THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

BY

GEORGE EDGAR MOORE, A.B.

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1. The doctrine of Apperception (page 32).

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The "Problem of Knowledge in the Greek New Testament" must have for its end the conception of God as revealed therein in the relation in which He stands to Jesus Christ. The full expression of the Christian name of God as found in the New Testament is the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."

The fundamental thesis of the New Testament based upon this name is that God has revealed Himself through His Son, and in the revelation Jesus gave him claimed to have the knowledge of God, which enabled him to live a life of supreme mastery over the world. Yet it must never be forgotten that Jesus never claimed to be equal with God in knowledge, although this mistaken view is often met in the older theories of the Dogmatic School in dealing with the doctrine of the Kenosis. "He claimed to know the Father as no one else knew Him, but on the other hand, he confessed that his knowledge was limited in so important a matter as the time of his return."* The claim of Jesus was that he was bringing a perfect spiritual revelation of God to a people who had been left without knowledge, but this claim did not imply that he knew all the Father knew. Jesus reveals God in his character, purpose, and activity.

Thus, as Alfred E. Garvie suggests, "it is not reverence, since Jesus confesses ignorance upon such a question in which he himself was so vitally concerned, to claim for him universal knowledge regarding such matters as the authorship of the Old Testament writings, causes of disease, and the events of

*Hasting's Bible Dictionary.
*Hasting's Bible Dictionary.
the remote future; nor is it any lack of homage and devotion to acknowledge
the other evidences of limitation of knowledge the gospels offer.** Many
apparent instances of limitation appear in the gospel narratives. He seems to
make a mistake at the fig-tree, expecting to find fruit when it was not the
season for figs (Mark 11:13); he is sometimes surprised and disappointed (Matt.
8:10; 26:40; Mark 1:45; 2:1, 2; 6:6, etc.); information comes to him through
the ordinary channels of seeing and hearing (Matt. 4:12, 17; 14:12, etc.);
and he even sought it in this way (John 1:38; 9:35; Luke 4:17, etc.).

But while in his life he evidenced important limitations, he at other times
saw in himself as the personal vehicle of the divine self-end.** Or, to put
it in his deeper insight that his worth as revealer of God's message is seen.

In making such an affirmation we are in no sense claiming for Jesus the theory
of omniscience, for if he possessed this he would not have been a religious
quality his mission upon earth would be the "nothingness of an illusion," as
he did make his life story a thing of value for the world. His unique earth
both moral and religious excellence and reality must be excluded from his life.

The fundamental thesis of the New Testament is that truth is not only to be
believed but to be done. It not only gives us a deeper comprehension of
this we affirm that he was a growing and developing moral and spiritual
personality, but in this development he betrayed no consciousness of sin.

Furthermore, in opposition to the doctrine of Anselm and the Dogmatic School

may it not be that had not Jesus died at the hands of his enemies the common
fate of all men would have befallen him. Such a conception as Scholasticism
affirms, would, instead of honoring Christ, rob him of his unique position, for

*Hasting's Bible Dictionary.
it would make that perfection only a moral semblance of reality had there been no liability to err and no limitation of knowledge, and would, even more, be utterly meaningless and unethical for him to ask men to be like him. Human emotions throb in his breast; he suffers as others suffer; but in all he did and said he suffered no moral defect or failure; in brief, he realised himself with reference to God. "If the life-work of Christ is the work of God this involves the assumption that the personal self-end of Christ has the same content as is contained in the self-end of God, which content Christ knew and adopted as such, in accordance with the fact that he was already known and loved by God Himself as the personal vehicle of the divine self-end."* Or, to quote from Herrmann, "the Godhead of Jesus can only be understood in the sense that the mind and will of the eternal God meet us in the historically active will of this man." The limitation of his knowledge thus does not limit his authority as revealer of God's revelation, but rather only such a limitation could make his life-work a thing of value for the world. His unique worth lies in the manner in which he mastered his spiritual powers through a self-consciousness that transcended that of other men, and by his will brought them all to bear upon his personal destination, and . . "that the common destiny of men, through which they attain their distinction from nature and their lordship over the world, was first realised in its full compass in the self-consciousness of Christ, and through him made manifest and effective."**

*Justification and Reconciliation (Ritschl), 451.

**Faith and Fact (Edghill), 197.

*Justification and Reconciliation, 332.
CHAPTER I.

KNOWLEDGE: GAINED ON PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND APPROPRIATION.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

I. Knowledge gained by personal experience and appropriation. It expresses relative knowledge, and gives prominence to the process of attainment. For this reason that the knowledge of the knowers is by no other means.

(1) Where there is reference to some prior facts on which the knowledge is based;

(2) Where the idea of familiarity is involved, this idea arising out of the stress γνωσις lays on the process of reception.

II. A relation between knower and known, equivalent to "to be influenced by our knowledge of an object." The result of this knowledge is the complete realisation of the Christian life.

III. A knowledge as the result of doing the will of God.

IV. The unique knowledge of God and Christ.

V. The particular relationship of the Father and Son.
Knowledge Grounded on Personal Experience and Appropriation.

Matt. 22:18—Γνωσθείτε, ἵνα γνῶτε τὴν πνευματικὴν ἀλήθειαν. And when Jesus knew their wickedness. Matthew conceives of the Lord as knowing their true character from experience with them.

Mark 4:11—χαλέπισαν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν δεδομένη τοῦ μυστηρίου τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ Θεοῦ. And he said to them, Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God. The mystery of the kingdom of God was the content of the gospel, i.e., Christ's revelation of the Father and the fulfilling of his counsels. This mystery was contained in parables which seemed inexplicable to the outsider who thought that supernatural power would bring sure and speedy success to the cause of God. But Jesus sets it forth unmistakably that the kingdom of God belongs to the order of living, growing things, and subject to law. Their knowledge of the mystery, as the kingdom itself, would be progressive—the result of personal experience and appropriation. As they come to know him they would through him who

Mark 4:13—καλεῖς αὐτοῖς ὁ δὲ δόται τὰ παραβολά ταῦτα; καὶ πῶς πάσας τὰς παραβολάς γνώσεσθε; And he saith unto them, Know ye not this parable? And how will ye know all parables? ὁ δ' ἔχει γινώσκω. ὁ δ' ἔχει suggests a knowledge which comes from intuition or insight; γινώσκω knowledge from personal experience and appropriation. ὁ δ' ἔχει refers to the possession of knowledge and is simple and absolute; γινώσκω is relative and involves more or less the idea of the process of attainment.

John 1:49—Χέιλε, κατεργάσθη: Πώς εἶ με γινώσκεις; And Nathanael saith to him, Wherefore dost thou call me, Nathanael surprised that Jesus should call him by name and asks, Πώς εἶ με γινώσκεις; supposing that some common friend had told Jesus about him.
John 2:24, 25—αὐτῷ δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς, σὺν ἐπιστευν ἐκείνῳ αὐτῷ, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸν γινώσκειν πάντας: καὶ διὰ αὐτὸν ἤρει ἐν τῷ μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐγινώσκεν τῷ Ἰν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. But Jesus did not entrust himself to them, because he knew all men; and needed not that any should testify of man, for he knew what was in man. The use of γινώσκω makes it evident that Jesus knew human nature—the motives, governing ideas, and ways of men, by contact with them. This knowledge possessed by Jesus was not supernatural knowledge, but γινώσκω suggests that he knew men as others could know them by coming in contact with them. John "describes the knowledge of Jesus both as relative, acquired knowledge (γινώσκω), and absolute, possessed (οἶδα).

John 14:7—εἰ ἐγνώσετε με, καὶ τὸν πατέρα μου θείον καὶ ἰδίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἰδίαν αὐτῶν, γινώσκετε αὐτῶν, καὶ ἱδρύκατε αὐτῶν. If you had known me, you would have known my Father also; and from henceforth you know him and have seen him. The knowledge of Jesus which they were to possess was a knowledge acquired and progressive. As they came to know him they would through him who was the source of all knowledge of God, come to know the Father. Marcus Dodd holds that the distinction between γινώσκω and οἶδα is that the former represents a knowledge acquired and progressive; the latter a knowledge perceptive and immediate. The use of γινώσκω with reference to the knowledge of Jesus points to a knowledge of him by experiencing and appropriating his message as the message of God. (See John 17:3). 

Romans 1:21—διότι γινώσκετο τῷ Θεῷ όμως οὐκ ὡς Θεῶν ἐδόξασαν ἡ ἡφασσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἐματαιοῦσαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔσκοιτος ἡ ἀθώσεως αὐτῶν καρδία. Because that when they knew God they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but because of their imaginations they became vain, and their foolish heart was darkened. For a clear understanding of
this passage it will be necessary to consider verses 18-23. Paul is giving a direct reference to the manifestation of truth through nature to conscience. Compare the Psalmist—�א ידרע יבשומת.* See also where at Lystra Paul, after remarking that God had permitted the heathen to go their own way, adds that He did not leave them without excuse. Paul points to the epochs in each national development as incitements to seek God.*

And yet heathen philosophy had failed to know Him Who had revealed Himself in part in nature to conscience. With this idea of God's being revealed in nature to conscience, Paul gives the reason why they did not make progress in the knowledge of God. It is clear from verse 21 that this was the "true" knowledge of God as far as it went, but it could only be retained and increased by being acted upon. The heathen knew God through nature, but they omitted the correlative moral act to their knowledge of Him from nature. The knowledge which they possessed of God was a relative knowledge, a knowledge to be gained by appropriating the things of God, and this knowledge was lost to them because they failed to act upon that knowledge and glorify God.

Romans 7:15—ו חק קא תכף תўמא סח היצטחא For that which I do I know not. W. Sanday says—סח היצטחא appears to describe the harmonious and conscious working of will and motive, the former deliberately accepting and carrying out the promptings of the latter.** This use of the verb suggests that he is not absolutely ignorant of what he is doing, but that he is

*Psalms 19:1.

**Acts 14:16,17.

**Acts 27:26,27.

**I Cor. 1:21ff.

**International Critical Commentary on Romans 7:15.
as a man acting blindly; a partially conscious agent. Henry Perry Liddon suggests that a slave must often act without knowing why.*

Eph. 3:19—γνῶναι τέ τινι ὑπερβάλλονσιν τῇς γνώσεως ἀγάπας τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἓνα πληρώθητε εἰς πάν τὸν πληρώμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. And to know the love of Christ which passes knowledge, that you might be filled unto all the fullness of God. There is a knowledge which it is possible for us to experience. It is not a matter of mere intellect, but of conscious, personal experience. It is a progressive knowledge. The emphasis is upon the process of attainment.

Hebrews 8:11—καὶ οὖ μὴ διδάσκων ἐκαστὸς τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκαστὸς τῶν ἄδελφων αὐτοῦ, λέγων, Γνῶθι τὸν Κύριον. ὅτι πάντες εἰδότως με ἀπὸ μικρὸν αὐτῶν ἡ τις μεγάλου αὐτῶν. And they shall not teach every man his fellow-citizen and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord, for all shall know me from the least to the greatest of them. The distinctive meaning of these two words is seen when we compare the two covenants. Under the Old, "none but the educated scribe could understand the minutiae of the law. The elaborate ritual made it impossible for the 'private' individual to know whether a ram or a pigeon was the appropriate sacrifice—it was only known by them as it was taught by an 'intermediary' between God and man" (γνῶσις). But under the New the people are brought into true fellowship with God, and this involves an immediate knowledge of Him" (озна). "The absolute relation is here described, but it does not define how the universal privilege will in fact be realised."**

*Commentary on Romans.

**Nestcott. "Commentary on Hebrews."
in the heart alongside the love of parents and friends, and will demand for its expression no more external instruction than those primal, instinctive, and home-grown affections."


I Cor. 4:19; 8:2; 13:9; 13:12; 14:7; 14:9.


*Greek Expositor's Bible.
Matt. 7:23—καὶ ὁ τῶν ὄμολογησών αὐτοῦ ὁ ὄνομα τῆς γνώσεως ὑμῶν ὁμολογεῖ. And they will I profess unto them, I never knew you. In this passage γνώσεως "expresses a personal relation between the knower and the object known." The object of knowledge is known only in so far as it is of importance for the knower. The verb implies an active relation—a self-reference of the knower to the object of knowledge. The obvious meaning is "I have never been influenced by my knowledge of you." This use of the verb is not in contradistinction of section I above, but an additional emphasis found in its use in the Greek New Testament.

John 10:14, 15—ἐγώ εἰμι ο ποιμὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ γνώσις τὰ ἐμα, καὶ γνώσις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρα, καθὼς γενόμενοι με ὁ πάτηρ, καὶ γενόμενοι τῶν πατέρα. I am the Good Shepherd, and I know my sheep and am known of mine. As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father. There is a mutually reciprocal knowledge between Jesus and his sheep, and the existence of this knowledge is the proof that he is the shepherd. The shepherd's claim is authenticated by the knowledge of the marks and ways of the sheep, and they hear his voice and follow him. As the sheep are influenced by hearing the voice of the true shepherd, and the shepherd by his knowledge of the sheep, so Jesus was influenced by his Father and the Father by the Son,
as he carried out the Father's will. γνῶσις implies that neither God nor Christ are static beings in relation to knowledge, at least, but that both are dynamic and subject to the law of growth. Notion of Him as the knower has its meaning that through Him we know ourselves raised to know. — Note. — γνῶσις used to express the active relation between the knower and the object known appears in Matt. 1:25; 12:7; 24:43; Luke 12:39; 12:47; 12:48; 19:44. John 10:27; 16:3. 

But I Cor. 2:8; 8:3, Heb. 3:10, I John 2:4; 3:6, seems to mean that they were incapable of receiving the message. Indeed every scripture the message was vitiated, because there was in that a moral incapacity to receive the truth as delivered. They did not will the things of God, even they III. of ours, but continually failed to understand. Knowing as the result of Willing to Do.

John 7:17-18: "τις θέλη ἐὰν ἄν θέλῃ ἐνας, γνῶσις εἰς ποιεῖν, ἀν παρέχει τὸν Θεόν ἐπιτρέπει. If any man will to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God, or I speak of myself. By doing the will of God we come into the knowledge of God. Men will recognise the teaching of Jesus as the will of God only when their purpose and desire is to be in harmony with God. The divine mission of Jesus is known only by those who are walking in the ways of God. This will of God embraces the whole realm of ethics and religion and especially directs itself to the two great commandments of love to God and man. This verse properly belongs to the domain of Christian ethics, and comprises the personal and social life under the forms of personal activity. The claim to the knowledge of God thus has no particular content apart from that based on that Christian ideal of life.
which satisfies the human spirit. If a man claims to know the doctrine of God his life must square itself with that ideal. "The divinity of Christ may be denied as of any value unless the recognition of Him as the Christ has the meaning that through him we know ourselves raised to kingship and dominion over the world." If men only did, if their lives squared with the message God has given they would know. Thus the boast of a knowledge of Him is verified in the life.

John 8:43—διαίτε τὴν λαλίαν τὴν ἐμὴν ὑμῖν γινώσκετε: Why do you not know my speech? They were incapable of receiving his message. Indeed every utterance the Master made was misunderstood, because there was in them a moral incapacity to receive the truth he delivered. They did not will to do his will, hence they did not know, but continually failed to understand him.

I Cor. 2:14—ψυχικός δὲ ἄγνωμός ὁ δὲ ψυχικός ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, μωρία γὰρ αὐτῇ ἔστιν, καὶ ὁ δὲ γνώμαι γνώναι, ὅτι πνευματικός ἄναρχηται. But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; and he cannot know them because they are spiritually discerned. A man must will to do the will of God if he would know the things of the Spirit of God.


*I Justification and Reconciliation, 418.*
The Unique Knowledge of God and Christ.

Luke 7:39—οὗτος, εἷς προφήτης, εὐλογοῦσαν ἀν τίς καὶ πολυττὴ ἡ γυνὴ, ἤτις ἀνέπαυεν αὐτοῦ. This man, if he were a prophet, would have known who and what manner of woman this is who touches him. This passage implies that the people regarded the prophets as a class of people unto whom God revealed Himself, and kept them from moral defilement by giving them a clear insight into the characters and lives of men. The enemies of Jesus put this estimate upon his claim. If he were a prophet as he claims to be it would have been given him to discern what kind of a woman she was.

Romans 11:34—τίς γὰρ ξένω νοῦν Κυρίου; For who has known the mind of the Lord? The utter impossibility of man's experiencing the depths of the riches, the wisdom, and the knowledge of God. This trinity as they appear in verse 33—(a) πλοῦτος; (b) σοφία; (c) γνώσις may refer (a) to the superabundant wealth of the divine resources; (b) to provident wisdom—disposing of everything in the best way and with a view to its final purpose; (c) to the more purely intellectual, and directed toward things still future and unknown to man—a reference to the omniscience of God. "In all these attributes God is so far above man that it is impossible for man to experience or come to a knowledge of them.


"Henry Perry Liddon, "Commentary on Romans."
The Particular Relationship of the Son and the Father.

Luke 10:22—καὶ ὁ δεότας γινώσκει τὸς ἐστίν ὁ υἱός, εἰ μὴ ὁ πατὴρ, καὶ τὸς ἐστίν ὁ πατὴρ, εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱός. And no one knows who the Son is but the Father, and who the Father is but the Son. The use of γινώσκω is this passage at once suggests that Father and Son have come into a definite experienced relationship. While the precise relationship of the Son and the Father belongs to the domain of systematic doctrinal theology, still an investigation of the passage here may be profitable. Jesus claims to have experienced a relationship with God known to no other man and implies, at least, that no other can come into such a relationship with God except through him. The term Son here seems to mean, however, nothing more than knowledge of God, and certainly has no reference to a pre-existing state. It was a developmental knowledge, a progressive attainment. Jesus experienced a religious relationship of God known to no other man, but how he came into such knowledge no psychology has yet satisfactorily fathomed, but as he came into it God crowned him as the satisfactory medium by whom He should reveal His message to the world. In the gospel of Matthew we find ἐπιγινώσκω, and by many commentators it has been interpreted as expressing a fuller knowledge of God by the Son and of the Son by God. But a comparison of the passages in which this form occurs does not warrant such a conclusion. The force of the Greek preposition ἐπὶ is rather that of pointing out the object of knowledge. There is only the suggestion that the Son and the Father are the objects to which the attention is definitely called. It cannot thus be claimed, as is often done, that since Jesus knew the Father as no other man knew Him, that he
knew all things as completely as the Father. γινώσκω implies, as in
John 10:14,15, that neither Jesus nor God are static Beings at least as
far as the acquisition of knowledge is concerned, but growing, dynamic
Beings, subject to the laws of growth.

VI.

Various Unclassified Readings.

* * * *

eις τοις οίκους αυτῶν. I know what I shall do, that, when I am put out
of the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses. Here the verb
suggests a resolve to act in such and such a manner. It, however, retains
the distinctive meaning of γινώσκω as a conclusion arrived at meditately.
It is a purely intellectual concept.

II Tim. 3:1—τούτω δε γίνωσκε, ὅτι ἐν ἔσχαταις ἡμέραις ἐνστῆσονται καιροί
χαλεποί. But know this, that in the last days perilous times shall come.
In this passage we have a rhetorical use of the verb. It, as in the
above passage, however, retains its progressive meaning. Compare our
expression, verging on slang, "get this into your head." This use is
also found in II Peter 3:3.

Conclusion from the Study of γινώσκω.

* * * *

In the Greek New Testament the word γινώσκω, in its various forms,
appears 204 times. Of these it appears 110 times in the gospels; 17 times
in the Acts of the Apostles; 43 times in the epistles of Paul; four times in
Hebrews; three times in James; twice in II Peter; 21 times in I John; and four
times in Revelation. Of these 204 uses of the word in the Greek New Testament it has been found that in 159 instances it is used to express a knowledge gained by personal experience and appropriation. It has been seen that in 16 instances there is the added notion of a relation between knower and known.

In the Greek New Testament it has been used to express the idea that knowledge may be the result of doing the will of God, and under this head we have placed six texts. γινώσκω has also been used to express a knowledge belonging to God and Christ, and the particular relationship of the Son and the Father. The various heads, however, under which we have classified the uses of the verb are in no way distinctive, but in all cases it may express that personal experiential relationship upon which our knowledge depends. Our purpose in this study of the problem of knowledge must be kept in mind, i.e., to find the pregnant meaning of the word and its use in a definite situation.

— Reference to the sources of knowledge, not to the experience.

2. From external sources.

3. Reference to personal contact into the sphere of God.
CHAPTER II.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

* * * *

BASED ON THE GREEK VERBS—γινώσκω, ὁμοίω, συνιστάναι, ἐπιστεύω.

* * * *

ὁμοίω is used in the Greek New Testament to express—

I. Absolute confident knowledge (and its obverse) without special reference to the process of attainment, but to its possession—
   (1). From external evidence;
   (2). Referring to a deep insight into the things of God.

II. The Unique Knowledge of God and Christ.

III. Knowledge belonging to God alone.
I.

Absolute Confident Knowledge.

* * *

John 7:28, 29—Καὶ οἶδαν, καὶ οἶδαν πόθεν εἰμι· καὶ ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὄνηκέν ἐλήλυθα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀληθινὸς ὁ πέμψας με, διὸ ὑμεῖς ὄνθελα διὰ τοῦτο ἐμαυτοῦ ὄνηκέν. And you both know me and you know whence I am, and I am not come of myself, but He that sent me is true whom you know not. But I know Him, for I am from Him, and He sent me. Jesus catches up the words of the doubters and concedes their correctness in identifying him as the son of the carpenter. They absolutely possessed this knowledge. But they were absolutely wrong (οὐκ οἶδαν) in deducing from this origin that he was a self-appointed, and therefore not the Messiah of God. You do not know Him Who sent me, but I know Him for I am from Him, and He sent me.

οἶδα is thus used to express confident knowledge without any reference to the process of attainment, and the antithesis absolute ignorance with the use of the negative particle.

Acts 7:18—Ἄριστος ὁ ἀνέστη βασιλεὺς ἔτερος, ὡς οὖν ἔδει τὸν Ἰωάννην. Till another king arose who knew not Joseph. The word may be taken literally in this passage and thus would imply that the king was absolutely ignorant of the fact that such a man as Joseph ever lived. Or, without violation to the text it may mean "who did not know Joseph's history and services sufficiently to know who he was." Joseph had not come into any relationship with the present king. Distinguished from γνώσας Joseph may have come within the field of vision of the ruler, but there was no experience which would enable him "to assume their office in society and to be acknowledged in society and by the ruler.

Romans 14:14—οἶδα καὶ πέπεισμαι ἐν Κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ. I know and am persuaded
by the Lord Jesus. The use of ὀνήμα can be explained only by πέπεισμαι ἐν Κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ. Paul had confident knowledge because he dwelt in Christ. Christ to him was the source of all spiritual knowledge, and his knowledge of the inherent nature of things is implied in his relation to the universe, and from him Paul receives this knowledge.

I Cor. 2:2—οὐ γὰρ ἐκρίνα τι εἰδέναι ἐν ὑμῖν, εἰ μή Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐσταυρωμένον. For I determined not to know anything among you but Jesus Christ and him crucified. The meaning of this text can scarcely be that Paul steadfastly excluded all other knowledge, but as Lightfoot suggests "I did not trouble myself about the knowledge of anything else," so earnest was I in desiring to attain to the possession of the knowledge of Christ. εἰδέναι refers to the possession of knowledge.

I Thess. 4:4—εἰδέναι ἵκαστον ὑμῶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκῆνος ἐν ἁγιασμῷ κτάσθαι καὶ τιμῆ. That each one of you may know how to acquire for himself his own vessel in sanctification and honor. Many translators and commentators translate "to possess his own vessel," instead of "to acquire for himself his own vessel." But if this means his own body (vessel) we are compelled to give κτάσθαι a meaning which is found no where else in Greek literature. The perfect κτάσθαι is the form used to express this idea. Again, τὸ σκῆνος in common usage and in Greek law means "wife," like the Latin vas."

Compare I Peter 3:7—"giving honor unto the woman, as unto the weaker vessels." Accepting this interpretation as the thought of the apostle, εἰδέναι would refer to the possession of knowledge. The apostle's thought must have been to know for a fact, not to have knowledge particularly as the result of experience, but to be in possession at all times of that knowledge which would enable them "to acquire their wives in sanctity and

*Dean F. O. Norton (Drake University).
honor. The same thought is seen in the next verse where it is expressed in the negative—μὴ ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμᾷς, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἔθνη τῷ μὴ εἰδότα τῶν Θεῶν. εἰδότα here refers to the absolute ignorance of the gentiles. God was present to them in the works of creation; they could not but see Him there. Yet they turned to idols, until they had absolutely forgotten in their profligacy that there was such a Being as God. This absolute ignorance is easily seen in Matt. 26:70—οὐκ οἶδα τῇ λέγεις. Here the affectation of supreme ignorance is expressed. I not only do not know the man, but I do not even know what you are talking about. (With I Thess. 4:4 compare Matt. 7:11).

Note.—οἴδα is used in this sense in the Greek New Testament in

Romans 2:2; 3:19; 5:3; 6:9; 6:16; 7:7; 7:14; 7:18;
I Cor. 1:16; 2:12; 6:2; 6:3; 6:9; 6:15; 6:16; 6:19; 7:16;
8:1; 8:2; 8:4; 9:13; 9:24; 11:3; 12:2; 14:11; 15:58;
16:15.
II Cor. 1:7; 4:14; 5:1; 5:6; 5:16; 9:2; 12:2; 12:3.
5:19; 5:19; 5:20. III John v. 3.
Jude v. 5, 10. Rev. 2:17; 3:17; 7:14; 12:12;
19:12.

* * * *

II.

The Unique Knowledge of God and Christ.

Matt. 6:8—οἶδε γὰρ ὁ πάθος ὑμῶν ὡς χρῆσθε, πρὶν τὸν ὦμος αἰτήσαι αὐτὸν.

For your Father knows what you have need of before you ask Him.

Matt. 6:32—οἶδε γὰρ πάθη ὁ οὐρανίος ὃτι χρῆστε τοῦτον ἀπάντην. For your
heavenly Father knows that you have need of all these things. These
passages clearly show that the Greek verb οἶδα refers to the possession of knowledge.

Matt. 12:25—εἰδῶς δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς τὰς ἐνεπιθέσεις αὐτῶν. And Jesus knew their thoughts. A frequent expression in the gospels. Jesus did not infer, but had insight into the feelings that prompted their words.

Matt. 15:12—οἶδας δὴ τι ἡμισαντος ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον ἑσπανδαλίσθησαν;

Do you not know that the Pharisees when they heard this saying were offended?" The impression that Jesus made upon his disciples undoubtedly was that he knew all things intuitively.


In this case the New Testament Spirit merely knew Jesus as Part to be the Martin Luther's view of the same case later.

III. Knowledge Belonging to God alone.

Matt. 24:36—Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης καὶ ἡμέρας οὐδεὶς οἶδαν, οὐδεὶς οἱ ἄγγελοι τῶν οὐρανῶν, οἱ μὴ ὁ πατὴρ μοι μόνος. But of that day and hour no man knows, not even the angels of heaven, but my Father only.

Mark 13:32—Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης, τῆς ἡμέρας οὐδεὶς οἶδαν, οὐδεὶς οἱ ἄγγελοι: οἱ ἐν οὐρανῷ, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱὸς, οἱ μὴ ὁ πατὴρ. But of that day and that hour no man knows, no not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father. The use of οἶδα in these two passages means
that this knowledge belongs exclusively to God, and suggests that the time has been set by the Father. It was a knowledge native to God—a possession of knowledge but not an attainment by any process controlled by law. Compare with this Luke 10:22, where God and His Son have come into an experienced relationship.

IV.

Various Unclassified Readings.

Matt. 7:11—εἰ οὖν ὑμεῖς πονηροὶ ὄντες, οἴδατε δόματα ἄγαθα διδόναι τοῖς τέκνοις ὑμῶν. *If you then being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children.* The sense of this passage seems to be "If you have sense enough to give." Possession of knowledge is expressed. (Cf. I Thess. 4:4).

Mark 1:24—οἶδα ὦ πώς εἴ, ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ. *I know you who you are, the Holy One of God.* At this stage the man with the evil spirit merely knew Jesus as a fact to be the Messiah; experience of His power came later.

Note.—Matt. 20:22. I Cor. 3:16; 5:6; 14:16. II Cor. 5:11.


V.

Conclusions from the Study of οἶδα.

* * * *

In the Greek New Testament the word οἶδα, in its various forms, appears 291 times. Of these it appears 139 times in the gospels; 18 times in the book of Acts; 95 times in the epistles of Paul; twice in Hebrews; three times in James; six times in first and second Peter; 14 times in the letters of
John; twice in Jude; and 12 times in the book of Revelation. Of the 291 times that it appears in the Greek New Testament it has been found that 245 of them suggest a possession of knowledge without any special reference to the process of attainment, or of an absolute ignorance. This knowledge may be the result of experience as it is with γινώσκω, when the difference between the two words is the difference between the possession of knowledge (οἶδα), and knowledge in the process of attainment (γινώσκω), or it may be the result of deep insight into the things of God. This word also expresses the unique knowledge of God and Christ, and what is to be particularly noted is that οἶδα is used to express that knowledge the possession of which belongs to God alone. As with γινώσκω the discussion of the philosophical problems will be reserved for the conclusion at the end of this thesis.
CHAPTER III.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

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BASED ON THE GREEK VERBS—γινώσκω, οἶδα, συνίημι, ἔπισταμαι.

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συνίημι is used in the Greek New Testament to express—

I. Mental activity as distinguished from sentient affection, i.e.,

Knowledge acquired by reflection and reason.

*  *  *  *

Matt. 13:13—διὰ τούτῳ ἐν παραβολαῖς αὐτοῖς λαλῶ, ὅτι βλέποντες οὐ βλέπουσιν καὶ ἀκούοντες οὐκ ἀκούοντις οὐδὲ συνιοῦσι. Therefore speak I to them in parables, because seeing they see not, and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand. I speak in parables because (Matthew 3:11, Mark and Luke 11a) they cannot see. This quotation refers to their incapacity to understand. A hearing of the word as spoken or written is presupposed but not an understanding of it; on the contrary, rather, a losing of it. The passivity which accounts for their failure to understand, is found in a positive cause, which at first sight may be taken to refer to some external ulterior cause, i.e., the prince of darkness who is anxious to
to prevent their understanding. But upon careful examination it is quite evident that the prince of this world finds its reason in the disposition of their minds. They were so prejudiced against the teaching of Jesus that they were incapable of exercising their rational faculties. From the verb συνίσκοι means to reach a conclusion by a systematic comparison of facts; the collecting together of the single objects in one whole by the activity of reason, and by this reason and reflection to arrive at underlying principles or laws. They failed to arrive at these underlying principles or laws because they refused to abjure their prejudices. This is the pregnant meaning of the verb as used in the Greek New Testament.

Mark 4:12; 6:52; 7:14; 8:17; 8:21.
Luke 2:50; 8:10; 18:34; 24:45.
Acts 7:25; 28:26; 8:27.
II Cor. 10:12.
Eph. 5:17.

Conclusion from the Study of συνίσκοι.

* * *

In the Greek New Testament συνίσκοι, in its various forms, appears 25 times. Of these it appears in the gospels 18 times; in the book of Acts three times; in the Roman letter twice; in II Corinthians once; and in Ephesians once. It may be worthy of notice, in passing, that this word is not used by the
writer of the fourth gospel, and that it is not used with reference to the 
knowledge possessed by God and Christ. As suggested above, in every case 
in the Greek New Testament, the meaning of συνένισιν suggests the use of the 
rational faculties, the collecting together of single objects into one whole 
through the activity of reason, and by analysis and synthesis to arrive at the 
underlying principles or laws.
CHAPTER IV.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

Based on the Greek verbs—σπετταμαι, οἶδα, συνίημι, ἐπισταμαι.

* * * *

1. The knowledge of the content of a thing, by intimate acquaintance with it.

In such a thing as Christian baptism were expressed as would naturally most others, the sense of ignorance seems to be to express the fact that another was lacking complete knowledge inasmuch as he failed to recognize the characteristic distinction between Christian baptism.

Mark 14:68—οὐχ οἶδα οὐδὲ ἐπισταμαι τί σὺ λέγεις. I do not know nor understand what you say. οἶδα suggests his claim of absolute ignorance of the fact that he had ever been with the Master, while ἐπισταμαι is not used in the effort to betray embarrassment "the statement is not intelligible to me." The meaning of ἐπισταμαι is "to have no adequate idea of the content of what is being said.

Acts 10:28—Τῇ μείζῃ ἐπιστασθε τό θεόμετρον ἐτοι άνδρι Ιουδαίω κολλάθη κατ' ἐπιστασθηνν αλλούν ὑμᾶς. You know how unlawful it is for a man that is a Israelite to speak with a Greek.

*The Gospel of Mark, Swete.
Jew to join himself or come unto one of another nation. Εἰπώταται is used inferring their knowledge of the content of the theory and rules of the holy people, and is contrasted with Καλεδομόθες Θεος Ζεισα. This knowledge was gained from the prolonged practice of the Jews as an exclusive people, but now God showed Peter by means of the vision that the exclusiveness of the Jews with reference to Him must pass away.

Acts 18:25—διὰλεγόντα καλεδομόθες Θεος Ζεισαν Κυρίου, Εἰπώταται is used in this passage to express his ignorance of the content of Christian baptism. Although many commentators advance the view that an absolute ignorance of Christian baptism is expressed, the use of Εἰπώταται would suggest that such a view was incredible in itself. If absolute ignorance of the existence of such a thing as Christian baptism were expressed we would naturally expect Οἶδα. The use of Εἰπώταται seems to be to express the idea that Apollos was lacking in complete knowledge inasmuch as he failed to recognise the characteristic distinction between Christian baptism and the baptism of John. He did not understand that the content of Christian baptism was superior to that of John's ordinance—he knew (understood) only the baptism of John. The obvious meaning of the verb is—"to have a just and adequate idea of the content of a thing."

Acts 19:15—διὰ παραθέντης ἐδρασάν ἐν Χριστῷ Πνεύμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἦν Χριστός. Οὐ χρῖστος Πνεύμα Εἰπώταται. And the evil spirit answered and said, Jesus I know and Paul I know. In this passage there is some difficulty in making a distinction between γινώσκω and ἐπισταμαι. Both words are usually translated "know." The former, however, denotes probably a more personal knowledge (R.V. margin, "I recognise."). The latter "I know about.
Paul."* Or, "Jesus I acknowledge, and Paul I know."² Wordsworth declares that the latter denotes knowledge of a lesser degree such as acquaintance with a fact.² In γνῶσιν there seems to be intended a recognition and admission of power, while ἐπιστημαί suggests a knowledge that the content of Paul's preaching was that of an appointed ministry. The probable distinction may be seen if we translate "I have come to know Jesus, from personal experience, and (I have come to know) that he has power over evil spirits, and I know about Paul and that through him Jesus manifests his power, but who are you."

Acts 26:26—ἐπιστημαί γὰρ περιεῖδοτον ὁ βασιλέως. For the king knows of these things. The use of the word as it expresses proximity to a thing is here clearly seen. Paul appeals to the knowledge of Agrippa, a knowledge that he would have gained from his close connection with the Jewish religion, and from the extent of his father's reign. The king had an adequate idea of the content and meaning of Paul's speech; from his intimate acquaintance with these things. Jesus and acquaintance with it. The idea of presenting.

Jude v. 10—οὕτως ἐπισταμένοι, καθὼς ἐν τῷ ὑστερώσιν, ἐπισταμένοι. But these rail at whatsoever things they know not; and what they understand naturally, like creatures without reason, in these things they are corrupted. οἶδα. The distinction between these two forms of knowledge seems to be that οἴδα is used of a knowledge of the things

*"Greek Expositor's Bible," Rendall.

*Lightfoot, in above.

*²Wordsworth, in above.
that belong to the spirit, and require intuition or insight, while εἰδωλαί refers to the understanding of natural things. The carnal mind was blind to all higher wisdom, which alone can be spiritually known.

James 4:14.

* * * * *

Conclusion from the Study of εἰδωλαί.

* * * *

In the Greek New Testament εἰδωλαί, in its various forms, appears 15 times. Of these it appears in Mark's gospel once; in the book of Acts 10 times; in I Timothy once; in Hebrews once; in James once; and in Jude once. This word is used to express knowledge of the content of a thing—a knowledge gained from long experience and acquaintance with it. The idea of proximity would perhaps be one of the inherent factors in determining the use of this Greek verb.
I. Comparative meanings of the verbs γινώσκω, οἶδα, συνίημι, ἐπισταμένω. In the following summary will be found a comparative study of the four verbs. On pages 12, 19, 22, 27 may be found the particular meaning of each, but the shades of difference may be more clearly seen in a comparative summary of what appears there in another form. In making a comparison between γινώσκω and οἶδα it will be seen that the former lays emphasis on the process of attainment while the latter points to the possession of knowledge rather than the process of attainment. True it is that this distinction is not always readily seen, but from many texts no other conclusion can be obtained. Compare, for example, the use of γινώσκω in John 7:17—ἐὰν τις θέλη τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν, γινώσκεται περιττὸς διδαχῆς πάσας ἔναν ὕποτις ἑαυτόν, with the use of οἶδα in Matt. 24:36—Περιπλεκτὴς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης καὶ ὃς ὁ δὲ διδάσκεται οἶδαν, οἶδα οἱ διαγελοὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμίων, εἰ μὴ ὁ παίδη μου μόνος. The distinctive meaning of the two verbs in these passages is clear. γινώσκω suggests a knowledge that is gained progressively—we shall know as we do the will of God—and is subject to the laws of growth. This knowledge is relative
and progressive. The use of οἶδα, however, could scarcely be interpreted in any other way than by "possession" of knowledge. It was a knowledge which belonged to God alone. The meaning of the former thus would be "to come to know," while that of the latter would be "to know," "to see with the mind's eye," and signifying a purely mental conception, in contrast both to conjecture and to knowledge derived from other persons or things. In comparing the words γινώσκω and οἶδα with συνίστω, it will readily be seen that the difference between the latter two is the difference between the possession of knowledge, and the process of reasoning to arrive at underlying principles or laws. But the distinction between γινώσκω and συνίστω is not so apparent. Close observation, however, shows that γινώσκω applies chiefly to the apprehension of truths, while συνίστω is ratiocinative; the former refers to the act as an immediate recognition, while the latter superadds the power of reasoning about things and tracing their relations to arrive at their underlying principles or laws. By another classification we may show the relationship of these Greek verbs, by suggesting that "to know may mean either to perceive or apprehend, or to understand or comprehend.

Knowledge in the first sense is only recognition; knowledge in the latter sense is the result of an intellectual comparison and embodied in a judgment." Εἰμίοριστας, as stated on page 27, refers to a knowledge of the content of a thing gained from long experience and acquaintance with it. In comparing it with γινώσκω, οἶδα, and συνίστω, we find that

*Thayer's New Testament Greek Lexicon.*

*Baldwin's Psychological Dictionary.*
γινώσκω suggests an experienced acquaintance with a thing that will permit of immediate recognition, without necessarily implying a knowledge of the content of that thing; οἴδα signifies a clear and purely mental perception; οὐνίμωι implies the use of the rational faculties; while ἡπίστασθαι suggests a knowledge of the content of a thing from long experience and acquaintance with it. The following outline summary will show the results of this part of the investigation:

1. γινώσκω

γινώσκω is used in the Greek New Testament to express a knowledge—

1. Gained by personal experience and appropriation.
2. That gives prominence to the process of attainment.
3. That expresses a relation between knower and known.
4. That expresses an acquaintance without specifying a knowledge of the content of the thing known.
5. That expresses an intellection without demanding the necessity of affirming, denying, or passing any judgment.
6. That, strictly speaking, is only recognition.

2. οἴδα

οἴδα is used in the Greek New Testament to express a knowledge—

1. Without special reference to the process of attainment, but to its possession.
2. Gained from deep insight into the things of God.
3. That is a purely mental perception, in contrast to conjecture and knowledge derived from other persons and things.
4. The absolute knowledge of God.
5. Of the content of a thing, from insight and intuition rather than from long acquaintance and experience with it.

3. συνέψιμα.

συνέψιμα is used in the Greek New Testament to express a knowledge—

1. That is the result of the activity of reason and is embodied in a judgment.

"4. ἐπιστάμαι.

ἐπιστάμαι is used in the Greek New Testament to express a knowledge—

1. Of the content of a thing, from long acquaintance and experience with it.
The doctrine of Apperception is suggested by the emphasis γινώσκω lays on the process of reception. It is the logical outcome of the deduction that this verb expresses progressive knowledge. It at once suggests synthesis, of which the combination of the new and the old is an essential part. The raw material of perception is taken up into a psycho-physical organism and there given vital form and meaning. As a principle in educational theory this at once recalls the apperceptive mass of Herbert. But the doctrine of Apperception as found in γινώσκω differs widely from that of Herbert. Apperception, with Herbert, is conceived as a purely mechanical process effected on the mind and not by the mind, but this Greek verb does not refer to such "passive receptivity" but rather to "inquiring activity." γινώσκω thus presents a teleological aspect. It expresses a knowledge which is the result attained by the functioning of the self. In other words, "we must conceive of a synthetic activity of the Ego manifested throughout the whole process, and by means of its activity binding together the mere facts into systems..."
according to their quantitative, qualitative, and causal activities."*

Knowledge, then, as suggested by γνώσις, grows by the synthetic activity of the Ego, not by being forced upon a passive mind. Apperception is that process by which perceptions are brought into combinations with our previously existing systems of ideas and assimilating with them gives them vital meaning: because they do not "recess.

II. The unity of mental and motor life. From the discussion of γνώσις, however, we make take a decided step in advance of the doctrine of Apperception. As may be gathered from the previous sections of this thesis, γνώσις is used to express a knowledge that is progressive—the gradual appropriation and assimilation of experience. In γνώσις we also found the idea that knowledge must lead to action. To view these two ideas as one is to affirm the unity of the mental and motor aspects of consciousness, and is in full accord with the Spencerian formula "that the essence of the mental life and bodily life is one." Or, as Schiller says, "action is not one thing and thought something alien and other," but that "thought is a mode of conduct, an integral part of active life."** It expresses, in full accord with the doctrine of modern psychology, that "intelligence is an appendage of activity." It would lead us too far afield to discuss the psychological implications of such a doctrine, but as Erving E. Miller has well said, "the psychological principle No impression without expression needs to have added to it for its completion No expression without further impression."*** Mental and motor life are always in a progressive knowledge, and not a completed, fuller knowledge.


**See "Humanism," F. C. S. Schiller.

***"The Psychology of Thinking," Erving E. Miller.
one and cannot be divided. The consequences of this doctrine when applied to religion, in Ritschlian phraseology, is that "the divinity of Christ may thus be denied as of any value unless this recognition of him Christ has the meaning that through him we know ourselves raised to kingship and dominion over the world." Or to use the negative of this in Socratic dialectic, "They err because they do not know."

III. The One and the Many. One of the age-long dilemmas of philosophy has been the problem of the One and the Many. From time immemorial the philosopher and the theologian have vied in declaring God omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent—a Being who comprehends ALL as an inherent attribute of His nature. God existed for them as a Whole. With this view no satisfactory answer has ever been given to the problems of "Evil," "Foreordination, Predestination, and Foreknowledge," etc. The nearest approach to an answer to these questions was conceived by Hegel who made the Absolute His Own alter. In latter years the pendulum has been swinging from this conception of God as a static Being to a dynamic God—from Being to Becoming. In the light of our investigation what does the New Testament say? The basis of our attention must be the words of Jesus in Matt. 11:27—καὶ ὁ θεός ἐπιγνώσκει τὸν υἱὸν, εἶ μὴ ὁ πατήρ; οὐδὲ τὸν πατέρα τις ἐπιγνώσκει, ἐἰ μὴ ὁ υἱὸς, or as found in Luke 10:22, where γνῶσις expresses the particular relationship between Father and Son instead of the ἐπιγνώσκω of Matthew. We have found in our investigation of the passage in which ἐπιγνώσκω occurs, that it expresses, like γνῶσις a progressive knowledge, and not a completer, fuller knowledge, but rather "describes a knowledge directed towards a particular object;
but not used of knowledge in the abstract."

We may thus confine our attention to the simpler form. It would indeed be strange that the word which is used to express progressive knowledge, and which lays emphasis on the process of reception, should be used by Jesus to express his own particular relationship with the Father and the Father's relationship with him, when there was at his command the word οἶδα suggestive of a knowledge that has already been attained. It is worthy of notice in this connection that in regard to the second coming, in declaring that the knowledge of that day and hour belonged to God alone he uses the word οἶδα. (For a discussion of this word see page 39). In discussing the Being of God and of Christ, it may be well for us to take them up separately. It is a relatively easy matter to show that the Son was a developing personality, and that he came into a knowledge of God and his mission. "He grew in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man."* As a basis for the discussion of the Being of Christ, it will be necessary for us to turn to the λόγος of John. It must be remembered that the term λόγος does not mean word in the grammatical sense, but like vox, of the living, spoken word; the word, not in its outward form, but with reference to the thought connected with the form. If we grant this, then, in considering its Old Testament use not only logically, but historically, as bearing upon the gradual revelation of God's plan of salvation, God Himself is the Word in so far as that Word is the medium of that revelation of Himself, and the λόγος, though personality is not yet attributed to it, occupies a sort of middle ground between God and man. If we follow this line of reasoning and project it into the New Testament doctrine of the λόγος.

*Epistle to Ephesians (J. Robinson), 254.

could we not better understand John's conception and the "Incarnation doctrine of Paul?" Would not these become intelligible? If this is so, then that conception which presents Jesus as a conscious, growing, and developing personality, gives him a unique position by virtue of his complete mastery over the world, in Christian life and thought. In this way he becomes vital, without the addition of that incomprehensible omniscience which would rob him of his place and value for man, and make his perfection only a moral semblance of reality. In this way, instead of a moral semblance we should have a person and work of significance for the human race. And such a conception of Jesus as a dynamic personality can not be said to do violence to the thought of Paul that "ethically he became the Lord of heaven, heir of the creation, appointed head of a redeemed universe of conscious beings, by the fact that he had been manifested as the Son of God with power by the resurrection of the dead." Such a view of the doctrine of the Χριστός makes its appeal to the conscience of men, not reducing the whole human life of Christ to the mere illusive appearance of one who was not really human at all. Even John, while marvelling at the complete mastery over the world possessed by Jesus of Nazareth, would lead us to this view of Christ's divinity, as he dwells with special force and vehemence upon that "which our eyes have seen and our hands handled of the Word of Life." The portrait of Jesus as revealed in this passage is beautifully presented by Harnack. "There can be no doubt that in this passage, Jesus described the God of heaven and earth as his Father, and he is positive that everything he does and says proceeds from the Father. He prays to Him; he subjects his will to Him; he struggles hard to find out what it is and to fulfil it. Aim, strength, understanding, the issue, and the hard must, all come from the
Father. This is what the gospels say, and it cannot be turned or twisted.
The feeling, praying, working, struggling, and suffering individual is a
man who in the face of his God also associates himself with other men."
Thus Matt. 11:27 can only be predicated of Jesus as a religious valuation.
He grew into the knowledge of God as his Father, and this claim as the
Son of God, which may in its last analysis mean "the knowledge of God,"
was verified in his life. "The religious estimate of Christ which finds
expression under the definite condition in the predicate of his Godhead,
must approve itself in the connection between Christ's visible conduct
and his religious convictions and ethical motives; it does not stand in
any direct relation to the presumable endowment of his person with inborn
qualities or powers. For not in the latter relation but in the former
does he exert an influence upon us. The religious estimate of his person
will stand related to his moral conduct in so far as the latter is the
test and counterpart of his own conviction that he enjoys a unique
fellowship with God." Such an interpretation of the life of Jesus is in
thorough accord with the use of γνώσις.

Turning now to the knowledge of God as revealed in this passage. The
conclusion from what has preceded is obvious. The knowledge of Jesus, it
is clear, is the knowledge of a finite, growing, developing personality,
who declared his Sonship by his all-determinate purpose in carrying out the
will of God. The sense of this passage, therefore, viewed in the light of
logic, demands that the same predicates be applied to the Father as to the
Son. There is no alternative, be it in philosophy or in theology, than

"What is Christianity?" 136.

"Justification and Reconciliation," 412.
that "along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite either in power or knowledge or in both at once." *(The term finite is used in this thesis in the sense of a God who has an external environment). The truth of this is borne out in the experience of men, who have active commerce with Him. He has His limits, His enemies. He is one among many—Son, Holy Spirit, angels, devils, etc. "God is not a name for the totality of things, heaven forbid, but only for the ideal tendency of things; believed in as a super-human person who calls us to co-operate with Him in His purposes, and Who furthers ours if they are worthy." The conclusion thus forced from the study of the words of Jesus, if words are not too frail a foundation upon which to base a conclusion of such magnitude, is that the God of the New Testament is a dynamic God, a conscious personality, and as such, subject to the laws of consciousness. "Experience and reason," as William James says, "Meet here on common ground." The truth of the above is borne out in the quotation above referred to, "He grew . . . in favor with God." In this passage there is implied a changed relationship by the Father toward the Son, a recognition of the Son's activity affecting the attitude of the Father, and this changed relationship is expressed by the fact of that reciprocally progressive knowledge expressed in Matt. 11:27.

When we turn to ὁ διά, on the other hand, we are confronted with the problem of an absolute knowledge—Παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἡκάλυψις καὶ ἡμαρτονόμωσις, ὁ διὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μηδὲν παθήματα μονὸν μάθημα. In

*A Pluralistic Universe, 311.

*A Pluralistic Universe, 124.
our investigation we came to the conclusion that it expressed knowledge in actu. ὁ δὲ expresses the actuality of which γνῶσις is the potentiality. But are these—the actual and progressive states of knowledge—two contradictory notions? Does the fact that it is claimed for God that He has absolute knowledge in one thing demand that He must have absolute knowledge in all things? But upon what hypothesis are we going to discover a limit set upon the knowledge of God? No other than the express declaration of Jesus in Matt. 11:27. In this passage (and we must as far as this thesis is concerned be content with what it says) as in Luke 10:22, the Greek verb γνῶσις taken in its ordinary meaning declares that external environment is calling God Himself into active acknowledgment of Jesus as the medium through whom the Χριστός is to be revealed unto men.

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**Summary.**

In this summary we shall give only the main points of the investigation:

1. γνῶσις is used to express progressive knowledge, the gradual appropriation and assimilation of experience.

2. ὁ δὲ is used to express the possession of knowledge without emphasis upon the process of reception.

3. συνήμι is used to express a knowledge that is the result of reflection and reasoning.

4. ἐπιστάμαι is used to express the knowledge of the content of a thing.
In the Psychological and Philosophical problems (among others) arising out of
this investigation, it was found that--

1. In the doctrine of Apperception, the Greek word γινώσκω laid emphasis
upon "inquiring activity," in contrast with that view which places
the emphasis upon "passive receptivity."

2. In the unity of the mental and motor life, "thought was viewed as a
mode of conduct, an integral part of active life." Or, in Spencerian
phraseology, "the essence of the mental life and bodily life is one."

3. In the problem of the One and the Many, God must be regarded as One
among Many, and viewed as a dynamic God rather than a static Being.
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