The problem. What was the public image conveyed by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's concerning the deterrent policy of the United States, and to what extent did the Vietnam conflict mirror that impression?

Procedure. The public speeches, interviews and congressional testimony of Joint Chiefs of Staff members from 1960 through 1969 were examined for their outlook on deter­rence. During the research for this information three sources provided the bulk of the documented material used. They were the Congressional Record, Vital Speeches of the Day and U.S. News & World Report.

Findings. In the 1960's the deterrent power of the United States relied mainly on the retaining of a strategic nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear attack with enough counter force to destroy the aggressor.

During that decade members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also stressed that conventional non-nuclear war was more likely to come about than general nuclear war. It was therefore necessary for the United States to prepare to fight such conventional conflicts. Without a conventional flexible response policy the United States would have only two responses in the face of non-nuclear Communist aggres­sion: withdrawal of opposition or retaliation with nuclear weapons. Conventional strength would provide for graduated responses to all levels of hostile Communist actions.

Acceptance of this limited war concept was clearly demonstrated in Vietnam not only in the non-use of nuclear weapons but also in the limitations placed on the American military.
UNITED STATES DETERRENCE POLICY IN THE 1960's:
MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
PUBLICLY SPEAK OUT

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In Partial Fulfillment
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by
Martin Andre Harswick
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Approved by Committee:

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Dean of the School of Graduate Studies
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Chapter 1

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
ITS ROLE AND PERSONNEL

As the top officers of the American military establishment, the public statements by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's had at least two major purposes. One was the desire to gain public support for the viewpoints expressed. The second was to instruct American society in the rudiments of the United States military policy. In attempting to achieve those goals, the Chiefs of Staff were highly visible proponents of select causes.

The domestic turmoil in the United States brought about because of American involvement in Vietnam, overshadowed the far more important prevention of nuclear war between the superpowers in the 1960's. Such turmoil and the absence of a nuclear conflict were due in part to the deterrence policy advocated by the Joint Chiefs. In examining their public statements of that period a clearer perspective of United States nuclear and non-nuclear deterrent policy is gained.

Although informally created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942 to direct the strategic planning of World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not gain legal status
until the National Defense Act of 1947. Under this act the Joint Chiefs of Staff was recognized as the principal military advisory body to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. ¹

Despite its position as the central planning and advisory agency of defense matters the Joint Chiefs of Staff has no plenary decision making authority. ² The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, an amendment to the National Defense Act of 1947, kept the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an advisory role and left final decision making on military matters in the hands of the President. ³

Besides its advisory role the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the authority and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, has among other duties, the responsibility for providing the strategic direction and operation of the Armed Forces. ⁴

Membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of a military Chairman; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Staff,


³ U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVIII, 7167.

Military officers because of their authority in certain fields and their access to special information are sought after as speakers and writers. In response to public demand the Chiefs of Staff as the senior military officers in the American military establishment made numerous public appearances. They also served as a vital source of military information for committees of Congress.

The speeches, interviews and congressional testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were well covered and documented. Their views most often appear in the Congressional Record, where speeches and testimony in whole or part are recorded. Vital Speeches of the Day, which includes entire speeches and U.S. News & World Report, which often publishes interviews of Joint Chiefs.

The vast implications that military policy had on American society, the need to associate singular military aspects of their statements with more mundane background information, the desire to gain public support for their policies or those of their superiors and the general overall informative and educational nature of their position

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2 "If the Military is Compelled to Speak," Newsweek LIX (January, 1962), 27.
caused the Joint Chiefs to speak out on a broad range of subject matter. These included national defense, religion, the American Revolution, civilian control of the military, the use of the Armed Forces to control riots, economic competition with Communism, patriotism and nuclear deterrent and flexible response policy.

As their speeches, testimony, and interviews were intended for public consumption their statements were presented for the most part in layman's language. There was also a very strong tendency to present their views in periodicals in broad generalities.

The content of public statements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was limited by national security requirements and by bureaucratic considerations. In 1962 alone, Joint Chiefs of Staff speeches were eliminated completely, deleted in part or otherwise changed in meaning because the original content caused "increasingly unfavorable publicity," brought about "mounting adverse criticisms" or did not correspond with the spirit of the executive office. Changes were also made to bring about clarity, to avoid misrepresentations, to eliminate derogatory remarks about university personnel, to play down the cold war, to "prevent premature announcements", and to "eliminate over emphasis on sensitive issues".¹

During the Eisenhower administration the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in the position of either presenting a unanimous front to the public or keeping divergent views to themselves. The trend of having the speeches of leading military officers censored was continued by President John F. Kennedy who required advance review of Pentagon speeches to insure clarity, strength, and consistency in such public speeches.

The concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with administration policy is actively sought. At times crude or subtle pressure has been applied to get individual member agreement to views of higher authority. The intensity of pressure indicates the importance of Joint Chiefs of Staff approval. In short, members are at times pressured to conform to presidential wishes and are warned not to oppose them. Such a policy was no doubt followed during the


4Seymour Harris, "Military Security or a Balanced Budget," Current History, XXXVIII (April, 1960), 203.
administrations of President Lyndon B. Johnson, and President Richard M. Nixon.

Yet executive pressure to conform to the official line in public statements by Joint Chiefs of Staff members was countered by the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act which required the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when testifying before committees of Congress, to express their own outlook on military matters regardless of how it stood in relation to their superior's policy.¹

Loyalty to their particular service also affected Joint Chiefs statements, as the individual Chief tended to bolster his own service needs or capabilities. While not down grading the other services each Chief, Commandant or Chairman did not overly praise the attributes of the other services.

A further factor influencing Joint Chiefs viewpoints was their varying backgrounds. There was no single military mold from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff members were cast. Neither did all of their statements conform to a single viewpoint.

Not all members of the Joint Chiefs have been graduates of the nation's military academies. General George H. Decker, Chief of Staff, United States Army, October 1, 1960 to October 31, 1962 was a graduate of

¹U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, GVIII, 7168.
Lafayette College in Pennsylvania. General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff from July 1, 1961 to March 31, 1965 graduated from Ohio State University. LeMay’s successor General Paul T. McConnell, Chief of Staff until July 31, 1969 received his Bachelors Degree from Arkansas’ Henderson State College. Commandant David M. Shoup, who served in that position from January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1964, was a graduate of DePauw University in Indiana.

Joint Chiefs’ members reacted differently to the bureaucratic structure in which they functioned, as in the issuing of public statements. Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, June 22, 1961 to August 31, 1963 was an outspoken critic of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,¹ who reportedly lost his option for a second two year term because of his public statements.² Unlike General LeMay who bluntly informed McNamara of the testimony he was going to present to Congressional Committees, Admiral Anderson held back his critical views from McNamara and then unleashed his disagreements in Congressional hearings.³


General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff United States Army, September 30, 1962 to July 5, 1964 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff July 6, 1964 till July 30, 1970 was a member who did not complain in public or engage in "corridor grumping."¹

Although noted for his candid answers in Congressional Hearings General LeMay did not plant questions with Congressional aides. He also kept the press at arms length.² The implication that other members of the Joint Chiefs planted questions with members of Congress before giving testimony should be noted. Considering the pressure under which Joint Chiefs public statements are made it is highly likely that individual members have used this method. However, the exact extent of such a practice is not known.

Not all officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were recognized as combat heroes or had engaged in front line combat duty. General Wheeler, General Decker, General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff United States Air Force, March 26, 1957 to August 31, 1961 and Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marines, January 1, 1964 to December 31, 1968, although serving in important staff position in their careers were noted more for their planning skills


than for combat roles.¹

Other members such as General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff United States Army, July 6, 1964 to July 2, 1968, his successor William C. Westmoreland, Chief from July 3, 1968 to June 20, 1972, General Shoup and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, August, 1955, to June, 1961, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 30, 1962 to July 5, 1964 and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer had extensive combat experience.²

Public reaction to Joint Chiefs of Staff statements was probably shaped not only by the position held by the officer but also from the personal image of each Chief. Although the extent to which the personal projection effected the message being conveyed is uncertain, it should be realized that each Chief had his own distinct public personality which influenced responses to him.

A drafter of the NATO Treaty who was called unresponsive to the needs of President Kennedy, General Lyman L.


Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff United States Army July 1, 1959 to September 30, 1960 was not known for a dynamic persuasive personality.1

Soft spoken, humble and deeply religious2 General Johnson was called a "friendly computer" whose concern for the enlisted men earned him the title of a "private's general".3

An early advocate of geopolitics and world education4 General White was known also for his brilliant mind and the continued maintenance of an air of confidence in the ability of the Air Force to accomplish its goals.5 He was a leading architect of the Air Force missile program.6

General Taylor was seen as the "most civilian minded general" and the "most prestigious figure in the United States military establishment".7 Called an intellectual he

1"The Cold War: Chief of Staff," Time, p. 10.

2U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII, No. 16, 11114.


4U.S., Congressional Record, CVII, No. 9, 11714-15.

5U.S., Congressional Record, CVII, No. 9, 11719.

6U.S., Congressional Record, CVII, No. 9, 11714-15.

was fluent in Japanese, German, Spanish, and French.\textsuperscript{1} Known as Mr. "Flexible Response"\textsuperscript{2} he served as special civilian military advisor to President Kennedy from June 1961 to September 1962.\textsuperscript{3}

General Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps from January 1, 1968 to November 29, 1971 was considered an expert in military management and a scientifically trained organization man.\textsuperscript{4}

An advocate of the Polaris submarine, Admiral Burke was a no nonsense, nose-to-the-grindstone worker,\textsuperscript{5} who believed the only way to break a man was with work.\textsuperscript{6} In talking about the Pentagon he liked to say "there are a lot of poisoned wells in this desert".\textsuperscript{7}

\footnotesize{
\begin{enumerate}
  \item "The Cold War: Chief of Staff," \textit{Time}, p. 10.
  \item "Gen. Taylor to Head Joint Chiefs: Lemnitzer Named to Head NATO," \textit{Aviation Week}, LXXVII (July, 1962), 23.
  \item U.S., \textit{Congressional Record Appendix}, CVI, 1081.
\end{enumerate}
}
Called the "diplomat" because he wasn't, General LeMay had a public image of being a tough and able World War II hero who continuously challenged Department of Defense policies. In the public mind he was more an image than a person, and was known as the big bomber man.

Admiral David L. McDonald Chief of Naval Operations, August 1, 1963 to July 31, 1967 was noted for the position that if he could not live with a superior's policy he would either get that policy modified or resign.

Described as being "as colorful as a basket of frogs", General Decker's personality was further characterized by the statement that "you could set a bomb off under his desk and he wouldn't turn a hair". As Army comptroller for three years he gained the managerial skill needed for the Army's top position.

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1 U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), CXI, No. 6, 1371.

2 U.S., Congressional Record, CXI, No. 2, 1621.

3 "From LeMay to McConnell--A Change to the 'New Breed'," Newsweek, LXV (January, 1965), 16.


5 U.S., Congressional Record, CVIII, No. 3, 3523.


7 U.S., Congressional Record, CVIII, No. 3, 3523.
Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations from August 1, 1967 to July 31, 1970 when he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a reputation "for a computer like mind" and great leadership ability. A man of warm personality, he blended his qualities of a southern gentleman with leadership and competence.¹

Not a dreamer but a leader who had a fine sense of the practical, Commandant Greene's credo was one of efficient planning, preparation and training to insure combat readiness.²

A believer in physical fitness and mental gymnastics, Commandant Shoup exercised regularly and enjoyed playing chess. He believed chess forces a person to look over an entire problem instead of just one side of an issue, which in today's world is important. In training Marines he preferred to concentrate on the ability of his men to tangle with and defeat the enemy rather than on the teaching of hate.³ General Shoup insisted that his Marines did not need instruction about Communist theory in order to fight them. What was needed was knowledge on how well the enemy fought.⁴

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¹U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 11, 14601.

²U.S., Congressional Record, CIX, No. 18, 23744.


Known as a "Soldier Statesman" General McConnell impressed his civilian superiors with his "sharp minded capabilities".\(^1\) In his attempt to get Air Force programs accepted, he used the soft sell.\(^2\) As an organization man he rated high in planning ability, in getting along with other people and in trust. Although a World War II flying general, he was not known to the public or controversial, and did not advocate any particular school of thought.\(^3\) After him, the top positions in the Air Force would go to a younger breed of officers who are products entirely of the jet and nuclear weapons age.\(^4\)

General Westmoreland was called "the model of a modern major general". Despite his Vietnam command he kept good relations with the news media.\(^5\) According to military historian S.L.A. Marshall, Westmoreland possessed three attributes needed by a modern battlefield commander:

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\(^1\)U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), CXI, 411-412.


\(^3\)"From LeMay to McConnell--A Change to the 'New Breed'," Newsweek, p. 16.


\(^5\)U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 12, 16215.
"durability, popularity, and professional competence".¹

Billed as a lucid thinker and a precise speaker,² General Wheeler subordinated Army causes in the interest of overall military needs.³

Despite the variety of experiences and personalities the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's were able to present a clear and overwhelmingly uniform image of the American policies of Deterrence and the Prevention of Nuclear War and Deterrence and the Acceptance of Limited War. This was due to the "conservative realism" of their professional military ethic distinctly characterized in the following manner:

The military ethic emphasizes the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature. It stresses the supremacy of society over the individual and the importance of order, hierarchy, and division of function. It stresses the continuity and value of history. It accepts the nation states as the highest form of political organization and recognizes the continuing likelihood of wars among nation states. It emphasizes the importance of power in international relations and warns of the dangers to state security. It holds that the security of the state depends upon the creation and maintenance of strong military forces. It urges the limitation of state action to the direct interests of the state, the restriction of extensive commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose or

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII, No. 4, 5306.

²U.S., Congressional Record, CIX, No. 5, 6488.

adventurous policies. It holds that war is the instrument of politics, that the military are the servants of the statesman, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism. It exalts obedience as the highest virtue of military men. The military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative.¹

Affected by that military ethic, the Joint Chiefs' of Staff deterrent policy was also realistic and conservative.

¹Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 79.
Between 1945 and 1970 the United States felt that the chief military threat to her security was the power held by Communist nations, especially that of Russia. Primarily in response to that threat the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated deterrent policy in the 1960's. This was in direct contrast to the cooperation of these powers during World War II.

The Allied alliance in World War II between capitalist America and Communist Russia was based on need and not on creed. As Allied interest coincided only on the issue of defeating a common enemy,¹ the victory over the Axis powers removed the binding element between Russia and the United States. In place of the Axis threat Russia and the United States looked upon each other as menaces to their respective conflicting national interests.²

By the end of the war an aggressive Russia determined


to pursue her own course in world affairs replaced Germany as the major force in Europe.¹ Backed by her military and economic power Russia embarked on a foreign policy designed to expand her influence and control of global affairs to the fullest possible extent.²

Russian designs to upset the free world balance of power represented a global threat and conspiracy. In seeking world domination the Soviet Union brought about the struggle between freedom and terror. The spreading Communist "virus" needed to be contained to prevent further contamination of non-Communist areas and belligerent statements by Soviet leaders encouraged such fears.³

Soviet expansionist ambitions were seen directly in her actions. From 1944 to 1946 Russia demanded that the former Italian colony of Libya be given to her. In 1945 Russia demanded that a base in the Dardanelles be allotted to her control while the support of a revolution in Greece by bordering Communist nations further accentuated Communist ambitions.⁴ Partial American response included giving aid

¹Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 15-16, 21.


⁴Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 182-183.
to Greece and Turkey to prevent their absorption by the Communist bloc and to keep them within the Western camp.¹

Russian failure to establish a leftist nationalist government in Iran owing to diplomatic pressure and the possibility of a sharp confrontation with the United States focused on would be Russian expansion at the expense of the freedom of small nations. During that crisis American military aid to Iran put the United States on the road to the formation of anti-Soviet military blocs.²

It is apparent that the United States perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to American security owing to the actual or potential use of Soviet armed forces. Russian subversive actions against nations in which the United States had interests further substantiated this view.³

By 1946 the American public was so convinced of Russian aggressiveness that it felt another war, initiated most likely by Russia, would occur within twenty-five years.⁴ That same year only the nuclear monopoly of the United States

¹Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 40, 42.

²Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 182.


gave her a military capacity comparable to that of the Soviet Union.\(^1\) The rapid demobilization of American forces from twelve million to two million men between 1945 and 1947 was not matched by Russian reductions. This led the United States to rely on nuclear weapons to provide a "relatively cheap" yet effective security.\(^2\)

Since 1945 the conflict and tension between the United States and Russia known as the Cold War has had at its strategic center the vast power that each possessed.\(^3\) Fortunately, the issues of the Cold War in many instances were better left unresolved than settled by war.\(^4\)

For the majority of the Cold War years the clash of American and Soviet differences revolved around the fate of Europe since Russia desired to expand her hegemony in Europe, while the United States resisted that goal.\(^5\) The American desire in Europe to see all European nations have the benefit of self determination was directly countered by the Russian policy of keeping Europe divided into two spheres of


\(^3\)Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1199.

\(^4\)Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy*, p. 77.

influence. 1  Within divided Europe the two Germanys remained the critical issue between East and West, with Berlin the most vexing problem. 2

This trend toward a permanently divided Europe was unavoidable by 1945. 3  Russian domination of Eastern and central Europe based on "physical occupation and military power" 4 required an appropriate counter balance, namely the presence of American military force in Western Europe. 5

The loss of Czechoslovakia in 1948 further undermined the position of the West. 6 That same year, the attempt by Russia to pressure the West out of Berlin by means of a blockade forced Western Europe and the United States to concentrate on the Soviet military threat. 7

America's deepening commitment to protect Europe in part stressed increased emphasis on military preparedness. 8

1 Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 61.
3 Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 25.
4 Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 34.
5 Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 180.
6 Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 45.
7 Hammond, The Cold War Years, p. 27.
8 Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 9.
for she saw the defense of Europe as second only to her own national security.¹ The fall of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade showed that compromise with Russia was impossible and hastened the creation of NATO as a means of preventing further Soviet expansion in Europe.²

In responding to the Russian threat of overt aggression by establishing NATO,³ a status quo policy of soothing Western fears, preventing Soviet expansion and allowing Russia to keep her satellite nations was followed.⁴

Even the Marshall Plan which sought the economic recovery of Europe, was founded mainly on the compelling argument that it was necessary to halt the spread of Russian Communism.⁵ While indeed rescuing Europe from political and economic disaster the Marshall Plan also resulted in the creation of points of strength in Europe useful in the containment policy.⁶

¹Hammond, The Cold War Years, p. 74.

²Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 187-188. The 1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia pointed up the Russian desire for security and domination of surrounding nations above all else. Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 917.


⁴Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 48.

⁵Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 800.

⁶Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 43-44.
Both President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson advocated dealing with Russia from a position of strength and by the end of 1951 Truman had adopted a rigid stance to contain Communist aggression.¹

Using counter force in areas threatened by Communist aggression, the policy of containment sought to make such hostile action too costly to pursue. It consisted of giving economic and military aid to nations facing Communist subversion and aggression, the creation of military alliances ringing the Soviet Union, and an increase in the American military budget.² Containment was a basic tenent of American foreign policy in the 1950's and 1960's.³

While Russia favored keeping the status quo in her own sphere of influence, she encouraged change in Asia and Africa. Despite the desire of the newly developing nations to defend their independence while remaining aloof to the East-West struggle, Russia carried the Cold War into the non-European world.⁴

Korea tested the containment policy and the ability

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¹Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 43, 53, 62.
²Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, pp. 46-47.
⁴Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 87, 90.
of the United States to apply it. Given the position which had been developed by the United States, the overt North Korean attack on South Korea in June of 1950 could not be ignored. Communist success in taking over mainland China made it seem even more imperative that the Red tide be stopped in Korea. If it was not stopped in Korea, Communism could spread throughout Asia and Europe thereby threatening American national security and survival.

In Korea, the Soviet Union used proxies and puppets in attempting to accomplish some of her goals. To prevent Russian success United States involvement forced President Truman to rearm the nation, an action which for the first time stopped Communist military aggression cold.

Numerous military attitudes were affected by the Korean war. The United States settled for a limited war in accepting as its goal a status quo ante bellum position. It pointed up the willingness of American political leadership to fight a war as it saw fit regardless of the

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1 Wanamaker, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 47.
5 Hammond, *The Cold War Years*, p. 41.
6 Bailey, *A Diplomatic History*, p. 827.
domestic political repercussions. Red China's strength and aggression in Korea further encouraged American leadership to stress the need for mutual defense treaties with Asian nations. Such treaties were for the purposes of containing Communist expansion in that part of the world.

The war also speeded up the rearming of West Germany, increased American military aid to NATO, and saw the United States encourage Japan to rearm while attempting to make her a democratic bulwark in the Far East. A renewed emphasis on foreign military bases resulted. Furthermore, the limited war in Korea and later in Vietnam have shown the limitations placed on military conflicts as established by the mere possession of nuclear capabilities.

President Truman's containment policy was followed and accepted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Under

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1Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 50, 52.


3Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, p. 51.

4Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 816.

5Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 193-194.


7Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 866.
Eisenhower's direction the build-up of containment alliances stretching from NATO to South Korea was completed.\textsuperscript{1} Such alliances emphasized the need for collective strength, making aggression too costly, the use of foreign military bases and military aid to American allies.\textsuperscript{2}

Eisenhower's outright acceptance of open military alliances at the expense of relations with neutral nations was dubbed "pactomania" by his critics. Critics or not, the alliance system served as a rigid application of the American policy of containment.\textsuperscript{3}

The Eisenhower Doctrine initiated by the Suez crisis of 1956 and proclaimed in March of 1957, further indicated his policy of preventing successful Communist aggression. It was thought that advance notice of United States' resolve to promptly aid nations threatened by Communist aggression would prevent such aggression.\textsuperscript{4} By pledging aid to any nation asking it to repel international Communism, the Eisenhower Doctrine followed the stereotyped response that change in foreign governments could be attributed to Communist ambitions and not self determination.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1}Hammond, \textit{The Cold War Years}, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{2}Wanamaker, \textit{American Foreign Policy}, pp. 48-49.

\textsuperscript{3}Hammond, \textit{The Cold War Years}, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{4}Bailey, \textit{A Diplomatic History}, p. 844.

\textsuperscript{5}Graebner, \textit{Cold War Diplomacy}, p. 100.
This new policy was first used in 1958 when American troops were sent into Lebanon to protect that government from internal as well as external threats.\(^1\) The view held by the United States of international issues as a struggle between Communism and freedom was clearly evident in the 1958 Middle East crisis;\(^2\) a crisis which saw the overthrow of the pro-western government of Iraq and the subsequent attempts to overthrow the governments of Jordan and Lebanon by Arab nationalists backed by Russia.\(^3\)

During the Eisenhower administration military policy shifted from conventional weaponry to heavy reliance on nuclear power. Under the guidance of Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the "New Look" in defense posture was initiated. It stressed nuclear strategic weapons and the means to deliver them while downgrading conventional forces. The "New Look" attempted to use technology in order to save on manpower and money.\(^4\) No doubt the conviction that war could not be limited\(^5\) made nuclear weapons preferable.

\(^1\)Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy*, p. 102.

\(^2\)Hammond, *The Cold War Years*, p. 119.


\(^4\)Hammond, *The Cold War Years*, pp. 74-75, 77.

The "New Look" caused Army Chief of Staff, Maxwell Taylor to resign in 1959 since he felt that such dependence on nuclear weapons left the United States with an inadequate level of conventional capabilities. ¹

Containment was bolstered by the addition of "Massive Retaliation". Designed to eliminate any more Korean style conflicts, "Massive Retaliation" stressed the freedom of action by the United States to respond, if need be, with nuclear weapons not only against the forces being directly used by an aggressor but also against any would-be sanctuary. ² This policy had two major limitations. First, was the uncertainty whether the United States would use such weapons. Second, was Russia's ability to retaliate in like manner. ³ Yet, by the end of 1953 President Eisenhower gave the go-ahead to contingency planners to count on using nuclear weapons in their plans. ⁴

The Russian change to the soft sell method after the death of Stalin in 1953 could not be handled by the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation". The new Russian approach of enticing less developed nations with economic aid rather

¹Hammond, The Cold War Years, p. 103.
²Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, p. 47.
³Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, p. 49.
⁴Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 75-76.
than coercing them was potentially far more dangerous to the United States, and made "Massive Retaliation" unreasonable.\(^1\)

By 1960 the ability of Russia and the United States to shower nuclear weapons on each other made a nuclear response too risky, except as a last resort. Simultaneously the decision of Russian leaders on November 1960 to extend Communist influence through covert aggression, "wars of national liberation", "third party" struggles and the like was based on the nuclear capacity of the United States.\(^2\)

"Massive Retaliation" while used as a threat in the Indo-China war between France and the Viet Minh was ultimately ruled out.\(^3\) While American policy had edged away from the use of nuclear weapons, her military hardware and related military capabilities were not as readily adaptable to such a change. Military flexibility had been traded for economic considerations by President Eisenhower.\(^4\)

In the late 1950's the American position of "Massive Retaliation" gave the United States only two options; either back down in face of conventional aggression or fight a

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\(^1\)Wanamaker, *American Foreign Policy*, pp. 49-50.


\(^3\)Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy*, p. 95.

nuclear war.¹

Consequently, since the development of nuclear weapons encouraged lower level conflicts fought under the "umbrella of mutual nuclear deterrence" the United States needed a policy to deal with such limited non-nuclear wars. Therefore the American reliance on "Massive Retaliation" of the late 1950's shifted to "controlled and flexible response" by the mid-1960's.²

The Kennedy administration followed two major military policies. One, was the policy of maintaining a strategic nuclear force that could survive a nuclear attack with enough power to retaliate effectively. The second, was the development of a broad range of conventional counter capabilities,³ designed to give a flexible response capability in any given situation.⁴

Kennedy increased military flexibility along with increasing the military budget.⁵ Such a "flexible option" policy extended the United States' response beyond

¹Bailey, A Diplomatic History, pp. 849-850.
³Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 149-150.
⁴Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, pp. 50-51.
⁵Hammond, The Cold War Years, p. 193.
capitulation or possible nuclear war.\textsuperscript{1}

Overall, Kennedy's policy stressed peace and forfeited the idea of America making the first nuclear strike. Also included was the search for the best defense at the lowest possible price, continuation of civilian control over the military, plus the desire to prevent nuclear war.\textsuperscript{2}

Such a policy no doubt was established in part, because of the acceptance by President Kennedy that the United States could not have an utterly superior strategic force in relation to other nuclear powers.\textsuperscript{3}

In Asia President Kennedy inherited the problem of Laos which was in danger of falling to Communist inspired insurgents. Many feared that if Laos fell to Communist forces her neighbors, especially South Vietnam, could also fall into Communist hands. Initially President Kennedy wanted to take action to neutralize Laos but later decided to pull back to a more defenseable position in South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{4} By the time of his assassination Kennedy had increased American troops in South Vietnam to sixteen thousand.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{align*}
\textsuperscript{1} & \text{Hammond, The Cold War Years, p. 159.} \\
\textsuperscript{2} & \text{Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, pp. 50-51.} \\
\textsuperscript{3} & \text{Hammond, The Cold War Years, pp. 193-194.} \\
\textsuperscript{4} & \text{Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 879.} \\
\textsuperscript{5} & \text{Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 894.}
\end{align*}
Upon unexpectedly assuming the Presidency, Lyndon B. Johnson was faced with the problem of how to protect South Vietnam against Communist aggression. The situation dramatically changed in August 1965 when North Vietnamese torpedo boats allegedly attacked two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. In response to presidential prodding Congress enacted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing President Johnson to take whatever steps were necessary to protect American forces from further attacks.\(^1\)

Despite public assurances that Americans would not fight an Asian war for Asians, that the United States would not escalate the war, and armed with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, President Johnson increased American forces in South Vietnam from thirty-five thousand in 1965 to five hundred forty thousand by the middle of 1968.\(^2\)

Arrival of those additional American troops prevented immediate Communist victory and eliminated any future possibility of military victory for the Viet Cong. However, Hanoi clung to the chance that political repercussions in the United States would pressure American withdrawal.\(^3\)

Russia seemed to be less of a threat in the 1960's

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\(^1\) Bailey, *A Diplomatic History*, pp. 899-901.


\(^3\) Hammond, *The Cold War Years*, p. 219.
than in the early 1950's owing to a stronger Europe and a growing split in the Soviet Bloc.\textsuperscript{1} However, the threat of Red China grew in that later period. The explosion of China's first nuclear bomb in 1964 was followed in June of 1967 by her first hydrogen bomb. These developments added to the United States' fear that China might enter the Vietnam conflict. Reportedly China's position was that if the United States' escalation included the bombing of the Red River dikes in North Vietnam or an attack on China, China would intervene. Disclaiming such actions by the United States quieted war talk in China.\textsuperscript{2}

In the Americas Communist Cuba proved to be the most dangerous military problem for the United States in the 1960's. This was due to the belligerent attempt by Russia to upset the strategic balance of power by sending some forty nuclear missiles to Cuba in 1962, along with other offensive material.\textsuperscript{3} Russia was compelled to remove the missiles and some of the other related offensive weapons by the determination of the United States to use force if necessary in getting the Russian threat reduced. Nonetheless, as late as 1964 Cuba remained the strongest Latin American

\textsuperscript{1} Hammond, \textit{The Cold War Years}, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{2} Hammond, \textit{The Cold War Years}, pp. 207-209.

\textsuperscript{3} Bailey, \textit{A Diplomatic History}, pp. 882-884.
power because of continuing Russian aid.¹

In her quest for world domination Soviet military aims included the buildup of a powerful military machine with emphasis on research and development programs, creation of a heavy industrial base to support an effective war machine, and elimination of American overseas bases capable of mounting an attack on Soviet territory. Also included was the desire to undermine NATO and other Western defense alliances and the spreading of Communism through "wars of liberation" as in Vietnam.²

The threat of Communism did not allow America to let her guard down. Despite her search for peace, America was forced by Communist actions to break with many diplomatic and domestic traditions. The Truman Doctrine reversed the Monroe Doctrine by giving aid to Greece; the Marshall Plan did away with non-intervention; NATO membership shattered the non-alliance tradition; and the United States was faced with conscription and a wartime size military budget during peace time.³

By 1947 the United States had taken a get tough

¹Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, pp. 992-993.
²Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy, p. 42.
³Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 809.
stance toward Russia. Since that time the Soviet Union has continued to challenge American interests through political and military blackmail and subversion. Whatever method was called for, Russia was ready to use for the purpose of extending her power and influence.

Such a threat to the American nation was the problem that American military security faced in the 1960's. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in forming their deterrent policies operated from this background. Their statements conveyed a continuing belief in the need to be on guard against the Communist threat, the need to contain Communism, the concern for being able to react in a strong enough fashion to combat Communist aggression, and the desire to keep American military alliances and the cooperative strength of the free world bolstered to an adequate degree for security.

1 Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 796.


Chapter 3

DETERRENCE AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

Two basic deterrent doctrines were acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's. One, which will be called Deterrence and the Prevention of Nuclear War, was based mainly on the precept that the United States must retain sufficient strategic nuclear forces capable of surviving a nuclear attack with adequate retaliatory power to destroy the aggressor.

The second, Deterrence and the Acceptance of Limited War, stressed the idea that conventional non-nuclear war was more likely to come about than general nuclear war, therefore, preparation for that type of struggle would be increased.

Although separate in many ways in their respective approaches to the attainment of national security, and located far apart in the possible destruction that could come about, they are interdependent parts of the whole strategic picture of military preparedness.

A clearer perspective of the Joint Chiefs' of Staff views on deterrence can be gained from their outlook concerning the over-all role of the military in the 1960's. It is from their basic understanding of this role that the narrower outlook on prevention of hostilities was formulated.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed the role of the military establishment remained basically the same as it had been for close to two hundred years, that is, the prevention of war which would involve the United States. The goal of such prevention was tied to the primary tasks of maintaining peace on terms acceptable to the United States and the protection of American lives and property. Speaking in 1965 General Wheeler observed: "We all want peace and tranquility along with our freedom."


General Lemnitzer rebutted the image of the military as an aggressive institution. Interestingly, he claimed that the military neither wanted nor did it seek war.  

General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke also felt that the military sought peace rather than fostering aggression. General Wallace M. Greene Jr. stated: "No one abhors the thought of war more than those who have seen it first hand." General Decker stressed the same position: "No element of our society is less war minded than is the soldier, for none pays in war a greater price." Many of those who experienced war did not advocate war, it was up to fools to hope for war.

Apparently the paradox of the United States preparation

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1 U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), CVI, 4143; see also U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11221.


for war while searching for peace existed because of the need for the maintenance of a powerful national defense conducive to national security.¹ Military power was not only required but demanded a constant and unending program of readiness.² Immunity from aggressors could not be assured just because the United States had a peaceful outlook. The hope for elimination of armies was balanced by the need to face the harsh realities of the world.³ The desire to ban war could be present,⁴ but the keeping up of "martial ardor" and a suitable degree of strength for defense purposes was a must.⁵

Safeguarding of the American principles of "liberty, justice and human dignity", required not only an all out effort peacefully to solve the problems causing tension in the world but also the "essential" dedication of having the ability to defend the nation.⁶

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII, No. 13, 17314.

²U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 11, 14709.


⁴U.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 175, 10161.


⁶U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11221; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4510.
The preservation of peace through the possession of military strength was considered a major undertaking of the government. At the very least it allowed the government to exercise its national policies.

Deterrence, then, has been the foundation of United States military doctrine; the continuance of suitable military force which would prevent the enemy from engaging in military aggression to achieve his ambitions. This defensive doctrine sought to avoid any conscious attitude of aggression. General Thomas D. White stated: "While our nation will never commit aggression, we must stand ever ready to defend our freedom." Also, the nuclear capability of the United States was not used or should it be used to

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4U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 8, 10669. However, Robert F. Kennedy disagreed. "One of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said to me he believed in a preventive attack against the Soviet Union." Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1969), p. 119.
bring "a quick and successful" end to the struggle with Communism. Still, that very power was essential in insuring her security.

Deterrent power in itself was not enough, for if it did not prevent war, the military had to be ready to win a struggle of any nature forced upon the nation while preserving its institutions. Yet, General Harold K. Johnson remarked that lasting peace was not to be found on the battlefield but rather attained in the hearts of men.

Weaponry of that time pointed up the necessity for avoiding "lapses in vigilance and misuse of power", it was "too prohibitive" to do so.

As one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff succinctly summed it up:

The threat is real. It would be naive to think otherwise. This is not to say there will be nuclear war tomorrow, but the threat is very real. Remember, our job is to deter war, not primarily to fight one.

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1U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVIII, 4225.

2U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVIII, 4225.

3U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 14, 17313; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), CIX, 5919; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4512.

4U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 13, 17314.

We are bound by our duty to arm our country so that if a war should come through some miscalculation, we would have the weapons and the resources to prosecute it successfully.¹

The threat was real since geographic isolation from the ravishes of war was no longer possible. Strong aerospace forces for the first time directly menaced the nation's survival. This, then, was the treatest danger to the United States.²

Two post World War II strategic concepts, poles apart in their outlook on gaining security for the United States, were considered for possible use. The concept of "Fortress America" was rejected in favor of "Forward Strategy".³

Basically the "Fortress America" concept consisted of withdrawing behind the natural ocean defenses of the Atlantic and Pacific. Such confinement of United States forces guaranteed sure defeat. Meeting Communist aggression along the outer-rim boundaries of the free world was deemed more suitable.⁴


³U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4510.

⁴U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, 11221; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4510.
In meeting the Communist threat along the periphery of the free world, "Forward Strategy" required the positioning of military forces overseas and the development of the capability to project additional military power beyond national borders as it became necessary.\(^1\) As Admiral McDonald expressed in November of 1964: "true defense begins overseas".\(^2\)

Portrayal of Communist aggression as the leading danger to United States security was common.\(^3\) This was true whether such a threat was considered to be a monolithic or polyolithic Communist danger.\(^4\) "Forward Strategy" and the prevention of Communist expansion went hand in hand.

Bluntly focusing on the above union General Lemnitzer


stated: "We have been on the losing end far too long a time. We cannot give up 1 more yard to Communism anywhere." 1

This Communist threat since the end of World War II and the resulting conflict made collective security more important than ever. 2 Meeting this worldwide threat required a worldwide and collective strategy. 3 Treaty organizations such as NATO and SEATO represented such collective security and were considered inseparable from the national security of the United States. 4 It was far better to have allies throughout the world than to pull back into a shell like military posture. 5

Choosing between the two Communist giants, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rated Russia as the most dangerous because of her growing nuclear strategic force. This military


3 U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11221.

4 U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2684. Collective security was considered to be a cornerstone of the total security effort. U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4511.

factor was seen as perhaps having the effect of increasing Russian confidence in her ability to attempt military or diplomatic ventures which would be disadvantageous to the United States. It was not that the Joint Chiefs of Staff greatly feared a deliberate attack, but that probes, escalation or miscalculation might bring war about. Russian offensive and defensive forces appeared geared to the primary task of overcoming the lead the United States held in the capability to wage nuclear war. Particular attention


2U.S., Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), CXV, No. 208, 16773. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not certain whether the overall Soviet objectives were strategic nuclear parity or superiority. In either case they believed that probable Soviet aims were one or more of the following:

"First, to reduce the United States assured destruction capability—that is, our ability to destroy their industry and their people.

Second, to complicate the targeting problem which we have in directing our strategic forces against the Soviet Union.

Third, to reduce U.S. confidence in the ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, thereby reducing the possibility that the United States would undertake a preemptive first strike against the Soviet Union, even under extreme provocation.

Fourth, to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war," U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), CXIII, No. 12, 15545.
was paid to the increasing number of Russian ICBM's and ABM's,¹ and the dynamic growth of the Russian navy.²

The Russian naval threat as seen by Admiral Moorer was composed of two basic military components. The first was the change in Soviet maritime policy from a defensive posture to an offensive posture, global in nature and capacity. This reversal occurred in 1956. The second component was the Russian submarine fleet. Consisting of over three hundred and fifty vessels of post World War II vintage, this modern fleet presented a three dimensional threat to American security. Of the submarine fleet, 12 percent could launch strategic missiles without warning, 16 percent carried missiles with a range of over four hundred nautical miles designed primarily to be used against land and sea targets, while the remaining submarines armed with their torpedoes and mines posed a dangerous threat to American control of the seas.³

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII, No. 20, 26019.


In 1964 Red China exploded her first atomic bomb, and in 1967 her first hydrogen bomb. Apprehension over the growing nuclear capability of Red China added to the already difficult questions of what constituted an adequate deterrent.¹

The principle element found in the deterrent posture of the United States and the most important factor in preventing nuclear war in the 1960's was her strategic offensive strength.² "Power for Peace", the position that in order to prevent nuclear war the United States must have a war winning capability, pervaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought.³

Deterrent power gained its true effectiveness only


²LeMay, "Civic Action by the Air Force," p. 150; see also Burke, "Discipline in a Free Society: Personal Acceptance of Responsibility," p. 682; McDonald, "The Merchant Marine Fleet," p. 189; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2685; U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11221; U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), CVIII, No. 2, 2464. Defensive forces were seen as adding a contribution to the overall deterrent goal, however, it was less important than the offensive capabilities. "Why U.S. Will Win If War Does Come," U.S. News & World Report, pp. 53-54.

³U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4510; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 8194; U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11221-11222; U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), CXI, No. 2, 1624; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2183.
when sufficient strength to win any war was assured. The only "reliable guarantee" of peace was the ability to defeat any aggressor decisively. This response had to be retained at any price.

Surviving a nuclear attack with enough offensive capability to devastate the aggressor was desired, if the highest deterrent factor level was to be achieved.

Military power of this nature was credible and visible. Also, it must be able to address a number of threats, to work along with other aspects of national power, to create opportunities as well as a capacity for reaction. Furthermore, retention of adequate forces must be had at all times.

1 U.S., Congressional Record, CXL, No. 2, 1624; see also LeMay, "Civic Action by the Air Force," p. 150.


Strength to the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not mean only military capabilities. It included a range of interacting elements such as the spiritual and material resources of the nation, economic power and determination to uphold the cause and a valid thought-out strategy.¹

As established, the mere possession of the material means to retaliate in itself did not comprise the complete deterrent goal sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The will to use the means was definitely required.² Without the will on the national level to employ the required force wherever, whenever and for the required span of time needed, all the military hardware created for the deterrent goal was considered useless.³ Such will power came not from the military but from the nation, since the military served only as a "mirror" of society reflecting the image of that society. If the nation had the will then the military had it also.⁴


³U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII, No. 12, 15461.

General LeMay stated that while the will to use force to achieve a particular goal was but one of several factors in the deterrent structure, it was a must unless the nation was prepared to have the credibility of all deterrent factors suffer "proportionately".¹

 Misunderstanding on the part of Russia or Red China on the degree of willingness by the United States to stand firm in the face of aggression could invite new probes, increased support of subversion and possibly even overt aggression on their part.² The United States should project an image which included the "will and the heart" to protect her interests.³

 A clear understanding of the military strength of the United States would act as a powerful deterrent in preventing nuclear war.⁴ The American capacity for military reaction showed any enemy that aggressive action would

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¹The other factors being (a) forces in existence, (b) public understanding of those forces. "Protection With Progress," Time, LXXVIII (September, 1961), 17.


prove too costly for them to initiate. This theme was constantly underscored.  

Another point impressively made was the ability of the United States to defeat any aggressor. Repeatedly the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the enemy how much stronger

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1U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 4511; see also "Why U.S. Will Win If War Does Come," U.S. News & World Report, pp. 53-54; "How to Prevent a Nuclear War: Warnings to Americans by Joint Chiefs of Staff," U.S. News & World Report, p. 33. Unacceptable damage was defined as (1) destruction of the enemy's capability to continue war is assured, (2) war would end on conditions suitable to the U.S., (3) the enemy's objectives would not be reached (4) the enemy's destruction is assured. McConnell, "The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate': A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiority," pp. 457-459.


the United States was than they. Conversely any downgrading of United States' capabilities was seen as perhaps misleading the Soviets into starting a world war. General LeMay did warn of the alarming decrease in the American margin of strategic superiority predicting even the possible loss of such superiority at some unspecified future date.

The price of aggression was shown to be so high that no advantage would be gained through hostile action. These points were emphasized in terms which opponents of the United States could precisely understand. This was accomplished by taking into account not only what the United States

1 U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13608; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVIII, 7169; George C. Wilson, "LeMay Charges U.S. is Losing Its Strategic Force Superiority," Aviation Week, LXXVI (March, 1962), 23; "We're Powerful—Why Be Fearful?", U.S. News & World Report, p. 76; U.S., Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), CVI, No. 10, 12796; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2184; U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11222.


5 U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11221; see also "Danger Years For U.S. Just Ahead," U.S. News & World Report, p. 76.
thought was needed to win should war come about, but also by considering the enemy's outlook on the same question, for it was the enemy who was to be prevented from causing war.¹

Making nuclear war too costly for the party or parties involved clearly was a basic stipulation of the overall deterrent factor, for every nation had a cost level or "nuclear threshold" above which restraining influences no longer acted as a sufficient deterring force. This "nuclear threshold" was a dynamic not a static level, that was influenced by many factors which were not only variable but also unpredictable. Despite this complexity the threshold should be raised and kept above other nations' willingness to engage in nuclear war. This was accomplished by maintaining a "convincing strategic superiority".²

However, a possibility did exist that if a nation should conclude that its attack and defense capabilities would limit damage to an acceptable level, whatever it may be, the deterrent forces of the United States would no longer deter and "the first principles of (United States) security policy would be gone".³ General McConnell rejected the idea


³"How to Prevent a Nuclear War: Warnings to Americans by Joint Chiefs of Staff," U.S. News & World Report, p. 33.
that because the United States would not risk nuclear war, neither would other nations. What deterred the United States would not necessarily deter Russia, Red China or other powers.\footnote{McConnell, "The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate': A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiority," p. 457.}

A more somber tone was used in acknowledging that both Russia and the United States could annihilate each other,\footnote{U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 1, 1254; see also U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11221.} and that there was no defense at that time against saturation of nuclear weapons over a single target area.\footnote{"Little Wars--How Ready is U.S.?," U.S. News & World Report, L (May, 1961), 70.}

What, then, were the fundamental strategic concepts in vogue at the time when such destructive weapons existed and when a fool proof defense was lacking?\footnote{The Air Force defined strategic warfare as "operations designed to destroy the enemy's capability and will to continue" war. This entailed the destruction of industrial, military, and urban complexes in areas controlled by the enemy. McConnell, "The Role of Airpower in Viet-Nam: Strategic Persuasion," p. 12.}

The concept adapted to this task had as its aim the destruction of the aggressor's ability to wage war. Otherwise, through civil defense and other operations the aggressor might be able to reduce possible losses to an acceptable level of risk, while pounding United States' cities to
oblivion. As in the case of Russia, it was not enough to hold only her cities as nuclear hostages, for their destruction would not prevent remaining offensive nuclear weapons from being used against the United States, and might tempt Russia to launch a first strike. This was a Counter Force and not a Counter Population approach.

Counter Force was considered the best deterrent in that it would destroy or neutralize the offensive forces the enemy counted on winning with. As the very least, had it failed to prevent nuclear war, Counter Force would have provided the "minimum limitation of damage under the worst possible condition". It provided the best dividend that could be gained from any strategy.

General McConnell stated that Counter Force effectiveness depended on the strategic superiority of the United

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2 LeMay, "Civic Action by the Air Force," p. 150; see also "Danger Years for U.S. Just Ahead," U.S. News & World Report, p. 79. The role of Counter Force as defined by General LeMay was "the ability to destroy the aggressor's strategic offensive system, thereby reducing his capability to attack us." U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13608.
3 U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13608; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 8194.
4 U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13609.
5 U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13609.
States. He attacked the concept of nuclear stalemate that assumed strategic parity on behalf of the major nuclear powers. Conspicuous among General McConnell's statements was the thought that the United States could lose its strategic advantage and with it national survival.\textsuperscript{1} General LeMay warned that the continued need for strategic superiority should not be overshadowed by such convenient positions as "mutual stalemate" and, or "mutual deterrence".\textsuperscript{2} Likewise the notion that "they" like the United States sought accommodation based on reasonableness was rejected.\textsuperscript{3}

According to Generals LeMay and McConnell, sustained strategic superiority depended on technological superiority.\textsuperscript{4} Prudent attention was paid to the continued need for maintaining the technological superiority which the United States held in 1961. This was needed if military deterrence power was to survive.\textsuperscript{5} The exigency of keeping abreast of technological advances was measured not only in the cost or

\begin{enumerate}
\item McConnell, "The Fallacy of the 'Nuclear Stalemate': A Safe Margin of Strategic Superiority," pp. 457, 459.
\item U.S., \textit{Congressional Record}, CX, No. 10, 13608.
\item U.S., \textit{Congressional Record}, CXIII, No. 20, 26020.
\item U.S., \textit{Congressional Record Appendix}, CVIII, 7169.
\end{enumerate}
time element but in the possible devastation of cities and
the resulting loss of lives.\textsuperscript{1} General Thomas D. White urged
that the United States should not rely on static weapons
systems in a dynamic technological age.\textsuperscript{2}

General Wheeler acknowledged that although the United
States made progress with weapons systems, so too did Russia
and Red China utilize their technology to produce weapons at
an increasing rate that directly threatened the United
States.\textsuperscript{3} General LeMay indicated that the Russians were
more successful in applying technology to weapons than the
United States.\textsuperscript{4}

General Wheeler gave prominence to the importance of
the new technology by stating:

To accept heightened risk and a less stable
deterrent as a national posture would confuse un­
thinking personal preference for real-world policy
alternative. The choice demanded by the new tech­
nology is still between the quick and the dead.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}U.S., Congressional Record, CXI, No. 7, 9970.
\item \textsuperscript{2}U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961), CVII, No. 10, 13863.
\item \textsuperscript{3}"Top General's Rebuttal to Attacks on Military,"
U.S. News & World Report, p. 14; see also U.S., Congres­
sional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII, No. 20,
26746.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Wilson, "LeMay Charges U.S. is Losing Its Strategic
\item \textsuperscript{5}"Top General's Rebuttal to Attacks on Military,"
\end{itemize}
Yet, owing to the then minimum 4-5 year period needed for advanced estimation of desired capabilities, or even a greater lead time owing to the rapidity of technological change this area represented a weak link in deterring war.  

Technology did not progress at a uniform pace. For example, Anti-submarine warfare lagged behind other areas, while successful application of technology as in nuclear propulsion of ships and possible propulsion of air borne craft was applauded by General White. Outer space, however, provided a new dimension for application of technology for military use, thus causing increased problems for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing a proper deterrent.

One of the four basic reasons for the United States space effort was national defense. Although the peaceful intentions of the United States with regard to the space

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4 The other three reasons were scientific progress, national prestige and commercial advantage. U.S., *Congressional Record*, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), CX, No. 13, 16603.
medium were reaffirmed, the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to secure space from would-be hostile powers.\(^1\)

Space was seen as a potential threat and, therefore, no enemy should be allowed to develop capabilities in that realm before the United States did.\(^2\)

Space had direct military value. As the fortunes of nations have crested and tumbled upon their ability to use their environment, whether land, sea or the sky or a combination of them, so too space was seen as playing a similar role. The very survival of the United States depended on her conquest of and superiority in space.\(^3\) Leadership in whatever transpired there must be held by the United States.\(^4\)

Application of the new technology was needed to gain

\(^1\)U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), CXIII, No. 12, 15905; see also U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 13, 16603-16604.


\(^4\)U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CIX, 1202-1203.
an effective space defense. Such a defensive capability included the ability to detect, track and inspect any unidentified space object, as well as the capability to destroy objects in space should they prove to be hostile.¹

From the vast expanse of space to the depths of the oceans the prevention of nuclear war was a major goal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's. Simultaneously the Chiefs sought to deter non-nuclear war. For both types of conflict General Wheeler aptly summed up American deterrence policy:

I have argued, am arguing, and will argue for an American military posture which is (1) strong, but not belligerent; (2) too determined to be frightened and too strong to be defeated; and (3) unwavering, despite setbacks, disappointments and opposition in following that cause which we know is the right path to organize a stable and durable peace.²

¹U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 13, 16604.

Chapter 4

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF LIMITED WAR

Russia's first nuclear detonation in 1949 removed the monopoly on nuclear weapons held by the United States and brought about the possibility of mutual destruction of both super powers should a general nuclear war occur.¹

From that point on the military establishments of Russia and the United States have been faced with the dual tasks of adopting nuclear power for military purposes while maintaining and improving conventional non-nuclear means of waging war.²

Along with the changing material means of waging war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were confronted with the greatest transition of strategy and doctrine in military history.³ In response to the changes brought about by the nuclear age, and the challenge of Communist non-nuclear aggression the Joint Chiefs of Staff were faced with the need for a conventional non-nuclear deterrent policy.


²Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 1199.

The possession of certain weapons, according to General Decker in 1961, did not mean that they had to be used.\(^1\) This was seen in the non-use of nuclear weapons by the United States in her struggle against Communist aggression. The thought that the ability to win a nuclear war would deter Communist aggression proved incorrect. On the contrary, Communists have been able to take aggressive military action providing it did not bring about a nuclear conflict.\(^2\)

The direct Russian nuclear threat to the United States was readily discernible in the opening years of the 1960's. More subtle was the threat represented by limited war which allowed Communist powers to nibble away at the collective strength of the free world, and which if unopposed, would lead to ultimate defeat.\(^3\) Aggression of this nature continued because the Communist World was not content to allow its neighbors the right to free and independent governments. Such a threat required continued opposition for it was accepted that whenever a nation lost its freedom

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that of the United States was placed in greater jeopardy.  

Whether it was the strategic advantage of the United States or the development of Soviet nuclear capabilities, non-nuclear war came to be viewed as the most likely form of aggression. It was unlikely that the Soviet Union would gamble on an all out nuclear attack realizing the catastrophic losses she could receive. Rather, believing she had all but eliminated massive retaliatory action, except perhaps by an attack upon a NATO member, localized aggression seemed the suitable option.

The very effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent increased the need for further development of a conventional deterrence policy. Necessary, therefore, were forces in being which could respond to a broad range of threats.

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6 U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 540.
Lack of conventional strength could leave the United States with only two choices in the face of Communist aggression: the withdrawal of opposition or retaliation with nuclear weapons. Conventional strength provided graduated military, diplomatic and psychological responses plus expanded time for using them.¹

The possible consequences of limited war forced the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop not only a nuclear deterrent policy but also a non-nuclear deterrent posture. While General LeMay claimed that there was no single military point of view in the United States,² Admiral Burke lucidly stated the basic consensus of the need for two deterrent concepts:

While it would be foolish to ignore the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack, it is time to recognize that over emphasis on such an attack tends to inhibit original and constructive thinking on the over all Soviet threat particularly in the limited and cold war fields. These are the fields on which the Soviets will feel more and more at liberty to probe. It is entirely to their advantage to have the United States judge each Soviet move in terms of only one solution--massive nuclear retaliation--for they may believe that such a response is less and less likely to come about.³

¹U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 540.


³U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 540.
Limited war was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as more likely to occur in the 1960's than general nuclear war. General Shoup in pleading for increased military preparation for such conflicts stated:

There is a general consensus with which I heartily agree, that limited wars are the most probable type of action that we may have to fight. Although of less threat to national survival than general war, limited engagements merit our close attention.¹

The Army view strongly supported the possibility of non-nuclear war. General Lemnitzer in 1960 believed this to be the case owing to the Soviet nuclear capacity and the lack of such capacity by Communist China.² In May of 1961, General Decker indicated the Army had felt for some time that conventional war was more likely to come about than nuclear war.³ As shown in Laos the problems in the 1960's would most readily be those of Communist inspired subversion, controlled terror and infiltration carried on mainly


²U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), CVI, 6059; see also "Organization Changes Opposed by Lemnitzer," Aviation Week, LXXIII (September, 1960), 38.

by guerrillas, not a big war.¹

Strategic and tactical developments weighed the odds in favor of non-nuclear warfare.² To down grade the threat and possibility of non-nuclear war would be ignoring the well-equipped two million man army of Russia and the two and one-half million man army of Red China.³

This trend also observed by Admiral Burke deprecated the ability of having a nuclear capability as the only response to actions of other nations. Such a reaction was not adequate. More stress was to be placed on limited war capabilities.⁴

During the Eisenhower administration the doctrine of massive retaliation based on the assumption of unrestricted use of atomic weapons guided American military policy.⁵

¹"Little Wars--How Ready is U.S.?", U.S. News & World Report, p. 68.


This at least was the basic understanding as seen by the general public. However, as early as 1960 members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that limited war needs were to get increased attention and allocation of resources.

In the aborted Kennedy presidential era, General Taylor, an outspoken critic of massive retaliation and a proponent of "Flexible Response", saw the latter become the backbone of defense policy.¹

"Flexible Response" was seen as the ability of the United States to meet military threats along the entire range and level of intensities upon which aggression could occur. Since the threat ranged from massive Soviet tank attacks to jungle ambush, from nuclear weapons to the crossbow, a salient point in the Joint Chiefs' speeches was the need for adopting the "Flexible Response" concept in thought as well as in deed.² Proficiency in carrying out such a


response required the ability to campaign with or without nuclear weapons.¹ According to Admiral McDonald, Berlins, Qemoys, Lebanons, Suezes, Cubas and Vietnams, would continue to happen and the United States should be prepared to deal with such situations.²

Readiness for nuclear war was not incompatible with "Flexible Response".³ American security required both conventional flexibility and nuclear war preparedness.⁴ General LeMay, better known for his massive retaliation position rather than his advocacy of limited response, favored building up limited war forces providing there was the understanding that "you cannot fight a limited war except under the umbrella of strategic superiority".⁵ General McConnell concurred saying that besides being a powerful deterrent


²"In a Troubled World--Navy's Role in Cuba, Panama, South East Asia," U.S. News & World Report, LVIC (March, 1964), 70.


⁵George C. Wilson, "LeMay Charges U.S. is Losing Its Strategic Force Superiority," Aviation Week, LXXVI (March, 1962), 23. As in the case of Lebanon, the U.S. would not have dared entered "without strategic superiority".
force, this "umbrella" allowed greater freedom for statesmen to act in dealing with local conflicts and crises.\(^1\) Strategic deterrent forces allowed for effective employment of tactical forces in limited conflicts.\(^2\) Finally general nuclear deterrent forces kept limited wars limited.\(^3\)

Reliance was not to be placed on a single weapons system. The use of nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear conflict was inappropriate and could lead to an uncontrolled situation. Dependence on nuclear ballistic missiles alone did not allow the President the retention of desired flexible responses to a wide range of lesser provocations. Mixed and balanced land, sea and air forces,\(^4\) including manned aircraft and missiles, gave the President the means of retaining initiative at all levels of conflict or confrontation, thereby,


\(^2\)Curtis E. LeMay, "Civic Action by the Air Force," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXX (December, 1963), 150; see also U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13603.


reducing the danger of enemy miscalculation that the United States could not respond without risking a missile exchange.  

Even the tactical use of small nuclear weapons on military targets in the battle zone could lead to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. This was a key reason why a dual capability to fight large or small wars without nuclear weapons should be present.  

United States responsiveness to limited war should be based on prompt speed of movement into trouble spots to prevent exploitation of power vacuums. In itself speed of action could produce a desired deterrent factor. Effective counter action also included the ability to use precise and appropriate responses in each situation. As in nuclear deterrence policy, the needed determination to prevail in such situations came from the moral-psychological strength of American convictions.

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4 U.S., Congressional Record, CVI, No. 9, 11222.
Forward strategy allowed for the prompt reaction to Communist military aggression. The positioning of forces right up against the Bamboo and Iron Curtains allowed for immediate reaction on the spot. Strategic reserves provided for movement to crises in other locations. Reserve components were slated for use should expansion of ready forces be needed in case of an extended effort.\(^1\) Note, it was the reserves not the draftees that were to be used in an extended effort.

American willingness to back words with action was seen as shifting Russian activity to indirect confrontation.\(^2\) The tactical forces of the United States had apparently convinced the Communist World that aggression, on the scale of Korea, involved unacceptable risks, thus forcing them to operate at the lowest end of the scale of violence, that of covert aggression and subversive action.\(^3\) This belief

\(^1\) U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2684; see also Thomas H. Moorer, "The Soviet Navy: Our Ability to Meet the Challenge," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXV (October, 1969), 745; U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 6059; "We're Powerful--Why Be Fearful?", U.S. News & World Report, p. 74. There was no need to post forces near every trouble spot. U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2184.


\(^3\) U.S., Congressional Record, CX, No. 10, 13608.
certainly did not survive the severe test of the limited war in Vietnam.

In exploiting any physical or moral weakness in the free world, the Communist sought to keep the risk to themselves at a minimum. Russia realized the perils involved in limited armed aggression and according to Admiral Burke preferred to use "puppets and stooges", the loss of which would not endanger her; should the danger become too great they could be abandoned.¹

Communist military forces were able to support Cold War goals, propaganda campaigns, general nuclear war, subtle forms of subversion and open military participation in geographically restricted conflicts.²

Such conflict would most likely take place in the underdeveloped areas of the world; the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Asian periphery.³ Quemoy, Lebanon and Suez showed that a flexible, diversified, conventional force capability was highly important if American foreign policy was not to be handicapped by lacking the right amount

¹U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVI, 2183.
²U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 2683.
³U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CVII, 540.
of force at the right time. 1 Flexible response allowed for "selective, fine tuning of national action," rather than reliance on a "on/off" switch which offered little choice other than a calculated overt use of power. 2

It is of interest to note that American preparedness and involvement in Vietnam was needed to bring about an era where the "conference table would loom ever larger and the battlefield smaller and smaller in the settlement of international disputes". 3

Clearly the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960's accepted the idea that conventional non-nuclear limited war was more likely to come about than general nuclear war. They gave high priority to the development of a flexible response policy to fit all levels of military counter action.

The Joint Chiefs' belief that limited non-nuclear war would more likely occur than nuclear war was proved in Vietnam. America's response to the Vietnam conflict was based on the flexible response concept.

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3 U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 37, 36197.
Chapter 5

VIETNAM: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IN LIMITED WAR

The emergence of many new nations after World War II which lacked the capability to defend themselves against covert or overt aggression, and the avowed Communist goal of world domination increased the military and political commitments of the United States in the 1960's. Such commitments were made to protect the freedom and stability of those nations.¹

According to General Johnson, of the over one hundred significant instances between 1945 and 1965 in which armed violence was employed in the political process of sixty-eight nations, Communist participation was prominent in at least 50 percent. General Johnson saw no reason why such a trend would not continue in the affected underdeveloped areas of Latin America, Africa and southeast Asia. Vietnam as part of this trend represented the larger manifestation of aggressive Communist involvement in international politics.²


²U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), CXI, No. 20, 27624.
The struggle in Vietnam was viewed not as an isolated incident, but as part of the Communist blueprint to gain world power either by wearing down the United States in a series of local wars, or if United States' strategic power should slip, destroying her in a nuclear war. In accepting this specific challenge of unending Communist aggression, the containment of Communist expansion was once again a prime reason for United States' involvement.

In theory the prevention and successful containment of Communist aggression in South Vietnam would prevent more serious aggression in the future. If Communist ambitions were realized the United States would at a later time be forced to fight Communist aggression somewhere else, perhaps


at a location much closer to her own borders.¹

In this first of Khrushchev's "wars of liberation,"² the aggressive policy of North Vietnam was seen as requiring to a limited extent, a military response. General Giap, military chief of the armed forces of North Vietnam, was cited as stating that the immediate goals of his nation were the protection of North Vietnam, the overthrow of the government of South Vietnam and the uniting of all Vietnam under Communist rule.³

General Chapman felt that the attempt to conquer and destroy South Vietnam required the full prosecution of the war by North Vietnam.⁴ Such a desire to seize absolute control in the south through persuasion and terror⁵ indicated that it was more a case of Communist aggression than a


²Greene, "Vietnam: The Issue and the Response," 512; see also U.S., Congressional Record, CXI, No. 16, 21453.


⁵U.S., Congressional Record, CXI, No. 20, 27624.
In 1960 General Lemnitzer outlined the limited war policy goals of the United States. They consisted of the need for quick reaction to prevent successful Communist aggression, the application of the precise degree of force needed to defeat the aggressor without risking expansion into a nuclear conflict and the desire to limit the loss of non-combatants lives to the greatest extent possible. This limited response was likened to killing the rats in a community without destroying the neighborhood. The Vietnam war has not been fought in line with such a policy.

Unlike North Vietnam the basic political goals of the United States were limited in design and scope. These goals included providing security for South Vietnam, convincing North Vietnam that she was not able to take over

1U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), CXI, 2495.


South Vietnam by force, creating conditions suitable for self determination of southeast Asian nations, and the extension of aid to those southeast Asian nations that needed it to combat Communist pressure. Prevention of the loss of national prestige, and the averting of the potential danger of Communist victory in South Vietnam to American national security were additional objectives.

Vietnam was a test case in preventing successful aggression without destroying the aggressor. While the United States could have destroyed North Vietnam almost

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1 U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 20, 26020.


3 U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXI, 2494.


overnight, this was not done as it could have triggered a general nuclear war, the very type of occurrence the military wanted to avoid. Such devastation was not needed nor was it in line with the expressed policy and intention of the nation.¹

American military goals and actions were limited. The "classic objective of warfare--the overthrow and total defeat of the enemy" was not pursued.² Even during the period of rapid United States' escalation of forces into South Vietnam, General McConnell in March of 1966 and General Wheeler in June of 1968 asserted that the limited goals of the United States did not include the destruction or unconditional surrender of Hanoi.³ Invasion of North Vietnam and the overthrow of its government were goals inconsistent with American desires to keep the conflict limited.⁴

American restraint was also shown by the lack of "any expansionist desires" and the willingness of the United


²U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXI, 2495.


States to attain her objectives through negotiations rather than insisting on a military victory. Negotiations were intended to achieve American goals not to bring about defeat. Neither should they serve as a face saving device to cover American withdrawal.

General Johnson was convinced that the Communist inability to gain victory on the battlefield would not be alleviated at the conference table. What North Vietnam could not gain from military aggression would not be given on the diplomatic front. In direct opposition to North Vietnam's goals, any agreement reached was to include the freedom and security of South Vietnam.

Despite limitations placed on military actions, North Vietnam was not spared from damage. Such damage was used in attempting to convince Hanoi that the cost of aggression was too high to be continued, especially since her goals would

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1U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXI, 2495; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), CXIII, 1416.


3"Armed Forces: Renaissance in the Ranks," Time, LXXXVI (December, 1965), 34.

not be accomplished.\(^1\)

Admittedly North Vietnam was able to continue her aggression for an extended time. But, in doing so she was forced to accept the destruction of her economy, and the loss of population.\(^2\) It was expected that such losses, plus the failure to achieve her military goals would cause North Vietnam to cease her hostile actions.\(^3\) In brief, North Vietnam was to be made aware that aggression, like crime, does not pay,\(^4\) and that continued aggression forced the United States to punish her further.\(^5\)

Victory in Vietnam required the application of offensive actions including the bombing of North Vietnam.\(^6\) In attempting to break the will and capability of North Vietnam

\(^1\)U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXII, 2163; see also "As a Top General Sees the War Now," U.S. News & World Report, LXII (January, 1967), 14.


\(^3\)U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXI, 2495.


\(^5\)U.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 161, 11815; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), CXII, 442.

\(^6\)U.S., Congressional Record, CXII, No. 11, 13865; see also U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXII, 2162.
to continue the war, the policy of "strategic persuasion" was used. Unlike the purpose of strategic bombing in World War II, "strategic persuasion" in the 1960's was not intended to help bring about a complete military victory. As a flexible tool of foreign policy it allowed for the step by step bombing of selected targets, while keeping military involvement below the level of an uncontrolled conflict. By applying measured increases of pressure to Hanoi, it was hoped that the high price of aggression would be more than she was willing to pay, and would bring her to the conference table.¹

The claim was made that the destruction of troops, interdiction of supply lines and removal of North Vietnam as a sanctuary weakened her ability to support aggression in South Vietnam.²

At times even military targets such as airfields, missile sites³ and the port of Haiphong were off limits to


bomiting provided they did not interfere with bombing mis­
sions or as long as the United States could get by without
attacking them.¹

Civilian population centers were not to be attacked
deliberately. Although some civilians were killed it was
not because they were the intended target;² as in Hanoi and
Haiphong the industrial centers of those cities, not the
populations were the targets.³

The policy of strategic persuasion in Vietnam was
based on decisions of higher civilian authorities. General
McConnell clarified this in a trite but satisfactory manner:

The simple military solution would, of course, be
to destroy the out-of-country /North Vietnam/ base
supporting the in-country /South Vietnam/ guerrillas.
For important political considerations, however, our
national leaders have authorized air strikes only
against selected military targets in North Vietnam
and against the enemy troops and transportation
system.⁴

Starting in 1965 and continuing to the end of the
decade there is a trend in the Joint Chiefs' of Staff state­
ments that indicates displeasure with such a bombing policy.
Despite the response by one member that it would be

¹"General Greene Tells the Story of Vietnam War,"

²Wheeler, Earle G., "How to Fight the War in Vietnam,"

³U.S., Congressional Record, CXII, No. 11, 13866.

⁴U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXII, 2163.
inappropriate to comment publicly on such limitations as ample time had been provided to state opinions to superiors and committees of congress, other viewpoints indicate such disappointment.  

Providing a possible excuse in case of defeat in Vietnam, the bombing limitations were looked upon in the following manner. It would have been much more effective if the bombing had been less gradual. The Joint Chiefs of Staff called for a "sharp sudden blow which would paralyze the enemy's capability", but this was not done. Bombing pauses and the subsequent relaxing of pressure on the enemy only allowed him to be "that much better off".  

According to General McConnell, in 1965 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that ninety-four targets in North Vietnam receive a "very severe application of air power" causing their destruction. This was disapproved. If the United States had bombed North Vietnam extensively in 1965 when North Vietnam lacked the defenses it possessed by August 1967, the military situation would have been significantly better. Such bombing might have prevented casualties


received during the go slow period. By going the route of gradual bombing, Hanoi was able to build up her defenses and develop her reconstruction capability.¹

Bombing halts were considered unfortunate.² They were viewed as causing additional casualties.³ By giving Hanoi a sanctuary the military found itself in the position of a "narcotics squad" in pursuit of pushers who could not enter their headquarters.⁴

Although the military risk was acceptable, the failure of productive negotiations during bombing halts, caused further consternation.⁵

The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff entailed the belief that the enemy could only be defeated by destroying areas placed off limits, such as the thirty mile buffer zone between China and North Vietnam.⁶ Also advocated was


²U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 20, 27059.


⁶U.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 161, 11815.
the heavier bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. They accepted the view that continuous bombing of North Vietnam would have seen the conflict over or nearly over by December 1969.

The bombing policy was inconsistent with two points of deterrence. First, that the winning or containing of limited wars without delay was necessary. Second, limited bombing failed to use military force "efficiently and effectively" to gain victory. It also did not allow for sustained and increasing pressure, called "the prologue to victory".

The gradual increase in bombing was not advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It fitted the enemy's plan of action and did not allow for the most effective use of power.


Still, limited bombing was more valuable than often claimed. It did raise the morale of South Vietnam, brought the war home to North Vietnam, diverted North Vietnamese manpower to reconstruction work, reduced the flow of men and material into South Vietnam and interrupted communication. Consequently, it saved the lives of many Allied and American soldiers. Without it, perhaps as many as "eight hundred thousand additional United States troops" at a cost of seventy-five billion dollars over what was already spent would have been needed. Such restraint demanded the high price of an extended war and the need for patience.

The military did not promise a quick end to the conflict in Vietnam. Emphasized was the long struggle which Vietnam was to be. As General Johnson stated "we should have no illusions about achieving success quickly in

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4U.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 161, 11815.

Vietnam. The belief that a long struggle could exact the sacrifice of money, luxuries and a casualty list became a reality.

The extension of participation in the conflict concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They did not assume the public would sillingly see the war through to a successful end. In 1965 General Wheeler claimed majority backing by the American public for United States involvement in Vietnam. But from 1967 through 1969 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were far less positive of such support.

Admiral Moorer indicated that from the onset of American involvement, North Vietnam focused on influencing American public opinion as a means of wearing away the will of the American people. This is in line with that part of North Vietnam's strategy which included to some "measurable degree" the "false prospective" that Americans did not have


3U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXI, 2494.

4U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), CXIII, 1667; see also U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 24, 32031; U.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 167, 12536.

the needed determination to see their defensive struggle to the finish. 1

The need for the will on the part of the American people to stand firm at home as in Vietnam was voiced by General Chapman:

I think we are now involved in a great test of national wills with Hanoi, and that the issue is hanging in the balance right now. Who's going to back down? Who's going to crack first? Do we have the determination to stick it out, to see our objectives accomplished after we have done so much? Our servicemen in Vietnam have the determination, but what of the people at home? 2

In attempting to rally public support to the American commitment General Chapman used many time honored arguments concerning will power and deterrence:

Americans grow weary of war, and not just this war, but the very idea of war—and the need to prepare for war. But preparedness for war is synonymous with preparedness for defense. How many wars have not been fought because of this preparedness? And because Americans have been willing to fight on foreign shores how many times have we avoided fighting here, on our own ground? 3

Americans had been willing to fight on foreign shores, in the past, but in this poorly understood war 4

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2 U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 24, 32031; see also U.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 167, 12536.

3 U.S., Congressional Record, CXV, No. 167, 12536.

4 U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 20, 26020.
the absence of a Pearl Harbor or a Lusitania failed to pro-
vide a "nationalistic fervor". With the growing dissent in
the United States over the war, especially its length the
vital question was, would "the American people stick it
out"? 

General Wheeler felt that within South Vietnam a good
deal of restraint was shown by American forces. The overall
policy of weapons use ideally seen by the Joint Chiefs con-
sisted of attacks against military targets only. Civilian
population were not to be deliberately attacked. In many
bombing missions civilians were warned to take cover and to
get away from the Viet Cong. There was no desire to kill
innocent people. In many areas the control of weapons use
was so tight as to require clearance by a provincial or
district chief. Yet, it was impossible to keep the civilians

1Wallace M. Greene Jr., "Why We Will Win in Viet Nam,"
Nations Business (April, 1966), 116; see also U.S., Congressional
Record, CXIII, No. 20, 27059.

2"Vietnam--Top Marine's Size-Up," U.S. News & World
Report, p. 15.

3U.S., Congressional Record, CXIII, No. 20, 27059.

4Wheeler, "How to Fight the War in Vietnam," U.S.
News & World Report, pp. 39, 42.

5Wheeler, "How to Fight the War in Vietnam," U.S.
from being killed. Even American troops ran the risk of being killed by friendly fire power.¹

In line with the Joint Chief's policy of limited war, the United States refused to use nuclear weapons to end the war quickly. By doing so the United States prevented the possible expansion of this conventional war into a nuclear conflict.

As early as 1962, nuclear weapons were declared inappropriate for Vietnam and southeast Asia in dealing with conventional force aggression. The use of conventional weapons were considered suitable in that area.² Barring of nuclear weapons did not eliminate their role in American policy since "strategic persuasion" was carried out under the protection of the "nuclear umbrella".³ Strategic capability prevented the war from escalating into a nuclear conflict while allowing the United States freedom of action.⁴

As deep as the conventional commitment was in Vietnam, the need to retain strategic nuclear forces was evident. As


in Vietnam, United States strategic superiority in the future should prevent conflicts from reaching the level of nuclear war.¹

Weapons technology gave the United States a capacity to destroy North Vietnam without the use of nuclear weapons; it would take just a little longer with conventional ones.² The use of advanced technology in other areas resulted in the capacity to keep the mortality rate down to two percent of those wounded,³ the ability to monitor automatically any movement around a given position,⁴ and the prevention of ambushes by using defoliation chemicals to destroy ground cover.⁵ The helicopter provided mobility for quick reaction to enemy infiltration.⁶ This was in keeping with the Joint Chiefs' policy of using the most advanced technology possible in any given conflict.

¹U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXII, 2163.
General Wheeler contended that the massive effort in Vietnam did not radically affect American ability to respond to other emergencies in the world from the Middle East to Latin America.\(^1\) Although readily admitting United States' forces were spread a bit thinner than before Vietnam, General Greene displayed the confidence that America retained a strong deterrence capability.\(^2\) Strategically speaking the Vietnam war did not reduce American capacity to respond to hostile strategic acts.\(^3\) Yet General Westmoreland was not as confident. In September 1969, he called American military assets marginal in backing up her commitments.\(^4\)

Vietnam illustrated the need for the capability to deal with military conflicts in all types of environments, from the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam to the sophisticated environment of Europe.\(^5\) It substantiated the need for substantial deployment of forward forces, and preparation

\(^1\)Wheeler, "How to Fight the War in Vietnam," U.S. News & World Report, p. 44.


\(^3\)U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXI, 2495.


for limited as well as non-limited war.\footnote{U.S., \textit{Congressional Record}, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), CXII, No. 1, 541.}

The official military position as seen by General Westmoreland is that Vietnam has been a limited war with limited objectives,\footnote{Westmoreland, "Army Cutbacks--The Risks," \textit{U.S. News & World Report}, p. 71.} primarily those of preventing North Vietnam from conquering South Vietnam without destroying the aggressor.\footnote{U.S., \textit{Congressional Record}, CXV, No. 167, 12536; see also U.S., \textit{Congressional Record}, CXV, No. 161, 11815.} The force used has best fit the national interest. Limitations on military actions have been based on humanitarian and political considerations. American national leaders have desired to achieve their goals through the minimum use of force necessary to get the job done.\footnote{U.S., \textit{Congressional Record Appendix}, CXII, 2162-2163.}

In 1938 England and France sacrificed the Sudeten provinces of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in a futile attempt to gain peace in their time. Similar appeasement to Communist ambitions in South Vietnam by the withdrawal of American support was ruled out. Churchill's warning that "the belief that security can be gained by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal decision"\footnote{Johnson, "Vietnam: Comparisons and Convictions," pp. 169-170.} did not go unheeded.
Military aspects dominated the war. The sociological, economical and psychological aspects involved were often overlooked. The Vietnam conflict is fundamentally a political happening,¹ that was more likely to fade away than come to a sudden end.² All the Communists had to do was put an end to their aggression.³

Lacking a final formula for success⁴ and asserting that this war would not be taken over by the United States,⁵ the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured the nation that military victory was still possible in Vietnam.⁶ In any event there will be a victor and a loser. North Vietnam will succeed or fail in achieving her goals.⁷


⁴U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, CXII, 442.

⁵U.S., Congressional Record Appendix, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), CXII, 504.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the military aspects of this conflict could be solved.\textsuperscript{1} They did not, however, call for an absolute military resolution of the problem.

Chapter 6

DETERRENCE IN THE 1960’s: LIMITATIONS, FAILURE AND SUCCESS

For a quarter of a century the containment of Communist expansion and the desire to avoid nuclear war between the super powers have been the most conspicuous limiting aspects of United States military responses to Communist aggression.

Two additional factors dating from the Korean war which have also moderated American counteraction options to Communist incursions, have been the willingness of the United States to fight limited wars for limited goals and the inclination of American political leadership to fight such conflicts as it saw fit regardless of domestic political, social and economic repercussions.

These four dominant elements converged in the American commitment in Vietnam. The lack of any one of them would have made the intensive military involvement by the United States in Vietnam highly improbable.

Yet members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1960’s through their public statements concerning nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear deterrence and Vietnam, directly reinforced what have been traditional limitations on the American military.

The major concern of the Joint Chiefs involved the
maintenance of a policy that would guarantee American national security. In line with that policy the standard ploy of containing Communist expansion to safeguard the nation's security found prominence in their statements backing United States' commitment in South Vietnam. However, such an argument failed to convince the American public of the need for such an extensive military counteraction.

Any gain achieved by the temporary halting of Communist ambitions in South Vietnam can in no way match the benefits that would have occurred had the tremendous economic effort used in Vietnam been allocated to the economic, political and military development of more important nations in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Japan.

By publicly supporting a limited war for limited goals, primarily that of achieving a status quo ante bellum position, members of the Joint Chiefs have confirmed and continued that policy. In essence American reaction in Korea and in Vietnam invited the aggressor nation to achieve the traditional military goals of conquering and then absorbing its intended victim, with a de facto guarantee that its own national sovereignty would not be challenged by the United States. The line of action taken by the Joint Chiefs towards the initiator of hostilities caused the aggressor at the very worst severe economic and population losses.

Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their civilian
superiors sought to avoid a nuclear armageddon. Such a pragmatic policy came from the exigency of avoiding the use of the continental United States as a battlefield in any type of world war. This policy caused the United States to limit its military action in Vietnam. It also raised the question of why Communist powers could act in such a bellicose fashion with what seemed to be far less dread of precipitating a nuclear war, and not the United States? In essence the answer is the status quo outlook which has guided United States' military reactions from the mid-1940's to the 1970's.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree entirely on the way the war in Vietnam was being fought, they did for the most part accept the need to support their superiors' policy. Individual Chiefs in effect acted as mouthpieces of administration military policy for Vietnam.

The unpopularity of the Vietnam war in the latter part of the 1960's had the Joint Chiefs members placing their superiors' policy before the American public in quest of its support. Such support did not materialize especially in the last three years of that decade. The expressed limitations placed on the war did not satisfy the Hawks, while the Doves were dissatisfied by what they considered over-involvement by the United States.

The belief that limited non-nuclear war would more likely come about than nuclear war in the 1960's proved
accurate. Such vindication of the Joint Chiefs' views was no doubt of small condolence to the American families that have suffered in any number of ways because of the Vietnam conflict.

In part the Joint Chiefs' of Staff concepts on nuclear war and non-nuclear war deterrence policy also helped pave the way for the American military effort in South Vietnam. The United States nuclear arms capability based on the need for strategic nuclear superiority played a major role in the size of the American effort in Vietnam. United States forces would not have entered Vietnam in such large numbers without the protection of the "nuclear umbrella". This strategic nuclear power also kept the war limited.

In the 1960's the Joint Chiefs also acknowledged the need to adopt a policy of flexible response in thought and in deed. The very acceptance of limited war and preparation to fight non-nuclear conflicts made American involvement in Vietnam much more likely than it would have otherwise been. Without such a consensus by the executive office and Joint Chiefs of Staff, American involvement in Vietnam would have been nil, and the impact of that war would have been far less on the American political and social scene.

The policy of deterrence by limited war advanced by the Joint Chiefs did not achieve all of its goals. However, although the initial objective of preventing limited war, especially that of the level reached in Vietnam failed, the
flexible response ability of the United States had prevented successful Communist aggression in South Vietnam up to August 1972.

Conveniently overlooked by the critics of American participation in Vietnam has been the far more important, although less spectacular success of the Joint Chiefs' policy which prevented nuclear war in the 1960's. The loss of American lives and waste of American economic energy in the Vietnam war can by no means compare with the slaughter of human lives and the insurmountable physical damage that would have occurred in the United States had a nuclear war been unleashed.

If the military is to be condemned for fighting a war in Vietnam under limitations imposed by civilian superiors and accepted by the Joint Chiefs it should be given recognition for the successful policy of avoiding nuclear war.

For the remainder of the 20th century, United States' deterrence policy will continue to be limited by the American desire to prevent nuclear war, to stop Communist expansion and to fight limited wars for limited goals. Also, despite the growing difficulty to do so, American leadership will continue to fight conventional wars as it sees fit.

Less uncertain will be the degree of cooperation and support by individual Chiefs in advocating unpopular, unwanted or unneeded direction of military policy from civilian bosses.
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