SOME ASPECTS OF GERMAN COLONIALISM IN
AFRICA FROM 1884-1918

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SOME ASPECTS OF GERMAN COLONIALISM IN AFRICA FROM 1884-1918

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I. BACKGROUND OF GERMAN COLONIALISM

I closed my speech of December 6, 1897, with the words: "We do not want to put anyone in the shade, but we demand a place for ourselves in the sun," without dreaming the phrase would become historical.¹

The above statement of Prince Von Bulow, a nineteenth century statesman of the German Empire, has become a byword of imperialism. Germany's search for a place in the sun, her successes and failures, is one of the more interesting stories to come out of the Age of Imperialism. This age was marked by the scramble for colonies in Africa that took place in the last century, an age that is rapidly fading into history as the former colonies become independent states.

It was the purpose of this work to examine some of the characteristics of German colonialism including the background and development of colonial thought, the acquisition of colonies and their administration, the relations between the German masters and their native subjects and, finally, to examine the "colonial guilt lie" as Germany termed the Allied charges against her during first World War, and to arrive at an evaluation of Germany as a colonizer. In developing these topics, use will be made of contemporary journals and the works of authors acquainted with German

politics and colonial policy.

The German period of colonialism was short, lasting barely three generations, but within that short period Germany became one of the great African Powers and left her mark on the face of the Dark Continent.

Germany came late to the colonial field. She did not become a unified state until the appearance of Prince Otto von Bismarck as Chancellor in 1871. Meanwhile, Britain and France, along with Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, had been steadily increasing their hegemony over Africa to include most, but not all, of the available territory.

Germany's reasons for entering the colonial field were: (1) economic; (2) demographic; (3) political; (4) ideological; and (5) religious.

Economic. The Continental System imposed upon the German States by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the high English tariffs following the defeat of France, brought home to the German people the desirability of having their coffee, sugar, and tobacco grown upon German territories overseas rather than paying extravagant rates to the English and French for them. During the 1830's and 40's, the improvement in trade and commerce within the Germanies gave impetus to the establishment of world trade. The old Hanseatic cities of North Germany and the Rhine Merchants had led the way, and trading companies of Hamburg and Bremen began establishing factories, or trading posts, along the western and southern coasts
of Africa as early as 1833. In a four-year interval between 1879 and 1883, exports to Africa increased from 275,000 Marks to 422,000,000, while in the same period imports to the city of Hamburg from Africa increased from 5,000,000 Marks to 9,000,000.¹

In the years following the unification of Germany, the introduction of the Industrial Revolution with its consequent manufacturing and commercial boom, the billion-dollar war indemnity from France, and the over-production of goods in many fields led to increased pressure for more commercial outlets in the form of colonies. The boom in production led to speculation and inflation which, combined with the exhaustion of the war-indemnity and the triumph of English merchandise under free trade, resulted in a panic in 1873. Again, the way out of economic difficulty, as felt by the merchants, was in overseas expansion.

Demographic. During the 1840's and 50's, ever increasing numbers of Germans were leaving their homeland and establishing themselves in foreign countries. In many of these areas of settlement, principally in South America, the settlers remained together in German-speaking communities, and acted as customers and agents for the large trading companies. Pockets of German civilization were scattered all over the globe, and included Africa as well as the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Palestine, Greece,

and Hungary.

While emigration was looked upon favorably by the merchants for the trade and shipping it provided, it was viewed with alarm by the industrialists and patriots; the former because of the decline in the labor supply, and the latter because not all Germans maintained their identity abroad and were absorbed into the already existing culture. One of the most urgent problems German statesmen had to solve was to find some means which would eliminate the pressure in the towns but at the same time would keep the population within the limits of the empire. In other words, it was hoped that a "New Germany" beyond the seas would be established to relieve the pressure of population, yet without losing any skills or labor to the German flag.

Political. After Germany became unified in 1871, there was an abundance of energy and intense nationalism which found a natural outlet in an enthusiasm for expansion. Germany was now a nation, and like the other great states of Western Europe, felt the need to extend her nationalism to a colonial empire. Bismarck believed that the future belonged to the great states, and that Germany without foreign possessions and commercial interests, would not be able to keep up.

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2Henry Birchencough, "The Expansion of Germany," The Nineteenth Century, XLIII (February, 1898), 182.
Ideological. Two ideologies which were prevalent among colonial circles in Germany were a nationalistic idealism and industrial materialism. The nationalistic idealists wished for colonies on the basis of their appeal to the urge for power, prestige, a sense of national superiority, and a religious humanitarianism. Their argument was that Germany was now a great power, great powers had colonies, therefore Germany must have colonies in order to be accepted as a great power. Moreover, a great Christian country had the duty of spreading its culture to the less fortunate people's of the world.

The industrial materialists saw the opportunity whereby the ideals of the nationalist idealists could be translated into a profit in trade. In other words, it was hoped that Christian natives could be induced to wear German clothes. These two ideologies were often fused, as when the Basel and Rhine missions in central Africa opened trading posts for the natives among whom they worked.¹

Religious. The missionaries were also a factor in the entry of Germany into the colonial field. The Germans had been active in African missions for the better part of the 19th century. These missions had been concentrated in western and central Africa, especially in territories that were later to become part of the overseas

empire. These same missions had, since 1871, been pressing the government for protection of their work from outside competitors and hostile native tribes.

Summary. The economic reasons seem to be the most predominant among those given for the founding of the overseas empire. It was a merchant's request for protection that was to induce Bismarck to take action to secure territory in Africa. Again, it was the business man who was to lend support to organizations favoring colonial expansion. It was the industrialist who sought new markets overseas and new sources of raw materials for his expanding production. But the nationalistic idealist produced the propaganda and the ideology, which the business man supported and utilized in persuading the German nation and government to enter the colonial field. The two forces were so closely identified that we might say the impetus to colonialism was economic nationalism.

II. THE ROLE OF BISMARCK

The attitude of Bismarck toward the establishment of colonies for Germany is difficult to assess. His own utterances, both before and after the establishment of the colonial empire, seem to indicate an adverse opinion toward colonialism. His statement of 1871 when he said that "for Germany to acquire colonies would be like a poverty-stricken Polish nobleman providing himself with silks and sables when he needed shirts," is an example. In 1887, five years after the establishment of the first colony, he said
emphatically, "I am no colony man!" His actions before 1884 also
seem to indicate anti-colonialism; his rejection of demands for
colonies in the settlement with France, for instance.

Yet in spite of all this, it was Bismarck who established
the overseas empire. How this change came about is uncertain,
but there are at least two views on the matter. The first is put
forward by Dr. Mary Evelyn Townsend, professor of history at Co-
lumbia Teachers College. Her theory is that Bismarck's utterances
were merely a cover for his real ambitions, and that he was in
favor of colonies all along. She writes that he "combatted opposi-
tion to his imperialism at home and abroad by his consumate skill
in the conduct of foreign affairs" and that he also "subordinated
colonial policy to foreign policy, but made foreign relations,
insofar as possible, meet colonial ends."¹ Bismarck's first concern,
she says, was the firm establishment of the new German Empire in
Europe, the watchword being "safety first." This, however, did
not deter him from initiating protection for overseas commercial
undertakings and cooperating with the colonialists. When the time
was ripe, she goes on to say, Bismarck acted quickly to grab large
chunks of African territory for Germany.²

The other view, taken by Harry R. Rudin of Yale University,
was that Bismarck actually was not concerned with colonies, and

¹Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire,
pp. 59-62.

²Ibid.
that he simply changed his mind. The reason given for this change is protection of Germany's overseas market from possible restriction by either the British or French. Rudin says that Bismarck felt that he was protecting trade rather than erecting colonies when he sanctioned the occupation of territory. He goes on to say that between the two principles there seemed to be a world of difference in Bismarck's mind. To the degree that he thought his policies were in the defense of trade only, it was perfectly possible for him much later to say that he was never in favor of colonies.¹

Whether or not Bismarck's colonialism was pre-mediated, he had some definite views on the way he felt the colonies should be administered. First of all, he regarded colonies as business propositions requiring national protection. Secondly, he disliked the prospect of imperial provinces with their staff of civil administrators and military authorities. To his mind it was better to trust the genius of the Hanseatic merchants than to rely upon the rigors of the Prussian bureaucratic system for the rule of the colonies, and the study of colonial methods and training of colonial officials should precede any territorial expansion on a large scale.²


²Norman B. Harris, Europe and Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927), p. 80; and Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 124.
The chartered trading companies of the British type were to be Bismarck's models for administration. These companies had certain responsibilities in exchange for certain privileges, such as the East India company once had. They could raise a military police, enrolling the natives under European officers, could issue coinage, maintain a river fleet, and under certain restrictions, regulate trade.\(^1\)

In summary it might be said that Bismarck, for all his protestations to the contrary, was indeed interested in extending the influence of Germany. The forces which acted to check his ambitions in the early years were the ones of international consideration and the consideration of internal affairs, such as the Kulturkampf (the struggle against Socialism and Catholicism.) In 1878 the international situation, which had prevented him from taking strong action earlier, had changed. Improved relations with France under Premier Jules Ferry, combined with Britain's move into Egypt, (which conflicted with French interests and made German support desirable), produced favorable conditions for expansion. Given favorable public opinion at home, he lost no time in first extending protection and then annexation to German commercial enterprises overseas.\(^2\)

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III. THE COLONIAL SOCIETIES

During the early nineteenth century there were various 
groups and organizations in Germany which advocated overseas ex-
pansion for one reason or another. Foremost amongst these were 
the great mercantile houses of the old Hanseatic towns. Their 
interest was primarily profit. They saw in colonization a means 
whereby a secure trade could be built up and a monopoly established 
in some imported articles. There was also the prospect of profit-
able investment in plantations and factories which were secure 
under the German flag.

Then there were the missionaries, whose task of spreading 
the Gospel throughout the Dark Continent did not preclude turning 
a profit in trade with the natives among whom they worked. The 
Hesler Mission (Protestant) in the Cameroons, for instance, had 
an arrangement for getting goods in Europe for missionaries, from 
which grew an organization for selling these goods to the natives 
(Hesler Missionshandlungsgesellschaft). These missionaries looked 
upon the imperial government as a natural protector from hostile 
tribes, foreign governments, and competitors.¹

Some German authors devoted their efforts to creating a 
colonial cult. Two of these were Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, a lawyer 
and African explorer, and Friedrich Fabri, a former missionary in 
Africa and Inspector of the Rhine mission. Hubbe-Schleiden was

¹Hudin, op. cit., pp. 569-89.
among the first to suggest the acquisition of colonies as a national policy. In doing so, he set colonialism up as the new wave, in opposition to the old, laissez-faire, cosmopolitan school of thought. In his writings, colonialism became identified with conservative, narrow nationalism. This sense of nationalism, coupled with an overseas policy was, in his opinion, essential to Germany. He attacked the old free trade theory by showing that instead of equal opportunity for all, it had led to England's preemption of seventy per cent of the world's trade by 1875.

Fabri, on the other hand, tended to concentrate on the economic side of the colonial question and used as his argument the loss, through emigration, of valuable skills for the Fatherland. This, he went on to imply, was not an isolated question in itself, but one that was closely bound up with other national and social questions involving the material existence of Germany.¹

The German naval officials looked quite favorably to the extension of German power overseas. Germany had proven her power on land, so why not on the sea? Growing German trade demanded naval protection, and as navalism increased it paved the way for colonies. *As Prince Albrecht, the Builder of the German Fleet*

put it: 'For a growing people there is no prosperity without expansion, and no expansion without an overseas policy.'

The various explorers who tramped through the wilds of Africa typically returned to the Fatherland filled with glowing reports of exotic paradises filled with an abundance of nature's gifts, waiting only the advent of an adventurous people to tap the wealth. These men wrote books and utilized the lecture circuit in order to drum up enthusiasm for Africa and gain support for new adventures there. Many of these men, fired by the dual motives of adventure and profit, appealed to the imperial government to annex these bountiful lands, lest the British and the French beat them to it.

The work of these people and groups had been on an individual or special interest level. The Central Verein für Handels Geographie und Deutsche Interesse in Ausland had been founded in 1868 as one of the earliest colonial-minded groups. Three men; Freiherr von Maltzan, the naturalist; Ernst Freiherr von der Bruggen, a traveler; and Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, a politician, representing a cross-section of colonial interests, issued a call to all interested parties to meet in Frankfort to put the colonial ambitions of Germany on a broader base. A committee formed at a meeting on August 26, 1882, issued a circular describing the aims of the Society thus:

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1Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 57.
To extend to a larger circle the realization of the necessity of applying national energy to the field of colonization, to form a central organization for all the hitherto scattered efforts for expansion, to create some method for the practical solution to the question. ¹

Many industrialists and members of local societies interested in colonial questions heeded the call and met at Frankfort on December 6, 1862 to form the Kolonialverein. Within a year, it had 3,260 members located in 492 places in Germany and 43 abroad. Its official organ, Die Kolonialzeitung, first appeared in January, 1864, and made a universal and national appeal for all patriotic men to further the work of the colonial party. Its value as a propaganda medium can be measured by the fact that in one year, 1864-1865, membership increased over 300 per cent, rising to 10,275.²

Along with the Kolonialverein, another organization, Die Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation, founded by explorer and adventurer Karl Peters to further the interest in raising capital for colonies in East Africa, served to spread the colonial ideal throughout the country. The two societies were eventually to merge in November, 1867 to form Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft.³

To carry out its work, the Colonial Society was organized under a president chosen for his political connections. Assisting

¹Ibid., pp. 82-84.
³Ibid.
him was a small committee called an Ausschuss, which met three or
four times a year. At the other end were the annual meetings of
the society held in various cities throughout the country, to which
the branch organizations sent their delegates to discuss items
put on the agenda by them, earlier in the year. The whole organi-
ization resembled a legislature, and indeed it was, for more colonial
questions were discussed at its meetings than in the Reichstag.
Resolutions passed by the annual assemblies or by committees of
the organization were presented by the president as formal peti-
tions to the chancellor. If the petitions were not heeded, the
society repeated its demands or asked for an explanation of the
failure to comply.

To win support for the colonial cause in the early days of
the empire, the society used all the methods of propagandist agen-
cies. It had a lecture bureau with many speakers, and it arranged
hundreds of illustrated lectures throughout Germany. Traveling
exhibitions were used to acquaint people with the life and products
of African regions. Colonial congresses were sponsored in which
organizations having an interest in colonial matters were invited
to attend. A membership committee had the task of finding new
members. Another committee studied school texts and "corrected"
them as regards Africa, as well as supplied maps and books for use
by teachers. Information bureaus were set up for people leaving
Germany for Africa or elsewhere. A placement bureau helped get
jobs in the colonies for properly trained people.
The society's influence in the government was that of a strong pressure group. Some of the measures pushed by the society were an independent colonial ministry (later to be achieved), Gouvernementsrat or local advisory boards for colonial governors, Kolonialgerichtshof or a court of appeal in Germany for white settlers, and a large navy. It fought to block obstructionist tactics in the Reichstag by making colonialism an issue in every campaign, by press campaigns against opponents, and even by sending a group of deputys on a special tour of African areas.

Propaganda and politics were not the society's sole concern. They looked after the welfare of all Germans going to Africa. It worked for the inclusion of the study of tropical agriculture and native languages in schools and universities. It worked to further the study of tropical diseases and to get doctors in the colonies and rest homes in Germany for colonists who succumbed to the tropics. A Kolonialhaus was established in Berlin for soldiers, officials, missionaries, and others returning home from the colonies.

The society pushed for the opening of the interior of the colonies, pressuring the government to send expeditions, and when it failed to do so, they sent their own.

The welfare of the natives came in for scrutiny. German language schools and vocational training were stressed. The society took an early lead in opposition to slavery and was later able to put through its program on a national level.

Hacking the Kolonialgesellschaft, was the Colonial Economic
Committee, or Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee. Although independent until 1903, when it was amalgamated with the society, it had worked in close connection with it, laying stress, as the name implies, on the economic aspect of colonialism. It was made up of German nobels and princes, heads of states, scientific societies, chambers of industry and commerce, trading firms, missions, and colonial societies. It received financial aid from a lottery, from sales of its magazine, Der Tropenpflanzer, from the colonial society, and from the Ministry of the Interior. Also, funds were made available from commercial and industrial firms for special research projects in tropical products.

In addition to sources of information passed by the colonial society, it had its own information bureau and archives. Special committees were formed to study the problems of agriculture, exploration, and engineering in the colonies.

Mention should also be made of the Central Botanical Bureau in Berlin (Die Botanische Zentralstelle), which was an adjunct of the Economic Committee, and served as a clearinghouse for plant specimens from all of the colonies. Indeed, it became government policy to require all local governments to send specimens of all plants in the area to Berlin for analysis as to possible economic value.¹ We will now turn to the acquisition of colonies by Germany, beginning with her first colony, South West Africa.

¹The account of the work of the Colonial Society is based on Rudin, op. cit., pp. 164-78.
IV. GERMANY ACQUIRES COLONIES

South West Africa. Adolf Lüderitz, a Breman merchant, had on November 16, 1882, informed the German Foreign Office that he was planning to dispatch a cargo of merchandise to a point on the southwest coast of Africa lying between the Cape Colony and Portuguese Angola. In his request, Lüderitz asked whether or not he might expect the protection of the German Empire.

Bismarck paid attention to Lüderitz's request late in 1882 or early 1883 and communicated to the British government, asking whether Britain claimed sovereignty over, or intended to extend protection to, the area in question. The British Prime Minister Gladstone replied that England had certain establishments along the coast, areas, but he could not give a definite answer to the Chancellor's request until the exact location of Lüderitz's intended factory was made known and he had a chance to communicate with Cape Colony to see what, if anything, could be done to extend protection to German enterprise.

While Britain was awaiting a reply, Lüderitz's agent arrived in South West Africa on April 19, 1883, and on May 1, in the area of Angra Pequena Bay, acquired a tract of land with an area of about 200 square miles and with a coast line of 10 miles.¹

When no reply from Germany on Lüderitz's location was

forthcoming, Britain answered in November of 1883, saying that although no sovereignty had been proclaimed in the area, any claim to sovereignty by a foreign power would infringe on England's rights. On December 31, 1883, Bismarck dispatched still another message to London, demanding to know by what right or title England claimed this land.

No reply was received from Britain and from January to April, 1884, feeling ran high in Germany against Britain, which had cast herself as a dog-in-the-manger by her obstinate stand in South West Africa.

On April 24, 1884, Bismarck sent a note to Lüderitz, who had been greatly increasing his holdings, that the area was officially under imperial protection. The German Colonial Era had begun.

**Togoland.** Similarly, efforts were being made in 1884 to acquire Togoland. In that year the Imperial government appointed Dr. Gustav Nachtigal as a roving imperial commissioner, with the sole purpose of placing under protection areas not already claimed or under treaty with German merchant firms. Setting out on the gunboat *Kerna*, he visited several territories along the coast of West and South West Africa. First stop on the trip was the area of Little Popo. In July, 1884, he proclaimed a German protectorate over Togoland.

**Cameroon.** Proceeding from Togoland, Dr. Nachtigal arrived
in Cameroon just one week before the British Consul, sent on a similar mission, and proceeded to annex all available territory in the name of the German Empire. On October 13, 1884, Bismarck announced that both of these territories were formally under German protection.

**East Africa.** East Africa had for a long time been under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar, whom both Britain and Germany recognized. Though extending this recognition, German explorers had been active in opening up the interior and had been proposing acquisition as early as 1867. One of these explorers was Dr. Karl Peters, who spent considerable time trying to stir up German interest in the region along the Zambesi River. Failing to attract the attention of the government, and considering the Kolonialverein not sufficiently aggressive, he organized his own German Colonial Society (*Die Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation* referred to earlier) with intent to start an agricultural and trading colony. In November, 1884, Peters and his party proceeded from Zanzibar to the mainland and once beyond the area under the direct control of the Sultan, commenced making a series of treaties with the local chieftains granting control of their lands to Peters' German Colonization Society. By this means the Society acquired an area of 60,000 square miles.

Back in Berlin in February of the following year with a pocket full of treaties, he was successful in forming the German East African Company as the receiver of the property the
Colonization Society had obtained, and in securing an Imperial Letter of Protection for it.

In the meantime, the German government had been putting pressure on the Sultan to abandon his claims in the interior of East Africa. When the East African Company appeared on the scene and started making further treaties of acquisition, the alarmed Sultan sent troops to the mainland to enforce his claims. The German reply was to send a naval squadron on August 7, 1885, to overawe him. This, combined with the advice of the British representative, induced the Sultan to withdraw his troops on August 17 and acknowledge German claims.

Great Britain had made no protest about German actions in Zanzibar and East Africa, and had even lent a note of encouragement. It was the British Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, in fact, who asked Bismarck for a meeting to determine boundaries and spheres of influence. As a result of this meeting (October 29 - November 1, 1885), agreements as to boundaries between Britain, Germany, and Portugal were arrived at, and the Sultan of Zanzibar was left "out in the cold." 1

V. MITTELAUFIKA

Two concepts which intrigued German Geopoliticians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were Mittelaufrika

1Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, pp. 182-86; and British Foreign Office, op. cit., pp. 68-73.
und Mittel europä or, to put it more clearly, the hegemony of Germany over Central Africa and Central Europe.

The plan for Africa was the connection of the two colonies of South West Africa and East Africa, giving Germany an East-West belt across the southern half of the continent having decided trade and communications advantages as well as the political advantage of isolating Britain in South Africa by controlling overland communications.

Mittel Afrika, as the plan evolved, was to have extended from German South West Africa northward into the central territory of the continent, and southward to include the Union of South Africa, if possible. A German railroad from the Indian Ocean to Lake Tanganyika was to be the backbone of this ocean-to-ocean empire.

As a start to this ambitious project, Germany had extended the territory of South West Africa to connect Damaraland with the Zambezi River (known as the Caprivi Zipfel for Chancellor Caprivi, during whose administration it was obtained). All that was needed to complete this project was to secure a narrow strip of Portuguese Angola and a part of the basin of the Upper Congo.

This could have been accomplished by the purchase of territory from Portugal while the acquisition of the Congo territory would have been more difficult. The position of the Congo around

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1Gregory, op. cit., pp. 244-46.
1890 was precarious. Either a fomented rebellion or the bankruptcy of the Free State could have delivered it into the hands of its neighbors, with France taking the lion's share and leaving the Upper Congo strip to Germany, while England would be placated by Germany's pledge not to interfere with English relations with the Transvaal. An agreement between Germany and England was actually reached concerning the disposition of Portugal's African possessions should that country fail to keep order or pay its colonial debts but was not ratified due to the outbreak of World War I.\footnote{Curt L. Heymann, "Germany's Colonies," \textit{Current History}, XLV (February, 1937), 35.} Before the outbreak of war, a noted Prussian military author, General Friedrich von Bernhardi, had hinted at the surrender of the Congo as Belgium's price for neutrality, while France would surrender a part of West Africa in compensation for acquisitions in Morocco, as a means to link German East Africa with Cameroon.\footnote{Ibid.}

The foremost protagonist of the \textit{Mittelafrika} plan in Germany, both before and during the war, was the author Emil Zimmermann. He foresaw the day, "fifty years hence, when 500,000 Germans or more would be living alongside 50,000,000 blacks in \textit{Mittelafrika}. Then there would be an army of 100,000 men and the colony would have its own navy, like Brazil."\footnote{Ibid.}
CHAPTER II

GERMAN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

This chapter will examine the system whereby Germany sought to administer her new-found possessions. It will be noted that the chartered companies, Bismarck's ideal, were ultimately replaced by a stronger and more centralized Imperial control and that a Parliamentary crisis in 1906 significantly reshaped Germany's colonial policy.

I. 1884 - 1890

Bismarck had chosen the chartered companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as models for the administration of the nineteenth century German colonial empire because they had two distinguishing and seemingly advantageous features: Such companies were politically sovereign in their appointed areas and enjoyed a complete monopoly of economic opportunity in their area. These two features had been suited to the early era of European expansion when national-states were still weak and effective governmental control was not always possible. Bismarck had hoped by the use of such companies to avoid any government responsibility in the new possessions. His thinking here was motivated in part by his system of European alliances which might be endangered by colonial friction, by the weakness of the German navy, and because
he feared the expenses which colonial administration would impose on an unwilling Reichstag. The companies, then, would have the entire responsibility for administration and taxation, for the development of the land, for negotiations with the natives and for all local concerns. The Empire was only to prevent interference by other powers—hence the term Schutzgebiete, or protectorates.

This system, however, failed to operate as Bismarck had planned. First, in all the African possessions, only two such companies were formed: The East African Company and the South West African Company. Of these, only the first one was chartered with sovereign rights. The Togoland and Cameroon Companies were too weak and were unable to effect any sort of government. The Empire was ultimately obliged to step in and provide first a commissioner, and then a governor, with all the bureaucratic paraphernalia Bismarck had denounced as the "French System." Neither of the two African companies existed after 1890.

The second reason for the failure of the companies was that they lacked money, prestige and national support, and were hence unable to develop the vast resources at their disposal, to control the native people, or to deal with foreign complications. The capital which had been invested in them disappeared because of

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1Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 125.

2A full discussion of the companies and their shortcomings is to be found in Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, pp. 125-26.
incompetent management, lack of experience, and the unscrupulous
and often scandalous behavior on the part of their governors.
Furthermore, public sentiment in favor of colonies had cooled-off
somewhat after 1885 and the business world was discouraged by
results. Company mistakes caused native uprisings and misunder-
standings with other colonial powers. It finally became necessary
for the government to become the sole governing power in the col-
onies.

Imperial administration did not prove an immediate success,
for this was for Germany a new and untried domain. A good many
of the men sent out were of the wrong type—wrong in training,
character, and mode of life. Bismarck had once expressed the fear
that to establish an imperial colonial bureaucracy might be to
pack it with "questionable existences."\(^1\)

The attitude of the German Imperial Diet toward the colonies
in the early years was, if not openly hostile, at least apathetic.
Only among avowed colonialists and Pan-Germans was there any en-
thusiasm. No one did more to create distrust in the colonial
movement than the Radical leader Eugen Richter, who, in a speech
to the Reichstag on November 2, 1885, drew the following picture
of the colonies:

In East Africa the natives are driven to work with the
whip; in Cameroon they are poisoned with brandy; Angra Pequena
is a bankrupt concern and three imperial officers squat there

\(^1\)British Foreign Office, op. cit., p. 94.
in a sea of sand watching the German flag.¹

The public, which had first welcomed the colonial movement with jubilation soon showed signs of reaction; much of the earlier enthusiasm had been due to the march of events in 1884 and 1885, and had been a half-patriotic, half-sentimental response to Bismarck's appeal to national pride.

II. 1890-1906

In 1890, Bismarck was dropped as Chancellor and Count von Caprivi took his place. Caprivi was less a colonial enthusiast than Bismarck, and one of his earliest utterances, for which the colonial party never forgave him, was to the effect that no greater misfortune could happen to Germany than that the whole of Africa should fall into her hands.²

Nevertheless, one of his first acts was to establish the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office under the direction of Dr. Paul Kayser.³ An advisory council, the Kolonialrat, was also established and attached to the Colonial Department. It consisted of representatives of merchants, bankers, shippers, experts of various kinds, and missionaries. The Council met for the first time on June 1, 1891, and for some years it served a useful purpose.

In 1894 Caprivi retired and was succeeded in the Chancellorship

¹Ibid., p. 95.
²Ibid., p. 98.
³Cwassendi, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, pp. 166-60.
by Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe. The Prince also was not a colonial enthusiast, but he had a conscientious desire to face the Empire's responsibilities towards its overseas dominions, as evidenced by a speech before the Reichstag on December 11, 1894:

The maintenance of our colonial empire is a duty to our national honor and a sign of our national prestige. We shall not fail to defend that empire, but we must also so shape it that it may attain economic independence and not be left behind by the neighboring territories, and so that the future of German colonial policy shall not be compromised. The German name would be belittled in the world if the German nation were unwilling to take part in the mission of culture by which the past cruelties of slavery will be abolished and the light of Christianity be carried in to the Dark Continent. 

Hohenlohe introduced the first practical check on military rule, placing the colonial troops directly under the Colonial Department instead of the Ministry of Marine. Also, an Imperial Order of December 12, 1894 more clearly defined the functions of the colonial administration at home and made it plain that the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office was alone competent to deal with colonial questions other than those of a purely political character.

Under the able administration of Dr. Kaiser, 1891-1896, the number of white settlers increased in the Cameroons from 105 to 230; in Togo from 36 to 96; in South West Africa from 750 to 2,025; and in East Africa to 1,280; while the trading companies, firms, and undertakings had increased in Cameroon from 11 to 16,

1British Foreign Office, op. cit., p. 116.

2Ibid., p. 112.
in Togo from 11 to 18, in South West Africa from 12 to 23 and in East Africa from 1 to 13. Hospitals, with laboratories well equipped for research work in connection with tropical diseases, schools, regular postal and telegraph services, roads, and railways had also been freely provided.¹

Closer ties with the Fatherland had been established by increased transportation facilities, notably the East African Line and the Woermann Line to West Africa, and by the creation of colonial literature. The Colonial Department published the Kolonialblatt, its official bulletin, and the Colonial Society kept its readers informed by means of its Kolonialzeitung. There were also numerous scientific and governmental publications relating to developments in the colonial sphere.

Dr. Kayser's administration was not totally enlightened, however. One of his mistakes was in following the concession policy which amounted to the wholesale "give away" of land in Africa. Dr. Kayser found the Reichstag reluctant to grant the necessary funds to carry on his administration and turned instead to the bankers and merchants. The lure was generous land grants and mineral concessions in the colonies. An example was the South African Company of British and German ownership. The government granted to this company an area of 227,000 square miles in South West Africa where diamonds were to be found, thus allowing the

¹Ibid., p. 115.
company to gain a virtual monopoly on the diamond mining industry in South West Africa. In return for this grant the company was supposed to construct a railroad from the Western Coast to the country's Eastern Boundary. The company failed to do this and the government was forced to construct its own line and to supply a military garrison as well to protect the company from the natives, whom they had angered by their policies. In East Africa a similar policy was followed. Here the company did build the railroad, but with the condition that all land three kilometers on either side of the track be theirs along with an additional grant of 4,000 hectares in another place for each kilometer of finished road. Thus did large stretches of territory become permanently alienated from the ownership of the German nation.\(^1\)

Dr. Kayser's second mistake was to overemphasize the official, bureaucratic character of the colonial administration to the neglect of economic development. Allowing the economic control of the colonies to slip out of the hands of the colonial office by a too liberal concession policy resulted in the National Liberal Party, the monarchists, the army, the nobility, and business pressing their character and their interests on the colonial administration and hence coming to virtually "rule" the overseas possessions. As a result, the colonies suffered from militarism, bureaucracy, financial manipulation, and from the lack of sound

\(^1\)Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 171.
economic development.

The Colonial Department of the Foreign Office under Dr. Hayser's direction might also be criticized for devoting too much attention to the creation of elaborate systems of control before there was anything to control. The administrative superstructure was too heavy and too expensive in relation to the actual state of development in German Africa.

It was during Dr. Hayser's administration that the excesses of Karl Peters and an East African planter, Friedrich Schröder, came to light. Peters had been appointed Imperial High Commissioner for East Africa, following the removal of the East African Company as the governing power. He served in this position until charges of misconduct were made against him in 1892, when he withdrew to the Colonial Office in Berlin. He returned to his post in Africa in 1895. In 1896, the Socialist Deputy, Herr Bebel, made new accusations against him in the Diet. Until then the Colonial Secretary had been prevented from taking effective action by the influence of the powerful supporters of Peters. Now, however, the government could no longer conceal the matter and Peters was appropriately tried before the Disciplinary Chamber at Potsdam for the execution of a native boy under questionable circumstances and of having on many occasions been guilty of conduct disgraceful to his office. Peters was found guilty and dismissed from the Colonial Service without pension, in 1897.¹

Schröder, too, was protected for a time (his brother was a member of the Colonial Council.) He had been expelled from the colony for a short period but returned to renew his brutal treatment of Africans and Chinese coolies under his control, for which he was prosecuted and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment at the same time as Peters' dismissal.  

The Peters-Schröder episode served to bring the entire colonial policy into disrepute and to hasten the day of reckoning at home.

In 1896 Dr. Kayser ceased to be Colonial Director and was succeeded by Baron von Richthofen, whose best qualifications for this position were a knowledge of the methods of British colonial administration, his freedom from bureaucratic narrowness, and his relations with the commercial and financial world. He saw that the power of the military should continue to be subordinated to that of the civil authorities; that administration should proceed from certain definite principles; that order should be introduced in the colonies; and that disputes and areas of friction with other colonial powers should be smoothed over or eliminated. While these were his ideals, his sole accomplishment was the extension of the coastline of Togoland into Dahomey by treaty with France in 1897.  

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1 British Foreign Office, op. cit., pp. 113-14.

In March, 1896, Dr. von Buchka replaced Baron von Richthofen as Colonial Director. Von Buchka was a Conservative jurist who had only indirect knowledge of colonies from being a member of the Colonial Society. He did not prove to be a successful administrator, and he resigned in 1900.

The year 1900 marked a change in German colonial policy, for in that year Count von Bulow assumed the chancellorship and more strongly identified colonial policy with world policy. Bismarckian policy had always sought to utilize existing circumstances in order to maintain peace and to strengthen Germany's position in Europe; the aim of the new policy was to expand Germany's colonial empire. In pursuit of this aim, the colonies were regarded as symbols of national prestige in the game of power politics, while their internal development and need for greater public awareness and support in the form of immigration and settlement, were neglected. The official, military, and bureaucratic class continued to dominate the colonies and to exploit them for their own benefit. This situation was an outgrowth of the earlier period of company rule and reflected a continuation of previous trends of colonial control by a small number of people.1

Bulow's appointee, Dr. O. W. Strubel, was able to effect limited self-government in the colonies by the formation of Legislative Councils, open, of course, only to white men, on the British

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1Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 227.
Crown Colony pattern.

Following Dr. Stübii was Prince Hohenlohe-Langenberg, son of one of the founders of the Kolonialverein, who failed utterly to master the difficulties of the colonial department.

The utter lack of knowledge and preparation for their position obliged Dr. Buchka, Dr. Stübii, and Prince Hohenlohe to submit to the group in control. "These imperialists, led by von Bulow, conducted the internal colonial policy with a high hand and with only a very slight regard for the welfare, present or future, of the colonies so long as their private interests were served and the greed for world power on the part of their ruler was gratified."¹

Germany's colonies came to be highly regarded for their political prestige in world affairs under Kaiser Wilhelm II's "New Course" in Weltpolitik. Generals, bureaucrats, merchants, and adventurers dominated the colonies. Colonial development lagged. Military officials engaged in numerous punitive expeditions in order to cover themselves with honors.²

The overseas possessions were regarded as a dumping ground for shady characters, family failures, and wrecked lives. The early record was one of noisome scandals and marked moral obliquity.³

¹Ibid., p. 228.

²Weltpolitik: World policy. Policy taking in consideration the political situation of the whole world. Used as a term to indicate the more ambitious and aggressive German imperial policy after 1900.

The African colonies had failed to attract any great stream of emigrants, which might form a true colonial population capable of contributing to its own defense. ¹

The criticism of the colonial administration, both at home and in the colonies, continued to build up in the first year of the twentieth century. A German, Max von Brandt, whose brother was connected with the government of South West Africa, wrote in the Deutsche Rundschau (Berlin) complaining that the bureaucracy was stifling the colonies and that they were not learning to stand by themselves. He went on to point out that reluctance about capital investment was holding back colonial development.² The long-time foes of colonialism, the Social Democrats, led the fight against colonies and colonialism in the Reichstag. Uprisings in the colonies finally precipitated a parliamentary crisis in 1906-1907.

III. 1906 - 1918

The Kaiser and von Bulow had expected opposition from the Socialists and the Freisinnige Partei, another left-wing group, but they did not expect to lose the support of the Catholic Center. This party, which Bismarck had earlier won over to the idea of colonialism, had taken a turn in the other direction during the

¹Birchenough, op. cit., p. 187.
years 1884-1906, cooling to further colonial development, partly because of the expense and partly because they disliked Prince Hohenlohe, a Protestant, feeling that Catholics were discriminated against in the colonial office.  

The Socialists were the most vehement foes of colonialism and spared no opportunity to call attention to the mistakes and abuses in the administration, of which there were many. The government, for its part, was handicapped in its defense by the outbreak of revolts throughout the African territories as well as by the scandalous conduct of many officials which had come to light.

The Socialist deputies in the Reichstag reiterated again and again the abuse of the natives, the corruptness of the bureaucracy, the ruthless exploitation by the privileged companies. They hit hardest at the imperialist defense of economic benefits. They showed that by 1906, of all the African possessions, only Togoland was self-supporting, the others requiring imperial grants of unprecedented amounts. 2 Trade was not a valid argument, they said. Tariffs were levied on imports from the colonies and the trade balance showed more goods and materials being purchased from the British and French possessions.

The crisis reached a climax in 1906 when the Reichstag refused to appropriate the funds demanded by the government for the

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1 Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 251.

2 Ibid., p. 239.
colonial administration. At this point von Bulow dissolved the Diet and threw the whole issue open to the electorate.\textsuperscript{1}

In this election, the government made it quite clear that the issue was that of world power. "Germany's position in the world is menaced. The forthcoming election will decide whether Germany is capable of developing into a World Power from a European Power," challenged the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the official government paper.\textsuperscript{2}

Dr. Berhard Dernburg, the newly appointed director of the Colonial Office, was sent on tour by von Bulow to drum up enthusiasm for continued colonial development. The Freisinnige Partei, which had opposed colonialism along with the Catholic Party and the Socialists, now supported the colonial cause. In addition, the patriotic societies, the Naval League, the Colonial Society, the Pan-German League, and the Association for the Suppression of Socialism threw their weight behind the Chancellor's appeal to "patriotism" and "the Honor of the Fatherland."

With well organized support on its side, the government won an overwhelming victory on January 25, 1907. On election night, thousands jammed the palace area to give the Kaiser an ovation. Von Bulow appeared on his behalf and summed up the meaning of his victory by quoting from his predecessor, Bismarck: "You have placed Germany in the saddle and now she can ride."\textsuperscript{3}

In spite of the Government's victory, it was all too clear to the Kaiser and his ministers that there was a dire need for overhauling the colonial system. Criticism had been too severe

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 241. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid. \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 243.
and too searching, revelations of mismanagement too true and too
compromising. From then on, the government would direct its
"attention to the colonies themselves, and would cease to exploit
them as mere pawns!" This was to be the new era of scientific
colonization and in it Germany would begin to realize its dreams
of a self-sufficient empire.¹

In keeping with the spirit of the New Era, a bill was passed
in the Reichstag in January, 1907, which transformed the Colonial
Department into a cabinet ministry. Dr. Dernburg became the first
Minister of Colonial Affairs.

As has been mentioned, Dr. Dernburg, the new colonial di-
rector, had been instrumental in providing propaganda for the
colonies during the election. Now he turned to a large-scale
educational program to arouse a new interest in colonialism. He
succeeded in interesting the merchant classes to a point where
membership in the Colonial Society increased and a new Colonial
Institute was founded in Hamburg in 1908.² More influential
perhaps than Dr. Dernburg was the discovery of diamonds near
"Luderitz Bay in South West Africa.

The new ministry was organized into four divisions: The
Department of Political Affairs, General Administration, and Jus-
tice; the Office for the Direction of the Staff; the Division of
Military Administration; and the Department of Finance. The

¹Ibid., p. 248.
²Ibid.
organization was along the lines of subjects rather than individual colonies, as was the case in the British system.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 260.} The old Kolonialrat was abolished and an agricultural and economic section of permanent officials was instituted in its place.

Dernburg turned next to the problems of law and personnel. The best elements of tribal custom and law were synthesized with German law and a new code promulgated. Ineffective officials were eliminated and a long-time aim of the Kolonialrat, the establishment of a system for training future administrators, was inaugurated. Under this system established in 1895, candidates for colonial positions served an apprenticeship of at least one year in a bank or business; next, a two-year term in Africa, followed by one-and-one-half to two years in the Seminary for Oriental Languages, University of Berlin, and received university training in law and administration culminating in examinations in geography, hygiene, government, and practical science.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 251.} Germany did not establish a central school for training in colonial affairs like the British, French, or Dutch, but drew upon the facilities of leading institutions throughout the country.

In the colonies themselves a reorganization took place. The military and police services were regulated, legal and judicial methods were reformed, and the civil service reconstituted and made uniform. Each colony had its own governor appointed by
the Kaiser with his complete staff consisting of such officials as a judge, a postmaster, a tax collector, a doctor, and a chief engineer. Directly under the governor in the larger colonies were the district chiefs (Bezirksantmänner), who were assisted by smaller staffs on the model of the governor's. They served to centralize the administration and to make it less bureaucratic, as did also the extension of the principle of legislative councils, composed of officials and citizens, which already had been attached to some of the colonial governments. Dr. Dernburg was especially interested in promoting self-government, both of white settlers, especially in South West Africa, and of natives, so far as it was possible.¹

In the field of economics, Dernburg saw Germany's sudden growth as an industrial power necessitating overseas territories to supply food and raw materials. He also saw the African native being elevated to the level of civilization where he would become a consumer of German products.² Nor did he overlook the problem of transportation which was necessary to unlock the potential riches which he envisioned. His railway program constitutes one of his most significant contributions to scientific colonization, more than doubling the mileage between 1906 and 1910, and giving railway construction a momentum which only ceased with the outbreak of World War I.

¹Ibid., p. 253. ²Ibid., pp. 254-55.
Of great service to the Colonial Ministry was the Colonial Economic Committee (Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee) founded in 1896 by members of the Colonial Society who were dissatisfied with the administration's neglect of the colonies. This organization sent research expeditions into the interior of the colonies and conducted research in the agricultural field.¹

Under Dernburg's guidance, the colonies showed signs of growth. There was an increase in white population from 3,585 in 1902 to 18,562 in 1913. Increases were also seen in railroad mileage and land under cultivation.

Fortunately, Dr. Dernburg's policies were carried on by such men as Dr. Lindequist (1910-1911), and Dr. Solf (1911-1916), the last two colonial ministers of Germany.

¹ Ibid., p. 256.
CHAPTER III

GERMANY AS COLONIAL MASTER

Some of the reasons why the Allied Powers felt it necessary to remove the colonies from German control were the alleged mistreatment of the natives, the use of the colonies as bases for aggression, and the fact that the colonies were not necessary for the German economy. This chapter will examine the subject of German native relations.

Nine-tenths of Germany's colonial population was in Africa, totaling 11,700,000—both white and native. The ratio of soldiers and officials (including missionaries and nurses) to every bona-fide white settler (i.e., merchants, traders, farmers, etc.) was given as 7 to 1. On the continent as a whole Germany controlled 347,878 square miles or eight per cent of the total land area.

Professor Moritz Bonn of Munich, in an address before the Royal Colonial Institute in London on January 14, 1914, summed up Germany's system for the control of the African:

The question of German colonial policy is a question of native policy. It is not merely a question of how we are to rule

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1O. Eltzbacher, "The German Danger to South Africa," The Nineteenth Century, LVIII (October, 1906), 526.
2Ibid., p. 526.
3Townsend, European Colonial Expansion Since 1871, p. 156.
them—Owing to the different structure of our colonies, the
task will be different in each of the groups. In the Cameroons
and Togo we are ruling native States and native tribes by a
bureaucracy somewhat on the lines of the Indian bureaucracy.

In East Africa we are creating a mixed colony, planting frag-
ments of a white society among dense African masses. In South
West Africa we have created a kind of manorial system with a
European lord and an African serf. Each type has its advan-
tages, each has its drawbacks.¹

The attitude of some of the authorities and colonists toward
the native was one of contempt. The native was regarded as an
inferior being, whose whole purpose was to serve the ends of the
white man.² Professor Karl Dove, Director of Land Settlement for
South West Africa, once said that "leniency toward the natives is
cruelty to the whites."³ The negro was often looked on as a means
to an end and never as an end in himself. His welfare and that of
the colony were frequently subordinated to the interests of the
Germans on the spot and to those of Germany as a whole.⁴

I. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

The German's use of flogging in their African possessions

¹British Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks, German African
Possessions: Treatment of Natives in the German Colonies, Vol.

²Beer, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

³"Germany and the African Native," Living Age, CCXCIIX
(November 9, 1918), 371.

became so notorious that in adjacent territories the German lands were spoken of as the "Colonies of the Twenty-five" (i.e., where twenty-five lashes were the usual punishment) and the "Flogging Colonies."¹ Punishments officially recognized as being permissible were corporal punishment (flogging and birching), fines, imprison-
ment with hard labor, imprisonment in chains, and death. In the actual administration, a considerable leniency was allowed. Deputy Hermann Rören stated in the Reichstag on December 3, 1906 that:

This punishment is not ordered merely for grave misdemeanors or for crimes by judicial sentence, but it is applied on the mere order of administrative officials, even by Station Direc-
tors, who officially have only the rank of a subaltern, or by their assistants, or by some overseers of smaller stations who are taken largely from former non-commissioned officers.²

These floggings were supposed to have been entered in a punishment book, but this was frequently not done.

With regard to instruments used in corporal punishment, four seem to have been the most widely employed: A rhinoceros
whip or hippopotamus whip (sjambok), a rope's end, a "little stick" or birch rod, and a salted strap. The official instrument of punishment was the sjambok, and the Colonial Department laid down specifications for its construction: Strips of rhinoceros hide, 80 to 100 centimeters long by 1 centimeter in circumference and smooth at the whip end.³

¹British Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks, German African
²Ibid., p. 8.
³Ibid., p. 10.
The humanitarian deputies of the Social Democratic Party in the Reichstag deplored the incidence of flogging. On March 26, 1906, Deputy Ladebour said:

"Every flogging becomes barbarous, whether given with a rope's end, the sjambok, or a salted strap. First, it is physically detrimental, causing injury and shaking the nerves; it injures the soul, it brutalizes and blunts it; and it brutalizes the officials who order the flogging--The unfortunate result is that by their administration German officials do not spread "Kultur," but produce a servile spirit--If that is true, then you have simply worked destruction on the spiritual life of these people."

Deputy Matthias Erzberger on March 19, 1906 said that:

"Flogging is used too generally in my opinion;" and he stated that in 1903 in East Africa 2,283 natives received floggings as additional punishments. Deputy Gustav Noske, on April 20, 1912 gave the figures for 1910:

The number of natives who are condemned to very trying imprisonment is most striking . . . . Realize that in East Africa alone in one year 10,144 longer or shorter sentences of imprisonment were given. That, considering the comparatively small district subject to German administration, is a colossally high number of convictions . . . . The number of floggings in South West Africa rose correspondingly. It rose from 928 in 1905 to 1,282 in 1910. In South West Africa we have from 70,000 to 80,000 natives subject to the German administration. Among this small number of persons no fewer than 2,371 cases of more or less severe punishment were imposed. That is such an enormous percentage that one really doesn't understand on what principles justice is administered.

In Cameroon, besides 54 negroes who were sent out of life into death, 3,516 colored people were punished with imprisonment; in 1861 cases fines were imposed, and in 1,909 floggings . . . a similar increase in the convictions, and of course, also in the flogging cases, is to be recorded from Togo. That

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1Ibid., pp. 11-12.  
2Ibid., p. 15.
little land had not fewer than 5,205 convictions. Now surely there can be no doubt that the Reichstag has no wish that we should make Togo into a flogging area. We have had pretty bad conditions there, and do not want to make them worse.  

In regard to the use of corporal punishment by other European powers, evidence is incomplete, due, perhaps, to a natural reluctance to discuss such matters. However, the practice was not unknown, for in the British protected territory of Basutoland, whipping could be imposed for the offenses of rape, distributing indecent publications, and stock thieving. For stock thieving alone, the punishment was up to fifteen lashes. In the Congo, while Belgian law did not recognize corporal punishment, such punishment was meted out by native courts with no supervision by Europeans. 

The result of the uproar in the Reichstag over the use of corporal punishment was the enforcement of stricter regulations regarding its use. Sentences of flogging were to be imposed as punitive measures only, and not as disciplinary ones. They had to be administered in the presence of an administrative official and a doctor or sanitary official. The strokes were limited to twenty-five for a healthy, full-grown man, to be applied in two installments at least two weeks apart; and the use of the whip

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1Ibid.


3Ibid., II., p. 490.
was prohibited in the case of Arabs, Indians, women, and children.\textsuperscript{1}

II. SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR

Slavery in the African possessions was mostly confined to East Africa where it had been practiced by the Arabs. Under Dr. Dernburg, regular slavery was effectively stopped. Domestic slavery or peonage was slowly being phased out and probably would have ended completely had not World War I intervened.\textsuperscript{2}

On the other hand, a system of forced labor closely akin to slavery was practiced in all of the colonies in order to provide labor for the plantations, roads, and public works.

The natives were recruited by the chiefs and headmen of the various villages upon terms and wages set down by the Germans. Where the native chiefs were not relied on, the hut tax, paid off in labor, was used. The German reasoning behind this was that in return for the benefits of civilization the natives should render an equivalent service to the state. This view is expressed by Lieutenant-Colonel von Morgan, a leader of an exploring party in Cameroons.

The only real tax, which is also of cultural value, is compulsory labor. We can do nothing in the tropics without native workmen, and especially cannot make progress in

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\textsuperscript{1}Townsend, \textit{Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire}, pp. 287-88.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 284-85.
Cameroon, whose future depends on plantations. As we in Germany have compulsory schooling, so there must be compulsory work in the colonies. As to how this labor is to be supplied, and for how long, the District Judge must decide.1

In East Africa and Cameroon, the system consisted of dividing labor into two classes: day (or casual) labor and contract (or recruited) labor. The day laborers were not bound to any one master and were given piece-work and paid for it on the same day. Recruiting agents paid native chiefs and headmen one rupee or more for each black man recruited, and naturally the headmen coerced as many of their followers as possible, in order to swell their commission receipts.2

A labor law was passed in October, 1913, under which contract laborers whose time had expired were reimbursed for travel back to their homes in the interior. Before, they had to make their way back as best they could, if at all.3

The plantation system, according to Beer, resulted in a decline in native population, due, in part, to sexual irregularities and an increased syphilis rate, but mostly because the men were not allowed to bring their families with them.4

The whole system of plantation labor met with considerable opposition from the merchant classes of the colonies, not so much


2Ibid., p. 21.

3Ibid., p. 22.

4Beer, op. cit., p. 28.
on humanitarian grounds as on practical ones: The natives who
were to bring products of their own labor to market were often
forced to work on the plantations and roads instead.

Other European nations followed a similar pattern in regard
to the use of native labor. In Kenya, or British East Africa,
the native had an obligation of labor for the state on public works.
Headmen of each village may similarly require free labor on any
works which may benefit the community as a whole. While only adult
males are legally liable for such labor, women and children have
been known to be made to participate. The theory underlying the
principle of compulsory labor in British colonies was that this
is a traditional obligation which their chiefs had enforced under
native law.1

Each native in the French colonies was subject to an annual
labor tax known as the prestation. This required a certain number
of days of free labor for government purposes every year. This
labor could be used only for the maintenance of communication fa-
cilities such as roads, bridges, etc. In some cases in remote
areas, prestation could be used for construction of facilities
where the use of local material was necessary. The French also
required natives to perform service in return for payment. Natives
who can afford to do so may buy their way out of such obligations.2

In the Belgian Congo, and in Portuguese Africa, similar

1H uell, op. cit., I, pp. 370-71.
2Ibid., pp. 1037-42.
requirements on communal labor and forced paid labor prevailed. 1

III. EDUCATION

Most of the education in the colonies was in the hands of the missions, as is indicated in Table I, four-fifths of all the schools in 1914 were mission schools. These schools received large grants in aid from the Imperial government for the teaching of German and other subjects, particularly in the field of vocational education.

**Table I**

SCHOOLS AND PUPILS IN GERMAN AFRICA, 1914*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>(European) Teachers</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 government</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,832 mission</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>106,550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9 Protestant, 2 Catholic Societies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South West Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 government (White only)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 mission</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23 Protestant, 38 Catholic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cameroon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 government</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>868</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>473 Protestant</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27,528</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158 Catholic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Togoland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>366 mission</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14,653</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 Protestant and 1 Catholic Society)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 government</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**As of 1914.**

*Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, pp. 291-94.

The inadequacy of trained whites to man the administration caused the government to rely more on trained natives for such duties as clerks, customs officials, telegraph operators, interpreters, carpenters, masons, and all kinds of mechanics and craftsmen. The planters and traders gave full support to the government and missions in this activity as it provided them with a supply of much needed skilled labor and would also, it was hoped, induce in the native a desire for a higher, European standard of living which would cause him to become a consumer of German products.

There was no attempt at higher education for the native, either in the colonies or in Germany. The feeling was that there was no need on the part of the native and that too much learning could be dangerous if he came in contact with social and revolutionary ideas on the continent. An exception to this were the teacher-training institutes in some of the colonies which attempted to supply native teachers in the lower grades.  

German education in Africa, which had its start with the early missionary societies, had lagged somewhat during the exploitive period of German colonization. With the coming of the new era under Dernburg, education under government sponsorship and support began to grow. By 1914 however, it had still reached only a small portion of the native population in the colonies, e.g. 1.6 per cent in Togoland and Cameroon and 1 per cent in East

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1 Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, pp. 290-36; and Rudin, op. cit., pp. 363-61.
Africa. British and French systems were similarly confined to a relatively small portion of natives under their control. British Gold Coast had, in 1913, 384 schools serving 18,000 students out of a native population of 1,501,199, and French West Africa had 70 schools and 2,500 students in 1900 out of a population of 3,200,000.¹

What the Germans lacked in quantity, they made up in quality. On the eve of the war, Togoland had the best industrial arts school in Africa, and the British administrators who took over East Africa after the war admitted that the German educational system was far better than their own. As an example, the British administration in occupied East Africa could send written messages to all of the chiefs and received a written reply, something that was not always possible in the British possessions.²

IV. LAW AND JUSTICE

In Cameroon, and in other colonies as well, there were a series of native courts alongside the German courts. For the Germans there were the Bezirksgericht (District Court) and Obergericht (Superior Court). For the natives, there were native courts, presided over by local chiefs, for infractions of tribal law. For

¹Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, pp. 290-95; Buell, op. cit., II, p. 31; and Statesmen's Yearbook, 1902 and 1913 (London: Macmillan Company, Ltd., 1902 and 1913), pp. 615 and 230.

²Buell, op. cit., I, p. 478.
more serious offenses, the native may be tried before local officials or District Courts. There was often arbitrariness in German administration of justice on the local level, with subordinate officials exercising extensive rights of punishment without reference to higher authorities. Where sentences needed confirmation by the governor, that official usually based his decision on the report from the local officer.\footnote{British Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks, German African Possessions, Vol. XVIII, No. 114, pp. 17-19.}

Fines were the most prominent form of punishment, alongside the forms of corporal punishment referred to earlier. Most crimes were those committed against property. This was due to the fact that native and European definitions of property were not always identical and clear definition or understanding to eliminate this culture clash was never achieved. As an example, natives in Cameroon often lent out money entrusted to their keeping or left behind goods they were supposed to be transporting to cover gambling debts incurred at the way stations.\footnote{Rudin, op. cit., pp. 203-4.}

The natives could, and sometimes did, appeal their cases all the way to the Reichstag in Berlin. Such was the case of the Duala people in Cameroon, who hired a German lawyer when they were faced with eviction from their village by government order.

In regard to land tenure, there was no clear-cut definition in the white man's eyes of native requirements. The natives
combined domestic agriculture with hunting and food gathering, roaming the countryside in search of game. In general, the Germans felt that the native was entitled to only as much land as he actually worked. There were, however, variations from this. In East Africa the native was allowed four times as much land as he actually worked, while in South West Africa all native claims to land were overridden, by force as well as by law.1

V. NATIVE REBELLION AND WARFARE

The Germans were engaged throughout their colonial history in warfare with the natives. These conflicts ranged all the way from major operations in South West Africa and East Africa, to minor skirmishes elsewhere.

In Cameroon, there were several causes of conflict. In most instances it concerned interference with the white man's trade. Native tribes with trade monopolies with other tribes in their area attempted to keep the European out. Sometimes the trader was the first white man in the area and had to fight his way in. At other times European-owned caravans ran out of supplies and raided native villages, or villagers tried to recover gambling debts of porters by seizing their loads.

In some cases cannibalism was given as a reason for military

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action against the tribes. Occasionally the Germans felt it necessary to move against tribes that attacked natives who were at peace with the administration. Warfare was also resorted to in order to enforce terms of treaties signed by the natives at an earlier date. 1

South West Africa was the hardest hit of the colonies as far as rebellion was concerned. The worst outbreak came at the turn of the century in the Herero Rebellion.

The Hereros, a nomadic people of South West Africa, had never become accustomed to German rule, an uprising occurring as early as 1883. These people had also been at war with the Hottentots, led by Hendrik Witbooi. The government decided that peace could not be restored in the colony until Witbooi was defeated, and so sent a military expedition against him. Meanwhile, word had reached the authorities that Witbooi had made peace with the neighboring tribes and had joined them in a concerted effort to oust the Germans.

The German military expedition under Major Theodor Leutwin managed to trap Witbooi and force him to sign a peace treaty in 1883.

In 1897 an epidemic of rinderpest caused great unrest, due to the native belief that the epidemic was caused less by the disease than by the forced inoculation the Germans insisted upon. Major (now Governor) Leutwin was able to control the outbreaks at

this time with the aid of Witbooi and the other chiefs.

One of the grievances which plagued the natives was the manner in which they were defrauded by the German settlers. The natives were dependent upon the traders for many of the necessities of life and though they were always paying, they were never out of debt. When debts could not be paid, their cattle and land were confiscated. Claims were enforced against the chiefs or the entire tribe.

The most serious grievance had to do with the land question. The Hereros had watched their land being encroached on by the European farmer and the occupation of the choicest districts by the newcomer. The government attempted to set aside large tracts for the Hereros, but this failed to compensate them for the old freedom to feed their herds where they pleased.

Another grievance was what the natives believed to be a great disparity in justice between the white man and natives. A case in point was that of Prince Prosper Arenburg, an officer of the First Guards Division in South West Africa. Convicted of the murder of a native and assaults on five native women, he was sentenced to death by military court-martial, only to have his case reopened by the Emperor and commuted to fifteen years imprisonment, and then reopened again and to be finally acquitted. Such incidents seem to indicate to the native that he could seek no justice from the German officials.

The accumulation of these and other grievances led to the
final explosion in 1903. In that year, rebellion broke out in the south among the Hottentots. While German troops were suppressing the outbreak, the Hereros took advantage of the absence of the Germans to inflict heavy damage to German property and the loss of many German lives. The main outbreak in the south was suppressed in 1904, but guerilla warfare continued to linger on until June of that year when General Lothar von Trotha was able to corner and destroy the main body of Hereros, the remainder fleeing across the South African border. These refugees returned almost immediately and resumed the conflict for nearly a year, until Witbooi was killed and the Hereros driven across the eastern border into the Kalahari Desert.

The rebellion had cost Germany several thousand lives and 323,000,000 Marks. It had cost the Hereros a good deal more, as summed up in the words of Dr. Paul Rohrbach:

The land question is solved, for the Hereros have lost their land, which is now fiscal property and is settled by whites. The cattle question is also solved, for the whole of the livestock of the Hereros has been destroyed; there are hardly any cattle left. 1

East Africa had its share of troubles also. The first serious outbreak occurred in 1888 in the Arab uprising against German interference with the slave trade. The most serious uprising was in 1906 by the southern tribes. The reasons given for

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the outbreak were the general harshness of the administration, the unending demand for labor, and the hut tax. This last was a tax introduced in 1897 which had to be paid off in money or labor, and as the native rarely had little money, it served as source of labor supply for the colony. In addition to the hut tax and forced labor, there seems also to have been a considerable resentment against extortion by Indian traders and the oftentimes violent conduct of the men accompanying the caravans.

The rising itself began in July, 1906 in the Matumbi hills and spread over the southern hold of the colony. The revolt spread northward to the center, but the northern tribes did not participate in it.

German military and naval units cooperated to put down the main uprising, but guerilla war lingered on until 1907, the whole affair costing 75,000 lives to both sides.¹

The reasons behind these various uprisings were many, but they seemed mainly concerned with the inability of the German to understand the ways of the natives, and vice versa. Cameroon and South West Africa provided a sharp contrast in the treatment of the native. In the former, campaigns were punitive in nature, designed to punish the tribes for infractions of German rule. The paying of tribute and labor by the vanquished seemed to be a bonus of the larger purpose of law enforcement. There was no concerted

effort on the part of the Germans to drive-off or exterminate the native; on the contrary, it was to their advantage to preserve and protect the native so that they might have the use of his labor. This was due to the fact that Cameroon was a hot, equatorial country which made life there very difficult for the white man.

South West Africa is a different story. Here, the temperate climate of the interior highlands, combined with good range land, made the region attractive to European settlers. Here, the native was in the way. The land was desired by the white farmer and rancher, which came into direct conflict with the grazing rights of the native. The German policy here, therefore, was one of restricting the native to reservations in less desirable areas, or when he refused to be restricted, of extermination, in much the same manner as the American plains Indian was treated. This latter policy was bound to lead to open warfare between the opposing groups.

Conflict in East Africa was based on a small number of Germans trying to exercise their authority over a vast expanse of territory. Where possible they utilized the local chieftains, but when this procedure broke down, they had to rely on force to accomplish their aims.

Throughout the conflicts, the advantage in the long run was with the Germans, who had the modern weapons with which to fight. The natives, for their part, were ill equipped to fight a modern war, relying as they did on bows and arrows and old,
muzzle-loading flintlocks sold them by European traders. With such odds, the outcome in any conflict was not long in being decided.

It would seem that the German was disliked, even hated by the natives. That this was not always the case however, is shown by the following passage by Harry R. Rudin of Yale University:

It was my good fortune to travel a good deal in the interior of the Cameroons. Wherever I went, I heard natives praise the excellent German administration. The frequently made comment about the Germans was that they were very strict, at times harsh, but always just. That is high praise; and even greater praise lies in the affection that the natives felt for individual German officials. A nation cannot ask for higher tribute to the excellence of her administration than such opinions from the people administered. These opinions were given under all possible circumstances, without leads or suggestions from me. I was actually criticized when I reminded the natives of some of the brutalities that occurred. The most vigorous criticism of German rule came from German traders, who had much to say about the minute regulation of and the officious interference in their trade, and about the inspections carried out by health inspectors.¹

Rudin insists that the question of whether or not Germany's administration of her colonies was good or bad is a relative matter. The variations between colonies within the German Empire and between conditions that existed in British and French colonies and those of Germany, were many. Further, the absence of open archives prohibits a complete comparison with other European colonial systems. Also, the time element is important: Germany was a relative newcomer to the colonial field, and any comparison must be made on the basis of conditions in other colonies in their first few

¹Rudin, op. cit., pp. 419-20.
decades. Colonial governments can devote themselves to policies of civil administration only after the first generation has completed the work of conquest. He feels that if Germany had been allowed to continue as a colonial power after the war, her civil rule would have compared favorably with the very best that the world knows today. Townsend, in her work, reaches substantially the same conclusion and feels that German rule was neither better nor worse than that of any other colonial power.¹

VI. PERIODICAL COMMENTARIES ON GERMAN COLONIALISM

With regard to press commentaries on Germany as a colonizer, a survey of some articles appearing in certain American and British publications reflected a change in attitude toward German colonialism both before and after the war.

The British were, at first, not openly hostile to German colonial ambitions. J. W. Gregory, writing in 1896 of the proposed German barrier across Africa, is quite friendly toward the German Mittelafrika scheme that was then evolving, and about which more is to be said later. He said that peace with England was indispensable to Germany for her colonial expansion, and that therefore Germany would seek peaceful means to extend her territories. Furthermore, he says, England really had nothing much to lose by allowing Germany to spread out. The Cape-to-Cairo Railway,

¹Carlton J. H. Hayes, introduction to Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. viii.
the dream of Cecil Rhodes, shouldn’t be hampered by German control of the right-of-way, and besides, the water route along the East African coast provided a much easier route than the railway.¹

In "The Expansion of Germany," Henry Birchenough struck a more somber note on German colonies. While conceding that the desire for colonies on the part of Germany were quite natural, he pointed out that Germany is too late; that all good areas were already taken. Such German colonies as existed were hostages of fortune in that they were scattered and weak and could not easily be defended from naval attack, while Britain and her possessions were secure in the power of the British fleet. Germany’s real competition in Africa, as he saw it, lay in the realm of trade.²

In an article entitled "Greater Germany," in Outlook magazine, the English press commented that as long as Germany limited her overseas competition to trade, England had nothing to fear, while a similar British news article, condensed in Review of Reviews gave a favorable picture of German treatment of natives in East Africa.³ "German African Troubles," appearing in Independent, was the first article appearing on the Herero uprising in South West Africa. The author, Paul Tafel, placed major blame for the

²Birchenough, op. cit., pp. 182-91.
³"Greater Germany," Outlook, LXXIII (April 18, 1903), 503-5; and "The German Colony of East Africa," Review of Reviews, XXVIII (July, 1903), 96-97.
uprising on the natives, but admitted German aggravation of the natives was also at fault.¹

The Herero Rebellion was significant in the course of British thinking on German colonies. It precipitated the first really hostile article concerning German rule before the war, and was to be frequently referred to in World War I. In "The German Danger to South Africa," Mr. O. Eltzbacher feared that the revolt in South West Africa, caused by German misrule, would spread to the other German colonies, and thence to British territories. Britain, in his opinion, should have attempted to buy South West Africa, or failing this, to have intervened. Intervention was defended at length on legal grounds, and an attempt was made to justify the British fear of an uprising among South African natives.²

"Have the Germans Failed in East Africa?" was the title of an article in the Review of Reviews which sought to show that East Africa, though not yet profitable, certainly had great possibilities.³ A French news article, condensed in a later issue of the same magazine, stated that the German colonies were not paying and that few Germans actually lived there. It said, however, that the potential was great, provided railroads were built to open


³"Have the Germans Failed in East Africa?" Review of Reviews, XXV (February, 1907), 247-48.
In "Frenchman and German in Africa," the American writer, Edgar Allen Forbes, considered German trade to have been the most important factor in Germany's overseas empire, while war with England was viewed as being disastrous to Germany. Favorable comment was made on German administration, particularly the education of the natives.  

"Germany's Eye on Portuguese Africa," was the title of an article in Literary Digest which says that the Portuguese colonies were in bad shape and that Germany desired to take them over in order to unify her African possessions. Selected comments from the British press showed no objection to such a move.  

The outbreak of World War I marked a change in attitude, first in Britain, and later in America, the shift to a hostile attitude coming quickly. An article entitled "The German Colonies," which appeared in Living Age, made a simple economic summary of Germany's colonial history. The only hostile note appeared at the end, where it was implied that the native was dissatisfied with

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2 Edgar Allen Forbes, "Frenchman and German in Africa," Part II; "Germany--The Third Power in Africa," Review of Reviews, XLIV (September, 1911), 312-16.  
3 "Germany's Eye on Portuguese Africa," Literary Digest, XLII (October 17, 1912), 321.
German rule.¹

An American article appearing in October, 1917, described Anglo-French action against the German colonies, and their precarious position. It concluded with the statement that while the colonies had not been too successful, they had great potential.²

Sir H. H. (Harry) Johnston, in another article called "The German Colonies," was the first to advocate the seizure, by the Dominions, of Germany's colonies in partial payment for damages caused by the war. This was the first instance of one of the arguments to be used later in the demand that Germany be made to give up her colonies. He also made use of the other favorite argument, that is that the natives did not wish to live under German rule, and that to hand them back at the conclusion of hostilities would be cruel. He did, however, praise Germany for her good work in the past, especially in scientific work in the colonies, and said that German treatment of the native had, in the long run, been harsh but good. (He credits the natives' desire to live under the British flag, rather than the German, to the activities of British missionaries before Germany took possession of these areas). He concludes by praising the qualities of the German people and blaming the war on the Hohenzollern Dynasty and the "Prussian

¹"The German Colonies," *Living Age*, CXXXIII (October 17, 1914), 181-83.

²"Germany's Colonial Losses," *Literary Digest*, XLIX (October 17, 1914), 721.
The article "Germany and Her Place in the African Sun," was a more strongly anti-German British commentary. The tone of the article was propagandistic and emotional. The author, William Greiswell, said that the sole purpose of Germany's entrance into the World War was to destroy British Africa, and in order to substantiate this claim, he cited instances of German intrigue in the Union of South Africa before the outbreak of war. He said further that Germany, in turn, had no legal claim to any land in Africa by virtue of her use of deception to gain possession of territory.  

F. T. Piggott's article, "The German Colonial Blunder" was a refutation of the German claim for the necessity of colonial expansion on the grounds that Britain has always been willing to share her colonies with merchants and settlers from other countries, while A. Wyatt Tilby, in a following article in the same magazine again made the argument for the seizure and retention of Germany's colonies, this time on the basis of Britain's need to consolidate and safeguard her central and south African possessions. Following Tilby was Evans Lowin's article on the "First German Colony," which traced the history of German colonization, especially in


2William Greiswell, "Germany and Her Place in the African Sun," Fortnightly, CII (November, 1914), 774-82.
South West Africa, and decried the rigid methods of administration and the arrogance of the Germans in colonial matters.¹

"Germany's Terms," by Hans Delbrück, appeared in Atlantic, as an early German reply in an American magazine. Delbrück, a German editor, demanded a colonial adjustment following a German victory in Europe which would have balanced the colonial territories of Britain, France, and Germany. Several combinations of territory were proposed, but all would have resulted in one large German colony in Africa rather than the separate existing ones. He went on to set forth five conditions for any realignment of African territory:

First, that national, and not commercial interests of Germany, should decide the question; commercial interests should take second place in this matter.

Secondly, the object of German colonial aspirations must be a vast, compact territory wherein the German Spirit can rule by its own strength.

Thirdly, any territorial changes should be made quickly.

Fourthly, Germany should not hesitate to purchase Portuguese Angola.

Fifthly, that a colonial balance would insure peace for a long time to come.²

In "Germany, Africa, and Terms of Peace," Sir H. H. Johnston restated his position that in spite of his earlier admiration for German colonization, he believed that Germany must be made to give

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²Hans Delbrück, "Germany's Terms," Atlantic, CXV (April 1915), 526-33.
up her colonies in payment of war debts, as these are her only remaining source of wealth.¹

John Harris, a British Missionary and traveler who wrote an article on "German Treatment of Natives," said that German "iron-fist" methods and rigid administrative structure were unacceptable to the native, and that whenever the native interfered with German rule he was destroyed. He made the plea that Britain had the duty to rescue the natives from the harshness of the Germans.²

In a later article, Harris wrote of seven reasons against the return of the colonies. The reasons given by him from Germany's viewpoint were that the colonies had few white settlers and that the status of German authority would be destroyed by defeat. From the native viewpoint, the native would be free from German exploitation and safe from reprisals for aiding the Allies. The political reasons were the expectations of the Dominions and France for territories. The final reason was that the German forced labor system was inefficient.³

In "The Cameroons: An Object Lesson in German Colonial Government," Cyril Cox detailed German treatment of the natives


²John H. Harris, "Germany's Treatment of Native Races and Britain's Duty," Nineteenth Century, LXXVII (July, 1915), 44-51.

³John H. Harris, "Germany's Colonial Empire: Seven Reasons Against Restoration," Nineteenth Century, LXXXI (May, 1917), 1157-63.
in Cameroon, and compared the British colonial, economic, and judicial systems with the German. Under the British, the natives kept their own land and sold their produce to British merchants, while the Germans ran large plantations where the natives were forced to live and work, and where they lacked personal freedom and private property, which resulted in a lack of incentive to produce on the part of the native and was the cause of failure in Cameroon. In regard to justice, the British were very strict in regard to native rights and welfare, even at the expense of the whites, while German justice served the needs of the state and the native had no rights, merely obligations. This, said the author, was the cause of native disaffection for the German.1

Another German article, this time by Gustav Noske, Social Democratic Deputy to the Reichstag, denounced the idea that Germany had planned aggression against British African possessions, and claims, instead, that Britain only wished to get rid of German competition and bring German commerce and need for raw materials under British domination. He went on to cite growing trade and increased expenditures for public health made by the Germans. The natives, he said, are much better off for having been under German rule. (This last was in contrast to his earlier statements in the Reichstag. cf. p. 41.) He concluded that in the

future, colonial systems should be regulated by an international agreement concerning the disposition and governing of all African territories.¹

Three articles, "Germany's Colonial Crimes," "Germany and the African Native," and "Barbarity in the German Colonies," all appeared in 1918, and had in common the depicting of German savagery in the repression of the Herero uprising... All three attempted to paint a horror picture of atrocities committed in Africa, and all were based on the "Blue Book" published by the Union of South Africa shortly after the conquest of German South West Africa. This book purported to reveal the crimes of the Germans as they were related by the natives and was the basis for most British claims of German misrule in Africa. All three articles were designed to shock the reader and support a decision against the return of Germany's colonies.²

Some of the literature of the immediate post-war era tended to continue the British proposition that Germany was unfit, because of her Prussian militaristic mentality, to rule over native peoples. Some examples of this were the following articles: The first was by Charles Burke Elliott, who argued that the colonies

¹Gustav Noske, "Colonial Policy After the War," Living Age, CCXCVII (June, 1918), 810-16.

²"Germany's Colonial Crimes," Literary Digest, LIV (October 26, 1918), 21; "Germany and the African Native," op. cit., pp. 370-72; and "Barbarity in the German Colonies," Literary Digest, LIV (November 16, 1918), 54-56.
should be held in trust by an international commission or the League of Nations until such time as Germany is deemed "cured" and able again to administer them. He deviated from the usual British line in that he envisioned an ultimate return of German colonial possessions. The second was by Anita Allen Perrine, who said that German misrule in the colonies was not only the fault of local authorities, but represented official German policy. The third article, by Evans Lewin again, re-emphasized German inability to rule alien races, but praised German accomplishments in the fields of scientific investigation of tropical resources and the elimination of disease. In this respect, he shared the admiration for German scientific and engineering accomplishment shown by Sir H. H. Johnston. His conclusion was that the failure of German farmers to migrate in large numbers to the colonies and work the land themselves had made the colonies ineffective.¹

A somewhat different outlook, than was usually given by British writers, was supplied by Noel Buxton, who reminded his fellow countrymen that they had praised Germany's rule in Africa before the war, and said that the exclusion of Germany from Africa was impractical. He suggested, instead, that an international agreement concerning the governing of African territories should

¹Charles Burke Elliott, "The German Colonies and Their Future," Review of Reviews, LX (January, 1919), 72-76; Anita Allen Perrine, "German Africa and the Peace Conference," Outlook, CXXI (January 22, 1919), 146-46; and Evans Lewin, "German Colonial Administration," Atlantic, CXXXIII (April, 1919), 530-34.
be instituted and that territorial adjustments should be made which would satisfy Germany's wishes and guarantee peace through a balance of African claims. In this instance, his views were very similar to Delbrück's and Noske's.¹

In the period preceding the outbreak of war, we have seen from the above that seven out of eight articles were either in praise of Germany's colonialism or at least not opposed to it. The coming of war brought a dramatic reversal of opinion, with twelve hostile and only five favorable comments. In summary, British accounts of German colonization up until the outbreak of war were favorable. The only hostile note on the Herero Rebellion was caused by the fear that it might spread to surrounding British possessions. There was no mention of German brutality, nor was it implied that Germany had any aggressive plans in Africa. In fact, as far as colonial expansion on the part of the Germans was concerned, Britain saw no reason why Germany shouldn't desire to link up her colonies, as long as she followed peaceful means to do so.

With the coming of war, the British opinion of German rule did an about face. Some writers like Sir H. H. Johnston and Evans Lewin, continued their earlier affection for German accomplishments, but joined their countrymen in demanding the forfeiture of Germany's possessions. The alleged grounds for this demand were

the German mistreatment of the natives, based largely on incidents in the Herero Rebellion, the aggressive intention of Germany to conquer neighboring colonies of other powers, and the claim of the Allies for just reparations for which the colonies represented Germany's best assets.

The Germans, for their part, did not have much to say, as Britain controlled the lines of communication between Germany and the rest of the world. Two who did get their views published in America took opposite lines. One based his views on the assumption of a German victory and laid down the conditions Germany would demand in any African settlement. The other, writing later in the war, called for an international agreement to safeguard the interests and rights of all parties in Africa, including the Germans.

VII. THE ECONOMIC BALANCE SHEET

Sir H. H. Johnston, writing in 1911 of Germany's colonies said:

She has secured a mountainous tract in West Africa—Togoland—which is likely to be of great commercial importance. In the Cameroon there lies vegetable and mineral wealth of incalculable value; already diamonds and copper in South West Africa are atoning for lack of rainfall, while in German East Africa we are about to see a remarkable development in tropical agriculture and in the rearing of livestock, besides perhaps more diamond mining. ¹

Such were the resources as noted by a British authority on Africa. Getting at these resources was a problem which had

been for a long time in the hands of private companies. In the
reform period following the 1906–1907 Parliamentary upheaval the
Imperial government began to take a greater interest in the econ-
omic development of the colonies.

Up to 1913 and beyond, Germany's colonies were costing more
than they were returning.\textsuperscript{1} Eltzbacher estimates the cost of pro-
tection in the colonies at 11,000,000 per year, or 1,400 per year
for each bona-fide colonist in each of the territories.\textsuperscript{2}

Townsend shows in Table II that in a three year period,
colonial costs (in Marks) continued to rise faster than revenue,
necessitating ever larger Imperial Grants to meet the deficit.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Colonial Balances, 1803–1913 (Marks)}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Year & Colonial Costs & Colonial Revenue & Deficit \\
\hline
1803 & 42,164,000 & 9,351,000 & 27,813,000 \\
1804 & 147,286,000 & 11,586,000 & 65,801,000 \\
1805 & 204,281,000 & 15,836,000 & 78,824,000 \\
1806 & 168,988,000 & 16,080,000 & 110,908,000 \\
1807 & 155,583,000 & 24,110,000 & 131,473,000 \\
1808 & 66,110,000 & 42,000,000 & 26,560,000 \\
1809 & 82,485,000 & 43,720,000 & 38,765,000 \\
1810 & 96,890,000 & 53,180,000 & 43,510,000 \\
1811 & 87,830,000 & 64,520,000 & 23,110,000 \\
1812 & 93,910,000 & 67,970,000 & 25,940,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

*Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire,
pp. 240; 264.

\textsuperscript{1}"The Weakness of Germany's Colonial System," op. cit., p. 236.
\textsuperscript{2}Eltzbacher, op. cit., p. 256.
\textsuperscript{3}Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire,
p. 240.
These costs represented investments in harbors, roads, and railroads, which did not directly benefit the Fatherland; and also the expense of opposing native uprisings, the Herero Rebellion alone costing the government 323,260,000 Marks.¹

Harris said that all of the German colonies combined supplied Germany with less than two per cent of her imports of those raw materials which the colonies exported, and not more than one-half of one per cent of all the raw materials, domestic and imported, consumed by German industry.² Townsend bore this out when she said that in 1904 the colonial trade was 64,459,000 Marks, while the total foreign trade was 18,278,100,000 Marks—one-half of one per cent being colonial.³ Curt L. Heymann gives Germany's trade balance as follows: In the four years preceding World War I, Germany's imports amounted to $2,750,000,000 of which the colonies furnished $14,000,000, or about one-half of one per cent. Of Germany's exports, the colonies consumed seven-tenths of one per cent.⁴

The appointment of Dr. Dernburg following the government's

¹Ibid., pp. 240; 264. ²Harris, op. cit., p. 120.
³Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 236. For purposes of illustration, amounts are quoted in Marks or Pounds Sterling. Taking 1909 as the median year (between 1900 and 1918), the equivalent in U. S. Gold Dollars is as follows: $4.86,6 1/2; = 20.43 M. Source: The World Almanac and Encyclopedia, 1909 (New York: Press Publishing Company, 1909), p. 461.
⁴Heymann, op. cit., p. 46. Heymann, as well as Townsend and Harris, are speaking of all of Germany's colonies, though it must be remembered that the bulk of trade was with Africa.
victory in 1907 (see also Chapter II) marked a turn in the economic fortunes of the colonies. As a result of the research and development projects carried on by the Colonial Ministry, some of Germany's needs were beginning to be met at the start of World War I. By 1914 the colonies were supplying one-twelfth of the vegetable fats and oils, one-fifth of the rubber, one-fifth of the cocoa, 100 per cent of the sisal hemp, and a large part of the demand for phosphate. Attempts to cultivate coffee in East Africa and tobacco in Cameroon were unsuccessful.

A look at the value of colonial products at the end of 1912 shows them in the following order (in millions of Marks):¹

1. Diamonds 30.4
2. Rubber 20.9
3. Palm Kernels and Oil 10.8
4. Sisal 7.4
5. Copper 6.3
6. Cocoa 4.5

The foreign trade balance for the year 1901-1912 (in thousands of Marks) is shown in Table III.

| TABLE III |
| AFRICAN COLONIAL TRADE BALANCE, 1901-1912 (THOUSANDS OF MARKS) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>33,408</td>
<td>15,820</td>
<td>17,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>37,024</td>
<td>16,879</td>
<td>13,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>34,882</td>
<td>21,678</td>
<td>13,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>40,672</td>
<td>20,581</td>
<td>19,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>62,514</td>
<td>23,438</td>
<td>39,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>113,517</td>
<td>25,523</td>
<td>88,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>60,199</td>
<td>35,933</td>
<td>24,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>64,264</td>
<td>37,726</td>
<td>26,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>97,615</td>
<td>58,264</td>
<td>39,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>119,949</td>
<td>82,843</td>
<td>37,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>130,131</td>
<td>81,579</td>
<td>48,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>128,478</td>
<td>103,748</td>
<td>24,730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Henderson, op. cit., p. 135.

¹Beer, op. cit., p. 18.
These figures show that the African colonies were increasing their exports after 1906, but were still showing a trade deficit. With trade and economic development, general business interest increased so that by 1914, 400 companies and firms were active in the overseas territories. Included were 10 banks, 9 steamship lines, 47 mining companies, 136 plantation and stock raising companies, 49 diamond concerns, and 109 miscellaneous industrial firms. The total amount of capital invested was estimated at 505,000,000 Marks German and 88,900,000 Marks foreign. ¹

Finally, German colonial economic history may be divided between the period preceding 1907, and the one following it. The first was a period of conquest and exploitation, an attempt to "get rich quick" without concern for long-range development. The second was that of "Scientific Colonization," with the government bringing scientific knowledge, political administration, and financial investment to bear on the problem of making the colonies not only self-sufficient, but also, a source of much needed raw material for the Fatherland.²

Things were getting better by the start of World War I. Togoland was self-sufficient and South West Africa was showing a trade profit, largely in diamonds. We now turn to the final chapter in German colonial history, the loss of the colonies.

¹Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 265.
²For an economic summary of the German African colonies in 1913-1914, see Table IV in the Appendix.
CHAPTER IV

THE END OF THE COLONIAL EMPIRE

Germany's colonial empire, which she had so quickly acquired, was destined to be as quickly lost in World War I. How the colonies were lost, the basis for their removal from German control, and German attempts to justify restoration, will be the subjects of this chapter.

I. THE WAR IN AFRICA

The defense of the colonies against attack from Britain and her allies presented Germany with a serious problem in 1914. The combined white and native forces, both army and police, in all of the colonies numbered only 11,000. These troops, scattered over a continent, were incapable of serious aggressive action against neighboring colonies. Since it would be impossible to send reinforcements from Germany, the Germans counted on a quick and decisive victory in the Western Front to both preserve and extend their overseas possessions.

The official view in Germany seems to have been that her weakness in Africa made it impossible to defend the colonies against any determined attack. Consequently an attempt was made to keep the colonies outside the range of hostilities. The German Government invoked Article II of the Berlin Congo Act of 1885, which
provided that territories in the conventional Congo Basin should, if possible, be under the rule of neutrality in wartime. But no sanction had been provided to enforce this Article and the signatories of the General Act had only agreed to use their good offices to prevent the spreading of hostilities to the Congo region. The Allies rejected German suggestions that no hostilities should take place in Africa.

The German government then told the local commanders to make out the best they could. Some officials, however, felt that the colonial forces should attack Allied positions and thus pin down a considerable Allied force in Africa and take the pressure off the Western Front. Some attacks were carried out, though there were differences of opinion between military and civil officials.

In the campaigns themselves, the Allied powers quickly overran Togoland, while Cameroon and South West Africa took a longer time to "defeat." The heaviest fighting was in East Africa, where the German and native troops, under the able leadership of General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, managed to hold out until 1918.

Two aspects of the conquest of the German colonies are worth mentioning. First of all, as far as Great Britain was concerned, it was an Imperial enterprise. It was troops from the Dominions, from India, and from the Crown Colonies that bore the brunt of the struggle. South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand considerably extended their spheres of interest and their outlook on world
politics as a result of these campaigns. Secondly, the determined resistance put up by local German commanders, particularly by von Littow-Vorbeck against heavy odds caught the imagination of the German public. Before 1914 there had been some apathy in Germany concerning colonial enterprise. After the overseas possessions had been lost, the memory of their defense helped to keep alive the colonial idea in Germany.¹

The Treaty of Versailles spelled the end of German Africa. Indeed, it had ceased to exist even before negotiations were begun, Britain having at last subdued East Africa in 1918. Moreover, the Allies were determined to keep what they had won, as evidenced by secret treaties which were made between them earlier in the war. For instance, a treaty was signed between Great Britain and France on March 4, 1916, dividing Togoland and Cameroon between them, and Britain and France together signed a treaty with Italy in 1915 whereby the Italians were promised compensation in Africa if either of the other powers enlarged their holdings there. Added to these treaties were "hopeful expectations:" Those of South Africa for South West Africa and Belgium for a piece of East Africa.²

The Allied cause for making Germany give up her possessions overseas were based on the position that Germany had mistreated

¹The foregoing is based on Henderson, op. cit., pp. 96-108.

²Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, pp. 378-79.
native peoples, that the colonies were bases for imperialist aggression against neighboring territories, and that Germany would suffer no great economic loss if the colonies were removed. These views are stated in "The Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace":

Germany's decision in the sphere of colonial civilization has been revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers consenting to make a second experiment of their assuming the responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them.

Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers felt themselves compelled to safeguard their own security and the peace of the world against a military imperialism which sought to establish bases whence it could pursue a policy of interference and intimidation against the other powers.

The Allied and Associated Powers considered that the loss of her colonies would not hinder Germany's normal economic development.¹

Germany's reply was that she had legally acquired the colonies and her ownership had been acknowledged by all of the powers. The colonies, the Germans went on to say, would be of even greater necessity after the war, as the low exchange rate and decreased earning capacity made it difficult to purchase necessary raw materials from other countries. Furthermore, Germany had the right and duty of all civilized countries to explore the world scientifically and to educate backward races. The Germans went on to

reiterate the accomplishments of the colonial administration in abolishing the slave trade, restoring order to feuding tribes, opening up the interior to trade, administering equal justice to white and native, controlling tropical disease, and education. As further evidence of their good works, the Germans mentioned the many ante-bellum testimonials of other powers to Germany's success as a colonizer. 1

The whole basis of Allied charges against German rule were regarded as the "Colonial Guilt Lie," (Kolonial-schuldüge). Dr. Heinrich Schnee, former governor of East Africa, in his book, German Colonization Past and Future, goes to great length to explode the "myths" about German colonial administration. He cites the numerous favorable comments made on German rule before the war and the lack of any criticism concerning the rule of the natives. The charges of misconduct made by Erzberger and Noske in the Reichstag were only half the story: These two men also defended the colonies in their other writings.

The charge of aggressive planning and militarization of the natives is shown to be false on the basis that the whole number of white and colored troops on the continent at the beginning of the war was quite small. These forces had only meager supplies and were armed in most instances with obsolete weapons. 2

1"Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace," International Conciliation, XLI (October, 1919), 81-55.
The whole group of charges of misconduct made in the Reichstag at the time of the Parliamentary crises of 1906-1907 were investigated by a special commission, of which Dr. Schnee was a member, and were found to be false in most cases. Where the charges of cruelty were substantiated, punishments were meted out to the offenders. Dr. Schnee says that the whole story of misrule seems pointless when one considers what the state of these territories was before Germany took them over. At that time, the various tribes were engaged in slave-hunting and warfare, and peaceful pursuit of agriculture and commerce were impossible. The advent of German rule changed all this and brought order, stability, and prosperity to these areas.

The native revolts are explained by Schnee on the following basis: The Arab Revolt of East Africa was caused by the German repression of the slave trade; the Maji-Maji Rebellion by a wizard, or witch doctor, who incited the natives—not the hut tax, as formerly believed; the Herero Rebellion was caused by the natives, who massacred German settlers out of fear of losing their land. The cruelties which accompanied this conflict were not supported by the German government and were the result of natural hatred for the murder of fellow Germans.

The use of the whip by the Germans was justified by being the only means to deal with the backward native. Schnee says, however, that its use was restricted and controlled.

Forced labor, says Schnee, was only used on public works.
Plantations and other private works employed only volunteers. The high death-rate among plantation workers was caused by the inability of the native to adjust to different climates where he was to work. In any event, regulations were in force requiring plantation owners to provide medical and hospital facilities for their workers.\(^1\)

In spite of the defenses made by the Germans, they were still forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, Article 119 of which read:

Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions.\(^2\)

II. CONCLUSION

Some features of German Colonization deserve notice. The colonies were acquired rapidly. There was little friction with foreign powers, although Britain and some of her dominions were concerned over the establishment of German rule in areas into which they had hoped to expand, e.g., Cape Colony over South West Africa. Gladstone wished Germany "Godspeed" in her colonial career and welcomed her as "Our Ally in the execution of the Great purpose

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 114-28; 138-40.

\(^2\)"Treaty of Peace With Germany," International Conciliation, CXLII (September, 1919), 84. Today Togoland and Cameroon are independent, East Africa (Tanganyika) is moving toward independence. South West Africa is still technically a mandate, but is actually a part of the Republic of South Africa.
of Providence." The frictions that did exist were settled amicably.¹

The German colonial empire had two elements of weakness in it from the start. First, it had no geographical unity such as that possessed by the colonies of Britain and France. It was composed of isolated regions which other powers had not bothered to occupy. Secondly, it lacked important strategic points—such as Walvis Bay (South West Africa) and the island of Zanzibar (off East Africa) and Fernando Po (off the Cameroons)—which were already in the hands of other countries. These weaknesses, combined with limited sea power, made Germany's colonies easy prey for the Allies during World War I.

In all of the colonies, annexation had been preceded by trading. They were tropical plantations and commercial possessions with white settlement in any large numbers limited to parts of South West Africa and East Africa. In 1911 the African possessions had only 16,891 German inhabitants, many of them officials and not permanent residents. At first the colonies were ruled by chartered companies, but this system failed to work and they were replaced by the Imperial Government, leaving the companies to commercial exploitation. Although primarily commercial adventures, the colonies' trade wasn't very extensive. In the nineties development had been retarded somewhat by the policy of Dr. Kayser who

¹Henderson, op. cit., p. 117.
made unduly large land concessions to a few companies. In 1913 colonial trade was only one-half per cent of total German commerce, but was growing.

The Germans made mistakes at first. The administration had been placed in the hands of unsuitable officials, who ruled on Prussian military and bureaucratic lines, which proved unsatisfactory. Natives frequently lost their lands; they were compelled to perform forced labor; they were often cruelly treated; and little attention was paid to their customs. Many high officials were dismissed from their jobs for mistreating the natives, one of whom was Karl Peters. Repression led to uprisings which were savagely put down.

But there was a brighter side. Arab slave trade was suppressed in East Africa with the cooperation of the British. Many officials, doctors, and missionaries, did good works and showed a conscientious desire for the welfare of the native. There was an improvement in administration following the 1905-1907 Parliamentary Crisis. Dr. Dernburg, the first Minister of the Colonies, inaugurated a new era of scientific colonization, whereby economic, scientific, and administrative skills were brought to bear on the problems of the colonies. Officials were carefully trained at the various German universities and schools offering work in the colonial field. The government bought back much of the land that had been given away. New regulations for native welfare restricted corporal punishment and regulated the conditions of native labor.
Domestic slavery was slowly phased out. Public works were built and railway mileage greatly increased. The new policy had been in force only eight years when war broke out, but significant progress had already been made.

During the war, colonial enthusiasts demanded the establishment of Mittelafrika, the linking together of existing colonies, at Allied expense. The German colonies, however, were easily conquered. Only in East Africa did the Germans put up serious resistance. In 1919 the victors partitioned the German Colonial Empire largely on the basis of Allied agreements made during the war.

Germany strongly resented what she considered the "colonial guilt lie" (Kolonialshuldübe), based on charges of misgovernment made by the Allies. They said that when natives were mistreated, the responsible officials were punished. They never militarized the natives under their rule as France and other countries had done. They considered their colonial administration better than that of Belgium and Portugal and on a par with Britain and France.

German rule was, on a whole, quite good in spite of early mistakes, mistakes which could be made by any colonial power in its first years. In the early twentieth century Germany seemed to have come of age in colonialism. What German rule would have been like if it had been permitted to continue, no one can say. It seems very probable, though, that it would have compared favorably with other colonial powers.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine some of the characteristics of German colonialism including the background and development of colonial thought, the acquisition of colonies and their administration, the relations between the German masters and their native subjects, and, finally, to examine the "colonial guilt lie," as Germany termed the charges against her during World War I.

German colonialism came much later in time than the colonial systems of her neighbours, but Germany had a strong background by way of exploration, missionary work, and trade. When the unification of the German State was completed, Germans began to look beyond their borders to areas where they might find their "place in the sun."

In the 1880's, public opinion had been made receptive to the prospect of overseas expansion through the efforts of the Colonial Society. Prince Bismarck listened attentively to the demands of the colonialists, but did not take action on them until 1884, when a series of events arising over the questions of protection for a German merchant led ultimately to the establishment of the first German colony.

German rule from 1884-1906 was characterized by the exploitive
character of the privileged companies which refused to accept
the responsibility of rule and sought only to enrich their stock-
holders. Following a series of scandals and native revolts, a
Parliamentary crisis in 1906-1907 paved the way for a new colonial
policy. This new policy was marked by efforts of the government
to reclaim land held by chartered companies, to regularize local
government, to insure the safety and welfare of the native, and to
tap the wealth of the colonies for the good of the German nation
instead of a few investors. This was the period of "scientific
colonization" which was beginning to show promise when World War I
intervened.

The outbreak of war spelled the end of the German colonial
adventure, for the colonies fell rapidly into Allied hands with
exception of East Africa. After the war, Germany sought to retain
the colonies, but the Allied Powers considered her unfit for colo-
nial rule, and mandated them instead.

Thus ended Germany's brief experiment in colonialism; an
experiment which had its share of successes and failures; an experi-
ment which for a short time was part of the history of European
colonialism in Africa.
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Figure 1. German African Empire, 1914.
TABLE IV
ECONOMIC STATUS OF COLONIES, 1913-1914*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>German East Africa</th>
<th>South West Africa</th>
<th>Kamerun</th>
<th>Tagoland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area—Square Miles</td>
<td>393,500</td>
<td>322,000</td>
<td>197,498</td>
<td>34,620</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native Population</td>
<td>7,045,770</td>
<td>80,556</td>
<td>3,326,132</td>
<td>1,031,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>5,336</td>
<td>14,830</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Products</td>
<td>Rubber, Sisal,</td>
<td>Live-Stock,</td>
<td>Rubber, Cocoa, Palm-Oils</td>
<td>Palm-Oils, Rubber, Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hides, Coffee</td>
<td>Hides, Diamonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>Gold, Mica</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Ports</td>
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<td>Swakopmund</td>
<td>Victoria,</td>
<td>Anecho,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>Lüderitzbucht</td>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>Lome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>771 miles</td>
<td>1,222 miles</td>
<td>193 miles</td>
<td>203 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>31,418,000 M.</td>
<td>39,000,000 M.</td>
<td>23,356,000 M.</td>
<td>9,958,000 M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>50,309,000 M.</td>
<td>32,500,000 M.</td>
<td>34,241,000 M.</td>
<td>11,427,000 M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue and Expenditure</td>
<td>54,760,000 M.</td>
<td>54,140,000 M.</td>
<td>15,340,000 M.</td>
<td>3,380,000 M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit or Surplus</td>
<td>40,940,000 M.</td>
<td>38,520,000 M.</td>
<td>6,940,000 M.</td>
<td>None</td>
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*Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, p. 265.