THE REASONS WHY THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
PROVIDED FOR PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE
IN JANUARY, 1933

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

If 1898-99 were years of great debate and a turning point in American foreign policy, so were 1932-33. The Great Depression had touched off a long debate on national interest and imperial conscience which came to a climax in that year. The victory of the contractionists of 1933 was as significant as that of the expansionists of 1898.\(^1\) In both cases material interests were so mixed with idealistic motives that simple interpretations will not suffice. Marxist dogma of capitalist depravity in which retention of naval bases left the Philippines "in reality . . . no independence whatever"; and American dogma of independence being the fulfillment of democratic mission, both fall pitifully short of the historical truth, a truth which one may approach only by examination of the particulars.\(^2\)

The problem of this thesis is to establish the motives behind the passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in January, 1933. Special interest is in the "why" of

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\(^2\)Moscow Pravda, (March 21, 1934), cited by Friend, Ibid.
Philippine independence, from the point of view of the United States.

A survey of what has been written on the subject by many authors would leave one largely devoid of any knowledge of the forces producing Philippine independence. The Philippine question as part of American turn-of-the-century imperialism has received a good deal of attention. When it comes to later Philippine-American history, the Islands are usually mentioned only very briefly. This is true of most American histories, whether general or diplomatic, a specialized study of neutrality or isolationism, the 1920's or the Hoover administration.

Reference to the Philippines in these histories is limited to a few well-defined occasions in Japanese-American relations. In the Taft-Katsura and Root-Takahira agreements of 1905 and 1908 one sees that the United States recognized Japanese influence in Korea and Manchuria in return for Japanese renunciation of aggressive designs on the Philippines. But with only one-third of the navy in the Pacific and no major base in the Philippines, Theodore Roosevelt made a dramatic reversal of position and declared they had become "our heel of Achilles... all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous."¹

This "heel of Achilles" argument is almost universally quoted by historians and Congressmen alike, often in discussions of the Manchurian Crisis of 1931.

Another common Philippine entrance onto the stage of historical reference is in conjunction with the Washington Conferences of 1921-22, and one is told that fortifications were foregone in Guam and the Philippines in return for Japanese acceptance of the short end of a 5:5:3 capital warship ratio with the United States and Great Britain. A similar thing happened in the London Naval Conferences of 1930. Except for the occasional mention of the Philippine Independence Bill, the Islands generally do not enter into these histories again until the attack of Pearl Harbor (and Manila Bay) in 1941.

The casual reader, if he thought about it at all, could almost get the naive impression that the question of Philippine independence was not controversial. In the general neglect of the question, the motives producing independence do not emerge. What relationship does freeing the Philippines have to the depression? to the popular psychology of those crucial times? to resurging American isolationism? to the Japanese threat and the national security of the United States? Most historical sources do not say. It is expected that an
investigation of these facets of the question of Philippine independence will lead to a better understanding of the crucial years 1929-33 to which this work will be limited.

All authors, of course, do not neglect the Philippine question. On a polarity to the authors of neglect are a limited number of specialized studies which investigate the motives producing independence. If the question of Philippine independence has been neglected in general, here one finds that the economic motive has been emphasized in particular.

The first student of the problem, by Grayson L. Kirk, emphasized the economic interests as the cause of Philippine independence. Writing at the time, he charged the United States government with the betrayal of a national trust for which, however, no single group could be held responsible. "It means, rather, that a great ideal was traduced, less by individual or group malevolence than by the sheer force of circumstances bearing inexorably in a depression-ridden democracy upon harassed and none too farsighted public servants."¹

Garel Grunder and William Livezey, writing in 1951, emphasized the economic aspect even more, devoting themselves almost completely to the farm lobby and barely mentioning foreign policy, immigration, or other motives. For example, they credited "increased isolationist sentiment" as a "powerful influence for Philippine independence," and then dismissed it by saying that President Hoover and his advisors "did not subscribe to this policy of scuttle and retreat."¹

Julius W. Pratt, writing in 1950, provided a better balanced but still incomplete discussion of American motives.² And a very recent, and perhaps the most thorough scholar on the subject, Theodore W. Friend, approached the question of Philippine independence as part of a history of the Philippines, and, though giving consideration to various American motives, lacked in detailed analysis.³


²Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950); Friend, loc. cit.

³Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires (New York: Yale University Press, 1965). This shortcoming is largely overcome by a detailed analysis of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act contained in a four-part series of articles appearing in Philippine Studies. For complete reference, see this thesis' bibliography.
A third category of source material includes a number of authors who discuss the problem of Philippine independence, but generally do not attempt their own analysis of motivation. A search of these sources revealed that Kirk's research, as supplemented and broadened by Grunder and Livezey, was heavily relied upon by this third category of writers. The narrowness of the field of historical researchers on this question makes such a finding easy to understand. The pattern of emphasis on the economic motive becomes the more important because it was transferred into a large number of other historical works. "The deciding influence was the lobbying of American interests which wished to exclude Philippine products from America," is found as a recurring theme.¹

Although Kirk did discuss the Japanese "problem", he saw it as one of peaceful penetration.² Post World War II scholars, however, have changed the emphasis to


²Kirk, loc. cit.
the Japanese "threat". Hard-pressed sugar producers and other interests protested bitterly against Philippine competition and Japan's imperialist drive made it clearer than ever before that the islands were indefensible.¹ "... Primarily the depression and secondarily isolationism brought them the long-sought but economically dubious blessing of independence."² Thus some authors included isolationism as a significant motive, but it still remained secondary to the economic.

Upon pursuing the isolationist factor, one will discover a seeming dichotomy between military planning and national policy regarding the Philippines. From the service viewpoint, continued possession of the Philippines, or at least naval bases in the Islands, was absolutely necessary if the United States intended to play a large role in the Far East.³ The Republican policy of retention dictated that the Philippines must


be defended. But the right to fortify the Philippines was surrendered, and with it went all chances of defending the Islands and providing a military sanction for American policy. These seeming contradictions between military strategy and national policy will be investigated as a possible key to Congressional thinking.

Politically, disagreement existed between the political parties regarding what the criteria for Philippine independence should have been. There was also a variation in historical analysis of those differences. Theodore Friend, like most authors, was content to note the lack of objective discussion regarding criteria, saying simply that the two parties had always disagreed on that point. Whitney T. Perkins argued that the party differences were not fundamental, and a bi-partisan policy should have been possible. George E. Taylor agreed that all parties to the debate "took eventual granting of

2Ibid., pp. 25-26.
Philippine independence for granted.\(^1\) Disagreement was reflected by Roy Watson Curry, who contended that, "an unyielding consistency \(\uparrow\) in Philippine policy\(\uparrow\) was not to be expected," because of a basic conflict between imperialist and anti-imperialist forces.\(^2\)

Were the Philippine people capable of governing themselves? Grunder and Livezey concluded that the question of political stability could not be established, but they condemned the Congressional majority's "callous disregard" for the economic and military unpreparedness of the Islands.\(^3\) Former Governor-General William Cameron Forbes, writing in 1928, thought them unready. The Philippines, he said, had not yet had enough training to successfully manage their own affairs.\(^4\) Taylor thought them unready, too, because of the "inevitability of oligarchial rule."\(^5\)


\(^5\) Taylor, *op. cit.*., p. 63.
At the other polarity, Balston Hayden, writing in 1930, thought the Filipinds had acquired a deep sense of nationality.¹ Robert Aura Smith stated that the question of political readiness must positively be answered in the affirmative because it satisfied "what they want."²

This investigator will attempt to formulate conclusions regarding the relative merits of these conflicting historical hypothesis.

The pattern of Philippine-American relations for many years was essentially determined by the passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in January 1933 by the last lame-duck Congress, against the will of the last lame-duck President, in the most severely depressed period in the history of the American economy. Into that period this thesis inquires, to determine the questions of motive—political and social, military and economic—that produced it; and especially to determine whether the emphasis which has been placed upon the economic motive is justified.


²Robert Aura Smith, Our Future in Asia (New York: The Viking Press, 1940), p. 95.
CHAPTER II

PARTY DIFFERENCES

If the Philippines had been ready for independence, it would have been perhaps the most cogent reason for freeing the Islands. But on the vital question of the state of readiness, as well as the method of preparing the Philippines for independence, the two parties historically did not agree.

From the very beginning, Democrats, failing to effect immediate withdrawal from the Philippines, constantly agitated to gain a commitment to independence at some future time. Republicans resisted, partly for political reasons and partly from conviction. They insisted that to stress independence, even as a future goal, would divert efforts from the essentials of preparation for independence.

The question of independence tended to recur as a dominant emotional and political party issue. Since the outcome of this issue could have produced the very independence with which it dealt, a review of party colonial policies and arguments perhaps will serve as a window from which to observe the forces which produced Philippine independence.

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1Perkins, op. cit., p. 195. 2Ibid.
Party arguments largely evolved around whether the Philippines had achieved "stable government," or whether they had achieved "democratic government," which implied a much longer period of education and practice in the exercise of government. ¹

Elihu Root and Howard Taft, architects of the original Republican policy, favored the latter approach. Their policy assumed a long period of tutelage supervised by a large number of Americans so that a permanent imprint would be made on the Filipinos. ² Consummation of independence was, therefore, repeatedly deferred. ³

Republicans did not intend to govern the Philippines permanently, however, without the consent of the governed. ⁴ The goal of ultimate independence was not denied the Filipinos if they wanted it. The possibility of a permanent Philippine-American link was not denied, either. The thought, as Whitney Perkins put it, "intruded" with Republicans that the Filipinos might

² Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 86.
⁴ Ibid., p. 15.
eventually prefer to remain linked with the United States, provided the issues of independence were not unduly magnified nor decided too soon.¹ With both Root and Taft, however, the thought was quite premeditated. Both hoped for an eventual dominion relationship to develop.²

Leading Republicans envisaged a high standard of living in the Philippines achieved through close ties with the United States. Since expanded commercial opportunity in the Far East was one of the main justifications for annexation, it was expected that American investment and the increase in trade would greatly increase the prosperity of the Islands and at the same time profit Americans.³ This could not occur other than by cooperation in the political sphere.

Stability was the sole criterion officially established by the Democrats. By this was meant a government elected by the suffrages of the people, supported by the people, maintaining order and fulfilling its international obligations.⁴ Democrats

¹Perkins, loc. cit.
³Perkins, op. cit., p. 209.
mainly differed from Republicans in their insistence that the Filipinos should largely determine for themselves the form of their political institutions, and that independence should follow, regardless of the interests or desires of the Philippines.¹

True to their philosophy, the Democrats in 1916 passed the Jones Act. The preamble of the bill promised eventual independence—not a permanent link—to the Philippines as soon as stable government should be established.² An effort to attach the Clarke Amendment to grant independence within four years passed the Senate and was defeated only by last minute Republican maneuvering in the House. Defeat came, not from opposition to independence, but rather from objections of dignitaries of the Catholic Church, plus the desire on the part of Republican leaders to maintain party regularity on the eve of a presidential campaign.³

Even though Philippine independence was not granted, it was clear that a substantial number of


²Curry, op. cit., p. 448.

Democrats in Congress expected to sever all ties with the Philippines within a few years.¹ In 1921, President Wilson said he was satisfied that the Filipinos had established "stable" government, and asked an unresponsive Republican Congress to free the Philippines.² The Democratic leadership had proclaimed their belief that the maintenance of stable government had been fulfilled.³

With the return of the Republicans to power in 1921, "stability" once again ceased to be the sole criterion by which the question of Philippine independence was to be judged.⁴ Under Governor-General Leonard Wood, the policy of early independence represented by the Jones Act was reversed. Stressing order and efficiency, Wood aimed at economic advancement with no further extension of self-government and no social or economic experimentation.⁵

The Republican policies of the 1920's, however, could not reverse the actions of the Wilson administration,

¹Perkins, op. cit., p. 221.
³Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 158.
⁴Hayden, op. cit., p. 747.
⁵Perkins, op. cit., p. 234.
which had not only promised eventual independence, but had greatly accelerated Filipino progress toward independence by broadening areas of native participation in government and limiting the scope of American influence and control over the Islands.\textsuperscript{1} The proportion of Americans in government dropped from 29 to 4 per cent, thereby shifting the Philippine Civil Service from a colonial basis to a national one.\textsuperscript{2} The chief means by which the United States, through judicious use of power, could hope to establish a just and effective government according to American standards had been eliminated.\textsuperscript{3} The Republicans could not undo what they thought to be too rapid an extension of self-government because it would cause disillusionment and perhaps active resistance.\textsuperscript{4}

After the near success of the Clarke Amendment, the adoption of the preamble to the Jones Act, and the cut back of the American Civil Service in the Philippines, it was clear that the Republican policy of indefinite postponement was far less realistic than it had been

\textsuperscript{1}Wheeler, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{2}Grunder and Livezey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 158-59.

\textsuperscript{4}Perkins, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 232.
when Taft and Root were formulating their ideals.¹ A situation had been created incompatible with the retention of American sovereignty for any considerable length of time.²

At least one Republican, Henry L. Stimson, remained undismayed. During his short term as Governor-General from 1927 until becoming President Hoover's Secretary of State in 1929, Stimson perhaps made more progress toward the illusive Republican colonial ideals than any other man.³ By giving the Filipino public the more concrete and significant immediate goals of greater political autonomy and economic development, he largely, though temporarily, succeeded in quieting the agitation for independence.⁴ By attracting beneficient American capital, Stimson was able to produce a degree of Filipino prosperity which he thought could dispose of the independence movement by killing it with kindness. His "dearest hope," in fact, was that a permanent connection

¹Ibid., pp. 234-35.

²Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 161.


could be created between the Philippine Islands and the United States.¹

One thing that may have helped Stimson was that the Republican administrations of the 1920's had been able to keep a Republican Congressional lid on the Philippine independence question. Between 1920 and 1929, 39 independence bills were introduced in Congress, but not one was ever reported favorably by a committee of Congress.² This may have been instrumental in creating the apparent disinterest about the Philippines in the 1920's, as well as in concealing a sentiment by a majority, or near majority of Congress in favor of independence.³

Stimson's progress toward his goal of a "permanent connection" was interrupted by the depression. Agitation by pressure groups within the United States for a tariff made it clear to the Filipinos that Stimson was


²Address of Marcial P. Lichauco, Assistant Attorney General of the Philippines, before the Foreign Policy Association of New York. (January 7, 1933), reprinted in the Congressional Record, 72d Congress. 2d Session, pp. 1909-10. (For conciseness, an abbreviated form will subsequently be used for the Congressional Record. The above entry would become: Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 1909-10.)

³Perkins, op. cit., p. 240.
not America, and that his policy might not long be American policy. Thus the Filipinos re-opened for urgent consideration their demands for independence.¹

As the Philippine debate carried into the 1930's, the two parties, as always, differed in their estimates of readiness. Arguments followed essentially the same pattern as that seen at the turn of the century. Indeed, the debates of 1932-33 often echoed the political content of the debates of 1898-99. The old Senator Beveridge manifestations of dollars, defense, deity and destiny were still enjoined by administrative leaders, but they were now more than offset by Judge Hoar's words "right, justice, duty, and freedom," now used as a rejoinder by members of the Congress.²

President Hoover's cabinet, especially Secretary of State Stimson and Secretary of War Hurley, exerted all the influence at their disposal to persuade against the feasibility of Philippine independence.

Stimson was most concerned with the effects of independence on American foreign policy. He also thought that "resulting economic distress would provoke resentment

¹Bundy, op. cit., p. 146.
²Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., pp. 70, 72.
and unrest in the islands."¹ Future generations of Americans and Filipinos would lose a chance to benefit from that "remarkable and successful experiment in cooperation between these two peoples."²

Patrick J. Hurley, whose office administered Philippine policy, led the fight to retain the Philippines. He was the chief spokesman, although probably not the most influential one, for retention. Although he, too, offered the opinion that international conditions did not justify independence, and that the Philippines could not defend themselves from aggression, Hurley emphasized political and economic arguments.³

The Filipino people were not reasonably prepared, politically and economically, said Hurley, to accept independence. A stable government had not been established with reasonable assurance that it would continue to exist. Independence would therefore be harmful to the Filipino people.⁴


²Ibid.


⁴Ibid.
Economic independence, Hurley said, was a prerequisite of political independence. Independence would result in economic and financial chaos, with a resultant inability to manage governmental expenses or to pay debts. This, he agreed with Stimson, would bring great internal disorder.¹

Hurley emphasized that any trade relations which would be established in the distant future after projected independence should be effected gradually before independence. He wanted to begin to restrict Philippine free imports and Filipino immigration to the United States without fixing a date for independence.² His doctrine demanded not only stable government, but also economic independence and more perfect social standards.³

Another argument offered by some Republicans included the ill effects such a move would have on the United States. Abandonment would be harmful to the commercial interests of the United States.⁴ The Philippines

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 1928.

³Address by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman to the Catholic University in Washington, D. C., (December 12, 1932), reprinted in the Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 1171-72. Schurman was a member of the American Commission to the Philippines under President McKinley.

⁴Raymond Leslie Buell, "Philippine Independence," an article prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Policy Association, reprinted in the Cong. Rec., 71:2, p. 8423. Senator Hawes introduced the article as being an "impartial statement."
were still needed as a commercial base, and in time would become an entrepôt for American trade into the Far East and Southeast Asia, though they had admittedly proved disappointing in that role so far.¹

Along with market predictions for a profitable trade, the United States had to keep the Philippines in the name of Christianity, even though ninety per cent of the native people were Roman Catholic.² Besides, Republican's rationalized, the Filipino _tao_ (peasant) really did not want independence.³

Although most of the concrete data to free the Islands was economic in character, the warp, and sometimes the woof, of the arguments consisted of moral obligations—moral obligations to grant freedom to the Islands and moral obligation to retain them—said Charles Beard, "as if there were something reprehensible in the clean economic motive."⁴

¹Wheeler, _op. cit._, p. 384.
²_Ibid._, pp. 382, 384.
³_Ibid._, p. 382; Hurley Report, _loc. cit._
The doubtful stability of an independent Filipino government would erode the value of American commercial investment. Such depreciation would "constitute a species of moral repudiation both undignified and dishonorable."¹

Because the Philippines reportedly were not politically, socially, or economically ready for independence, the Philippine independence bill morally forsook the "high ground of conscientious trusteeship followed for thirty years for the lower levels of attempted political and economic expediency."² Said one contemporary critic, "What we proclaimed as a venture in international altruism turns out to have been very close to a confidence game."³ Those favoring independence would harm the Philippines, and disguise the injury with the "kiss of independence."⁴ The President, to the extent he stood opposed to such motives, was said to stand on "impregnable

¹Buell, loc. cit.


³Morrison, Ibid., p. 113.

⁴Pratt, op. cit., p. 310.
moral ground."¹ The United States must be true to its trust; freeing the Islands would lead to destruction of Filipino rights and would be "repugnant to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution."²

Thus it was that old Philippine hands, some "dripping with sentiment," did not believe the mission of the United States had been accomplished.³ But their prophecy of chaos if the United States withdrew cast more doubt upon a full generation of socio-political construction in the Philippines than most Americans were willing to sustain.⁴

The Democrats offered several arguments of their own in favor of Philippine independence. First of all, the Filipinos desired it. Their war against the Spaniards and Americans, and perpetual demand for independence were cited as "proof."⁵

In the second place, the Islands had been given repeated promises by spokesmen of the United States, including declarations of several presidents, Republican

¹Morrison, loc. cit.
⁴Ibid.
as well as Democratic, and the Preamble to the Jones Act.\textsuperscript{1} It was the policy of the government, said the Democrats, to free rather than to retain the Philippines.\textsuperscript{2}

A third argument was that the Philippine people were able to maintain a stable government. They occupied all local positions and most positions in the central government, and were conducting, except in a few instances, the affairs of government.\textsuperscript{3} They were reasonably similar in race, language, religion and ideals, or at least their differences were no greater than in other bilingual countries. Their literacy rate was said to be greater than in many Latin American countries.\textsuperscript{4}

It was stated that the United States was not justified to exact perfection from the Philippines as a condition for independence.\textsuperscript{5} Dr. Jacob Schurman stated the sentiment poetically:

\begin{quote}
To gild refined gold, to paint the lily,
\ldots or add another hue
Unto the rainbow, \ldots
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess.\textsuperscript{6}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{3}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{4}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{6}Schurman Address, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 1173.
\end{itemize}
Congressman Lozier of Missouri argued that the competency of a people to govern themselves was not the same in any two nations or in any two republics.\(^1\) Senator King later expanded the same idea, stating a rationalization which seemed to typify the attitude of a large number of Congressmen. He said:

"We do not owe the Filipinos so much that we have to go over there and Americanize them. . . . I think the Filipinos should swim along with the Asiatics; in other words, according to what is over there."\(^2\)

Representative Hare said his purpose for conducting hearings was to ascertain whether or not the condition precedent to granting independence, or, stable government, had been met. He concluded that

". . . our government at no time assumed the obligation to see to it that the Filipino people would be able indefinitely to maintain a government from a financial standpoint before granting them independence. Nevertheless, we are thoroughly convinced that they are as able to maintain and govern in their way as we are to maintain a stable government in our way."\(^3\)

The fourth argument in favor of independence was that the Filipinos were more of an economic and financial liability than an asset to the United States. The duty-free entrance of Philippine products was alleged to

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\(^1\)\textit{Cong. Rec.}, 72:1, p. 1240.

\(^2\)\textit{Cong. Rec.}, 73:2, p. 5009.

\(^3\)\textit{Cong. Rec.}, 72:1, p. 2777.
injure the American farmer, while the unrestricted immigration of Filipino laborers was causing trouble on the Pacific coast.¹

The final argument was that Philippine independence would terminate the strategic difficulty which the occupation of the islands imposed upon the United States.² They were of doubtful advantage from a purely trade standpoint, had little or no utility in time of war, and might even become a burden and threat to the United States in the event of our embroilment with certain powers.³ Representative Garber of Oklahoma argued that the stable government which we were required to establish to secure independence was within and not without the Philippines. If the United States had to guarantee the latter, such a requirement would preclude independence at any time.⁴

Proponents of Philippine independence had an especially large amount of moral ammunition to add to their barrage of arguments. One of the reasons for this was that the Filipinos themselves supplied much of it.

¹Buell, "Philippine Independence," loc. cit.
²Ibid.
³House Report, loc. cit.
None of the groups pushing the independence question had to take a bad public position; they were defenders of "liberty."

The House Committee on Insular Affairs set the tone for the moral theme when it nicely dovetailed interest and principle. "Our self-interest and our self-respect coincide in demanding action," was the report. Mr. Tucker, noting that the benefit of American occupation to the Filipinos was greater than the total cost to the American taxpayers, also appended the moral factor: "... It is a question whether Americans desire to be taxed to benefit Filipinos and whether it is socially desirable or morally right that they should be."2

Representative Harold Knutson of Minnesota, who once bluntly stated that "charity begins at home ... the United States of America comes first," nevertheless saw fit to charge that much of the opposition to Philippine independence was based on selfish considerations.3

1House Report, loc. cit.


3Cong. Rec., 71:2, pp. 690, 8869.
Agrarian and labor representatives condemned industry and commerce representatives for using moral obligation as a ground of opposition to independence to cover their profit-making activities in the Islands.¹

Representative Cross of Texas called the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce an "avaricious group, parading in sheep's clothes," who were attempting to vanquish freedom by the "lance of greed plated with gold." He added, sarcastically, "How their altruistic hearts do palpitate with sympathy" for those "ignorant yellow peoples."²

Perhaps it was as the Philippine Resident Commissioner Osias stated, that pro-independence forces were engaged in enlightened selfishness, in addition to their ethical reasons.³ The opposition, presumably, was engaged in crass selfishness.

Senator Hawes credited the opposition with being sincere, but imbued, he said, with a wrong sense of patriotism. Those so dead against "lowering the American flag" were almost willing to lower the moral standards which the Stars and Stripes had always symbolized. He

¹Beard, op. cit., p. 513.
²Cong. Rec., 71:2, p. 8798.
The promises of the United States are of supreme import. It is the ethical factor of the problem. They are a sacred obligation, unless we have come to believe that America's word of honor may be given and withdrawn as material advantage or political exigencies dictate.

The primary reason for granting independence to the Philippines, according to several Congressmen, was because our government "promised" it; thus, it was a moral obligation of this country to fulfill its promises. Various declarations made by every president since McKinley were cited in the "Spirit of '76." In addition, it was recalled that overseas empire was contrary to Jeffersonian traditions.

To withhold independence from the Philippines because it might disturb peace in the Orient would be to "recognize an unsound philosophy or policy repugnant to the very best traditions of our nation," and violate the principles of our own Declaration of Independence by violating government only by consent of the governed.

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3 Ibid.
Many people thought that Philippine products would come more and more into competition with American products, and there wasn't any morality in making the American farmer sustain the burden of United States Philippine philanthropy.\(^1\) To keep them would do more injustice to Americans than freeing the Islands would do to the Filipinos.\(^2\)

There was also the likelihood that Philippine products would eventually be taxed, which would be "hostile to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution, and obnoxious to the concepts of democracy."\(^3\)

In a unique twist of pro-independence reasoning, it was argued that the Philippines should be freed to prevent an immoral act of taxing them without their consent.\(^4\)

J. D. Craig remarked that King George III wanted to retain colonies for tax purposes, whereas the United States proposed to free the Philippines in order to tax them.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Editorial in the *Minneapolis Tribune*, April 18, 1932, reprinted in the *Cong. Rec.*, 72:2, p. 385.

\(^2\) *Cong. Rec.*, 73:2, p. 5009.

\(^3\) Senator King of Utah, *Cong. Rec.*, 71:1, p. 4377.

\(^4\) Representative Dyer of Missouri, *Cong. Rec.*, 71:3, p. 2111.

\(^5\) Address by J. D. Craig to the Foreign Affairs Convention, Buffalo, New York, (April 14, 1932), reprinted in the *Cong. Rec.*, 72:1, p. 9543.
Thus were moral obligation and interest tossed forward and back. More than one Congressman stated unequivocally that questions of principle, such as the liberty and the rights of men, motivated them.\(^1\) Certainly some who used such arguments, or who heard them, were sincere. Others, perhaps, concealed their real motives and used moral arguments as propaganda to obtain votes for their cause. Usually they used both practical and moral arguments interchangeably. Charles Beard concluded that it was impossible to discover whether the sense of moral obligation or estimates of substantial advantages weighed heavier in the minds of those who freely used the terms.\(^2\)

Regarding the validity of the respective party arguments, Theodore Friend thought Stimson and Hurley unconsciously were exaggerating Philippine unreadiness as an excuse for maintaining administration policy. The "grandiose altruism, hopeful commercialism and even the ragged jingoism of the 1890's" were said to survive in these men.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) For an example, see the remarks by Senator Dill of Washington, *Cong. Rec.*, 71:2, p. 2597.

\(^2\) Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

"The Democrats, on the other hand, tended to demolish all criteria in order to advance Philippine independence," Friend said. Neither Woodrow Wilson, nor Hawes nor King thoroughly and thoughtfully assessed Philippine affairs with an objective in mind. Pre-existing interests and convictions moved them, just as they did Stimson, Hurley, and the opponents of independence.¹

Although old Philippine hands such as Cameron Forbes and Dean Worchester in the 1920's thought the Filipinos did not yet constitute a unified "people" in a nationalist sense, and therefore were not yet competent to conduct their own affairs of government, this did not seem to be a real issue either in or out of Congress after 1930.²

There was no dispute that in the first thirty years of American control the United States proceeded fastest with self-government.³ Governor-General Frank Murphy reported in 1933 that in many respects conditions in the Philippines were highly satisfactory. Peace and order prevailed, the public health was good, and there

¹Ibid.

²See Chapter I, pp. 9-10.

³Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 10.
was general freedom from suffering due to individual want or destitution.¹ Filipino social and political progress, by Oriental standards, was especially satisfactory.² Even vigorous opponents of Philippine independence such as Representative Underhill of New York thought the Filipinos able to govern themselves.³

The Filipinos, to conclude, were politically ready for independence. That is, they had the internal cohesion, or nationalism, and the governmental experience to govern themselves. This conclusion seems to have been confirmed by the political mettle shown by the Filipinos under the Commonwealth period of self-government which began in 1936. The transition was completely orderly. The Filipinos continued to function. The Civil Service proved its worth.⁴

However ready for complete separation from the United States the Philippines may have been politically in the early 1930's, they were woefully unprepared, ¹


²Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., p. 95.


⁴Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., p. 71.
however, for national self-support. The distressing thing about Philippine independence, as Mr. Underhill noted, was the inability of the Filipinos to finance themselves. The Governor-General in 1933 also noted a tendency toward lower revenues, and thought a sound financial policy for the Philippines was a problem demanding first attention.

The cause of the financial concern was that the United States, in preparing the Philippines for political autonomy, wittingly or unconsciously had created a genuinely dependent colonial economy. Grayson Kirk put it this way:

It is indeed paradoxical, in all probability tragically so, that, although the American government has constantly designed its political policies so as to confer upon the Islands an ever-widening sphere of autonomy, it has, at the same time, through the operation of a free trade deliberately drawn them into an ever-closer integration with the American economic system.

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3 Murphy, loc. cit.

4 Smith, Philippine Freedom, op. cit., p. 66.

5 Kirk, op. cit., p. 71.
Perkins did not think that Congress' policy was deliberate. He credited the creation of dependency both to disagreement as to what was desired politically, and to "an unthinking impulse of good will which failed to see clearly the political implications of economic integration." No thought was given, he said, to the effects of economic policy upon the economic and social bases of Philippine politics.¹

Whether unthinking or deliberate, a few statistics will verify the seriousness of the economic dependency. In thirty years, the United States' share of Philippine products has risen over thirtyfold, while other, non-American, Philippine trade had increased but slightly over twofold.² Exports to the United States comprised more than 86 per cent of total Philippine exports, while 99 per cent of their imports came from the United States.³

While its four leading agricultural commodities made up nine-tenths of all Philippine exports, dependency especially was centered around the sugar industry.⁴

²Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 212.
³Murphy, op. cit., p. 7; Cong. Rec., 71:1, p. 4073.
⁴Grunder and Livezey, loc. cit.; Senator Pittman of Nevada, Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 626.
Two-thirds of Philippine export income was derived from sugar, and in 1934 it amounted to thirty per cent of the total annual income of the Islands.\(^1\)

The upshot of the whole thing was that economic independence from the United States would have been a short cut to a major Philippine disaster.\(^2\) Vicente Villamin, a noted Filipino lawyer and economist, called it "brutally illogical" to demand immediate and automatic independence after rendering it well-nigh impossible.\(^3\) A nation's ability to maintain its independence, he said, had become in the depression decade a question of economic rather than political intelligence.\(^4\)

As to whether the Philippines were ready for independence, it was practically impossible, as Villamin noted, to separate the criteria of stable government

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\(^2\)Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., p. 104.

\(^3\)Address by Vicente Villamin to the Dubuque Lion's Club, (September 3, 1931), reported by the Dubuque Telegraph-Herald of that date.

\(^4\)Address by Vicente Villamin to the Cedar Rapids Rotary Club, (August 31, 1931), and reported by the Cedar Rapids Gazette and Republican, September 1, 1931.
from those of a stable economy.¹ Since the socio-
political and the economic could hardly have been
isolated one from the other, and assuming for the
moment that total independence, political and economic,
was the only option, then the answer to the question
of Philippine readiness for independence should have
been answered in the negative.

It remains to be seen why Congress pushed ahead,
anyhow.

CHAPTER III

THE EMPIRE SYSTEM AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Considering the economic dependency of the Philippines, why did Congress go ahead with independence? The answer may at least partly be found in the workings of the United States colonial system and the attitudes of Filipinos and Americans toward that system.

For the United States to be successful with its tuterage, there was a need for steadfastness, or certitude, a consistent policy unswayed by American economic or political pressures or by unreasonable demands for quick independence.\(^1\) If the United States had assured the Philippines independence if they wanted it, and had established criteria for self-government, there could have resulted an element of stability. Instead, as has been seen, America did what Cameron Forbes and other Republican policy makers had warned against. The political status of the Philippines remained a party matter, liable to change with changing party elections, and no permanence was possible.\(^2\) The most Congress promised was independence after establishment of "stable government," with no established criteria.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Grunder and Livezey, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
The failure to remove the independence question from politics revealed a fundamental inadequacy of American democracy to govern colonies. Government and governmental policy run by the strong pressure of public opinion, as it was in the United States, prevented the tradition of maintenance of policy. This was what Philip Jessup meant when he said, "Just so far as democracy exercises its powers, just so far it is incapable of governing colonies." ¹

Although agreeing that there was no permanent colonial policy, Perkins thought there should have been. Independence should not have been a party matter, he said, because the two parties were in fundamental agreement in their Philippine policy. They both wanted to "advance and secure the welfare of the Filipinos." ² Even the most ardent expansionist did not wish to govern the Filipinos as a permanent philosophy without the consent of the governed. ³ It should have been possible, Perkins concluded, to establish an agreed Philippine policy which would have removed independence from the

¹ Jessup, op. cit., p. 369.
² Perkins, op. cit., p. 195.
arena of politics and made it a product of agreed upon, and rational, criteria.1

Whether or not an agreed upon and rational policy was possible, it was not consummated. For many years the Filipinos had watched the balance in Philippine policy tipped back and forth by domestic political and economic factors.

The American system, to the Filipino, seemed to constitute a government of men, and not of laws.2 In normal times, the American people had a lack of active interest for the Filipinos. The empire function was a result of a series of compromises among conflicting domestic interests. Those which were best organized and vocal could carry the most weight in policy making. A few Americans voicing their individual sentiments could defeat legislation, including independence, for the Philippines.3

The remarks of Representative Lankford of Georgia during the 1929 tariff hassle might well have given voice to the feelings of the Filipinos as to where they

1Perkins, op. cit., p. 223.

2Hayden, op. cit., p. 726.

stood in relation to United States policy:

He wiggled in and he wiggled out;
And left the country all in doubt;
Whether the snake that made the track
Was going North or coming back.

The lack of certitude, said Manuel Quezon, a top Philippine leader, caused an anxiety in the minds of the Filipinos. When, they wondered, if ever, would they be "ready" for independence? They hoped, but hardly dared to believe that the United States truly was not interested in maintaining its political control for selfish ends. They lived with the insecurity and lack of liberty involved in the almost unlimited power of Congress over the Philippines.

Because of the lack of certitude and resultant fears, the Filipino leadership raised the dominant emotional and political issue of independence. It was easier, Quezon thought, to get freedom and liberty of the Filipino people through the road to independence.

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1Cong. Rec., 71:2, p. 8872.


3Perkins, op. cit., p. 209.

which the average American understood, than through a policy of colonialism which was entirely alien to the American mind.¹

The American people, in turn, could not understand the Filipino demands for independence. The democratic tradition led Americans to the complacent assumption that people ruled by the United States would be contented, that American strategic and economic ends were synonymous with the desires and interests of the Philippines.²

Americans found it difficult to realize that this country's relationship to dependencies was essentially similar to that of other colonial powers to their possessions. They did not foresee that conflicting political and economic pressures which were basic to democracy and capitalism would produce drastic and arbitrary effects in a dependency.³

When the Filipinos demanded their independence, the "noble motivation" of the United States to prepare the Philippines for self-government was split and failed to exert the influence it should have had.⁴ Since a fundamental assumption in the formulation of American policy was that the Islands were not to be exploited,

¹Ibid., p. 249. ²Ibid., p. 239.
³Ibid., pp. 194, 196.
⁴Ibid., pp. 239-40.
or held for an indefinite period of time against the will of the inhabitants, Americans were prone to rationalize, "They want their independence, let them have it."\(^1\) According to Smith, this was likely the strongest motive of the public at large. He said:

Unquestionably, the uninformed public felt that the best argument for Philippine independence was the fact that the Filipinos asked for it, and that the one important argument against retaining the Philippines was that we would do so against the Filipinos' will.\(^2\)

When the depression struck, the operation of the imperial system tended to play into the hands of pro-independence forces, and to generate a public opinion predisposed to grant the Filipinos what they apparently wanted.

Public opinion, of course, was one factor which could have greatly influenced Congress. In those days before public polling, however, it was difficult to ascertain. In lieu of polling, newspaper opinion was widely sampled and was construed by some to be indicative of public opinion.

Ten Eyck Associates, an "independent research organization," was hired by the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce to do an "impartial study" of

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 196. See p. 266 for a summarization of Perkins' thesis.

American public opinion as expressed in editorial comment throughout the United States for the year ending February 20, 1932.¹

Ten Eyck declared that past American opinion had always been against granting the Philippines their independence. Due to the many and varied issues involved, they said, the "dispassionate observer" in the United States could not decide which way the public opinion in the country was leaning.² They asked:

What has been the effect of the debates during the past year? Has there been a real change in the American public sentiment on the question, and, if so, what is the nature of the change?³

A study was undertaken of the major newspapers representing a total circulation of 15,589,740 in 34 states. This was construed to be a "fair example of the present state of public opinion on the question."⁴

After surveying 412 papers, 275, or 67 per cent were said to be "vigorously opposed to independence in the present or the near future." One hundred and seven,

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²Ibid., p. 6193.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 6197.
or 26 per cent, were noncommittal; and 30, or only 7 per cent, would endorse immediate and unconditional independence.¹ In fact, Ten Eyck declared, the number of newspapers of over 20,000 circulation favoring immediate independence was so small that they weren't even listed.²

The Philippine Commission, in its own study, scrutinized 582 of 1,912 daily newspapers published in the United States from December, 1931, to the end of January, 1933.³ Commission members found that 57 per cent of the newspapers opposed, and only 27 per cent of them favored Philippine independence under the terms of the bills considered by Congress in 1932-33. Most of the opposition newspapers, they said, were hostile to independence as such, and would not have supported any other measure providing for independence no matter what its terms might have been. Journalistic opposition


²Ibid.

³Report of the Philippine Independence Commission, (July 30, 1933), reprinted in the Cong. Rec., 73:2, (March 22, 1934), pp. 5120-5162. Senator Pittman, in submitting the report, called it the "most complete analysis of the Hawes-Cutting Bill that has ever been written."
was "by no means" confined to Republican newspapers, or to particular regions.¹

After the enactment of an independence bill became probable in July, 1932, the Commission noticed that there was a reversal in the viewpoint of many newspapers which formerly had voiced approval of independence. Some Middle West newspapers, for example, had advocated independence as a means of relief to agriculture. When it became evident that Congress would not grant independence at once and make Philippine products subject to the American tariff, many of those newspapers withdrew their support. Without naming them, the Commission said that a proportion of 8 to 2 in Minnesota and 6 to 3 newspapers in Iowa withdrew support for that reason.²

The Filipinos did note that the Des Moines Register, which had indicated a strong prepossession for Philippine independence, "bitterly assailed" the independence bill and left the impression that Philippine independence might well be postponed indefinitely—in the interest of the Filipino people.³

¹Ibid., p. 5158.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
Journalistic antagonism was said to continue to grow until it reached its maximum at the moment of passage of an independence bill by the Senate in late 1932.\footnote{Ibid.}

Referring to the "powerful anti-independence press," the Philippine Commission thought, "... It can truthfully be said that practically 90 per cent of the American press was opposed to independence legislation." The large newspapers were cited, but small-town papers were said to ordinarily echo opinions similar to those expressed in the "large and influential papers."\footnote{Ibid., p. 5123.}

Ten Eyck said that newspapers in the West North Central States, including Iowa, were generally opposed to immediate independence primarily on the grounds that economic independence had to come first. Iowa newspapers with circulations of 20,000 or over listed as having been against independence included the Cedar Rapids Gazette, Davenport Daily-Times, Dubuque Telegraph-Herald, Sioux City Tribune, and the Waterloo Daily Courier.\footnote{Ten Eyck, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6197.}

The 	extit{Sioux City Tribune}, for example, thought the moral obligation for making the Philippines self-sufficient...
had not been fully discharged. The white man's burden would remain for some time to come, however discom­forting the facts might be.¹

Immediate independence was not the right course to follow, according to the Dubuque Telegraph-Herald, because it would destroy the Filipinos economically.²

The Cedar Rapids Gazette said the United States must devote some attention to the economic security of the Philippines before turning them loose in a world that had even our own veteran industrialists bewildered.³

Other Iowa newspapers backing the President Hoover stand against immediate independence, according to the Ten Eyck, included the Council Bluffs Nonpareil; Wallaces Farmer; the Iowa City Press Citizen; the Atlantic News; the Fort Dodge Messenger and Chronicle; and the Mason City Globe-Gazette.⁴

For example, in an early stand, the editors of the Mason City Globe-Gazette maintained that.

¹Ibid.; editorial in the Sioux City Tribune, October 31, 1931.

²Editorial in the Dubuque Telegraph-Herald, September 3, 1931.

³Editorial in the Cedar Rapids Gazette, September 1, 1931.

⁴Ten Eyck, loc. cit.
independence would throw the conflicting races and religions at each other's throats overnight.\textsuperscript{1}

A survey of daily newspapers published in Iowa in the early 1930's not only substantiated the quotations used by the Ten Eyck Associates for the above newspapers for the period they studied, but also revealed three additional categories of editorial sentiment among Iowa editors during 1932-33, and apparent changes in sentiment on the part of three newspapers already reviewed.

Six newspapers seemed to maintain a rather neutral attitude toward the Philippine question.

The \textit{Burlington Gazette}, in an editorial, had some fun with the Philippine question: "A magnanimous (\textit{sic}) Congress, responding to the appeal 'Moro libre,' hacked the shackles from the synthetically oppressed spiggoties over the protests of President Hoover, by successfully opposing his veto." They said they counted ten advertisements in the Manila newspaper for real beer, and said it was pretty hard for the "big white brothers to figure out wherein lies the Filipino's grievance."\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}Editorial in the \textit{Mason City Globe-Gazette}, August 10, 1931.

\textsuperscript{2}Editorial in the \textit{Burlington Gazette}, January 19, 1933.
The Cedar Falls Daily Record gave front page attention to Philippine news, but apparently took no editorial position.¹

Also noncommittal was the Centerville Daily Iowegian, which contented itself with an impartial survey of the question. It summarized that, "Congress apparently thought the islands too great a liability for us to proceed to govern them from altruistic motives."²

The Davenport Democrat and Leader seemed rather "ho-hum" about the whole thing. Its editors presented arguments of both sides, but revealed their ignorance by lumping pineapples in with Philippine sugar as products which Americans wanted a tariff wall erected against.³

The Oelwein paper took no position toward the Philippines, but was very critical of Congress' treatment of President Hoover. "The House of Representatives again showed by their vote how little they think of the

¹Newspapers were scrutinized for March and April, 1932, when the Hare Bill passed the House; and September 1, 1932 until after the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill was passed over Hoover's veto in January, 1933.

²Editorial in the Centerville Daily Iowegian, January 16, 1933.

³Editorial in the Davenport Democrat and Leader, January 15, 1933.
leadership of President Hoover," they said.¹ At another
time, they accused Congress of being determined that Mr.
Hoover would put across none of his plans and marking
time until his term expired.²

The Sioux City Journal stressed the foreign theme. Citing arguments of both sides, the paper seemed genuinely non-committal. "Uncle Sam," they said, "appears to be in an uncomfortable position whether he is to stay in the Philippines an indefinite length of time or get out."³ The paper explained that the Far East situation was becoming "more dangerous every day;" the United States, even if she were to leave, could not stand silent and inactive should Japan "gobble" the Philippines.

At least five Iowa newspapers took a more direct approach in favor of independence for the Philippines. The Ames paper thought that it was "up to the United States now to justify that faith and redeem its pledges [to free the Philippines]."⁵

¹Editorial in the Oelwein Daily Register, January 14, 1933.

²Ibid., January 18, 1933.

³Editorial in the Sioux City Journal, January 17, 1933.

⁴Ibid., January 19, 1933.

⁵Editorial in the Ames Daily Tribune-Times, March 26, 1934.
"The United States has dilly-dallied with the Philippines long enough," thought the Boone editors; "Now is as good a time as any to free the islands."¹ They repeated the error that pineapples were serious rivals to our domestic producers.

The Des Moines Sunday Register, early in the game, favored independence when it said:

Considerations of self-determination should have brought Philippine independence before this time. But self-interest now promises to do what adherence to the traditional American principle of liberty failed to do.²

The Estherville Daily News apparently was predisposed to favor independence, although it seemed more interested in sniping at Congress. Congress, it said, had positive proof to refute any man's claim that it hadn't done anything for the good of the country. Since independence wouldn't be forthcoming for another ten or thirteen years, Congress might change its mind five or six times by then.³

"Old Doc Congress" had pronounced the cure for "imperialism fever," declared the Clinton Herald. Complete and perpetual immunity from the disease was

¹Editorial in the Boone News Republican, January 13, 1933.
²Editorial in the Des Moines Sunday Register, November 1, 1931.
thought likely. The paper was friendly toward Philippine independence on altruistic grounds. Although admitting that independence "probably will mean economic and political retrogression for the islands," the paper remained unconcerned about the outcome.¹

A final group of newspapers appeared to be favorable to the idea of Philippine independence, but criticized the way the United States was going about it.

The emphasis of the Cedar Rapids paper expanded from Philippine economic needs to the needs of the American farmer. In December, 1932, the paper still noted that the "Islands are anything but independent economically," and thought that "actual ceding of sovereignty will depend almost entirely on conditions in the Philippines and the rest of the world at the time the prescribed transition expires," regardless of what laws were passed.²

The next month, the paper also criticized the recently passed independence bill because it would not help the midwest farmer. In order to keep the record straight, it said:

¹ Editorial in the Clinton Herald, January 21, 1933.
² Editorial in the Cedar Rapids Gazette, December 21, 1932.
The greatest benefits will go to eastern capitalists who have large investments in the Cuban sugar industry. When Congressmen come back to tell us they voted for Philippine independence in order to help the farmers, they'll be speaking of other farmers. The interests of the middle-western farmer run mostly in the other direction.  

The Gazette went on to say that, "the measure is an excellent example of what competent lobbyists and the ancient art of log-rolling can turn out."  

Two other newspapers which formerly were critical of the independence came to accept the idea, but opposed the method. 

The Mason City Globe-Gazette thought the quickest way out was probably the best. Unfortunately, the Hawes-Cutting Bill probably would not let us out. We should not shake off the moral responsibility for turning the Islands loose "without a decent chance." The paper considered the Hawes-Cutting Bill "needlessly harsh and abrupt." 

The Waterloo Daily Courier, apparently friendly to the idea of independence, thought that the bill "does not end our responsibilities." "If anything, it adds to them." The Filipinos, American sugar, and Hoover

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1 Ibid., January 19, 1933.

2 Ibid.

3 Editorial in the Mason City Globe-Gazette, January 23, 1933.
disliked the plan. "But Congress likes it," the paper facetiously concluded.  

A *Des Moines Register* editorial, dated January 9, 1930, which was also reprinted in the Congressional Record, favored independence:

> Why should the United States not say and say frankly, and that without too much regard for the sugar situation, that the time has come to shape our relations in the Pacific with some regard for the promises we made. 

By 1932, however, the *Register* said that, although the Philippines eventually were going to have to get along by themselves, that "it does not demonstrate a very high level of ethics to retaliate against their competition with us the minute that the very success we have taught them becomes somewhat disadvantageous to us."

All that "great fuss" about responsibilities and "noble motives" was going to "sound like brass" if we granted independence without a real contribution to Philippine adjustment.  

The *Register*, nevertheless, seemed almost relieved when Hoover's veto was overridden. "In any case, it is

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3. Editorial in the *Des Moines Register*, December 12, 1932.
settled," went the editorial, ". . . it is hardly conceiv able that we can ever effectively quibble again about our independence promise."\(^1\)

As a result of their lengthy newspaper survey, the Ten Eyck Associates reached an "inevitable" conclusion:

The American people today are in full agreement with those who feel that the Philippines should not now be given political independence, and, more specifically, should not be given political independence until their economic independence is assured.\(^2\)

This, they said, was the spirit that was obviously moving the American people.

The Philippine Commission, however, drew a different conclusion. They noted an impotency on the part of a majority of the American press to marshal public opinion and congressional votes against enactment of the independence measure, and concluded:

It is quite probable that preoccupation of the average citizen with his own affairs in an era of great stress, and also the solidarity of the labor and agricultural elements which favored Philippine independence, influenced Congress more than did the newspapers.\(^3\)

One reason that would account for the newspaper opposition, thought the Commissioners, was traceable to

\(^1\)Ibid., January 16, 1933.

\(^2\)Ten Eyck, op. cit., p. 6198.

\(^3\)Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5159.
selfish interests which either owned or dominated many American publications. Some of these, they said, were banks, exporters and importers, those who saw the Philippines as a key to American commerce, and other institutions such as the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce. 1

Another cause of the widespread newspaper opposition, said the Filipinos, was the fact that there existed a wide variety of "contradictory and irreconcilable" grounds of opposition to the independence bill. 2 The Commissioners noted an "utter lack of uniformity among the newspaper editors as to the grounds of opposition." 3 Certain features of the bill which some groups described as selfish, oppressive, and unjust were the ones possessing merit in the eyes of equally numerous groups. Although many of the newspaper arguments were not critical of independence, they were all regarded as expressions of opposition to the bill because of the effect that it was believed they would have on the administration. 4

As pertains to Iowa newspaper opinion, the proper conclusion would seem to be that many, probably most, Iowa newspapers were not opposed to the idea of Philippine

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1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 5139. 3Ibid., p. 5138. 4Ibid., p. 5139.
independence. Although the Des Moines Register developed some strong reservations about the wisdom of the Independence bill, it did not "bitterly assail" the bill.

It would seem invalid for the Ten Eyck Associated study, which carefully couched the language of its report in terms of whether immediate and unconditional independence was desirable, to conclude that the spirit obviously moving the American people was to withhold political independence until economic independence was achieved. "Immediate and unconditional" independence admittedly was something of an extreme and likely to trigger a large amount of opposition. A wide range of other solutions were possible, but were not considered in the study. Newspaper editors, let alone the American people, were not asked whether they would favor some solution which would provide for Philippine independence.

Newspaper opinion probably was not truly representative of public opinion. The Philippine Commission was probably close to the truth when they guessed that most Americans were preoccupied with their "own affairs," and that the labor and agricultural elements influenced Congress more than did the newspapers. The Congress was probably more in tune with what was likely the emotional state of the popular psychology of the time than with the logical correctness of the press.
What, then, was the public opinion? American interest in their "own affairs" involved more than merely selfish economic or isolationistic connotations. Also involved was an altruistic factor which could have had an even greater effect on the empire system than the shortcomings inherent in the operation of the system itself. That factor was the existence of a rather deeply ingrained anti-colonialism.¹

Some of those favoring Philippine independence genuinely felt badly that their nation, itself born as the result of revolt against empire, had nevertheless persisted in maintaining a colonial empire of its own.² Americans had never really accepted the role—or the ideological premises—required of a major colonial power.³ The Minneapolis Tribune explained that the United States temporarily "went British," but "didn't know quite how to behave." This resulted, the paper said, in a policy of "bewilderment and befuddlement."⁴

²Ibid.
Although the old Anti-Imperialist League formed in 1898 had become defunct, there was never a shortage of anti-imperialists. In fact, anti-imperialism remained as one of the few reformist groups to survive the Progressive Era and the World War.¹

According to Smith, William Jennings Bryan succeeded in convincing many Americans that there was something wrong with empire. "It was made the antithesis of democracy and therefore the anathema to the democratic-minded Americans," he thought.² Many members of Congress were said to have had an attitude that the United States could be an empire only against its will, and that it would release itself from that unfortunate classification at the first opportunity.³

Many of the anti-imperialists had been against the League of Nations because they believed it an abettor of Anglo-French imperialism. After the defeat of the League Covenant in the Senate, they turned to attacking imperialism closer to home. They wanted the United States

²Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
³Ibid., pp. 56-57.
not only to get out of the Philippines, but also out of Central America and the Caribbean.¹

Others defined empires with "doomed" capitalist system, with predatory wars, and with unlawful profits. This group, which included Communists, also claimed that there was no such thing as a "good" empire.²

The "average" American, however, as one author put it, manifested "no popular desire whatsoever to keep them [the Philippines] under American control or to continue any longer as a colonial power."³

Two liberal periodicals, The Nation and New Republic favored Philippine independence. A flood of volumes, especially by Moorfield Storey, once president of the League, also appeared in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Mostly critical of retention of the Philippines, this literature had its influence, and it indicated a trend in public opinion.⁴

A few senators, notably William H. King of Utah and William E. Borah of Idaho, presented pro-independence arguments in the Senate. Such men were the spiritual

²Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., p. 58.
³Ibid., p. 63.
⁴Pratt, op. cit., p. 312.
progeny of those anti-annexationists of 1898 who thought expansion both politically immoral and strategically unwise. Their numbers were swollen by disillusionment with the World War and discouragement with the Great Depression.¹ A species of liberal in their day, they were also isolationist.²

Another factor which, like newspaper opinion, had vague dimensions, but nevertheless was likely a significant tributary to the anti-imperialist stream, was race prejudice.

Filipinos who came to the United States fell heir to the attitudes developed by two conflicting traditions.

One tradition was the reliance upon immigrant hands for the least pleasant and lowest paid labor tasks. There were about 60,000 Filipinos in America in 1931, nine-tenths of them males, mostly under thirty years old. Their willingness to work for wages considerably below the American standard aroused the ire of American labor.³

The concentration of four-fifths of all the Filipinos on the Pacific Coast, mainly California, aroused

²Ibid., p. 520.
³Ibid., pp. 513-14.
the conflicting American tradition--hostility to the encroachment of alien peoples upon the ethnic and social homogeneity of the population.\(^1\)

Senator Tydings of Maryland asked about the Filipinos: "Shall we permit them to come and settle in our country and inject, perhaps, another stream of racial hatred to those streams which are already loose in the United States of America?"\(^2\)

"... Their whole racial tendencies are absolutely and diametrically opposed to those of the United States, their living conditions being different from ours, that when they want independence they should have it," said Senator Wheeler of Montana.\(^3\)

"I have no racial prejudices," declared Representative Welch of California, "but God gave the non-assimilable Asiatics a place in the sun and that place is in the Orient."\(^4\) Several Southern senators, equally free from racial prejudice, supported Mr. Welch. It was suggested that continued entry of Filipinos might permit a competition with American Negroes in certain

\(^1\)Ibid.
\(^2\)Cong. Rec., 71:2, p. 2590.
\(^3\)Cong. Rec., 71:1, p. 4381.
\(^4\)Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 7773.
kinds of labor to which the latter was deemed to be especially well adapted.¹

Pacific Coast and Southern Senators and Representatives, supported by the American Federation of Labor, joined forces in a Filipino exclusion movement. When this failed, they joined the independence bandwagon. The "non-assimilability" argument, which once had almost ruptured diplomatic relations with Japan, was now used with the intention of fracturing colonial relations with the Philippines.²

The Filipino Commissioners took advantage of the racist factor to call for a new relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Mr. Osias clearly stated the Philippine position:

If the people and Government of the United States wish to treat the Philippines as a foreign country for purposes of labor and immigration, you must first place us in the category of a foreign nation by granting us our freedom.³

The influence of race, as a social motive, was difficult to pin down. Senators from the Deep South and Far West who voted 25 to 1 to override Hoover's veto of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, may have been reflecting social alarm against immigrants of another color and

¹Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 199.
³Cong. Rec., 71:3, p. 3726.
culture, but such a motive could be demonstrated only in one quarter of the Senate, and even then clearly only in the Far West. Theodore Friend concluded, therefore, that the social motive was too diffuse to be critical.¹ Combined with isolationism and altruistic anti-imperialism, however, it helped to erode the old imperialist influence and to produce independence.

While anti-imperialism persisted in the United States, its influence was enhanced by a relative decline in the ranks of the imperialists. In general terms, the thrill of the conquest was gone; American experience in the Philippines proved wearisome; the difficulties of coming to terms with an alien culture had been demonstrated. American dollars had not always followed the flag; Wall Street's heaviest capital outlays had gone to nearby countries independent of American control. The surge for political domination was spent.² "The naive popular enthusiasm that had supported the 'large policy' of 1898 had given place to an attitude of disillusionment and skepticism."³ The old imperialists were on the defensive. Their arguments, in the light of past events, seemed

¹Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 107.
²Adler, loc. cit.
³Pratt, loc. cit.
hollow. The initiative was passing to forces favorable to Philippine independence.

Had any fair proportion of citizens of the United States shared the convictions of Mahan, thought A. Whitney Griswold, it would have been as difficult for a farmer's lobby to liberate the Philippines as it would have been for a similar English minority to dictate the evacuation of Singapore.¹

Robert Aura Smith concluded that the American people's objection to empire may have had a profound influence on what their representatives in Congress thought, and constituted one of the gravest threats to the empire structure itself.² He thought this "sentimental" objection, in sum total, played a larger part than did the military and economic arguments that evolved somewhat later.³

If Philippine independence was desirable in 1916 except for objections of Catholic dignitaries, Theodore Friend said, then the motives of 1933 need not have been "merely, or even mostly, selfish ones." He thought the factors which provided the margin to achieve Philippine independence were:

¹Griswold, op. cit., p. 453.
²Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., p. 63.
³Ibid., p. 55.
independence were strategic and political. He concluded:

Clearly no bill would have succeeded without both a strong independence movement in the Philippines and strong anti-imperial sentiment in the United States. . . . The anti-imperial principle was necessary to consummation of the independence movement to the United States.¹

Depending far less than European powers, economically and emotionally, upon holding colonies, the United States, in adversity, gave them up more readily. The stock market crash of October, 1929, and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, September, 1931, brought out the latent American anti-imperialism which, as will be seen, ultimately outweighed the determination of the Hoover administration and various private interests to hold on to the Philippines.²

Since independence had assumed practical significance to large groups of Americans, it had become an item of major importance to Congress. That this could happen was indicative of the weakness inherent in the American democratic-imperial system. Add to this the existence of the anti-imperial principle, and the framework existed so that acts of economic selfishness as well as of isolationism also became acts of political altruism. A coalition of protectionists and anti-imperialists was created in Congress which helped produce Philippine independence.

¹Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 108.
²Ibid., p. 69.
CHAPTER IV

ISOLATIONISM

Many of the attitudes and prejudices of the American people were bound-up in one way or the other with the Philippine question. In addition to aspects of imperialism and anti-imperialism were involved questions of internationalism versus isolationism. International conditions fully aroused these attitudes, made Congress take thought, and made the Filipinos confront their own future.¹ What were the foreign and military policies of the United States as they concerned the Philippines, and what changes were advocated? The answers to those questions perhaps helped to determine the future relationship between the United States and the Philippines.

The background of the American policy in the Far East corresponded directly, of course, with the rise of Japan as a major power.² Relative to Japanese power, American power in the Western Pacific after 1900 slowly and steadily declined. Philippine security accordingly was ransomed several times prior to 1930, starting with

¹Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 57.

recognition of Japanese special interests in Korea (1905) and Manchuria (1908).\footnote{ibid.}

In 1914, the Ladrones, Marianas and the Carolines Island groups, which the United States had allowed Spain to sell to Germany in 1899, were seized by Japan. At the Versailles Peace Conference in Paris, President Wilson agreed to let Japan retain the islands, which formed a barrier between the Philippines and Hawaii, under an unenforceable mandate from the League of Nations.\footnote{Walter Lippman, United States Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), pp. 39-40.}

Congress forsook fortification of the Philippines in 1921 partly in order to persuade Japan to accept the short end of a 3:5 ratio of capital warships. The American navy subsequently was allowed to fall under treaty strength and grow overage, while Japan kept up to treaty strength and up-to-date naval architecture.\footnote{Friend, "American Interests," loc. cit.}

One of the primary purposes for acquiring the Philippines was thus repudiated, namely, the establishment of a strong naval base and navy to support American commerce and policy in the Orient.\footnote{Beard, op. cit., p. 523.}
The London Naval Treaty of 1930 continued the basic provisions of the 1921 agreement.\(^1\) The State Department told the Japanese that the United States was sacrificing the largest naval program in the world and maintaining the status quo on fortification in the Philippine Islands in order to "relieve Japan of any anxiety as to her national security."\(^2\)

What was being attempted was the creation of a balance of power. Japan was left to dominate the Western Pacific; the United States controlled the Northeast Pacific, with outposts deep in Jap-controlled territory on Guam, Wake, and the Philippines; the British were dominant in the Central and Southwest Pacific; France still held the Southeast Pacific; and the Dutch occupied the East Indies and New Guinea.\(^3\)

"No single power may be said to be strong enough to upset the equilibrium so long as the others retain their interests in the situation," maintained Nicholas Roosevelt.


\(^3\)Morton, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
Peace would be assured while the political status quo remained unchanged.¹

A community of interests became established in the 1920's particularly among the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The latter nations opposed Philippine independence lest the United States open the road southward for Japan by freeing the Philippines.²

The London Conference thus affected the question of Philippine independence. Great Britain assented to the United States program for disarmament only on the understanding that we were to remain in the Philippines. If the United States withdrew, Great Britain would insist on a different naval ratio.³

President Hoover disliked holding the Philippines. He thought they were not vital to American defense, and our mission was to free people, not dominate them.⁴


But the success of the whole disarmament program of that time, which Hoover wanted badly, apparently depended upon our staying in the Philippines.¹

Secretary of State Stimson, a recognized believer of international cooperation, was more positive in attitude toward the Philippines than was his Chief Executive.² Not only did he have a deep-seated feeling for a permanent bond with the Philippines, he also saw the Islands as an important strategic American base of operations.³ Stimson, via the Philippines, wished to apply American military power in the Far East, whereas Hoover continuously opposed the use of anything but moral sanctions against Japan.⁴

The Japanese attack on Shanghai in January and February of 1932 perhaps served as a virtual dress-rehearsal for the role of the Philippines in the Far East foreign policy that Stimson visualized. A real war scare was triggered among high American officials who

¹Wheeler, "Republican Philippine Policy," loc. cit.

²Bundy, op. cit., p. 160.


⁴Ibid.
heard many "wild rumors" that the Philippines or Hawaii might be attacked. ¹

Stimson thought such a Japanese attack was a real possibility. ² The entire American Asiatic Squadron, which was usually stationed at Cavite near Manila, was sent to stand-by in the harbor of Shanghai, and a regiment of American troops was sent there from the Philippines. ³ Although Hoover's purpose was to protect American lives, Stimson wanted to bluff and threaten Japan. ⁴ The American fleet, which coincidentally had arrived in Hawaii for maneuvers when the fighting at Shanghai was at its height, was deliberately left there. ⁵

On November 3, 1932, in a telegram he sent to United States Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew, Stimson expressed his feelings about the use of American power in the Shanghai incident:


²Current, op. cit., p. 103.

³Foreign Relations, 1932, loc. cit.


⁵Foreign Relations, 1932, loc. cit.
I think on the whole it has a very wholesome effect upon the sentiments of both the Japanese military and the Japanese people to realize that it is in the Pacific, and a bigger fleet than theirs.\(^1\)

The proximity of the Philippines, of course, permitted the application of power on the spot, with Hawaii serving as a base for reinforcements.

Stimson began to think in terms of eventual Japanese-American war, thinking it "almost impossible that there should not be an armed clash between two such different civilizations."\(^2\) He asserted to Hoover that the President "had better keep his powder dry," but Hoover was not impressed, saying only something about "phantasmagorias."\(^3\)

The crises over Manchuria and then Shanghai was significant to the question of Philippine independence because it deeply involved Republican policy making regarding the Islands. It made Stimson all the more determined to keep the Philippines.\(^4\) The consideration of an independence bill, reported favorably by a committee in May, 1931, followed by the Manchurian Crises in September of that year, and reintroduced in January, 1932,

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 302.


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Current, Secretary Stimson, op. cit., p. 120.
during the Shanghai Crises, came at the worst possible time as far as Stimson was concerned.\(^1\) Being an internationalist charged with the conduct of American foreign policy, Stimson naturally argued against Philippine independence largely on strategic grounds. Theodore Friend has concisely summarized these arguments:

American prestige in the Orient depended upon military force, upon completing the job of politico-economic development in the Philippines, and upon keeping face by not backing down before the Japanese. An independence act would not only weaken prestige in all three instances, but would overthrow the power equilibrium in Asia by eroding the American position, undermining European interests, stimulating various colonial and semi-colonial nationalisms, and above all, encouraging Japanese imperialism.\(^2\)

Joining Stimson in the leave-it-alone school was Secretary of War Hurley. Hiram Bingham was their outlet in the Senate, and Nicholas Roosevelt, the journalist, carried the argument to the public.\(^3\) The Joint Planning Committee of the Army and Navy was a chief lobby protagonist to the administrative position.\(^4\)

A few examples from both in and out of Congress perhaps will show the forcefullness with which the internationalists presented their arguments.

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\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 120-21.


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 85.
With war actually unsettling conditions in the Far East, leaving the Philippines was considered akin to quitting under fire.¹ To pick up and go was "contemptible," said Representative Brumm of Pennsylvania.² "To haul down the American flag in the Orient," said Congressman Colden of California, "is to invite the disgust of every nation hoping to preserve the balance of power and the peace of the world in the Orient."³

To leave the Philippines might "cast reflections" upon the United States as a power, said the New York Herald Tribune.⁴ Withdrawal from the Philippines, wrote Nicholas Roosevelt, would be a threat to the internal and external security and order of the Philippines, and damage our prestige, commerce, moral leadership, Christianity and democracy in the Orient; it would be regarded as a confession of weakness; and result in takeover of the Philippines by another power with consequent unsettling effects. The British would at once

²Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 7409.
³Cong. Rec., 73:2, pp. 4838, 4840.
use this as an argument to enlarge her navy.\(^1\) With native uprisings considered a prime danger in the early 1930's, freeing the Filipinos was likened to tossing a firebrand among dried fagots.\(^2\)

Even Winston Churchill entered the fray by writing an article which appeared in a popular national magazine. In an apparent attempt to offset balance sheet, or profit and loss considerations which tended to justify Philippine independence, Churchill admitted that the Islands were "in a material sense, no profit."\(^3\) Hence, American retention could not be argued upon "bookkeeping considerations of profit or loss." The issue could be decided, he argued, only on considerations of "national duty, dignity and honor, and upon its international repercussions."\(^4\)

However cogent the international considerations may have been, United States foreign policy as it concerned the Philippines was ensnared in a webb of contradictions which was bound to have concerned many Congressmen.

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\(^1\) Nicholas Roosevelt, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 410-15.


\(^4\) Ibid.
Theodore Roosevelt, an original apostle of the "large policy" of Mahan, once contended: "It is at best foolish and at worst criminal not to correlate policy and armament."1 Either the United States should retain complete control over the Philippine Islands, he said, or absolve itself from all responsibility for them. Any half-and-half course would be both foolish and disastrous.2 True to his philosophy, he eventually advocated freeing the Philippine Islands.3

Although the navy stood firmly against withdrawal from the Philippines, it, too, asked for a clear-cut decision either to withdraw or to maintain our strength in the Far East. Above all, the navy sought to avoid a middle course, the path of greatest danger.4

Yet all of the Republican administrations of the 1920's fell into precisely the error that Roosevelt and

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1 Morison, op. cit., p. 762.


3 Ibid.; see page 2.

the navy warned against. The United States hung in between the two possible resolute courses, unwilling yet to free the Archipelago, unready still to defend it. An ever-increasing dichotomy between national policy and military strategy and strength was created.

The navy defined the national foreign policies which it was charged to enforce as the maintenance of the status quo and the balance of power, the integrity of China, the Open Door in China, and freedom of the seas, the limitation of armaments, neutrality, and political isolation. The incompatibility between the first four and the latter three policies appear to be self-evident. The navy, more properly, simply noted that a serious conflict existed with Japan on the first four, and there was dissention within the United States on the last three policies.

Charged, nevertheless, with enforcing a national policy which dictated that the Philippines must be defended, the military planners devised "War Plan

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2 Morton, op. cit., p. 33.
3 Greene, op. cit., p. 375.
4 Ibid.
Orange," a contingency plan in case of war with Japan.\textsuperscript{1} The plan was based on a "strategic offensive" concept.\textsuperscript{2} This envisaged an offensive war, primarily naval. The initial mission was to establish sea power in the Western Pacific.\textsuperscript{3} This would mean a possible understanding with Great Britain, and utilization of the opportunity offered by a non-treaty regime to establish naval bases and fortifications in advanced American possessions which could serve as starting points for an offensive against Japan in her own waters.\textsuperscript{4} Retention of Manila Bay would thus be essential. To the army would fall the vital task of holding the base until the arrival of the fleet.\textsuperscript{5}

The prospects of successfully executing Orange Plan were variously described as "wholly unrealistic," and "more a statement of hopes than a realistic appraisal of what could be done."\textsuperscript{6} The commander of the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1}Morton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 29.


\textsuperscript{5}Morton, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{6}Borg, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 248; Morton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 30.
\end{flushleft}
Corregidor defenses called the plan "literally an act of madness."  

The navy went only so far as to say that Japan could attack, and the Philippines would be "extremely difficult to defend." National policy, after all, was not within its province and it could only assert that the Philippines would be defended and that reinforcements would be forthcoming, as planned in Orange, in the event of war, and provide for that defense the best it could.

The ambivalent American attitude between isolationism and commitments led to uncertainty or to divergent views between the army and the navy. Beginning in 1926, the army began to cleave to a "strategic defense" concept of national security. A line from Alaska to Hawaii to Panama would have been America's outer line of defense. With American defenses concentrated behind that line, the west coast and Hawaii would have been virtually impregnable against attack. Victory

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1Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, op. cit., p. 81.

2Ibid.

3Morton, op. cit., p. 36.

4Greene, op. cit., p. 355.

5Morton, op. cit., p. 34.
over Japan would have come via economic pressure and raids on Japanese commerce, with little interference with the economy of the United States.\(^1\)

In the split over what to do, the army thus emerged with an isolationist doctrine. It wanted to leave China and drop the burden of the Philippines, for it did not consider the Western Pacific a vital area in terms of American interests.\(^2\) A military commitment to the Philippines was therefore the gravest threat to that policy, and Philippine independence was considered a graceful way out.\(^3\)

The army was said to be sensitive to the surrounding intellectual and political environment, and responded to the strongly isolationist current of the time.\(^4\) Besides, War Plan Orange favored a navy-dominated Pacific at a time when budgetary allotments from a parsimonious Congress were scarce.\(^5\)

In spite of the army split, however, it was the naval strategic offense concept that guided American

\(^1\)Ibid.
\(^2\)Greene, op. cit., p. 370.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 372.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 373.
\(^5\)Ibid.
planners until the outbreak of war in 1941. ¹ In all fairness, however, it should perhaps be noted that the navy attempted to devise other means to defend the Philippines.

One means was through cooperation with the British, with the possibility that placing the entire British-American fleet under joint command could have held the Philippines. ² This was more like a partial solution, since the possibility of defending those islands was still considered rather remote. ³ This was, furthermore, but an informal agreement, since it was thought that a public treaty would have failed due to the fact that the American people were quite "chary" of any entangling alliances in those years.⁴

Seeking to narrow the dichotomy between policy and possibility, a second method to defend the Philippines was developed in naval planning circles even as Philippine independence was developed in Congress. Naval strategists planned an aerial defense for the Philippines based on aircraft carriers.⁵ The success of that plan, like

²Hoover, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 368.
³Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, op. cit., p. 102.
⁴Wheeler, Republican Philippine Policy, op. cit., p. 389.
⁵Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, op. cit., p. 97.
naval fortifications, would have depended on Congress' generosity.

Hobbes once said, "Covenants without swords are but words."\(^1\) Joseph Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan in 1932 complained that American foreign policy was "all battledore and no shuttlecock."\(^2\) Stimson saw himself plunged into a desperate world-wide battle for the highest stakes, and his hand, as he put it, was "a pair of deuces."\(^3\) Members of Congress surely must have scrutinized the contrasts between power and policy in the Far East as it prepared to decide the fate of the Philippines.

Internationalists in Congress up to 1931 had argued, "If we set the Philippines 'adrift' they will immediately fall 'prey' to Japan."\(^4\) Congressional isolationists until then had lightly dismissed such strategic arguments against independence as "the Japanese bugaboo."\(^5\)

\(^1\) Hobbes, *Leviathan*.


\(^3\) Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 159.


After the Manchurian incident in 1931, the isolationist tone became much more serious. The "Japanese bugaboo" became the "Japanese threat." Many Congressmen reacted negatively to further retention of the Philippines. Many wishfully desired non-involvement in all foreign broils. Some drew unsparing conclusions from the actual state of American power in the Pacific. ¹

The more inarticulate isolationist, disillusioned by the sequel to the World War, was generally apathetic, if not strongly opposed to American naval and military spending, to interventions abroad, and generally even to exercise of influence in foreign areas. ² This isolationism had many exponents in Congress who believed that the most powerful America was one which would confine its power to the continent, or at most to the hemisphere, rather than dispersing, and thereby weakening it, elsewhere. ³

The Manchurian incident was taken seriously by those Congressmen. It was viewed as clinching evidence for retreat to Hawaii. ⁴ Will Rogers seemed to decipher

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¹ Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 85.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Friend, Between Two Empires, loc. cit.
what was bothering the isolationists when he observed that "the freedom of a race of people never entered into it... The only reason why we ever held 'em this long is because the Japanese didn't use sugar in their tea. But they are liable to start using it any day."¹

Theodore Friend thought many in Congress were "willing to complete a series of awkward accommodations to Japan by a graceful and final withdrawal from the West Pacific," although, he said, the dignity of the forum forbade saying so.²

There appeared to be no reluctance on the part of some Congressmen to advocate withdrawal from the Philippines on isolationist grounds.

Lester Dickinson recalled that Japan was "very aggressive" at that time, that the fear of war with Japan was present "all the time." When asked whether Congressmen and Senators voted for Philippine independence because they wanted to eliminate that threat, Dickinson


²*Friend, Between Two Empires*, op. cit., p. 86.
replied, "That's one of the things they have (sic) in the back of their head. No doubt about it."¹

Senator King, noted that the Secretary of State did not favor Philippine independence within a short time because of the confused situation in the Orient, and stated that there were many congressmen who favored Philippine independence precisely for that reason.²

One Congressman repeatedly reminded his peers that the Philippines had become as the "sword of Damocles, suspended over our heads, that Japan can at her will cause to fall."³ We were holding a lightening rod, he said, and beckoning the lightening, Japan, to strike; when she did, our billion-dollar navy would go into "Davy Jones's locker."⁴

¹Statement by former U.S. Senator Lester J. Dickinson, personal interview, (July 28, 1967). Mr. Dickinson served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1918 to 1930, and in the Senate from 1931-1937. The Des Moines Register called Dickinson a "nationally known figure during his days in politics," and a darkhorse candidate for the Republican nomination for vice-president in 1924 (Des Moines Register, June 6, 1968, p. 6). Although 93 years old when interviewed, Mr. Dickinson was remarkably active and mentally alert. Although, understandably, unable to recall specific details, he did convey personal and, presumably, farm bloc attitudes toward the Philippine question. He died June 4, 1968.

²Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 553.

³Representative Cross, (Texas), Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 7406.

⁴Ibid., p. 7407.
Representative Thurston of Iowa, a member of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, said that the United States had all the hazards pertaining to the occupation of the Islands without any facilities or any provisions to protect our possessions. He was applauded when he stated, "So whether conditions remain stable in Asia or not, our people do not care to take the chance of being involved in a war on the other side of the globe."\(^1\)

In the Report of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs it was maintained that the Philippine Islands could not be held against a strong enemy for any reasonable length of time; they were a liability, and might involve us in disputes with a foreign power. Once the Islands were captured, they could hardly be retaken by us for at least two years, and then only at the cost of an immense amount of money and "hundreds of thousands" of American casualties.\(^2\)

It appeared to isolationists that the United States must bid the Philippines "good-buy and Godspeed," or blindly drift into a war which could not be justified on the ground of any economic interest.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Cong. \textit{Rec.}, 72:2, p. 1762. \\
\(^2\) Senate Report, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 12,812. \\
A sense of impending doom seemed to dominate the minds of some Congressmen. Senator Lewis of Illinois feared "even in this hour the complete imperiling if not the destruction of the institutions of this Republic."\(^1\) After mentioning the transition time of ten to fourteen years it would take to get out of the Philippines, Senator Robinson of Indiana, referring specifically to Japan, saw no need to mince words: "I am hoping," he said, "we may have good luck and good fortune enough to escape war with that power or any other during the next fourteen years; and then we are out, and we are out for good, and for all time to come..."\(^2\)

Since the Japanese menace was also an argument for the retention of the Philippines, sponsors of independence legislation paradoxically continued either to discount the possibility of any Japanese threat against the Philippines, or to show outright indifference to possible Japanese conquest of the Islands.\(^3\)

Senator Hawes countered Mr. Robinson's Japanese menace and war talk with rationalizations about the

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\(^1\)Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 1921.


\(^3\)William G. Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle West," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIII (December, 1936), 383.
nature of Japanese expansion. The conflict between
Japan and China proved again, he said, that Japan's
expansion was not to the tropics but to the temperate
zone, away from the Philippines and toward the mainland. 1
Japan had enough colonial problems already without taking
on more. Her self-interests were against aggression.
Her trade depended on international cooperation. 2 In
other words, there was no international problem to
freeing the Philippines—just free them. The Japanese
did not like the climate there anyway. 3

Isolationists forwarded other plausible themes
to counter the internationalist arguments.

Because Japan nor any other nation coveted the
Philippines, the United States could conclude a treaty
with Japan to recognize the Islands as an independent
state. The new nation would be neutralized, Hawes
argued, and its security assured via the sacredness of
treaties. 4 The United States, after all, expected her
word to be accepted in good faith, so she must accord

1 Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 14,477; the same arguments
were presented on the house side by Mr. Osias, Cong. Rec.,
72:1, p. 12,806.


3 Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 1794-95.

4 Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 12,840.
equal sincerity of motives to other countries signatory to peace treaties, agreed the Filipinos. ¹

Besides international agreements, the League of Nations would protect the Islands in any case, the isolationists said. The Philippines also had "moral protection," because a Japanese attack on the Archipelago would be an "unpardonable affront" to the United States. There was also a counterpoint of hopeful realpolitik—Great Britain, France, and Holland would step in should Japan show signs of upsetting the balance of power. ²

Even if international politics and counter-power should fail, isolationists concluded in a touch of irony, that the question of invulnerability had never been invoked as a prerequisite to independence. ³ Woe to the Philippines, they said, if there had to be an absence of troubles and dangers in every part of the world as a prerequisite to independence. ⁴

To go ahead was not cowardice, argued pro-independence forces. Teddy Roosevelt was cited as "proof." He had argued that the Philippines were the

¹ Cong. Rec., 71:1, p. 656.
³ Cong. Rec., 71:1, p. 656.
⁴ Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 1764.
United States' "heel of Achilles" and he never had a cowardly thought or action in his life.¹

In an ingenious variation, the Senate Committee and Representative Hare reported to their colleagues that to hesitate to go ahead with independence in the face of a "little international instability in the Orient" would be evidence of weakness.² To not free the Philippines on the basis of a "community of interest" with other European nations in the Orient, furthermore, would be to recognize an "unsound philosophy repugnant to the very best tradition of our nation."³

Philippine independence would enhance, not undermine, American prestige in the Orient, went the argument. The American action would be a "complete and emphatic answer to those foreign nations who have always been saying that . . . the United States of America is a great, grasping, avaricious, imperialistic nation."⁴ The United States would have a clearer voice in Asian affairs, it was argued, for she would have proof that

¹Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 1763.


⁴Representative Fish, (New York), Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 1763.
she had no imperialistic designs there.¹ America could make her record shine in clear contrast to the dark deeds of the "desperado nations" of Europe and Asia.²

Finally, although not publicly discussed, the idea was forwarded that there was more danger to the Filipinos while under the American flag. American bases on the Philippines might attract enemies to the Islands, but could not repel them.³ In case of war with Japan, the Filipino people could be the first victims, although they might, in fact, be a mere third-party alien to the question in issue.⁴

A contemporary journalist cited three foreign policies which the United States could have pursued: to provide against aggressive action by guaranteeing our communication with the Philippines and the Far East; to proceed as we were, face a later inevitable disaster from which we would ultimately emerge victorious; or to withdraw from the Far East.⁵

¹ Statement by Maximo Kalaw, a Dean of the University of the Philippines, Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 1094.

² Adler, op. cit., p. 112.


⁴ Kalaw Statement, loc. cit.

⁵ Wayne Francis Palmer, "Islands or Else," New Outlook, (February, 1934), reprinted in the Cong. Rec., 73:2, p. 841.
The first option was the internationalist. It would have meant keeping the Philippines indefinitely, and pursuing the Churchillian ideal of arming to prevent war.¹ This was what the navy wanted. There was, according to Perkins, little reason to suppose that the United States could have refrained from opposing a calculated course of aggression in the Western Pacific whether or not it was sovereign over the Philippines. Nor was it probable, he said, that the Philippines would have been spared if the United States had not been present.²

Theodore Friend thought that depression, traditional isolation, and naivete' about power made Americans unequal to the Churchillian policy.³ He wondered whether a second course should not have been taken--quick and complete withdrawal from the Philippines. This was what the isolationists--and the army--wanted.

Friend, however, was not advocating isolationism as American foreign policy, but rather was speculating about what might have been best for the Filipinos. He thought that naval views on strategy would have prevailed, and a direct thrust toward Japan would have

¹Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 266-67.

²Perkins, op. cit., p. 52.

³Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 267.
spared the Philippines being made a major battle ground. The Japanese would have arrived anyway and eventually departed, but less destructively on each occasion. The Philippines would have been spared a scourging comparable with that of Poland. This could have contributed to greater internal stability against the Communist threat in the post-war years.¹

Grayson Kirk, although he did not explore the idea, advocated isolationism. Since there was no valid basis for such a position, the United States, he said, should have withdrawn sovereignty from the Philippines, and given up all erstwhile plans for becoming a Far Eastern power. "If isolation is to be our policy, it should at least be an intelligent and thoroughgoing isolation," he said.²

American imperialism had been relatively "easy pickings" up to 1931; after that time the going promised to become increasingly rough. Americans had about decided that the game was not worth the candle.³ On the whole, by 1932 the impression had become widespread in the United States that the Philippines were an

¹Ibid., pp. 267-68.
²Kirk, op. cit., p. 126.
³Carleton, loc. cit.
inconvenient appurtenance, a burden rather than a
blessing in time of peace, costly and probably impossible
to defend in time of war. Many may have thought they
were worth protection by diplomacy, but assuredly not
by force. It was in this atmosphere that Congress made
its decision.
CHAPTER V

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

In 1921, members of the House Ways and Means Committee broke into laughter when a remark was made, half facetiously, about giving the Philippines their independence. Neither the public nor the Congress was seriously concerned at that time over any danger from Philippine import competition.¹

In 1930, the tone was entirely different. That "football of American politics," Philippine independence, was ready to be tossed out for another Congressional booting. The chief factor motivating Congress was said to be economic expediency.² The farmer was pictured as being "savagely menaced" by Philippine agricultural competition.³ Organized labor demanded the termination of Filipino immigration, a source of cheap labor.

On December 7, 1931, while hundreds of "hunger-marchers" milled about outside, the first session of the Seventy-second Congress convened. The mob outside lent

¹Kirk, op. cit., p. 76.

²"Freeing the Philippines to Tax Them," The Literary Digest, CIII (December 28, 1929), 8-9.

a tone that was recurrent in a Congress without answers to solve the bewildering problems of depression which gripped the nation.\textsuperscript{1} In this atmosphere, the United States Congress, inclined to clutch at anything that might prove to be a panacea to offset the Great Depression, prepared to decide the question of Philippine independence.\textsuperscript{2} Friends of the Islands were fearful that the disadvantages of Philippine competition would be so exaggerated that no reasonable view of those questions would be taken.\textsuperscript{3} There seemed to be an excellent chance the ball would be carried over the goal line.

In order to understand the striking change which occurred in advocated Philippine policy, a look will be taken at the general condition, attitudes and demands of the agricultural community and their representatives in Congress in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

Although the Great Depression gave great impetus to anti-Philippine agitation, it would be inaccurate to

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\textsuperscript{1}E. Pendleton Herring, "First Session of the Seventy-Second Congress," \textit{The American Political Science Review}, XXVI (October, 1932), 846.
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\textsuperscript{2}Smith, \textit{Our Future in Asia}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 109.
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say that the move to restrict or free the Philippines originated with the Depression. The farm community had not been prosperous at any time during the 1920's. In contrast with the wartime demand, farmers were plagued by overproduction and falling prices. The farmer's share of the national income had decreased from 14.9 per cent in 1920 to 7.8 per cent in 1929.¹

Philippine competition of the 1920's provided a ready, if misleading, scapegoat for American agricultural distress. Philippine agriculture had enjoyed an extraordinary boom during the decade. Wartime prices, plus improvement of an already strong position in the American market by the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, had given strong impetus to Philippine trade. Of the three leading exports, sugar increased 450 per cent, coconut oil 221 per cent, and cordage more than 500 per cent.² Since this contrasted so greatly with continental farmers, whose share of the national income between 1920 and 1929 dropped nearly fifty per cent, farm interests saw Philippine competition as a source of American distress. As prices for dairy products and cottonseed oil began

¹Kirk, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

to slump, domestic producers blamed the Philippine "coconut cow" for their plight.¹

The farm community saw the Philippines as a burden to the United States. The United States was buying more from the Philippines than it was selling to them. This was thought, as though by definition, to be an unfavorable balance of trade. The six-year period from 1923 to 1928 was said to have averaged $36,012,000 per year in favor of the Islands.²

To add to the reputed injury, eighty per cent of the imports from the Philippines were cited as consisting of farm products, whereas only twenty per cent of the exports of the United States to the Islands were farm products.³ This tended to increase the farm feeling that industry was getting to play first fiddle while agriculture burned.

The term "unfavorable," to the extent it implied something undesirable, was misleading. Many thought

¹Kirk, op. cit., pp. 74-79.
²Cong. Rec., 71:1, p. 4072.
³Senate Report, op. cit., p. 12,810; this "80%, 20%" argument was widely quoted, both in and out of Congress. In the Farm Bureau Federation Convention, December 10, 1928, however, it was said that 95% of our imports from the Philippines consisted of agricultural products. See the reprint of AFBF remarks, Cong. Rec., 71:1, p. 4067.
the U.S. could improve its position by decreasing its purchases, even if it meant killing the customer. They seemed to overlook the fact that the Philippines were our eighth best customer.\(^1\) There was even the possibility that the unfavorable balance with the Islands was being translated into a favorable operation through a triangular trade clearance with Japan.\(^2\) Besides, as the Philippine Independence Commission reported, "The only question of policy is whether or not the relation between the different accounts is what we as a nation would like it to be."\(^3\) Congress had yet to decide whether the relationship between the United States and Philippines was what it desired.

The most essential farm grievance concerned the question of competition. The farmer and dairyman saw agricultural imports from the Islands as a serious menace to their interests. "The greatest menace that confronts the American farmer today is the Tropics."\(^4\)

\(^1\)Smith, *Our Future in Asia*, *loc. cit.*

\(^2\)Ibid.


The *Minneapolis Tribune* quoted Alonzo E. Taylor, "a world famous chemist," as saying:

... It is impossible to conceive the mental process of the legislator who cannot see the same necessity for the protection of the American farmer from the rapidly increasing flood of tropical oils that is pouring into this country every year. America has a surplus of animal and cottonseed fats. Animal fat is a drug on the market today. The swine raiser is penalized by the packer for the excess fat on his hogs. The dairyman, with the price of butter down to a ruinous level, is forced to compete with the margarine made from Philippine oil imports. When Doctor Taylor as a chemist says that there isn't any reason why American-produced fats should not be used in the manufacture of our soaps, no fair-minded person would question his statement.¹

The farmer, already faced with the problem of overproduction, saw the development of irrigation systems in the American West as bringing new acreage into competition with farmers already in operation.² They dreaded the additional potential of the Philippines developed to the fullness of their vast agricultural possibilities, cheap Filipino labor working in the fields, and its products transported free of duty to the United States.

American farmers could not understand the government urging them to cut production in order to raise prices on one hand, and, on the other hand, aid


²*Senate Report, loc. cit.*
the development of Philippine agriculture and permit its products to compete with their own on the American market.\(^1\) This attitude was reflected by L. J. Taber, Master of the National Grange. After noting that agricultural imports were $1,906,150,000 in 1927, with $1,250,000,000 duty free, he continued:

The real surplus that is distressing American agriculture is imported into the United States from countries with lower standards of living and lower costs than exist here. As long as we have competitive imports of the enormous total of two billion dollars, the necessity for revision upwards of the agriculture schedules will be apparent.\(^2\)

In a gross distortion of fact, an article in Wallace's Farmer said the Philippines annually were costing the United States ten times the $20 million it took to acquire them.\(^3\) The deduction made by the farmer was that the free importation of insular agricultural products had already made a grave inroad upon the earnings of the American farmers--their standard of living--and the competition was likely to increase in the future,

\(^{1}\text{Cong. Rec., 72:1, (June 20, 1932), pp. 13,433-34.}\)

\(^{2}\text{L. J. Taber, "The Attitude of the National Grange Toward the Tariff," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CXLII (March, 1929), 331.}\)

\(^{3}\text{Herman Steen, "Coconut and the Cow," Wallace's Farmer, LIV (February 22, 1929), 289. The $2 billion alluded to coincide with approximate agriculture imports into the United States.}\)
multiplying adverse results. It wasn't the original cost, it was the upkeep that was bothering them!  

Faced with the severe economic maladjustment of the twenties, the agricultural community turned to the farm organizations for help. This period saw the rise of a militant and powerful farm bloc, hostile to Eastern industrial and financial interests, and willing to vote with the Democratic minority. The assemblage of forces opposed to Philippine competition included the National Beet Growers' Association, representing nineteen beet-growing states of the Midwest and West, who joined the Farm Bureau and the National Grange to lead the public attack. This already formidable array was joined by dairy organizations, cottonseed crusher's associations, cordage manufacturers, and domestic sugar producers. Behind the scenes was the powerful Cuban Sugar Lobby, which worked mainly through the National City Bank of New York to save their investment from the dual threats of Philippine competition and Cuban revolution.

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1 Beard, op. cit., p. 516.
2 Steen, loc. cit. 3 Kirk, loc. cit.
5 Kirk, op. cit., p. 93.
Efforts of the various farm lobbying groups succeeded in enlisting active support of Senators and Congressmen, especially from dairy and cotton states. "Through their efforts, the farm bloc thus became a unit, and a powerful one, in opposition to the free entry of Philippine coconut oil which they regarded as the chief source of their ills." ¹

Along with the agricultural were the labor lobbies which, as has been mentioned, were interested in restricting Filipino immigration. Their organized effort on the Philippine question was an early sign of the power and influence to which they would rise under the New Deal. ²

What agriculture wanted was tariff protection. The Farm Bureau, not active during the Fordney-McCumber high tariff bill of 1922, had seen industry reap the big increases. ³ This led Henry Wallace, editor of a leading farm magazine, to complain that agriculture was playing "Esau to the industrial Jacob." ⁴

¹Kirk, op. cit., p. 79.
⁴Cedar Rapids Gazette, December 7, 1932.
If the products imported from the Philippines had been manufactured, rather than raw products, said Congressman Cross, who would be so simple who would not know that the tariff would have long since been applied? ¹

The farm organizations were said to have an almost "feverish desire" to come to the rescue of American agriculture, to help place it on an equal footing with American industry, and to give it adequate protection from foreign competition.² Since a protective tariff had brought about the prosperity of industry, why not agriculture?³ Said Farm Bureau President Thompson:

We must secure a permanent national policy that will bring agriculture within the accepted American protective system, to the extent that protection is extended to the products of the farm just as effectively as it is extended to the other groups that go to make up our national life.

"Tariff for all or tariff for none," was the policy of the National Grange. "... The American farmer is entitled to sufficient protection to give him the American market," it said.⁴

¹Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 7406.

²Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5123.


⁴Sam H. Thompson, "The Essentials in Farm Relief as Viewed by the American Farm Bureau Federation," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CXLII (March, 1929), 325.

⁵Taber, op. cit., p. 329.
Soon after a victorious 1928 Republican campaign, which promised farm relief, President Hoover called Congress into special session to pass the Hawley-Smoot tariff, which called for higher tariffs on agricultural products. Farm bloc leaders in Congress soon made attempts to add amendments designed to grant independence to the Philippines, and to levy a duty on imports from the Islands even before independence.

A statement by Louisiana's Senator Broussard was typical of many made by Congressmen friendly to the farm position. He said:

Agricultural products in this country are entitled to the American market, which is the best market in the world. We are engaged ... in readjusting rates, especially on agricultural products, in order to preserve the American standard of living among the rural class of our people.¹

He proposed that the Philippines pay a duty on all commodities as provided under the then-pending Hawley-Smoot tariff act, thus equalizing competitive conditions.²

The statement by Senator Broussard was an example of the idea of economic nationalism, with which the farmer had become imbued.³ The farmer sought to withdraw from intercourse with foreign peoples to the greatest possible degree, to become as self-contained as feasible

¹Cong. Rec., 71:1, p. 4066.
²Ibid.
³Carleton, loc. cit.
in the modern world. Domestic measures, operating at home with American resources, were thought the best avenue to achieve a high level of well-being for all. 2

The farm community thought foreign trade should supplement—not compete—with domestic resources; it should exchange American surpluses with other countries where mutual advantage was served. 3 As former farm-bloc leader Lester J. Dickinson succinctly put it, one must "compromise between what you sell and what you need." Although he called himself a "high-tariff man," he said: "You can't be exclusive in it," that it was necessary to pick-and-choose "what you need a tariff on and what you don't." 4 It was thought that where advantageous,

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3Ibid.

4Dickinson Interview, loc. cit. Lester J. Hicks and Theodore Saloutos refer to Dickinson as the leader of the farm bloc in the House of Representatives in 1921. Twentieth-Century Populism: Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1930-1939 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1951), p. 324/. Letters by the Farm Bureau to Senator Dickinson, and his presentation of their position on the floor of the Senate would support Mr. Dickinson's statement that he was "one of the bloc leaders" in the Senate.
Congress should endeavor to maintain home markets for the benefit of domestic producers.¹

In spite of stringent farm efforts, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff bill of 1929 contained only defeat for agriculture insofar as the Philippines were concerned. "They lobbied and orated and resoluted and exerted fair and foul pressure, but, when the inequitous Smoot-Hawley (sic) tariff bill was approved by Hoover in 1930, it did not contain a tariff on Philippine products."² This was because it was not quite good morals or good principle to impose tariff duties on the Philippines so long as they were wards of the United States. As long as they were held without their consent, they should have absolutely free trade with the United States.³

On the basis of action taken, these attitudes appear to have represented the majority sentiment on the Philippine question in that Congress.⁴ So long as that attitude prevailed, tariffs could not be applied against Philippine products any more than a tariff could be levied against Texas or Illinois.⁵

¹ Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5121.
⁴ Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 192.
⁵ Kile, op. cit., p. 157.
Even in defeat, however, the Hawley-Smoot struggle marked the turning-point in the organized farm struggle against Philippine competition. Faced with tariff setbacks, a warning note crept into farm organization declarations during 1929. Congress was served notice that if the problem could not be solved on a tariff basis, the farmers were determined to press for immediate independence. ¹

During the Hawley-Smoot debate, Senator King had introduced an amendment proposing immediate independence for the Philippines. When discussion on the proposed amendment threatened to sidetrack positive action on the tariff bill itself, Senator Bingham, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, stated his intention to hold hearings on an independence bill as soon as possible, and to submit a report to Congress without unnecessary delay. This was the turning point. ² The same spirit of economic isolationism that produced the Hawley-Smoot tariff helped produce a series of proposals known as the Hawes-Cutting bill, for setting the Philippines free. ³

¹ According to Senator Bingham, representatives of farm organizations first made the threat to the Senate Finance Committee in 1929. Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 427.

² Philippine Commission, loc. cit.

Guaranteed the opportunity to take up the question of Philippine independence at an early date, the Senate quickly voted down the proposed agriculture-bloc amendments. The first Hawes-Cutting bill was subsequently introduced on January 6, 1931, and its favorable report by the Senate Committee was made on May 24 of the same year. The bill was left without decision by the 71st Congress, to be re-introduced in January, 1932.

The intervening period between passage of the Hawley-Smoot tariff in 1929 and the beginning of debate on the Philippine independence bill in 1931, of course, was marked by the advent of the Great Depression. The worst fears of the farmer, who was especially hard hit, seemed to be borne out. By 1932, the price index of farm products had reached its lowest point since 1899. Total farm receipts had declined to one-third of the amount of 1918, while farm mortgage debt rose sharply. Forced sales of farm property had quadrupled since 1921-24, and hundreds of thousands of hard-working farmers and rural shopkeepers were facing bankruptcy or expulsion from their homes and stores because they could not meet mortgages and other debts.

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1. Philippine Commission, loc. cit.

"Grave national questions in relation to the economic depression, with all its growing acuteness and consequent suffering and distress," increasingly engaged the attention of Congress during 1930 and 1931.\textsuperscript{1}

Members of the Philippine Independence Commission noted that the feeling of economic nationalism in the United States was growing:

Logically, the thought and the attitude of public men in the United States was that America should devote herself primarily to the cure of her own social and economic maladies, leaving the other nations to take care of themselves as best they could. It was not long before this view gained ground and gripped the mind of the whole American Nation.\textsuperscript{2}

This nationalistic trend was partly a natural reaction against internationalism which, it was alleged, had brought to the different nations many of their ailments.\textsuperscript{3}

This attitude, of course, smacked strongly of self-interest, and helped to generate a concern for the status of the Philippines as it affected the national interest of the United States. An article written by Rufus S. Tucker for the \textit{Harvard Business Review} was unique in this regard in that it made a summary analysis of Philippine-American relations touching on the Philippines as a market for American exports; as a source of materials;

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}Philippine Commission, \textit{loc. cit.}
  \item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 5121.
\end{itemize}
as a center of distribution for trade with Asia; and as
a field for investment. It also considered the strat-
egic value of the Philippines to the United States,
and contained a summary of the costs of occupation.¹

Tucker estimated that the total gain from the
Philippines to all classes of American citizens, whether
in profits from commerce, investments, or personal
service, was less than $10,000,000 a year. Costs of
occupation were said to be $4,000,000 a year, and
$22,000,000 was expended by American consumers for free
trade articles (not including sugar), or a total cost
to the United States of about $26,000,000 a year.²
This figure did not include the extra naval expenditures
needed to maintain the Philippines.

The question was raised whether it was possible
to show mathematically the increase of buying power
among stockholders and employees of industrial and
trading concerns trading with the Philippines producing
additional domestic buying power offset by any loss
that might come to American farmers.³ Or, whether
elimination of Philippine agricultural competition would
raise the buying power of American farmers to such an

²Ibid.
³Beard, op. cit., p. 520.
extent that they could take the surplus cotton and other manufactures for which an outlet was found in the Philippines. Although the Tucker influence was evident in some of Senator Hawes' manifestations, the fact of the matter was that no conclusive balance sheet was drawn by Congress showing profit or loss on a basis similar to Mr. Tucker, with respect to national interest in the retention or independence of the Philippines.¹

In other words, neither the data presented at the hearings nor the debates in Congress produced a mathematical solution of the problem in the economic terms employed by the parties to the argument.²

Economic nationalism was also attacked on other grounds. A "round robin," signed by 1,028 economists in 1930, protested against the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill on the grounds that increased protective duties would increase consumer prices; subsidize waste and efficiency in industry; injure the vast majority of farmers, who depended on the world market for their cotton, corn, lard, and wheat crops; and make export trade, in general, suffer.³ According to a January, 1933, Des Moines

¹See Hawes' remarks, Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 13,435; specific reference is made to Tucker's ideas in the same source, p. 14,474.

²Beard, loc. cit.

Register editorial, the forecasts of trouble the document contained were verified in almost every detail. ¹

The Des Moines Hearings of the Commission of Inquiry on International Economic Relations likewise produced widespread criticism of the nationalist economic approach of the early 1930's. Most Iowa authorities, including Mr. T. W. Schultz, head of Agriculture Economics at Iowa State College, and Mr. L. E. Hoffman, Dean of the School of Commerce at Drake University, critized the high tariff policies of economic nationalism as harmful to Iowa's agricultural industries. ²

Even the president of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation recognized that economic nationalism "is in opposition to the interest of agriculture generally." "American agriculture has suffered severely during the past, and ... at the present time from a policy of wholesale protection," he said, admitting that "it is only very recently that the farmer has begun to appreciate this fact." That was in April, 1934. ³

¹Des Moines Register, January 11, 1933.

²Hutchins, op. cit., pp. 361, 363.

³Statement by Charles E. Hearst, President of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, at the Des Moines Hearings, Hutchins, Ibid., p. 363.
In defense of agriculture economic policy were those who noted that farmers, like everybody else, were dealing with very extreme conditions. Said one author:

Clarity of thinking on the part of farm groups was neither significantly better nor notably worse than that of other groups, including Congress and the administration. All were dealing with a situation more baffling than any they previously experienced. All were wedded to relatively orthodox procedures.¹

In such conditions, said another author, "Simple arguments with specious plausibility can be expected to attract more attention than the subtle economic reasoning underlying the accepted theory of international trade."²

Agriculture interests perhaps were not so indifferent to the plight of the Filipinos as was reflected on the surface.

Mr. Dickinson reported that he didn't think Philippine sugar was hurting too much. He even felt a certain kinship to it because he once raised sugar on his farm in Kossuth County and "made good money off of it." When prices fell, however, he went over to corn.³ Perhaps he thought the Filipinos also could switch to a different money crop.


³Dickinson Interview, loc. cit.
Dickinson recognized that Congress "gets a lot of propaganda on a bunch of information that all of it (sic) doesn't pan out." He seemed to be interested in setting a precedent. The first thing to do was to free the Philippines, then negotiate on tariffs afterwards—to make a "business adjustment." If the Filipino needed help in certain areas, you could help them; if the American farmer needed help, then you could do that.\(^2\)

When asked whether we were helping ourselves and not caring for what happened to the Philippines, Mr. Dickinson answered:

No, I don't think we were. We never help ourselves by punishing anybody else by disregarding their interests. Usually those things we try to work out so it equalizes. But sometimes you have to go quite a ways before we learn what's happening in the hog trough.\(^3\)

In 1930, however, economic nationalism was in full swing. The organized voice of farmers and wage earners, representing as they did the bulk of the people and of political constituencies, gained in strength.\(^4\) Farm bloc representatives worked closely with the Farm Bureau. "There was never anything done that wasn't done in collusion with and for that purpose—\(^4\)

\(^1\) Ibid.  \(^2\) Ibid.  
\(^3\) Ibid.  
\(^4\) Philippine Commission, loc. cit.
to satisfy something they wanted done," Mr. Dickinson said. The tacit acceptance of their viewpoint by the mass of people made that sector appear representative of the mass, and helped them to determine policy.2

Conferences between the Farm Bureau, Grange and Farmer’s Union, January 6-8, 1932, produced a six-point legislative program which was presented before the House Committee on Agriculture, January 12.3 The Conference, which was quite a success, adopted the name National Farm Conference and met from time to time throughout the next two years. It was the first time in the history of organized American agriculture that the "big three" had ever reached unanimous agreement on a legislative project of such momentous significance to the industry.4

The National Farm Conference legislative program included high tariff policies (the American market for the American farmer), and Philippine independence (with

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1Dickinson Interview, loc. cit.

2Statement by Oscar B. Jessness, Chief of the Division of Agriculture Economics, University of Minnesota at the Chicago Hearings, Hutchins, op. cit., p. 318.

3Benedict, op. cit., p. 271.

resultant elimination of Philippine products from the duty-free list). The group met with a caucus of nearly one hundred members of Congress and discussed their plans. "Apparently this united front together with the increasingly desperate economic condition of the farmers, spurred Congress into action," the Farm Bureau said.¹

The farm and labor lobby was opposed primarily by American companies with investments in the Islands who lobbied through the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce.²

One category included utilities companies, food companies, and the Standard Oil Company. They generally asked for a thirty-year transition period to "put themselves in shape." They mainly spent a great deal of money on anti-independence propaganda.³

Companies involved in trade with the Philippines, mainly importers and processors, comprised a second group. They echoed the demands of the 1898 imperialists, and spoke for expanding American trade relations with the Far East. Manufacturers-exporters lent support to the importers, but neither group had alternative legislation to offer.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 181.


³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 509.
Finally there were the Manila Americans, who were interested in protecting what they considered endangered investment. They urged that America had not fulfilled her trust in the Philippines, nor had yet realized her trade potential in the Orient.¹

With a Philippine Independence bill destined to be debated in the 72nd Congress, the battle lines were drawn. It was readily apparent that, compared to the unified front of the labor and various farm organizations, no equally powerful American economic group was prepared to do battle for retention of control in the Philippines.² The confidence of the agricultural lobbies was bolstered. An administration discredited by the depression was faced with an uphill battle to retain the Philippines in the face of overwhelming opposition.

¹Ibid., p. 510.
²Kirk, op. cit., p. 100.
The desire of certain economic groups to put certain Philippine products beyond the tariff wall led them to advocate Philippine independence. Since it was the pressure of these interests that was a determining factor in the passage of the independence bill, it is necessary to inquire just how seriously these Philippine products competed with domestic production. This will require an examination of each of the four chief Philippine exports, tobacco, hemp, sugar, and coconut oil.

American tobacco interests did not actively participate in the proceedings leading to Philippine independence between 1930 and 1932. Philippine tobacco, although their fourth largest export, amounted to only five per cent of total exports in 1934. This was not particularly harmful to American tobacco or its manufacturers. Filipinos, on the other hand, had developed a particular liking for American cigarettes.¹ American tobacco companies kept quiet, and hoped to preserve a

¹Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 212.
tax-free market, which was vastly more important than competition at the raw product level.¹

Abaca and cordage, combined, amounted to about seven per cent of Philippine exports, their third largest. There was no objection to the free importation of Manila hemp or abaca because, at that time, there was no satisfactory substitute for making good rope. The bind came over their exports of cordage, which greatly exceeded imports of the raw material.²

The American Cordage Institute was faced with a decline in domestic production of cordage from 193,000,000 pounds in 1927 to 88,000,000 pounds in 1935, whereas imports from the Philippines increased from 4,900,000 to 11,000,000 pounds.³ Because of their dual position as an importer of raw abaca, the Institute seemed to make no all-out campaign. But behind the scenes they drummed-up support for Philippine independence as the only means to obtain limitation of a genuine competition.⁴

³Ibid.
Sugar was the major Philippine export, double that of tobacco, coconut and hemp combined.¹ Philippine sugar exports to the United States had increased rapidly to 1,000,000 long tons by 1932 compared to 356,000 long tons in 1922. This increase corresponded to a decline in raw sugar prices after 1929. American cane and beet farmers became convinced that their interests were jeopardized by the expansion of Philippine production.² What validity was there to the desire of American sugar interests to exclude Philippine sugar?

The answer was that exclusion of the Philippine product would have improved neither domestic prices nor production levels.³ Prices were dependent on sugar imports, not from the Philippines, but from Cuba. The price was established by the world market plus a twenty per cent tariff on Cuban sugar, which would still be coming in. The only loss to the United States was the amount of the Cuban duty on all sugar imported from the Philippines.⁴


²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Since the United States was consuming six million tons of sugar a year, and the beet farmers couldn't hope to produce a quarter of that, the Filipinos thought the American sugar interests guilty of a dog-in-the-manger attitude. On the average, about eighty per cent of United States sugar was imported, with 44 per cent from Cuba, 12 per cent from the Philippines, and 24 per cent from some of our other territories. The American market could absorb a considerable increase in Philippine production since, on the average, domestic sugar production increased less in ten years than consumption increased in one year.

For the United States to have become self-sufficing in sugar production, it would have needed to abandon the Cuban preferential, plus implement rigid limitation of imports from all insular areas, plus impose an extremely high sugar tariff.

Whereas it was agronomically possible to produce all our sugar requirements, the result would have been a decided increase in sugar costs paid by 97 per cent

1 Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., p. 106.
3 Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 9544.
4 Kirk, op. cit., p. 91.
of the total farm community to benefit less than three per cent. The consumer would have paid heavily for subsidizing an industry which could never have hoped to maintain itself in the free market. To greatly increase the cost of sugar to the farm community would not have been wise, since the real problem of the farmer was a low purchasing power, not the twelve per cent sugar consumption from the Philippines.

Although the sugar farmers, spread over some twenty states, were numerous enough in twelve of them to be a deciding factor, they were only part of the lobby. The sugar bankers were even more important.

The tactics of the beet lobbies, not soundly reasoned, was the harder to understand because they allied themselves with Wall Street and Cuban-American sugar.


3 Senator Pittman, Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 316.


5 Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., p. 107.

Senator Pittman was "astonished" at the tremendous support of the sugar producers of this country for the Cuban lobby, who for years had been almost "mortal enemies" of Cuba.¹

New York banks had millions of dollars invested in Cuban sugar. Such diverse critics as Cameron Forbes, Arthur Krook, and Manuel Quezon all singled out the National City Bank of New York as the leader in an effort to free the Philippines. Historian Theodore Friend agreed with Cameron Forbes' accusation that the bank was guilty of a short-sighted policy, conniving the independence movement to "chuck away the Philippines and save some of their pennies."²

Senator Underhill condemned the "oil utterances" on the floor as being "propaganda from certain paid sources, undoubtedly much of it financed by the sugar interests of Cuba," misleading the American farmer and his representatives into thinking Philippine independence would help the sugar growers of this country.³ California

¹Senator Pittman, loc. cit.

²New York Times, April 5, 1932; cited by Friend, "American Interests," Op. cit., p. 511. The National City Bank was said to have eventually lost about 60 million dollars in Cuba. Another author said that New York banks once had "as much as" $9 million invested in Cuban sugar. See Smith, loc. cit.

representative Colden called the propaganda "all a lot of buncombe and hokum."\textsuperscript{1}

Others, however, thought the American position in Cuba was of legitimate concern. Whereas perhaps $544 million in American money was invested in Cuban sugar alone, circumstances were such that little American capital was invested in Philippine sugar.\textsuperscript{2} Senator Hawes pointed out that the investment in Cuban sugar was held mostly by stocks held throughout the United States, and American investors had a right to question the fairness of a policy which taxed Cuban sugar, while allowing Philippine sugar to enter free. He said the Cuban sugar was "almost as much an American commodity as it could be were it produced within our own borders."\textsuperscript{3}

Senator Long, of the sugar-cane state of Louisiana, also came to the defense of the Cuban sugar interests. Four times as much business was being done with Cuba and, he said, not generally at taxpayer's expense. It was true that Cuba's exports to the United States of

\textsuperscript{1}Cong. Rec., 73:2, p. 4838.

\textsuperscript{2}Hawes Analysis, Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 13,434.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
209 million dollars in 1928 exceeded her imports of United States goods by $82 million.¹ But, said the Senator, the economic structure was complementary, not competitive. Moreover, the "unfavorable" balance with Cuba created a surplus credit for the exporting country which was used to apply to United States investment. He concluded, "We have just as much right to talk about building up trade relations with Cuba as with the Philippine Islands."²

Ninety per cent of Philippine sugar competed, not with the American-grown product, but with the sugar from Cuba. During the period from 1929 to the end of 1931, the Cuban sugar market shrank by over one million tons, while domestic beet and cane sugar increased 300,000 tons. This proved that duty-free Philippine sugar made no inroads on domestic sugar, but like any other duty-free sugar, it did displace part-duty-paying Cuban sugar.³ What Cuban-American interests hoped to gain by a tariff on Philippine sugar is shown by the following statement:

²Cong. Rec., 72:2, (December 9, 1932), pp. 269-70.
A duty on the part of the supply coming from the Philippine Islands would not provide additional protection to domestic producers and hence would not cause much further shift to sugar in this country. The probable effect would be to increase our purchases of sugar from Cuba because of the preferential duty on Cuban sugar.1

The Cuban share of the United States market, which dropped from 56.2 per cent in 1922-1926 to 28.2 per cent by 1932, had seriously curtailed American exports to that Island and brought disorder and revolution in its wake.2 Under the stimulus of tariff protection, American insular areas (Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines) had expanded their production and sales to the point that Cuba was in danger of being rapidly crowded out of the American market.3

Although it was true that Cuban-American sugar interests promoted Philippine independence solely for the selfish purpose of shutting the Philippines out of the American market, the economic and political disaster which was pending in Cuba in the short run would seem to lend some rational justification to their policy. If attempting to cut the Philippines out of the picture was short-sighted, then so was the "policy" which permitted the economic position of Cuba to seriously deteriorate.

1 Dowell, op. cit., p. 148; Robert L. Bacon, (Former member of Senate Insular Affairs Committee), Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 9544.

2 Kirk, op. cit., p. 128.

3 Ibid.
When Congress steadfastly refused to tax or otherwise limit U.S. dependencies, the Cuban sugar lobby, in its self-interest, probably thought it had no other choice than to press for Philippine independence. Because of their plantation methods, Cubans could expand production in any given year to fill up any hole in the world market. Cuba had been producing less than a third of capacity for almost fifteen years. Keeping a million tons of Philippine sugar out of the United States would help.¹

Inasmuch as political stability in Cuba depended on assured access to the American sugar market, it would appear that the American economic position in Cuba, indeed, Cuban stability itself, was a legitimate national concern. In fact, the political stability in Cuba was soon to be considered important enough that Cuba was assured access to the American sugar market, placing all imports on a quota basis under the Jones-Costigan Law of 1934. Although Philippine independence was won, the actual quotas for sugar production, including that for the Philippines, was taken out of the field of independence.

Against coconut oil, the second largest Philippine export, were arrayed Midwestern and Southern farmers.

¹Smith, Our Future in Asia, loc. cit.
represented generally by the National Dairy Union, the National Cooperative Milk Producers Association, and many state dairy associations. Their case was based on two arguments: the interchangeability of fats and oils in soap manufacture, and customer change-over from oleomargarine to butter.\textsuperscript{1} Soap (64.3\%) and oleo (22.4\%) accounted for most of American coconut oil consumption in 1932.\textsuperscript{2}

As has been shown, the United States was experiencing a period of economic nationalism, which was designed to preserve the American market for the American farmer. The fundamental issue was whether such domestic products as lard and other fats, cottonseed oil and other oils, and butter, could be given a larger home market in place of Philippine coconut oil. The consensus of historians has been that coconut oil became a scapegoat for what essentially amounted to severe competition between domestic fats and oils.

The above farm groups saw all fats and oils as fully interchangeable, with the relative prices of each acting as the primary factor in their use, or rejection, by manufacturers.\textsuperscript{3} To the farmer, all non-mineral oils

\textsuperscript{1}Friend, "American Interests," \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{3}Grunder and Livezey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 213.
and fats constituted "one gigantic reservoir from which we may dip out the supply for a great variety of uses."\(^1\)

Coconut oil, since it was the product of low oriental production costs and standard of living, resulted in an unfair competition to the American farmer.

"In this country," so the argument went, "coconut oil replaces farm-produced oils and fats, pound for pound, and forces the higher-priced American products out of the United States into the cheaper foreign trade."\(^2\)

This, in turn, had a "profound effect along the line in many industries which use vegetable and animal fats and oils."\(^3\) The broad appeal which the argument made to all farmers was shown by this statement:

... (This is) a considerable factor in holding down prices of hogs in the middle west, of soybeans in Illinois and North Carolina, of cotton and peanuts in the South, of flax in the northwest, and of dairy products all over the United States. At least 75 per cent of all the farmers in the nation are affected in a substantial way by this form of competition.\(^4\)

The *Minneapolis Tribune* editorialized, "It is an incontrovertible fact that 600,000,000 pounds of coconut

\(^1\)Brief of C. W. Holman, representing the National Cooperative Milk Federation to the House Ways and Means Committee, "Hearings on Tariff Readjustment, 1929," cited by Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 80.


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Ibid.
oil come into the United States every year from the
Philippine Islands and drive out of our market as least
as many pounds of American produced animal and cottonseed
fats."¹

The argument found its way into Congress. Senator
Borah, for example, quoted a letter from the National
Grange: "Since vegetable oils are interchangeable, to
permit coconut oil to come in free from the Philippines
in effect puts all our domestically produced vegetable
oils on the free list."² The same was true for sugar
imported from the Islands, he said.

The argument was deceptively simple. The Philippines
were the "key to this whole problem." To allow an exemp-
tion for Philippine vegetable oils was likened to building
a stout fence around three sides of a field and depending
on the neighbor's pigs not finding the fourth side.³

The question of interchanging oils for soap
manufacture stemmed from the competition lard was meeting

¹ Editorial, "Tax on Tropical Oils," loc. cit.

² Fred Brenckman, (Washington representative of the
National Grange), letter to Senator Borah, (September 25,

³ Steen, op. cit., p. 289.
from lard substitutes. The real problem of the lard producer, therefore, was not coconut oil, it was cottonseed oil.1

Because cottonseed oil was peculiarly well adapted to the requirements of a good "shortening" and cooking oil, its price was raised above other oils used in soapmaking, which diverted it away from that industry.2 By 1931, ninety per cent of the cottonseed oil output went into lard substitutes, whereas it had virtually disappeared as an ingredient in soapmaking. In the soapkettle, cottonseed oil was replaced primarily with coconut and palm oil, which increased from twelve to about 37 per cent of soap-making ingredients.3

What hog producers wanted to do was exclude coconut oil from the American market so that as much cottonseed oil as possible could be diverted away from the manufacture of lard substitutes into other products, primarily into


3Ibid.
soap. They thought the price of cottonseed oil and hence of lard would be raised, thus improving the competitive position of lard.\footnote{Rainer Schickele and Theodore W. Schultz, "The Land Market at Home and Abroad," Agriculture Experiment Station Bulletin No. 320, (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, June, 1934), pp. 92, 93.}

Put in other words, they wanted to shift lard, which was definitely on an export basis, to a higher priced domestic market by diverting cottonseed oil from the competing lard substitutes industry over into soap manufacturing.\footnote{Ibid., p. 93.} At the same time, lard producers wanted to prevent other domestic oils from replacing cottonseed oil in lard substitutes manufacture. The goals of the hog farmer thus ran at cross-purposes with the desire of other American farmers to improve the domestic oil market, especially for soy beans.\footnote{Wright, op. cit., p. 312.} It was that complicated.

The central importance of the question of interchangeability would seem to be readily apparent. To help clarify the issue, the question may be restated more concisely: How suitable was cottonseed oil for soap and, therefore, to what extent could it be diverted into the soap industry?
Grunder and Livezey, as do other historians, concur with the position of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce representative J. D. Craig, that the thesis of interchangeability was totally unsound.\(^1\) The extent to which cottonseed oil could reasonably be diverted would determine the reasonableness of the lobby position.

Compared to the food industry, cottonseed oil in the soap kettle indeed did not fare well:

The use of cottonseed oil to supplant other oils in the soap industry \(\ldots\) is not as practicable as to use it in the food industries. In the soap kettle, cottonseed oil competes with most all other fats and oils, inedible as well as edible, such as tallow and grease, whale and fish oils, palm oil and many other vegetable oils, most of which are cheaper than cottonseed oil. Moreover, cottonseed oil does not offer any preferable physical properties when used in making soap. Rather to the contrary, it has several undesirable properties.\(^2\)

Undesirable properties included a tendency to become rancid, and its color and softness made it unfit as a raw material for many soap grades. It had a high content of linolic acid (42%), which caused the unpleasant odors, whereas it had no lauric acid.\(^3\)

Coconut oil, in comparison, had a high content of lauric acid, an extremely important cleansing agent.

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\(^3\)Ibid.
but none of the undesirable linolic acid. The second most important ingredient in soapmaking, its white color and pleasing odor made it particularly suited for toilet purposes. It lathered quickly and freely at low temperatures, rinsed easily, and functioned well even in hard water, leaving no scum.¹

According to testimony of soap manufacturers in the early thirties, soap from cottonseed oil and tallow proved definitely inferior in all these significant points.²

New fabric characteristics was an important factor influencing soap manufacturer considerations. "Modern" fabrics were lighter and more fragile, and there was a need for soaps efficient at lower temperatures.³

Because of its high solubility, coconut oil was a regular ingredient of textile soaps. Soaps based on cottonseed formulas, however, would not leave modern fabrics clean. This fact led Senator Baily to comment that, if that made Americans dirty, they wouldn't be any dirtier than their fathers were.⁴

¹Grunder and Livezey, loc. cit.
²Ibid.
³Kirk, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
⁴Ibid., p. 82, citing Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1934.
Consumer preference was important. Manufacturers did not want to materially change the composition of the brands they had widely advertised.\textsuperscript{1} There was an increasing demand for hard, white soap, hard water soap, soap flakes and chips and many kinds of laundry soaps that helped foster the use of coconut oil in the soap industry.\textsuperscript{2} It was always hard to foresee how the public would react to even slight changes in the quality of products to which it had become accustomed.\textsuperscript{3}

For their part, the soap manufacturers were practically unanimous in declaring that they would not make any large scale substitution of domestic oils for coconut oil.\textsuperscript{4} Because of the "intrinsic worth to the industry" of coconut oil, it was thought that it would still be imported with the tariff being passed on to the consumer. Faced with this threat, the American Protestant and Catholic hospital associations expressed a joint protest. They feared their soap bill would be increased $25 million annually.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1}Schickele and Schultz, "Bulletin No. 171," op. cit., p. 160.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 166.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 160.
\textsuperscript{4}Kirk, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{5}Business Week, (February 24, 1934), p. 18.
Under the then existing production methods and consumer demand, it would appear that cottonseed oil was not a satisfactory substitute for coconut oil in soap-making. In fact, no domestic oils and fats could very well be substituted for coconut oil. In this respect, the use of coconut oil with domestic oils and fats was more complementary than competitive.¹

Tallow, the prime ingredient, which comprised one-third of the ingredients of soap, would not displace coconut oil:

Coconut oil and tallow supplement each other as to solubility and quality of lather, for when both are used together they broaden the conditions to which the resulting soap can be readily applied. Consequently, soaps generally used for toilet, household and laundry purposes, such as chips and flakes, are usually made from a combination of tallow and coconut oil.²

A higher price of coconut oil also could have had no possible effect in extending the market for soya bean oil in its principle use as a drying oil, for which almost 64 per cent of the total output was used. In soap making, which consumed 35.8 per cent, soya bean oil could be used with coconut oil, but was not a substitute for it. In fact, in making a modern soap, soya bean oil called for a higher percentage of coconut oil in the formulas then did other domestic oils and fats.³

¹Grunder and Livezey, loc. cit.
³Wright, op. cit., p. 317.
Corn oil constituted over four times the quantity of soya bean's 17.9 million tons, and was used to the extent of 45 per cent in the lard substitutes and salad oil industries, whereas soya bean use there was negligible. Another 45 per cent was used in soap making, but to shift a larger percentage to the soap kettle would be difficult. Once again, the uses to which corn oil was particularly adapted were those to which coconut oil was not adapted and vice versa.¹

Peanut oil was utilized to the extent of 53 per cent into margarine, and another 30.2 per cent into lard substitutes and salad oil. The 14.3 per cent used in the soap kettle faced severe competition, not from coconut oil, but from cheap animal fats and greases equally well adapted for the production of soap.² Prices of food markets for peanuts and peanut butter were so much better than for oils that farmers did not purposely raise peanuts for crushing. Imperfect peanuts were used for this. The quantity of oil used in soap making consisted of "foots" or refuse from refining.³

¹Ibid., p. 315.


³Ibid., p. 193n.
Iowa State College agriculture economists formulated a rule regarding price and suitability as it concerned domestic fats and oils:

The less suitable an oil is for a specific purpose, the cheaper it must be relative to other more suitable oils, in order to offset the higher processing cost or possible economic results that come as a consequence when the quality of the final product is altered.1

Assuming this rule was valid, then at least two contradictions in the arguments of hog producers become apparent.

First, it would have been extremely difficult to raise prices of the various oils relative to each other and in relation to what happened to cottonseed oil, since each had a "higher use" for which it was especially well suited. Since the various oils, except soya, were suitable in conjunction with coconut oil, and cottonseed was not well suited, then the other oils would have tended to become depressed, not increased proportionately, as coconut oil might have been excluded. It seems most unlikely, furthermore, that those oils complementary to coconut oil would not have been attracted into the lard substitute industry for which they were also well suited.

The second contradiction concerns a lack of suitability causing a lower price. Lard producers were

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1Ibid., p. 168.
seeking ways to increase the price of lard. But lard was low priced and losing its market, not because of coconut oil, but because it was an inferior product in need of being thoroughly standardized and made superior to that commonly being sold in that day. It was also victim to changing patterns in dietary intake. With the urbanization of the population and greater use of power machinery, the public was shifting from fats and carbohydrates to protein in the average diet.

Not only were lard substitutes superior, they also were manufactured and marketed on a much wider profit margin than lard, so that a considerable increase in vegetable oil prices could be absorbed by the processors margin without increasing the retail price of lard substitutes.

The author agrees with the Iowa State researchers who, after noting the difficulty of establishing an answer, concluded that the benefit of a tariff on Philippine coconut oil on lard prices would be "insignificantly small, at best, if not negative."

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2 Wright, op. cit., p. 146.
3 Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 93.
4 Ibid., p. 11.
As for cottonseed oil, Kirk's statement that there was "little, if any" competition with coconut oil was misleading. With hydrogenization, cottonseed oil could have been competitive in certain kinds or grades of soap. The more proper conclusion would seem to be that the oils were partially interchangeable, depending both on the price structure (the cottonseed lobby position) and technical limits (Kirk's position), as is indicated by the following statement:

"... In almost every case, cottonseed oil can be substituted for other oils to only a limited extent, if the quality of the final product is not to be markedly changed. In order to maintain the standard qualities of the various kinds and grades of soap, certain proportions of the specific oils in the composition of the fat and oil mixtures must be observed. This limits the interchangeability of oils, even though, from a technical view, the process of hydrogenation greatly increases the interchangeability, especially in the soap industry. In the final analysis it is the price structure of the various fats and oils which decides in each case which oils are used and in what proportions, of course, each within the range of its technical limits."

If coconut oil and cottonseed oil had been fully interchangeable, comparative price would have been the deciding factor. A tariff on or exclusion of coconut oil would have made more sense. But the technical considerations limited interchangeability. With cottonseed oil

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1Kirk, op. cit., p. 83.


3Ibid.
possessing a strong natural advantage in lard substitutes, as did coconut oil in soap manufacturing, severe economic leverage would probably have been necessary, perhaps to the extent of total exclusion of coconut oil, to facilitate a transfer of cottonseed oil to soap manufacturing.\(^1\) As with sugar, the total consumer community would have been forced to pay a higher price for a basic commodity produced by a relatively small part of the farm community. Unlike sugar, this subsidization would have supported an inferior-quality by-product whose demand was better being met by a substitute industry.

Another edible product, margarine, also provoked great lobby support for Philippine independence, since it cut across the interests of the dairy as well as the livestock by-product and cottonseed-oil industries.

The contentions of the above farm interests were two-fold: First, a tariff on coconut oil would benefit agriculture in general to the extent that domestic oils could then be substituted for uses then occupied by coconut oil.\(^2\) Second, they thought a duty on coconut oil would benefit dairymen by increasing the price of margarine and hence the price and market of butter.\(^3\) According to

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 157.

\(^2\)Wright, op. cit., p. 312.

\(^3\)Ibid.
historians Grunder and Livezey, on neither score did the agricultural interests have much of a case against any serious competition from coconut oil.¹

The attack on coconut oil was partly the result of a changing pattern of oil usage in margarine. In 1916, about 91 per cent of margarine had been a mixture of animal and vegetable oils, mostly cottonseed oil. By 1930, 69 per cent of margarine was all vegetable oil margarine. By 1932, the figure was 79 per cent.²

The increase in the use of vegetable-oil margarine led to a corresponding decline in cottonseed oil from twenty per cent of total ingredients in 1914 to seven per cent in 1933.³ This was because cottonseed oil complemented "animal" margarine, since soft fat or oil admixture was needed with the hard animal fats.⁴

The trend to vegetable-oil margarine, on the other hand, led to an increased use of coconut oil. In 1920, 26 per cent of the oil used was coconut oil; by 1931 it had risen to 67 per cent.⁵

¹Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 214.
³Kirk, op. cit., p. 86.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Schickele and Schultz, "Bulletin No. 171," op. cit., p. 163.
When cottonseed-oil had been an important ingredient in margarine manufacture, dairy and cottonseed interests had been at competitive odds. Dairymen in twelve states who backed bills prohibiting the use of margarine traditionally had found themselves opposed by their beet and cotton-raising neighbors. Owing to the fact that the raw materials employed in margarine manufacture in 1931 were largely derived from external sources, at a time when the marketing conditions for national oils and fats were far from favorable, dairymen were able to become bed-fellows with their former enemies. With coconut-oil as the scapegoat, a deal was arranged whereby oleo made from domestic oils would be exempted from proposed taxes. In exchange, cottonseed interests and meat packers came down in support of the "Buy America" movement.1

Farm arguments of interchangeability pertaining to the use of animal fats in margarine typically ignored changing patterns of consumer preference. Whereas margarines containing animal fats and cottonseed oil had once more closely resembled butter and sold for somewhat higher prices than vegetable oil margarine, the development of "nut margarine," a highly palatable all-vegetable margarine closely resembling butter, was definitely

turning the consumer away from animal fats to the "more appetizing" vegetable compounds. ¹

Coconut oil was used in the making of margarine, among other reasons, because it stayed solid at ordinary temperatures. In "nut margarine," coconut oil constituted the major ingredient, being more suitable than peanut oil, which did not have the required properties. Peanut oil did become the second most important ingredient. Thus the greatest potential for competition between coconut oil and a domestic oil actually turned out to be a complementary arrangement. ²

That there were advances in the methods of refining and solidifying of domestic oils in the 1930's cannot be denied. Hydrogenation and other additional processing costs could have increased the percentage of cottonseed oil used in vegetable formulas. A wide variety of margarine products on the contemporary market shows the fruits of such development. At that time, however, cottonseed oil generally had no qualities which made it superior to other oils in making margarine.

Interchangeability based on availability and price was still more a trend than an accomplished fact. The

¹Remington, op. cit., p. 262.

²Wright, op. cit., p. 316.
following conclusion by Iowa State College researchers seems best to describe the situation as it was in the early depression years:

As to the manufacture of margarine, the use of cottonseed oil as a raw material is not likely to expand, since the production of purely vegetable margarine does not favor the use of cottonseed oil. If the present trend towards vegetable oil margarine were changed and consumers would again want mixed animal and vegetable oil margarine, cottonseed oil could be more readily used in place of coconut oil as a major raw material.¹

In forming their alliance with domestic oils and fats against Philippine coconut oil, the dairy interests may have been rather shrewd, after all. Because margarine made from a combination of animal fat and cottonseed oil had lost favor in the public mind, elimination of coconut oil could have benefitted butter accordingly.

Whereas consumer preference gave the nod to cottonseed oil in lard substitutes, it gave it to coconut oil, combined with certain other domestic oils, in margarine. It would largely be up to future technical product improvements to change future consumer preference patterns.

The competitive struggle that was taking place between margarine and butter also played a part in achieving an independence bill for the Philippines. Dairymen wanted to improve the competitive position of butter by imposing a tariff on coconut oil.²

²Wright, op. cit., p. 312.
J. D. Craig argued that the tariff would not help. Because there was an average price difference, over the years, of 21.9 cents, a duty of two cents a pound, with 0.53 pound coconut oil in a pound of margarine, would not effect the rate of consumption.¹

Although the use of the long-term average was misleading, leading scholars on the independence question echo the same basic two cent argument--how little a duty of two cents a pound would raise the price of margarine and hence affect consumption.

Theodore Friend alluded to the farm argument as a "reprehensibly fallacious."² Since total output of margarine was only one-sixth that of butter, and the quantity of coconut oil utilized in margarine only five per cent of the total quantity of butter consumed in 1933, even complete elimination of coconut oil from margarine, it was argued, would have improved the market for butter only slightly.³

The farm position was portrayed as the harder to understand because the Philippines were one of the best

¹J. D. Craig, op. cit., p. 9543.

²Friend, op. cit., p. 82.

United States customers for exported flour and dairy products. These would be sharply curtailed as tariffs became reciprocal.

Historians thus have belittled the role of coconut oil and the competitive threat of margarine. The farmer was pictured as being, in effect, irrational. Kirk thought the truth was:

... that the dairy groups throughout the entire country have become highly emotional about the margarine problem and their animosity has become so great that they are willing to adopt any expedient which offers even a slender possibility of curtailing its sale.

Coconut oil, alias the "coconut cow," was pictured as being lunged at by the farmers as if it was their only vulnerable enemy:

The increasing use of coconut oil in the manufacture of butter substitutes has aroused considerable interest among farmers, particularly dairymen, in the possibilities of restricting its importation. As a result, some seem to have concluded that the vegetable oil situation involves only coconut oil and that consequently the competition of vegetable oils and animal fats and oils can be taken care of by restrictive import duties on coconut oil and copra.

What scholars of the Philippine problem do not do is concern themselves with details of the running competitive fight that was being waged between butter and

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1 Friend, loc. cit.

2 Kirk, op. cit., p. 88.

3 Dowell, op. cit., p. 142.
margarine—a fight waged so vigorously by the butter interests in the United States that it resulted in the highest butter to margarine ratio in the world.¹

First, the price spread between butter and margarine, though considerable, was misleading. The competitive position of butter to margarine tended to be the opposite to that of lard to lard substitutes. Butter was on the offensive, being undoubtedly superior to margarine.² Margarine, though a substitute, was an inferior substitute, and that inferiority indicated a competition on different price levels.³

Second, a competition from margarine was quite real. Because of improved methods of refinement and solidifying, margarine manufacturers were increasingly showing a knack for transforming raw materials. They were showing an ability to reduce the cost of margarine production by extensive mechanization of the production process. Better organization of the industry, moreover, had facilitated a well-directed and comprehensive


³Wright, op. cit., p. 313.
propaganda which had boosted margarine consumption to an all-time high in 1929.¹

In addition to the factor of competition on different price levels, plus improved industrial efficiency, there was the depression crisis with its effect on purchasing power. The margarine industry was able to adapt itself to the lessened purchasing power, and the already very low prices of margarine were still further reduced.² This accelerated a price decline which already was prevalent in butter. Butter prices, which in 1929 were 45 cents per pound for butter and 23.5 cents for margarine, fell off in 1930, butter to 37 cents and margarine to 21.8 cents. There was a still further fall in 1931.³

The decline in butter prices worked to the disadvantage of margarine, however, for butter thus became better able to meet the competition. An American consumption of butter, which had reached 17.3 pounds per capita compared to 2.8 pounds of margarine per capita in 1929, went to 17.7 to 2.5 in 1930, and 18.0 to 1.8 in 1931.⁴ Margarine consumption declined from all

¹Boker, op. cit., p. 534E.
²Ibid., p. 539E.
³Wright, op. cit., p. 313, 313n.
all-time high of 332 million pounds in 1929, to 312 in 1930 and 222 million pounds in 1931, a figure roughly equivalent to the average for 1921-25, and considerably below the 258 average for 1915-1920.¹

The significance was that, with a price spread of about fifteen cents per pound, butter was able to make considerable inroads on the competitive position of margarine. With low-purchasing power, it was shown to be desirable from the viewpoint of butter manufacturers to have the lowest possible spread in price.²

The big drop in margarine production in 1931, however, cannot be attributed entirely to the effects of the depression, or the more competitive pricing of butter. Butter interests had been engaged in other endeavors for governmental protection. Of concessions won, a Federal excise tax of ten cents per pound on artificially colored margarine was felt especially severely by manufacturers.³ That production and sale of margarine had been "greatly hindered" by this tax was shown by the fact that uncolored margarine, which in most cases was distinctly unattractive in appearance.

¹Ibid.

²Boker, op. cit., p. 537E.

³Ibid., p. 523E; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1931, p. 690.
nevertheless outsold artificially colored margarine in 1929 by nearly twenty to one.¹

Margarine manufacturers by 1930 had greatly increased the competitive position of their product by using palm oil, soya oil and yellow oleo-oil to naturally color margarine. Naturally colored oleo, consequently, was brought under the ten cent excise tax in 1931. As a result, the colored margarine most resembling butter, which had amounted to 5.5 per cent of total production in 1925, fell off to about 1.25 per cent in 1933.²

To conclude, it appears that the position of dairy interests may well have been more rational and justified than historians have hitherto been willing to concede.

Butter was locked in a competitive struggle against the inroads of margarine. That the competition was potentially greater in the near future even then was obvious. Therefore, belittling the effect of a tariff because the output of margarine was only one-sixth that of butter appears to be largely invalid.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 524E. The margarine, of course, was not mentioned by name, nor was it indicated whether it was "naturally" or artificially colored. Since uncolored oleo so vastly outsold the artificially colored oleo, it seems logical to assume that the oleo "most resembling butter" was naturally colored, and was the one to be hard-hit by the extension of the excise tax.
To argue that coconut oil amounted to only a small per cent of total butter output at that time also seems to fail to take actual and potential margarine competition into account. With all-vegetable margarine clearly gaining in popular acceptance, especially in the case of naturally colored margarine, coconut oil had established itself as a key ingredient in the margarine-butter struggle. Dairy interests, embattled against the inroads of margarine, had good reason to attack coconut oil.

However real the competition from coconut-oil margarine may have been, the effect of a tariff on the price and consumption of margarine, however, remains the more relevant argument. Kirk stated that with a fifteen cent margin, margarine would still maintain most of its customers. Yet, the consumption of margarine with that approximate price spread declined markedly in 1930 and 1931. The factors of price competition occurring on different price levels, and the absolute purchasing power of the population would seem to raise serious doubts about Kirk's thesis.

With a loss of consumer purchasing power and the decline in butter prices in those abnormal times, a significant number of buyers did decide in favor of
the superior product. In view of this, an additional one cent in the differential could have been of significance.

The tariff increase, furthermore, should not have been considered as though it stood alone. Dairy interests had won a significant concession by virtue of the ten cent excise tax imposed on the naturally colored oleo in 1931. Dairy interests, therefore, were seeking total concessions which would amount to eleven cents.

Considering the "obstinate conflict" between margarine and butter, it would seem likely that what butter interests sought was a tariff precedent which could possibly be translated into future rate increases. And, they would be undermining the basic foundation for margarine manufacturing as it was then known. With a restoration of consumer purchasing power or a continued decline in margarine manufacturer's cost of production, the tariff, added to the excise tax, conceivably could have significantly aided butter in maintaining a higher price and still retain its market.
CHAPTER VII

THE HARE-HAWES-CUTTING ACT

By December, 1932, the Philippine question was not so much whether independence would be granted, but rather it was largely a question of when and how it would be carried out.¹

To the Senate, long-distance pre-independence preparation with progressive tariffs in the interim, or immediate independence followed by a post-independence period of economic adjustment were the extremes.² The Senate, therefore, rejected the position of certain Filipinos, who continued to demand immediate, absolute and complete independence, and of Senator King, whose bill would nearly have provided the same. Also rejected was Senator Copeland's legalistic disquisition on the inability of Congress to alienate territory without a constitutional amendment. The War Department's bill, which provided for increased autonomy under the Jones Act, was a conservative solution without a following.³

² Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 1789-90.
Discussion narrowed chiefly to the Hare Bill in the House and the Hawes-Cutting Bill in the Senate.¹

Provisions of the two bills, which were categorically similar, were political, economic, and military in nature. Senator Key Pittman, ranking Democrat in the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, stated the philosophy of the Hawes-Cutting bill as follows: to fix a date for independence, based on the moral obligation to extend self-government; to grant a plebiscite, so that the Filipinos could determine their own destiny, whether dominion or complete self-independence; to grant a substantial transition period of readjustment and preparation; and to limit exports from the Philippines to approximately the status quo of 1932 trade from the Islands to the United States.²

Politically, the original House bill provided for an eight year transition, whereas the Senate version asked for seventeen to nineteen years. Both bills proposed a constitutional convention to be held immediately, and a plebiscite on whether the Filipinos wanted independence at the end of the transition period. Disagreement

¹Datum was of necessity largely derived from the Senate debates because the Hare Bill was passed under a suspension of rules, with debate limited to 40 minutes.

²Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5126.
centered around the length of transition, the plebiscite, and economic provisions.¹

Regarding the transition period, the Senate Committee considered it a test of the existence or non-existence of Philippine readiness for independence, without relinquishing at once the sovereignty of the United States over the Islands. The trial period would have enabled the Philippines, by their enactments, to actually test their capacity to rule themselves. The United States would have retained that control necessary to determine for itself whether it wished to proceed with its approval of Philippine independence.²

Senator Vandenberg thought the Hawes-Cutting Bill was the right approach, but suffered from having "reached out too assiduously for a meeting of the minds," thereby "losing some of its own logic and continuity."³ According to Theodore Friend, Vandenberg "uncompromisingly" pursued a twenty-year period of trade adjustment followed by rather than preceded by a constitutional convention. American tariffs would have been imposed progressively, and Philippine exports thus adjusted to a diminishing

¹ Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 96.
² Senate Report, op. cit., p. 12,812.
market. The Filipinos themselves would have decided biennially whether or not they were willing to accept additional burdens. Meanwhile, the United States would have retained power to guide Philippine foreign affairs in times of trouble in the Far East.¹

The War Department favored the Vandenberg proposal "as among all pending measures," making Senator Hawes suspicious of the inspiration behind the bill.² Hawes said the bill was a "legislative monstrosity" because it made increasing their own tax burdens a prerequisite to Filipino independence.³ Although Vandenberg thought the logic behind the bill "too cogent not to have a chance of producing a meeting of the minds in the Senate," the Senate ignored him and continued work on the Hawes-Cutting Bill, against which he had voted in Committee.⁴

Despite Theodore Friend's declaration to the contrary, Vandenberg did not uncompromisingly adhere to his original proposal. Late in the Philippine debate, and only after defeat of his initial proposals, he forwarded

¹Ibid.; Friend, Between Two Empires, loc. cit.


³Ibid., p. 14,361.

a fresh idea. In December, 1932, and again in March, 1934, he submitted a substitute bill which provided for "immediate, absolute, and complete independence at the earliest moment possible," the same as a similar substitute which Senator King had made. His plan differed from King's in that he proposed to create a "subsequent, post-independence period of economic readjustment." Reciprocal trade relations between the United States would have been established for a limited number of years to accommodate the Filipinos to their new status. But the Filipinos would have been under their own government, and the United States would have been cut loose from any obligation to defend them from aggression. If anything were to happen in the eighteen years Vandenberg thought it would take for the Philippines to become completely independent under the Hawes Act, he wanted it to happen under their flag rather than the American flag.3

The Senate did not seriously consider Vandenberg's alternate proposal, either. Harry Hawes, although "very much interested" in the suggestion, ruled it "clearly


2Ibid.

3Cong. Rec., 73:2, p. 3468.
out of the picture," presumably because it could not be done under existing trade laws. On the House side, Mr. Hare answered a similar query more specifically when he said, "I cannot think that it would be the policy of this country or this Government to maintain a free-trade relationship with any foreign country without maintaining a similar relationship with all countries." The suggestion ostensibly was not feasible under the "most-favored-nation" clause of treaties made by the United States with some fifty nations, prohibiting the giving of preferential tariff concessions.

Vandenberg countered that the agreement would not occur subsequently under the treaty power, but immediately as part of the "inherent organic act," which purpose was to separate two units of government. "As such, and as part of this present action, we would not violate the favored-nation clause," he said.

A cursory examination of tariff sources revealed that Vandenberg was probably correct. The depression had apparently brought widespread disrepute of the most-favored nation clause. Furthermore, many exceptions to


the clause had been granted prior to 1932, especially in dominion situations, without deleterious effects upon the general operation of the unconditional clause. One of the existing exceptions, in fact, was the United States' trade with Cuba.¹

Other motives probably were more important in the defeat of Vandenberg's alternate proposal. Perhaps most important was the public attitude. Vandenberg himself showed an awareness of what he was up against when he said:

One conviction unmistakably has taken hold of American public opinion, namely, if and when we leave the Philippines, we shall leave completely and permanently. There will be no post-independence tutelage. There will be no Platt amendment, as in the case of Cuba. There might be a reciprocal trade differential in our mutual tariff . . . but free markets will essentially disappear along with our flag.²

Another factor which may have accounted for the failure of Vandenberg's alternate plan to catch hold was the "rule of expediency" which the respective committees concerned with the independence bill had adopted. It was agreed that it would be futile to insist on an independence bill "too radically at variance with the bill used as a basis for the hearings."³ This would

²Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 12,829.
³Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5124.
"prevent effective coordination of efforts, might confuse issues, divide supporters of independence, and necessarily delay or impede action on an independence bill."¹ Committee members themselves had observed, that an immediate independence measure was "considered impractical by a consensus of opinion in Congress and impossible of enactment."² Sponsors of the bill were, in short, attempting to harmonize the divergent views of its supporters and to avoid as many controversial questions as possible, hence, the "rule of expediency."

Farm lobbies also took an active interest in the length of the transition period. Farmers had been asking for immediate protection, but the Hawes-Cutting Bill gave no protection at all for ten years, and no protection in full for as many as nineteen.³

The farmers said they could not wait nineteen years for full tariff protection, "not . . . even four years."⁴

¹Ibid. 
²Ibid. 
³Friend, "Philippine Independence," op. cit., p. 262. The original Senate version called for a basic fifteen year transition, with a tariff implementation of 5 per cent a year the last five years, followed by a plebiscite within two years, followed in turn by American Presidential recognition of independence, again within two years. 
⁴Letter from twelve national farm and dairy organizations, several state branches and four national farm newspapers to Senator Lester J. Dickinson of Iowa, Cong. Rec., 72:2, (December 14, 1932), pp. 426-27.
In a letter to Senator Dickinson, farm organizations called for complete independence within five years, with tariff step-ups of twenty per cent a year, beginning at once. They opposed any provision for a trade conference which would "contemplate or imply further trade concessions." ¹

Proposed farm bloc amendments designed to implement early or immediate tariffs or, if failing in this, quotas on Philippine products, thus engaged the economic area of contest in the Senate.² The stronger the economic motivation, the more stringent one might expect the tariff or quota provisions of the final bill to have been.

Senator Dickinson proposed an amendment to the Hawes-Cutting Bill exactly along lines of the farm lobby request. Sponsors of the bill, who argued that the amendment would defeat the logic behind the bill and weaken the bargaining position of the Senate with House members in conference, were barely able to defeat the Dickinson amendment, 37 for, 38 against it.³

Before Hawes and his fellow managers were able to work out support for a twelve year compromise, Senator

¹Ibid.
Edwin Broussard of Louisiana obtained a vote on an amendment of his own: an eight-year transition with no plebiscite. Although the amendment originally passed, 40 to 38, subsequent bargaining and maneuvering in the Senate brought reconsideration and defeat of Broussard's amendment.1

The farm bloc, having failed in their more immediate goals, then assaulted the quota provisions. Amendments by Senators Long and Smoot were adopted which reduced the quotas on Philippine agricultural imports considerably below the status quo envisioned by the bill's sponsors.2 Attempts by Senator Dickinson to still further reduce the duty-free quotas by fifteen per cent a year, however, were soundly defeated in the Senate.3

Farm bloc members had more support when they attacked the plebiscite provision of the Hawes-Cutting Bill. Ostensibly, the democratic process would leave to the Filipinos the final decision regarding their own fate. "We ought not to force the Philippines from under the flag if they wish to remain," Senator Cutting said.4

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1Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 326, 437.
2Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 266-70.
Debate in the Senate, however, centered around whether to retain the plebiscite at the end of the transition period, as embodied in the bill, move it to the beginning of the period of transition, or eliminate it altogether.

The farm bloc wanted the provision for a plebiscite stricken. It did not want to permit any opportunity for the Filipinos to prolong their dependency and protect themselves against an eventual agricultural tariff.¹

Other Senators objected to the provision because it would not only leave the whole question of Philippine independence undecided for many years, but would also leave the ultimate decision to the Filipinos, without Congress having a voice. The United States might have been bound to accept that decision, irrespective of its own interests on the subject.²

Another attitude which affected the plebiscite was an overriding fear that American commercial influence in the Philippines would grow larger as time drifted away.³ The influence of American investors in Cuba was cited to show how investment of more money in the

¹Letter to Senator Dickinson, loc. cit.
²Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5154.
Philippine Islands would create "additional economic and industrial chains."\(^1\) The "whispered advice" of numerically small but influential "extraneous elements" hostile to independence during the intervening transition period could produce a negative vote when the plebiscite was held.\(^2\)

Administration motives were also suspected. The administration policy of delay was thought "inexplicable on any theory except that of permanent retention of the Philippines."\(^3\) There were still imperialists around who wished to continue the existence of the connection between the Islands and the United States. That position was known to have been taken by such a high-ranking person as Stimson; and Senator Bingham, a leading Republican in the Senate, was quoted as favoring the Philippines becoming an organized territory, like Alaska or Hawaii.\(^4\) At least one Senator still held out hope for statehood status.\(^5\) Senator Dickinson thought


\(^2\) Perkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 221, 231; Philippine Commission, *loc. cit.*

\(^3\) Representative Lozier, (Missouri), *Cong. Rec.*, 72:2, pp. 7717-18.

\(^4\) Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

"absolutely" that many of his colleagues had feared the Philippines would become, if not a state, a dominion. Then they could do as they pleased, "not what pleases you," Dickinson said.1

Adding to the anxiety of some Congressmen was the persistent contention that the Filipinos really did not want independence, after all. Although the Senate Committee called "an insidious propaganda," intimations that the Philippine leaders were not sincere in their demands for independence, the claims were not unfounded.2 The dominion idea was, in fact, considered as a possible solution by Filipino leaders during several months in 1931. Manuel Quezon on more than one occasion said that he would put off independence agitation for thirty years in exchange for dominion government with free trade privileges.3 This was headed-off only when Harry Hawes called the Philippine Resident Commissioners to his office and threatened that he would quit and denounce them and consider himself deceived.4

1 Dickinson Interview, loc. cit.
2 Senate Report, op. cit., p. 12,809.
3 Bundy, op. cit., p. 147.
4 Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 67.
To Congress, the only question was "when and how" independence would be made effective, said Congressman Lozier of Missouri. 1 "If we are going to keep the plebiscite, then there is no use talking 'compromise'," said Senator Long, "because our view of the matter is that plebiscite means no independence." 2

Fairly or unfairly, distrust of administration intentions, the fear that corporation investment would solidify America's hold on the Philippines, and the fear of a change of heart on the part of the Filipinos summarized the attitude of many Congressman, and especially those in Congress who listened to the farm lobbies. 3 Accordingly, when Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina introduced an amendment which made ratification of the Philippine Constitution at the beginning of the transition period "an expression of the will of the people ... in favor of independence," it passed, 44-29. 4 The Senate thus encouraged the Filipino electorate to confuse the validity of a frame of government with the viability of a

1 Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 7517.


4 Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 612-16.
form of government.\(^1\) They had to make a final decision on the issue of independence before they had begun to feel the economic pressure involved.\(^2\)

The Byrnes Amendment violated the original philosophy of the Hawes-Cutting Bill because true self-determination was not given. The value of the plebiscite to the Filipinos, in permitting second thoughts, was entirely lost.\(^3\) But the Senate knew what it wanted to do.

A third major area of provisions were military and diplomatic. The Hawes-Cutting Bill provided for the retention of American bases, and in contradiction, for a neutralization agreement to be sought out with foreign nations in the region. The Filipinos took a passive attitude on these provisions, and no changes were made.\(^4\)

Although "Two-thirds, if not more" of the Senate Committee on Territories were at times in favor of surrendering on the date of independence all American military and naval reservations in the Philippines, and the original bill had no retention clause, one had nevertheless been inserted

\(^1\)Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 97; a similar remark was made by Kirk, op. cit., pp. 118-19.

\(^2\)Perkins, op. cit., p. 247.


in order to allay administration criticism of the bill on grounds of "balance of power." ¹

With the plebiscite, in effect, eliminated, the period of transition reduced from seventeen to twelve years, quotas substantially reduced, and virtual total exclusion of Filipino immigrants, the Senate passed the Hawes-Cutting independence bill on December 17, 1932, without a record vote. ²

Final terms of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill were ironed out in conference. A ten-year period of transition was agreed upon, because it was thought that fewer years would have resulted in a President Hoover veto of the bill. ³ There was also some precedent involved; since the Spanish had been allowed a ten-year period of readjustment, the Filipinos deserved the same consideration. ⁴

The higher quota system of the House was adopted. Limits were considerably lower than current Philippine production, which was reaching its all-time peak. The settlement was nevertheless a great deal more generous than the demands of the farm bloc, and eliminated some


of the farm bloc success in the Senate.¹ There was no immediate farm tariff relief provided, since the duty-free quotas would apply for five years, followed by five years of five per cent annual step-ups in duty, followed by a full tariff upon independence.² The bloc also failed to prevent the inclusion of a trade conference, which was scheduled to be held one year before independence.³

The main farm bloc success was the virtual elimination of the plebiscite.⁴ House conferees yielded to the Senate version, with a constitutional convention to be held within one year, and a vote in favor of the constitution interpreted as a vote in favor of independence.⁵

As for immigration, a token annual entrance quota of fifty was allowed, sparing the Filipinos the indignity of being treated like the Japanese and the Chinese, while still under the American flag.⁶

²Ibid., p. 269.
⁵Ibid., p. 267.
⁶Ibid., p. 270.
The results were satisfactory to American manufacturers and exporters: no limits or tariffs were to apply to American products entering the Philippines until independence. 1

The final bill passed the Senate on December 17, 1932, without a record vote, and on December 29 passed the House by a vote of 171 ayes, 16 noes. 2

In the democratic process, of course, legislation is derived through a process of compromise. Sponsors of Philippine independence saw the need to compromise, particularly with the agriculture elements, to make the question of practical importance to the American people and to win the support of certain elements in Congress, particularly in the Senate. 3 Opponents of immediate independence were given ten years; investors and bondholders were given a period to readjust themselves and achieve repayment; for the internationalists, a foothold was retained, yet the isolationists were also shown the beginning of the end; the laborer and the racists were given immediate redress of their grievances.

1 Ibid., p. 269.
3 Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5149.
One wonders, as Vandenberg said, whether the bill's sponsors did not reach out too assiduously for a meeting of the minds. Seeking to please everybody, the bill satisfied almost no one, as the following quote of Grayson Kirk will testify:

The most that can be said about the independence act was that it satisfied no one. Even Senator Hawes felt that the elimination of the final plebiscite and the introduction of the one-sided export taxes had almost completely destroyed the fundamental philosophy upon which the bill was based. American liberals professed grave alarm at our plan to retain a naval base, a decision which, they very properly pointed out, would make impossible the conclusion of any effective neutralization agreement. Conservative elements in this country ... continued to berate the betrayal of our trust. Even farm groups were indignant at the arrangements, which were far short of the immediate exclusion to which they had been committed.¹

The American Federation of Labor, which found the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill "reasonably satisfactory" with respect to the interests of American labor, asked Hoover to sign the bill. Incongruous companions with the AFL were Elihu Root and Cameron Forbes, who thought American trade, or optimistically, a prolonged relationship with the Philippines still possible under the bill.²

Besides the positions taken by Root and Forbes, other paradoxical roles were assumed while the independence

¹Kirk, op. cit., p. 123.

bill awaited the President's signature. The dissatisfied American Farm Bureau Federation, which had led the pack of farm lobbies for independence, turned about and asked for a veto.¹ In a purely political move, Manuel Quezon, for a decade the leader of the independence movement, also asked for a veto.²

Perhaps the crowning paradox was that Herbert Hoover, who was against colonies in principle, against large navies, Philippine sugar and Filipino immigration, ended up vetoing the Philippine independence act.³

Totally being a bill of compromise, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was not considered a good bill. It was, rather, a badly constructed and flawed piece of legislation and, according to Theodore Friend, perhaps should have been vetoed on that ground alone.⁴ Hoover's major objection to the bill, however, was that it would recklessly disturb the balance of power in Asia, thus voiding America's responsibility to the world.⁵

Hoover also thought the bill would abandon our duty to the Filipinos because the period of adjustment

¹Ibid., p. 680. ²Ibid.
³Ibid.
⁵Ibid., (Friend), pp. 672-73; Herbert Hoover's veto message, Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 1759-61.
was "too short, too violent." In his veto message, he advocated a gradual extension of authority to the Philippines for fifteen or twenty years, accompanied by gradual reduction of free imports. Prior to a final plebiscite, he thought the United States should fix a "mutual preference in trade," similar to but on a wider scale than that with Cuba, which would apply after independence. This would have corrected what Grunder and Livezey called a "serious omission" in the independence bill.

The President also had inarticulate reasons for vetoing the bill. Before he yielded office to Franklin Roosevelt, of whom he was sharply suspicious, Hoover was in the mood to fight. Repeatedly frustrated by Congress in the past, he had an appetite to show his power where it still could be shown—in the negative form of a veto.

If the administration was in a fighting mood, so was the Congress. The House heard the veto message read on January 13, 1933, and passed the bill over the

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1 Ibid., (Veto message), p. 1760.

2 Ibid., pp. 1760-61.

3 Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 211.

President's veto following a debate which was limited to one hour. The vote was 274 to 94.\(^1\)

The strategy of Senator Harry Hawes and other managers in the Senate also was to act quickly. They had been confident of the results in the House, but not in the Senate. A delay would have allowed time for a swelling cry from the national press, and for the Administration and farm lobbies to apply pressure.\(^2\)

The Senate convened January 14, 1933, and debated the veto for three days. The discussion, which was mostly in favor of overriding the veto, avoided specifics and took the high ground of anti-imperial principle.\(^3\)

On January 17, in a somber meeting, the Cabinet heard the news by phone: 66-26 to override. "Pitiful . . .," said Hoover. "Whatever the subject, there are not thirty senators we can depend upon. It's a rout." A switch of five votes would have upheld the veto, but, Stimson commented, "all the weak-kneed veterans went back on us at the last moment . . ."\(^4\)

\(^1\)Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 1768-69.


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 670.

Hoover had waged his veto battle with particular clarity and cogency, but it was a cause already lost, defined by a man already beaten. Various reasons, specific and abstract, appeared to have been involved in Congress' decision to override Hoover's veto.

One reason was the feeling on the part of some congressmen that there was not a single presidential objection that had not been debated by the Committee and the Senate. It was thought that every argument in the veto message had already been forcefully presented by Senator Vandenberg and passed on by the Senate.

To make matters worse, some of Hoover's basic arguments were at variance with basic philosophy embodied in the bill. Most serious was his suggestion that independence be postponed for fifteen or twenty years, whereas it was the purpose of Congress to fix a date for independence. He also argued for the beginnings of tariff protection before providing for independence, which came into conflict with a long established Congressional policy not to tax dependents.

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1 Ibid., (Friend), p. 673.
2 Cong. Rec., 72:2, pp. 1782-83.
3 Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5146.
4 Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 1926.
According to Grunder and Livezey, Hoover used the wrong economic reasoning in his veto message. He clearly asserted that the United States should not mislead her farmers about the protection they would receive in the bill; yet his statement was motivated not by the insignificance of Philippine competition but by the failure of the bill to meet that supposed competition.¹

Changing patterns of political leadership also accounted for the veto override. Through the fall of 1931, Hoover had been able to prevent Congressional action in opposition to his Philippine policy, but the power of the Administration to control that policy rapidly waned and eventually passed to Congress.²

This was due to several depression-linked factors. There was a loss of Republican strength in the Congressional elections of 1930, and again in 1932, when 158 "lame ducks," created by the voters in November, tended to be "mischief mongers," less likely to follow traditional policies.³

¹Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 218.
²Ibid., p. 189.
Growing Hoover unpopularity due to the depression also lessened Republican Party loyalty, and required less sacrifice of personal convictions on the part of party members of the House and Senate for the sake of party regularity. ¹

Then there was the political complexion of Congress, with no party in actual and effective control. ² Deducting six vacancies in the House, 219 Democrats confronted 209 Republicans, and in the Senate the count stood 48 Republicans to 47 Democrats. The Farmer-Laborites had one spokesman in each chamber. ³ Filipino leaders considered themselves fortunate that liberalism was dominant in the Congress. ⁴ Progressive Republicans, while voting with regular Republicans for organization purposes, could not be depended upon regularly to support the Republican leadership. Those peculiar facts contributed to the result and permitted the consideration by the Congress of the Philippine bill in a non-partisan way, Republicans, Democrats, and "Progressives." ⁵

¹ Philippine Commission, loc. cit.
² Ibid.
⁴ Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5123.
⁵ Ibid., pp. 5123, 5132.
If Republican leadership was diluted, the independence bill was blessed with able leadership. Senator Hawes championed the cause, foregoing practically every other interest and attention in Congress to concentrate his efforts on the passage of independence legislation. He was helped by Senator Cutting, a progressive Republican; Representative Hare, Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs in the House; and Senator Pittman, a man prominent in the counsels of his party. Hawes was also helped by the attitude of Senator Bingham, a Republican, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, who had found himself honor bound to report an independence bill, thus preventing the bill from being blocked in his committee.¹

The Democratic Party exhibited a great cohesion and effectiveness. Under the strong-arm leadership of Speaker Garner and House Leader Rainey, this made possible the passage of the Hare bill without prolonged debate and without the opportunity of amendments being offered on the floor. Except for this, said the Philippine Commissioners, the bill would otherwise have been "mutilated."²

¹Ibid., pp. 5121, 5132.
²Ibid.
Various attitudes were also important in accounting for the decisiveness with which the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill was pushed through Congress.

In view of the extreme economic pressures that were being exerted, some viewed the independence bill as a form of protection for the Filipinos.

During the tariff fight which preceded the independence debate, Senator Borah had said that taxes might be placed on Philippine products if the Islands were not given their independence within a "reasonable time."\(^1\)

In summaizing House Committee findings, Representative Hare had said of the economic competition, "There is no doubt but what this phase of the problem would have to be met in some other way unless independence is granted."\(^2\) Senators King and Tydings both noted the apparent lack of purpose on the part of the Senate to deal fairly with the Philippines.\(^3\)

Senator Tydings, when he became the new chairman of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs in the Seventy-Third Congress, warned the Senate that new quotas on Philippine sugar and taxes on coconut oil had

\(^{1}\text{Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 11,105.}\)

\(^{2}\text{Cong. Rec., 72:1, p. 7779.}\)

\(^{3}\text{Cong. Rec., 73:2, pp. 5008, 5011.}\)
been proposed in Senate Committees.\textsuperscript{1} He saw the trans-
sition period under the proposed bill as the only hope
for the Philippines.\textsuperscript{2}

The terms embodied in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill,
then, were construed by some as a form of protection
from possibly greater excesses which could be committed
against the Filipinos. In other words, said Whitney
Perkins, "We should injure them deliberately and in pro-
per form now . . . by giving them their independence,
lest in the future we sin impulsively.\textsuperscript{3}

A more dominant attitude, as indicated by the
utterances of several congressmen, seemed to be that the
bill, although admittedly faulty, was the best measure
that could be obtained. It represented a rational and
realistic solution of a most difficult problem.\textsuperscript{4}

Since it was considered the "best we can do,"
Philippine supporters considered it very risky not to go
ahead. Democratic Party leaders who had supported the
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill were generally going to be the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 5011.
  \item \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Cong. Rec.}, 73:2, p. 4992.
  \item \textsuperscript{3}Perkins, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 245.
  \item \textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{4See the remarks of various Senators, including
Senators Bingham and Tydings, \textit{Cong. Rec.}, 72:1, p. 11,505;
72:2, p. 1910; 73:2, pp. 5007, 5012.}
\end{itemize}
same leaders who would control the organization of the new Congress. At best, nothing would have been gained from postponement. 1

On the other hand, there was no way of telling when Congress would have another opportunity to vote for another measure. 2 Mounting social, economic and international problems might crowd the Philippine question out of consideration. 3 To rouse the interest in Congress and the public over Philippine independence all over again would be difficult in any case, it was thought, but even more so because Hawes and Hare, leading advocates of the Philippine position, were retiring, and many new members unfamiliar with the problem would be coming in. 4

Senator Hawes feared that "if we do not pass some legislation which will be signed it is a futile gesture, and three years of investigation will have been in vain." 5 Every member of the two committees was


2 Ibid., p. 5142; Cong. Rec., 72:2, p. 1922-23.


4 Ibid.

said to have been "imbued with the idea that this was possibly the last chance we would have in many years."¹

Many Senators must have agreed with Senator Fess of Ohio when he said, "I would rather have definiteness now."² No matter whether looked at from several viewpoints, many Senators voted for the independence bill, acknowledging its defects but holding that a bird in the hand was preferable to what might come out of a later Congress.³ The issue, it was thought, should be settled once and for all.⁴ "While we have them on shouting ground," said Representative Rankin of Mississippi, "let us call for mourners and have the thing over with."⁵

Although the Hoover veto was overridden, the mourners were called too soon. In October, 1933, the Philippine legislature rejected the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Independence Bill. Although this was done ostensibly to achieve a settlement more favorable to Philippine interests, the rejection actually came almost solely

¹Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5159.
³Morrison, op. cit., p. 112.
⁴Philippine Commission, op. cit., p. 5142.
⁵Cong. Rec., 71:2, p. 8869.
because of a trial of leadership between Quezon and his rival, Osmena. Before the end of the year, Quezon was back in Washington seeking a new bill.

Any new approach to Philippine independence was quickly ruled out. The Tydings-McDuffie Act, a bill substantially identical to the original, was introduced to the Seventy-Third Congress. Representative McDuffie, a sponsor, explained the difference between the bills to House members:

The only major change is our agreement to remove our army and relinquish the Army reservations. We retain our naval bases and coaling stations, but agree to enter into negotiations with the new independent government to determine the feasibility of further maintenance of our Navy in the Islands.

The Congress apparently felt that it had paid its full debt to the Philippine question, and that it was not prepared to spend more time and effort on it of its own initiative. "Disgust" was a ruling factor with more than a few Congressmen.

The Philippine matter was old business; most Senators thought it should have been closed business. The Tydings measure, which passed the Congress as

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1 Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 133.
2 Ibid., p. 143.
3 Cong. Rec., 73:2, p. 4834.
4 Smith, Our Future in Asia, op. cit., pp. 110-11.
decisively as the Hawes bill had been repassed over Hoover's veto, reaffirmed the motives which had laid behind passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill. Thus, observed opponent Arthur Vandenberg, "Yesterday's anathema becomes today's jubilee." "The Hare-Cutting atrocity . . . now becomes the Tydings-McDuffie Benediction."^2

Whether the effects were for good or ill, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, as substantially re-enacted in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, represented a turning point in American imperial policy. The United States retreated from the mission and commitment undertaken in 1899. The Filipinos advanced more readily toward their nationalistic goals. Japanese expansion would later impede American retreat and impair Philippine advance, but the essential decision had been taken.3

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1 Friend, Between Two Empires, op. cit., p. 145.


CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In the introduction it was stated that Philippine independence, an issue connected with the "glamour" of imperialism and war and presidential campaign at the turn of the century, has been relatively unheralded since then. The question was raised as to the "why" of Philippine independence. This study seeks to establish certain conclusions concerning the motives Congress had in passing the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in January, 1933, and especially to decide whether the emphasis which has been placed on the economic motive is justified.

Why has the independence question of the 1930's been neglected? One can only assume the answer. The Philippines may have been considered relatively insignificant, but their strategic location and the crucial nature of the times when they were made a commonwealth would negate such a conclusion.

One possibility is that independence was something of an anti-climax. The Philippine question of 1929-1933 had been an issue for over thirty years, and had often been a "political football." It was not a subject of public controversy and debate as it had been in 1900 (although the newspapers tried to make it so).
A second reason for neglect is that the question of independence was overshadowed by the momentous conditions that helped produce it. Historical emphasis of the early 1930's has been placed on domestic problems, primarily economic. Thus, Philippine independence became "simply" the product of selfish domestic lobbies exerting great pressure on a Congress beleaguered with other, more important problems. The Philippine question seems to have been relegated to a position of a "result," with consequently less interest taken in what caused it. This perhaps accounts for the paucity of specialized attention devoted to the subject.

The third and perhaps the most important reason why the question of Philippine independence has been neglected is because the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933, as repassed in the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 did not actually free the Philippines, but rather was the enabling legislation providing for the future independence of the Archipelago. In the interim, of course, World War II further overshadowed independence. If the Philippines had become free before World War II, perhaps more serious questions would have been raised about the role of the Islands in the causation of the war. This question now is only a matter of academic speculation. Nothing can be proven objectively; one can only hypothesize.
This endeavor, though perhaps thought provoking, may not be particularly fruitful.

Having accounted for the neglect of the issue of Philippine independence, the economic motive may now be scrutinized.

Although it was probable that the economic interests in Congress were responsible for the immediate momentum for an independence bill, the first conclusion is that the economic motive was not the most important force producing Philippine independence.

It was true that the independence question impeded progress on the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill, and the promise to consider Philippine independence cleared away that obstruction. Some senators indicated their willingness to omit the Philippines from proposed tariff action, but hinted that they were running out of patience. Either the Philippines were to be given their independence—and the farmers relief—or they would push for tariff protection anyhow.¹

The fact that the farm bloc did not succeed in including the Philippines in the high tariff program passed in 1929 was significant. A congress which admittedly succumbed to the pressure group influence, and

¹See pp. 148-49.
was charged with crass selfishness, nevertheless had a sense of fairness strong enough to withstand taxing the Filipinos while they were still under our flag.\(^1\)

Although economic lobbies were instrumental in producing an independence bill, independence was another matter. Had the farm bloc been a main force producing independence, then it should have dominated the actual construction of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill. This it did not do.

The Committee construction of the bill was unsatisfactory to the farm bloc. The Dickinson amendment to provide for early independence and the immediate beginnings of tariff relief failed to pass in the Senate.

The farm bloc was disenchanted by that time, but would have stayed on the independence bandwagon provided that duty-free quotas could have been cut considerably below the status quo. Although it had some initial success, cuts were restored in conference, and the bill passed the Congress by wide margins.

In the end, the defeated farm interests asked that the Hoover veto be upheld, but were completely unsuccessful. Senators from the beet and cane states, who had helped vote the quota cuts into the Hawes-Cutting Bill, voted

\(^1\)See p. 110.
more strongly (38 to 8) than the rest of the Senate to override the veto. They obviously wanted Philippine independence more than they did immediate economic protection. ¹

Elimination of the plebiscite was said to have been the main farm bloc success. Other fears were more instrumental in producing that amendment than the fear of prolonged Filipino tariff-free protection. Those fears will be discussed below.

The ineffectiveness of the farm bloc both in dictating the content of the independence bill and controlling the outcome of the veto fight would indicate that the emphasis which has been placed on the economic motive has been unjustified. Other motives were more important.

A second motive which probably did not forcefully dictate Philippine independence was the general public opinion.

Although a majority of newspapers opposed the idea of independence, it should be reiterated that this was not representative of public opinion. There seemed to be a preponderance of newspaper opposition to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill, but a wide variety of grounds of

¹See pp. 129-32.
opposition accounted for much of that. Much of the
disagreement was not over whether independence should
have been granted, but how it should have been done.¹
Even the Farm Bureau, which staunchly favored independ­
ence, opposed the final bill.²

If the general public had opposed independence,
this fact, combined with the widespread criticism by
newspapers, would likely have created a force which
Congress would have found difficult to go against.
Instead, newspapers were singularly unsuccessful in
arousing public opinion to support their stand.

There also was no evidence to indicate that the
public strongly favored Philippine independence. If
the public strongly favored, or conversely, opposed the
move, then it would seem reasonable to have expected that
the question would have been raised as a presidential
campaign issue sometime in 1932. But it was barely
mentioned in the campaign. Other issues dominated the
campaign and, presumably, the people's interest.³

If not strongly negative or positive, one of at
least two other possibilities may have characterized

¹See pp. 46-47, 57-60.
²See p. 141.
³See the Philippine Commission Report, op. cit.,
P. 5131.
public opinion. One was that the public was neutral, or indifferent. Ignorance or preoccupation with their own affairs could have produced public apathy to the problems of the Filipino. The Filipinos considered this to have been the usual state of American public opinion, resulting in special interests having great influence in policy making regarding the Philippines.¹

A second possibility was that the general public was mildly positive toward freeing the Philippines. It would seem likely that the "average" American, as Robert Aura Smith deduced, was predisposed to grant the Filipinos their independence.² Such a predisposition could have come about because independence was what the Filipinos asked for, it was the democratic way, and the people didn't really accept the idea of maintaining an empire.

Either neutrality or a predisposition to free the Philippines at that particular time would have aided the cause of independence, if for no other reason than it would not have impeded it. But the driving force producing independence was neither mostly selfish, nor the expressed demand of the general public.

What was likely more influential than the economic chaos which the depression produced, as it concerned

¹See pp. 41, 42-43.

²See p. 44.
Philippine independence, was the changing pattern of politics. The peculiar political circumstances, more than the economic pressure, accounted for a successful independence bill in January, 1933.

The cohesion of the Democratic party in Congress was largely a product of the times. Not only was President Hoover going out of office in sixty to ninety days, but a strongly Democratic congress was coming in. This realization provided the Democrats in the Seventy-Second Congress with a certain sense of power and of destiny. The traditional pro-independence position of the Democratic party provided the unifying cause.

In a sense, the issue of Philippine independence was an issue between two branches of government. The depression discredited the leadership of the Hoover administration and depleted the ranks of the loyal Republicans. The Congress seized the initiative in Philippine policy making. Remarks by several members of the Senate indicated that they weren't about to be dictated to on the matter. The mood or philosophy of the Senate was changing from conservatism to liberalism. Progressive Republicans were willing to vote along liberal lines at the sacrifice of traditional party policy and discipline. The liberal Democratic-Republican bloc in Congress made Philippine independence a reality.¹

¹See pp. 146-47.
Although the political complexion of Congress was partly a product of circumstances, the fact that the Senate was liberally inclined was indicative of its motivation. The main force producing Philippine independence was that liberalism. It was generated by anti-imperialism, the political conviction that American promises to Philippine democracy had come due, strengthened by a traditional and strategic resurgence of isolationism.

Although the two parties historically disagreed on matters of preparation and judging Philippine readiness, there had been political agreement regarding how the Filipino was to have been treated. Both parties agreed that the Philippines would not be retained indefinitely against their will, and were concerned for the welfare of the Filipino. Both parties, in short, tended to believe that democracy and fair play should prevail.¹

In the final independence bill, Filipino freedom was provided for with no realistic provisions made for their economic welfare, and the Filipinos were not left the right to decide for themselves whether or not they wanted separation. Filipino welfare at least temporarily was sacrificed in the first instance, and self-determination was in the latter case. Why was this done?

¹See pp. 12-14, 40.
The answer to this question may be found in the Senate debates over the transition and, more importantly, the plebiscite, and provides a key to the anti-imperialist and isolationist influences in the Senate.

The original purpose of the transition was to establish a period for Filipino readjustment and preparation for independence. It also would have served as a trial period to test whether the Philippines were ready for independence. Evidence of Philippine inability to govern themselves could have led to a revocation of the independence charter.¹

The final decision of Congress, however, was not based on an intelligent plan of readjustment and preparation because it was a product of political compromise.

Economic dependency forced the adoption of a transition. So obvious was the need that even the representatives of American agriculture failed to recognize the necessity of a provision to that effect. Immediately freeing the Philippines without providing time to adjust would have been too wholly selfish, too cruel. A transition provision was needed to gain the support of Republicans and, hopefully, of the Administration, who would not accept less than ten years.²

¹ See pp. 123-24, 131-32.
² See pp. 130, 137.
The assumption that the Philippines would have been economically ready for independence in ten years was completely invalid. Yet, post-independence free trade or a significantly longer transition period was a political impossibility. That was too liberal. Economic forces and isolationism dictated that the issue be resolved sooner than fifteen or twenty years.

The purpose of the plebiscite had been to grant true democratic self-determination to the Filipinos. When Congress placed the plebiscite at the beginning of the transition period, it took the final choice away from the Filipinos, and tended to eliminate the transition period as a trial or test of Philippine readiness.

The plebiscite largely furnishes the insight into Congressional motivations. It was true that the farm bloc wanted the plebiscite eliminated. But the argument, the motivation was not primarily economic.

Impetus for the elimination of the plebiscite was based, first, on a fear of permanent retention of the Philippine Islands, which was a product of the anti-imperial principle.

The idea of a Philippine-American dominion relationship more than "intruded" into the thoughts of

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1 See pp. 34-37.

2 See pp. 133-34.
Republicans. Implicit in the entire Republican policy was the undercurrent of eventually seeing a permanent relationship develop between the two countries. Hence, emphasis was placed on an American dominated civil service, preparation for self-government along lines of the American standard, and economic dependency and a Filipino standard of living bases on American markets. A permanent relationship was the fond hope of many high ranking Republican policy makers clear up to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, and even afterward.\(^1\)

Democrats conceded that the Philippines should not be indefinitely retained against the will of the Filipinos, but did not accept the implications of Philippine self-determination. They consistently maintained that the Philippines would have to separate from the United States--that there should be no permanent link. The possibility of a permanent relationship between the Philippines and the United States was therefore a fundamental difference that drastically altered the projected result of otherwise similar party attitudes toward the Filipinos. Anti-imperialism was implicit in the Democratic policy.\(^2\)

\(^1\)See pp. 12-13, 17-18, 140.

\(^2\)See pp. 11, 14.
The Filipinos were being prepared, but prepared for what? The Senate stopped to take thought.

There was a recurrent opinion voiced in the Senate that the longer independence was delayed, the more difficult it would become to free the Philippines. The efficient success of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce with the American press led congressmen to consider the influence that such a numerically small but powerful economic interests could exert.

The arguments of the Chamber of Commerce were cogent. But their motives were suspected. The organization was compared to the powerful Cuban sugar lobby. If too much time should lapse, vested interests conceivably could defeat independence legislation at home, or produce a vote against independence in the Philippines.

Fear of permanent retention would have made the intimations that the Filipinos really did not want independence especially disconcerting to many Senators. Senator Hawes bitterly squelched Filipino talk along those lines, which threatened to upset the moral rationale that the United States was simply giving the Filipinos what had always been promised them and what they had always demanded.¹

¹See pp. 105, 132-35.
What if, after over ten years of transitory experience, the Filipinos had voted against independence? Would the United States, the parent, the teacher, supposedly morally obligated in 1932 to fulfill promises of independence, have been placed in the position of being morally obligated to accept the democratically derived decision of the Filipino, or be embarrassed by not doing so?

The Senate, by eliminating the plebiscite, showed that it did not want to leave the question undecided for ten or more years, with the final decision then resting with the Filipinos. More than that, the Senate very deliberately ended the open-end Philippine policy—that a permanent link was possible.

The compelling influence in the Congress, then, was the cumulative impact of the anti-imperial tradition. Congress seemed to be tired of the same old story. The time had come to map a solution. Perhaps the most serious problem was to find the compromises that would unite the many divergent groups. This would explain the sponsor's rule of expediency.¹

Congress was so pre-disposed to the idea of independence that it was willing to swallow a multitude of

¹See pp. 128-29, 139-40.
shortcomings that went along with it. In the name of compromise, irrational injustice was perpetrated upon a willing Filipino, who acquiesced in the final product.

There was a compelling sentiment in Congress to settle the matter "now." This could hardly have been done and also tackle and make economic provisions more completely favorable to the Philippines. This would have elicited determined opposition, thereby scuttling the whole independence movement. Filipinos, and friends of the Philippines, had to bide their time and have faith that the inequities would be corrected later on. To have attempted to have done more might have been to have effected less.¹

Isolationism strengthened the anti-imperial tradition.

Strategic isolationism was a product of the Japanese threat. The Philippines were the key to Far Eastern foreign relations, or "international cooperation."

Certain leading senators, such as Senator Borah, who was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1932, must have been keenly aware of the state of American policy and armament in the Orient. The strong showing of the cane and beet states, including Borah's own state of Idaho, could not be explained on economic grounds, but it could on isolationist grounds.

¹See pp. 149-51.
The Philippines were also the key to American military planning in the Far East. War with Japan was a recognized possibility, especially in government and military circles. During the Philippine independence struggle the army, perhaps sensing the shift in public and political winds, publicly reflected its isolationist leanings, and opposed retention of the Philippine Islands. It made its stand official when, in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, it completely relinquished the right to any army foothold in the Philippines, while the navy maintained its bases there.¹

Since isolationism was a powerful force in the 1930's, then it would seem proper to assume that it helped produce Philippine independence. In fact, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, as repassed in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, in a very real sense was perhaps the first instance of neutrality legislation of the 1930's. The United States, by her failure to act, had rendered her Far Eastern "traditions" sterile and impossible of enforcement. Wherein was it illogical to follow through and recognize in deliberate policy the consequences of the previous inactions?²

¹See pp. 82-3, 152.
²See pp. 69-72, 79-81.
More than the Japanese threat was incorporated into the confines of isolationism. Isolationism was more than a product of external fear. Trouble with Japan might not materialize. United States withdrawal symptoms were also largely the product of internal depression difficulties. Called economic nationalism, the feeling was to take care of American problems first, and let the world take care of itself. When one has domestic difficulties, why add to one's vexations by strenuous activities outside the home?¹

The word "feeling" is of significance. Economic nationalism was not the product of reasoned economic thinking. Proven dollars and cents, profit and loss, did not determine policy. Rather it was an attitude, a reversion to a basic instinct of survival.

There was simply--too simply, perhaps--a feeling, a traditional attitude to pull back from our commitments, to withdraw into our continental shell, to get back to the Monroe Doctrine of the 1800's, which was also a rather natural reaction to the upheaval of the times.

The point that is emphasized is the fact that specific economic arguments not only were not particularly valid, it did not matter that they were not valid. They

¹See pp. 108-9, 113, 118.
did not produce Philippine independence. The avoidance of specifics and the preponderance of generalities reinforces the belief that anti-imperialism and traditional isolationism produced Philippine independence.

Attitudes, not economics, produced independence. Traditional anti-imperialism, itself in a sense isolationist, coupled with fears of Japanese expansion, the vulnerable nature of the Philippines and of the United States' position there, a natural fear of war as well as of the unknown, added to the immediate hardship that was the depression, equalled independence.

Anti-imperialism was the constant factor; the independence movement could not have succeeded without it. Isolationism reinforced rather than superseded the anti-imperial sentiment.

Although economic pressure groups and economic nationalism were not the most important forces producing independence, they caused the most serious shortcoming in the independence bill. Considering the economic dependency of the Philippines, the chief fallacy of Congressional reasoning was the assumption that final independence meant a complete Philippine economic break with the United States.¹

¹See pp. 128, 130, 132.
The United States should have granted the Philippines immediate independence, coupled with a friendly post-independence reciprocal trade relationship designed to promote an orderly Philippine adjustment to economic independence.

Senator Vandenberg proposed just such a plan, and President Hoover incorporated some of the same ideas into his veto message.¹

This approach would have offered several advantages. The political aspirations of the Philippines would have been realized and, in all fairness, their economic needs provided for. American anti-imperialists would have been satisfied. The United States would have been spared the responsibility of being militarily responsible for the Philippines, for which isolationists would have been thankful. Isolationism, if it was to have been the foreign policy of the country, would have been more logical in its applications. A policy of internationalism, on the other hand, would not have been prevented. Although eventual war with Japan might not have been avoided, it might have been fought with greater freedom of objectives and flexibility of strategy. The Philippines might have been spared being a major battlefield.²

¹ See pp. 125-28, 142.

² See pp. 82-3, 95-6.
Unfortunately the isolationist force was not well enough defined, so that immediate independence could have been the product; and the economic was too well defined, so that post-independence trade adjustments were not provided for. Vandenberg's alternate plan and Hoover's suggestions came too late, and were too ill-considered.
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