, not of necessarily verifiable sensations, but of material things and processes which are essentially inexperienceable. Then he adds to this postulate the thesis that the only true "substance" or "cause" in the universe is material substance and its activities, everything being considered as atoms of matter in motion. Thus, by introducing such categories

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as substance and cause, the materialist has on the one hand departed from positivism; on the other, he has made a greater appeal to common sense.\(^1\)

However, when materialism is used as a general name equivalent to naturalism, it simply implies the explanation of the crude phenomena of experience by the eternal flux of motions of the ultimate entities of the world in the impalpable medium of space.\(^2\)

The bearing of materialism upon the belief in immortality is made very clear by the peculiar force which lies in what it denies. The disappearance of the "other world" implies that there is no God (unless nature itself or humanity can serve as an object of worship). There is, of course, no immortality nor any sort of survival of death, unless the lasting effects of one's life and doings, or the cherishing of one's memory by later generations, can serve as a sort of immortality. It is pointed out that the mind develops with the body, and old age brings decrepitude to both. Thus, death ends communication with the personality, and the person is left with no tangible evidence that it has escaped the fate of the body. There is nothing in the human being more than what he derives from the natural causes which have produced him.\(^3\)

Finally, the ultimate conclusion of "pure" materialism is that conscious human reason is not one of the original and permanent facts of the world. The kind of mentality in human beings is a transitory feature of things, evolved out of lower organisms, and ultimately out of physical things which are presumably wholly inanimate. And, so far as one knows and

\(^1\) Brightman, op. cit., pp. 397-398. \(^2\) Hooking, op. cit., p. 42.

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 42-43, 45.
can see, reason will again flicker out into the inanimate. The enduring realities do not think or plan; there is no reason nor purpose for the world as a whole.¹

These characteristics are implicated and especially noted in the works of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Ernst Haeckel, T. H. Huxley, and Ludwig Buchner of the 19th century. Also, they are found in the works of such 20th century writers as Bertrand Russell, George Santayana, W. W. Sellars, and Irwin Edman. It should also be recognized that 20th century naturalism is more complex, more varied, and less typical.² In any event, one may still readily discern the materialistic-naturalistic world view which remains a source of reference and contribution to the various arguments against the Christian doctrine of immortality.

Here in this section the writer has, in a measure, indicated some of the important arguments against the belief in personal immortality, and thereby implicated some of the problems involving credibility and verification. At this point, several relevant questions may be put: Does death remain a threat, or may it be a fulfillment? Are the foregoing arguments against the Christian doctrine of personal immortality of such nature and of such foundation that they rationally and reasonably necessitate our abandonment of this hope and our acceptance of the whims of fate? If not, on what grounds may one properly assert a belief, an expectation, a hope in personal immortality? Has this Christian doctrine sufficiently and reasonably provided a warranted hope of fulfillment in its concept of resurrection and eternal life through Christ? In the

¹Ibid., p. 44. ²Cf. Ibid., pp. 70, 72.
following section the writer shall endeavor to offer some concluding suggestions which may indicate some helpful clues in meeting the challenge of these decisive queries.

Now, the writer is finally endeavors virtue looking will interpreting the Christian belief, as it has been defined. In refuting the questions that have been raised and the objections that have been presented. There is no easy answer that can be given in a conclusive and verifiable fashion whereby the Christian doctrine may be sustained in spite of all objections. It has been already demonstrated, that the answer is not merely: Is there a hereafter, or does death end it all? Primarily, it is a matter of conflicting world views. We evidence are behind the question of ondubitable concerning life after death in whether we are living in an atheistic or a theistic system, whether we would be mechanistic or creative. The writer recognizes the possibility that there are to some who believe in some sort of immortality, but do not believe in the existence of God, and, conversely, others who do believe in the existence of God as a Supreme Being, but who despise the possibility of life after death. Certainly, a theistic system is necessary to provide the foundational elements from which only a belief in the Christian doctrine of eternal immortality may be derived.

Nevertheless, there are apparently evidences within these assertions which are not to accept a theistic system, while others have decided differently, according to separate indications, to accept it. In view of this diverse concept, it is evident that great freedom has been exercised in the formulation of ideas concerning God and immortality, both in their assertions and demonstrations. The writer has previously pointed out indications for the
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Now, the writer is finally concerned with analyzing and interpreting the Christian belief, as it has been defined, in relation to the questions that have been raised and the objections that have been presented. There is no easy answer that can be given in a credible and verifiable fashion whereby the Christian doctrine may be warranted in spite of all objections. It has been already indicated, that the issue is not merely: Is there a hereafter, or does death end it all? Basically, it is a matter of conflicting world views. The evident crux behind the question of credibility concerning life after death is whether we are living in an atheistic or a theistic system, whether our world is mechanistic or creative. The writer recognizes the possibility that there may be some who believe in some sort of immortality but do not believe in the existence of God, and, conversely, others who may believe in the existence of God as a Supreme Being, but who deny the probability of future life. But certainly a theistic system is necessary to provide the foundational elements from which such a belief as the Christian doctrine of personal immortality may be derived.

Nevertheless, there are apparently evidences which have caused some men to accept a theistic system, while others have decided differently, according to separate indications, to reject it. In view of the diverse concepts it is obvious that great freedom has been exercised in the formulation of ideas concerning God and immortality, both in their assertions and denials. The writer has previously pointed out indications for the
existence of God, discussing the warranty of such a belief, but they still may be accepted or rejected according to the disposition of the individual. Whatever position one may take, his life, his judgments are unalterably involved with faith—whether it be faith in God or faith in empirical observations. For this reason, no matter what man's premise, life is lived by what he thinks he knows. The familiar words of the Apostle Paul in I Corinthians 13:12, "For now we see in a mirror darkly...now I know in part..." are a valid testimony for scientist and theologian alike. Yet, amid all of the uncertainties of life, it seems that there are some inherent guiding principles which man may reasonably utilize, especially relative to the problems involved in our existence.

Basically, the writer has taken an existentialist view in order to cope with the fundamental ontological question of being, which not only intimates the essential properties and relations of existence, but negatively suggests the opposite possibility of "nonbeing." This writer is aware that there are atheistic existentialists such as Jean-Paul Sartre, and Martin Heidegger, who reject belief in the existence of God. They admit that there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence, a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept, but that being is man, or human reality. What is meant by saying that existence precedes essence is that man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and only afterwards, defines himself. Thus, in such a view, man is only what he conceives himself to be, and he is only what he wills himself to be after his thrust toward existence.¹

However, from this writer's standpoint, God is the necessary ground of all being, the foundational creative influence that translates nothingness into being. So, it seems that the atheist is overly naive concerning his own being as well as other existence, and he apparently fails to realize that if our world is as groundless and purposeless as he implies, his assumptions, his words are likewise spoken and written in vain. The problem of being is basic, and so far as this writer is concerned, no mechanistic assumption is a satisfactory solution. The assertion that nature is the total system of causes, without a primal cause, each phase leading to and explaining the next, is an insufficient explanation of why there is existence instead of nothingness. At this point, the observations of Tillich and Hartshorne relative to ontology are especially helpful.

It is evident that Christianity affirms that questions of God and immortality are possible only because an awareness of God is present, and this awareness precedes any relational question. Such an awareness is possible only because God has revealed Himself to mankind, for man is able to look beyond the limits of his own being and every other being to that Ground of Being upon which all existence depends. Moreover, from a philosophical standpoint, the tension between life and death, being and nonexistence, becomes resolved when the participation of God in creation is recognized.

Again, although the moral argument has been often mismanaged and put forward as proof, this writer feels it has worthwhile meaning in connection with demonstrating the reason for our theistic preference. In other words, the writer suggests that the needs of practical life, the demands of moral nature are cogent considerations in anticipating what
life ultimately means. Moreover, from an ontological base, it should be considered how it is and why it is that man singularly possesses moral and religious inclinations unless they indicate some sense of obligation. Their dismissal as mere personal emotional states does not answer the question. The fact that any sense of "oughtness" presents itself at all, refers back not only to man himself, but to a moral universe, a moral ground of being.

Furthermore, as has been mentioned, it is of great significance to recognize the resultant factors characteristically involved when atheism is "lived by" and "lived out" and when theism is "lived by" and "lived out." As Paul Ramsey pointed out, there seems to be a definite destructive consequence, both individually and socially, if the theistical and moral principles involved in life relationships are rejected.\(^1\) Tillich also points to the necessary concept of theonomous reasoning in order to drive man beyond the limits of his finitude, his own autonomy, or social heteronomy, to experience the ultimate concern of his being in relation to the problem of existence and the ground of being.

On the other hand, if it is admitted that moral values are merely derived from human feelings, emotions, or other psychological states, as the logical positivists and the psychological illusionists assert, man not only finds himself adrift, alone in an orderly universe, but he is driven without reason, and his life, as Tillich says, "becomes filled with irrational or demonic contents and is destroyed by them."\(^2\) Therefore, from such an existential standpoint, the concept of God as the ground of being

\(^1\) Cf. Ramsey, loc. cit.

\(^2\) Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith*, loc. cit.
is necessary for meaning and purpose to exist. Hence, to this writer, there seems to be greater difficulties involved in disbelieving God than to acknowledge His upholding presence.

Thus, if the Christian is justified in positing a theistic ground for our existence, and if God is creatively and purposefully involved in the destiny of the realm of being, man has a base from which the doctrine of personal immortality may be projected. It is obvious that the development of the Christian doctrine of immortality further hinges upon the significance of the revelation of God through Jesus Christ and His resurrection as testified by the witness of the Scripture. For this reason, the writer does not consider the traditional Christian doctrine of immortality as attesting a mere survival of death by the continued existence of the soul.

Primarily, life after death in the New Testament is not a corollary of the doctrine of man, but of the doctrines of God and salvation. Hence, it is not rooted in the nature and capacities of man, but rather in the character and saving power of God. Man's dependence upon God for the gift and continuance of life is further emphasized by the Scriptural witness that man is mortal, that it is God who "gives all men life and breath" (Acts 17:25). Moreover, the New Testament states unequivocally that God "alone has immortality" (I Timothy 6:16), that God alone has "life in himself" (John 5:26). As Heller says, when man's life is understood to be a trust or a loan which he receives from God, and not a natural and inalienable property, the Biblical teaching about life after death appears not so much to run counter to the scientific view of man as to transcend it. There need be
no objection, so far as the Biblical view of man is concerned, to the contention of science that there is nothing which belongs to man's natural life that is immune to the destructive power of death. As we have stated, the Bible too, infers that man is mortal, but it goes on to affirm that God through Christ, by the exercise of His own power, will restore to full personal and embodied life the man who possesses His Spirit, even though he has succumbed to death. In the natural order, which is the only one with which science has to do, death is the end. But in the transcendent order of redemption God brings "life and immortality to light" (I Timothy 1:10). 1

However, according to modern science the point of vulnerability in the Christian doctrine of future life is not the dogma of the resurrection, but the insupportable assumption that the human soul can separate itself from the body and has the capacity for independent life and activity. This dichotomous anthropology is not only regarded as unscientific, but to a number of Biblical scholars it is also rejected as unscriptural. The soul is by no means limited to the spiritual or psychic aspects of human life in the Scripture, but it describes the whole man in reference to his own particular individuality. Genesis 2:7 says that God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life "and man became a living soul (nephesh)." Soul then is something which man is, not merely something which he has. The Danish scholar, Johs. Pedersen, defines the soul (nephesh) as "a totality with a peculiar stamp." 2

In turning to the New Testament one finds that Paul particularly used a variation of psychological terms. For him "psyche" (frequently

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2 Cf. Ibid., p. 221, Peters, loc. cit.
translated "soul") is not an important word; it is used only thirteen times, usually with reference to the natural life of man. The adjectival form of "psyche" is used by Paul to designate the unspiritual or carnal man (psychikos) as opposed to the spiritual man (pneumatikos) (I Corinthians 2:14f.), and to indicate the natural body (psychikon soma) of this life in contrast to the spiritual body (pneumatikon soma) in the life to come (I Corinthians 15:44). Also, the term which Paul uses to express the totality of the human personality is "body" (soma). Thus Bultmann describes Paul's concept, "The soma is not something that outwardly clings to a man's real self (to his soul, for instance), but belongs to its very essence. . . if man were no longer soma. . . he would no longer be man." ¹

Therefore, it follows that for Paul the only possible form which human life, in any true and proper sense, may take here or hereafter is "somatic."

Again, the words "body" and "soul" are frequently ascribed to Jesus by the writers of the Gospels, and while Jesus makes a distinction between the two terms, in no case does He necessarily imply a radical dualistic view of human nature. Aimo Nikolainen very ably gives a conclusive summary of the nature of man in the light of Scripture:

Man is an indivisible whole. Seen from different points of view, he is by turns body, flesh and blood, soul, spirit, and heart. Each of these portrays a specific human characteristic, but they are not parts into which man may be divided. Body is man as a concrete being; 'flesh and blood' is man as a creature distinguished from the Creator; soul is the living human individual; spirit is man as having his source in God; heart is man as a whole in action. What is distinctively human is in every respect derived from God. Man is in every cell the work of God (body), he is in all circumstances the property of God (soul), he is absolutely dependent of God (spirit), and in all his activity he is

¹ Cf. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
either obedient to God or disobedient (heart). The God-relationship is not merely the life of the 'highest part' of man. The whole man 'from top to bottom' exists only by relationship to God.\(^1\)

Thus, the writer says with Heller that if this analysis of the Biblical understanding of the structure of human life is correct, it seems that the Bible stands closer to the unitary view of man advanced by modern science than it does to the traditional dualism of religious anthropology. Man, then, is not a dichotomy, half mortal and half immortal, but a being whose total psychosomatic existence is at every moment dependent upon God. And, apparently, if one is to give proper expression to the Biblical teaching about the life to come, emphasis will not be made of a dis-embodied soul being reunited with its resurrected body, but rather of the restoration of the whole man to the fullness of personal life. Moreover, it should be recognized that it is a misnomer to speak of the "resurrection of the body," for this implies that only man's physical nature is involved. One would do better to speak of the "resurrection of man," or to use the Scriptural phrase, "the resurrection of the dead," for the object of the resurrecting power of God is nothing less than the whole man.\(^2\)

Although man has no immortality within himself, it is the Christian faith that man may partake of God's provision of salvation from sin and death and inherit eternal life. The means of redemption was provided in love through Jesus Christ, the son of God, by dying for sin and rising again unto life. Whatever interpretation one may place upon the Scripture, the factual birth of a resurrection faith cannot be denied. This refers to


\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 222-223.
a definite occasion of faith wherein the disciples were grasped by the
truth that Christ overcame death and apprehended the purposeful intention
of God for those who believed unto repentance and obedience. The Chris-
tian faith became thus typically formulated: "He who raised the Lord
Jesus will raise us also with Jesus and bring us...into his presence"
(II Corinthians 4:14). Whatever "object" of faith the early Christians
had, whether it was the predictions of Jesus, the manner of His death, the
empty tomb, or His alleged appearances, it must be acknowledged that the
transforming character of their faith witnesses to the basic truth that
their " Redeemer liveth."

Thus, in the face of the transitory character of man's life and of
his feelings of insecurity, the Biblical witness affirms that man's hope
for life after death rests, not upon his own frail nature and feeble
capacities, but upon the power and love of God which are made available to
him in Jesus Christ. Also, in answer to man's experiences of physical and
mental disintegration and the tendency of life toward fragmentation, the
Biblical witness, concerning the totality of the individual, directs man's
hope to a restoration of his whole being to a full, personal, integrated
life in the world to come. And, in response to man's loneliness and his
innate desire to live in community with others, the Biblical witness to the
solidarity of humanity assures him that life after death will not be experi-
enced in frightening isolation but in communion with all those whose lives
are "hid with Christ in God" (Colossians 3:3). ¹

In this regard then, the Christian doctrine of personal immortality
may not simply be adjudged as an outmoded theory. The Christian's hope is

¹Cf. Ibid., p. 229.
grounded in God--through Christ--not in his own mortal nature, and he
stands amazed at God's redemptive plan. Although death remains a threat,
the sting of death is removed. As Paul declares in I Corinthians 15:54f:
"Death is swallowed up in victory! O death where is thy victory? O death
where is thy sting?" Moreover, it seems to this writer that only he who
apprehends with the first Christians the horror of death, who takes death
seriously as death, can comprehend the Easter exultation of that early
Christian community and understand that the whole thinking of the New
Testament is governed by belief in the Resurrection. As such, the Chris-
tian doctrine of personal immortality is a positive assertion that the
whole man, who has really died, is restored to life by a new act of creation
by God. 1

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