AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF CHARLES DE GAULLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENT

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF CHARLES DE GAULLE IN THE
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

About a year has passed since the resignation of one of the most imposing political figures of the Twentieth Century--Charles de Gaulle. Twice--during World War II and again during the late 1950s--he came to "deliver" his country from the crises of defeat in war and rebellion in Algeria. His impact on France and indeed on the world during a period spanning nearly three decades has been undeniably considerable. De Gaulle not only has been a wartime military leader, but was an important military theoretician as well, whose views on modern armored warfare were ignored prior to World War II by fellow officers only to the detriment of France. While apparently little of a sentimentalist in most areas, he used the most emotional words and phrases where his country was concerned. Indeed, his command of the French language was superior, and his war memoirs, some believe, will live as among the finest examples of Twentieth Century French writing. His concern was with France, but de Gaulle's international policies during his tenure as French president evoked storms of rage throughout many parts of the Western world, particularly for his alleged efforts toward further Western European integration.

This paper is written in an effort to assess that
latter topic, the role of General de Gaulle relative to post-World War II efforts at "unifying" Europe. The question of de Gaulle's role is an important one, for although European unity has not progressed as far as some proponents of unity have desired, the development of various Western European multi-national institutions has been one of the outstanding political events of the last quarter-century.

If de Gaulle did indeed block efforts toward further European unity, then many questions present themselves. Why did he do so? Did his personal efforts mean that much, or were obstacles to European unity set up more by the condition of France as a state rather than by de Gaulle as an individual? If there is or should be a blame cast for putting up obstacles to further integration, it is fair to point so directly at de Gaulle and France? What has been the attitude of the other five members of the present European Community that has been developed? And what has been the attitude of states outside of this community, especially the United States and Great Britain? Finally, if European integration indeed has been blocked, can the integrative process be stepped up again in the absence of de Gaulle? Or have chances for unification been missed which are irretrievable?

These questions will be pursued in the course of this paper, but one initial opinion can be advanced: De Gaulle
did indeed block the vision of European unity that some had advanced; but some of his actions, as blunt as they were, saved what had been constructed and allowed the possibility of growth in the future. De Gaulle indeed was the force that kept Britain out of the European Economic Community in 1963 and thereafter, but his 1963 action undoubtedly has helped the E.E.C. achieve what strength it has today because British entry at that time probably would have served to weaken the community. Essentially, the thesis of this paper is that Charles de Gaulle acted as a supreme French nationalist in his actions and attitudes toward the European unification movement. While holding stiff attitudes against such things as "supranational" institutions and loss of sovereignty, he, however, has forced other Western European states to carefully consider just what it was they were building and how they could make it last. In that sense—while not perhaps a builder of European unification—de Gaulle was not the wrecker that some would have him be.

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem of assessing the role of General de Gaulle in the European unity movement is made more difficult because the unification question crosses so many lines. Unity implies different things to different people, as will be shown later, and the problem thus becomes involved in
political and military considerations of cooperation as well as economic integration, the area where the most has been accomplished so far.

In other words, European unity must be viewed in the light of many events and trends of the post-World War II era. Among the topics and institutions that become enmeshed in any discussion of the integration movement are the cold war; the economic, military and political ties of the United States to Western Europe; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the division of Germany, and nuclear weapons.

Another difficulty in assessing the role of de Gaulle and France in the European movement relates not only to the past "grandeur" of France—which indeed has been a factor in the entire problem—but the differing conditions of the states that the unity-minded would have integrate. For example, France is one of the largest Western European states and was among the victorious allies of the Second World War. But her partners in the European Economic Community, or Common Market, although sharing European status, are, of course, different from France. The Benelux countries of the E.E.C.—Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg—are small states that may be close to the model when statesmen and political scientists talk of the "anachronistic" nation-state; Germany and Italy were defeated in World War II; further, Germany remains divided, and Italy doesn't have
the industrial potential of either France or Germany.

The main outsider—which in the past few years has been looking in—is Great Britain, which isn't on the continent of Europe, which has had close ties with its Commonwealth, which refused to join in early efforts to set up European multi-state institutions.

Against these factors then comes the figure of de Gaulle, whose style of politics has been viewed by some as enigmatic, confusing and changeable. Simply stated, assessment of the problem raises difficult questions.

II. SOURCES, METHOD AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

Sources. Main primary sources were the words of General de Gaulle himself, especially in his World War II memoirs and in his speeches, messages and press conference statements while French president. The importance of de Gaulle's words themselves are two-fold: First, it is this writer's contention that de Gaulle was clear in what he said; he did not intend to confuse or to be obscure. A change in tactics might indicate to some a previous intention to confuse, but it is this writer's contention rather that where de Gaulle did change his position, it was for what he saw as a practical reason rather than an intention to obfuscate. Second, de Gaulle used the forum of the press conference to in effect act, to carry out governmental deci-
cisions. Notable is his January, 1963 press conference in which he "vetoed" British admission into the Common Market. De Gaulle also outlined his major policy premises in these press conferences and other messages. Additionally, the memoirs are valuable in acquiring an insight into the background of de Gaulle, his attitudes toward building Europe and the World War II squabbles he had with his British and American allies which undoubtedly have had some effect in his attitudes toward those states insofar as European integration has been concerned.

Other primary sources consulted again consisted of the words of statesmen of other European states, specifically Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt of West Germany and several of the current political leaders of Great Britain. These have been acquired from several books, periodicals and the official publication of the European Communities, the latter a valuable source for the 1968-69 period especially. The events of 1969--de Gaulle's resignation, the election of George Pompidou as French president, the so-called Soames affair--were studied largely through the pages of the New York Times.

Among major secondary sources valuable in the study were works relating to the history of the European unity movement, over-all views of the Common Market, and studies dealing with French foreign policy under de Gaulle and bio-
graphical works on de Gaulle. Several collections of articles and essays on the general topic of regionalism or integration were consulted as well as numerous periodical articles relevant to the topic.

**Method.** The method of study was undertaken with a view toward both analyzing new steps taken toward regional government in Western Europe and the particular role of one man, in one country, and his role in influencing the movement.

Initially necessary was a determination of the degree of regional co-operation and the extent of unification measures taken and the extent to which such steps differed from earlier forms of international co-operation. Some consider the steps taken toward integration and unification in Western Europe as highly significant and pointing toward an entirely new form of political association—going beyond earlier customs unions, military-type alliances or regional politically oriented associations.

Thus an initial step in this study was to delve into the historical aspects of the European unity movement to acquire an overview of the nature of integration, past concepts of European unity and the steps taken thus far. The main intent of this study, however, was not to give a detailed analysis of all aspects of the Western European unification movement, but rather to determine the influence
of one man, Charles de Gaulle. Thus, the basic emphasis in the study was put into determining to what extent de Gaulle's actions and style influenced the overall topic. The point that had to be kept in mind during the study was that indeed General de Gaulle was a major figure in whatever it was that was happening in European unification over a period of years. But it also had to be remembered that what de Gaulle was doing needed to be analyzed as to content as well as to style and with a view toward determining the effect in longer—as well as short-term affects. Some early analyses of certain de Gaulle actions seem to have been short-sighted, based too much on how he said things rather than on what he said.

Thus after acquiring this overview of integration in Western Europe, the next step was to turn to the actions of de Gaulle. Basic emphasis was put into studying his official statements, messages and press conference remarks, as well as his war-time memoirs. And after that, it was necessary to compare what de Gaulle said with what has taken place in the area of European unification. Accounts of activities in the area of European integration, various interpretations of de Gaulle policy and integration were consulted as well as continuing statements about where unification stood and where it should be going. This methodology then was used to obtain a conclusion about the de
Gaulle role in the unification movement and the direction in which the movement may go with his departure from government.

Essentially then, the method involved a collection of data, reflection on the data and an attempt to resolve apparent contradictions, and a final judgement based on the series of conclusions determined.

**Organization of the study.** In presenting this study, after an overview of the problem, it was decided that initially it was necessary to review past concepts of what a united Europe could or should be, since it is important to understand that a united Europe means different things in the eyes of different people. It also was felt necessary to give some extensive discussion on what meaning the words "integration" and "supra-nationality" have.

It was decided then to proceed in a somewhat chronological fashion to trace the background of de Gaulle including his ascendancy to power in World War II and his period of service as premier and president in 1958-69. Since early 1963 seems to be a watershed point in the history of European integration—with the Franco-German treaty of co-operation and the de Gaulle "veto" of British Common Market membership coming at that time—it was decided to separate the chronology roughly into what transpired before and after
that date.

A next section delves into various views on de Gaulle held by statesmen and social scientists and a view of the question of nationalism—as practiced by de Gaulle, as interpreted by French political parties, as practiced in other parts of Europe. Also discussed here are some of the de Gaulle policies employed vis-à-vis other states as well as the true challenge American industry presents to European integrationists and nationalists alike. A look also is taken at the possible future steps in European integration in the absence of de Gaulle.

Finally, in the summary and conclusions, a general assessment of de Gaulle and the integration question is given.

III. CONCEPTS OF A UNITED EUROPE

Ideas of Western European unity can be traced back for centuries; and although it may not be relevant to go as far as one might, to Dante or even beyond, it is correct to say that the issue always has been complex. But the essential reasons have remained about a half-dozen: The preservation of peace, the need for a common defense, the ambition to act as a stronger power bloc, the conservation of a common European culture, the wish to create greater material
well-being, the freeing of restrictions on trade.¹

So, while concepts of a united Europe have roots far back into history, essentially what has come to pass as true steps toward some kind of unity have been taken after World War II. The countries of Europe, battered after a devastating war, recognizing their military and economic weakness, were more open to suggestions of unification than they perhaps ever had been before. One post-war spark came from Winston Churchill, on September 19, 1946, while then leader of the Opposition in Britain. In a speech at the University of Zurich, he proposed making Europe as free and happy as Switzerland by recreating "a kind of United States of Europe."² And during the next year, in December, 1947, a number of organizations came together to set up a Congress of Europe which met at the Hague in May, 1948. The congress had 713 delegates from 16 countries and agreed on instituting an assembly of representatives of European parliaments, a European charter of human rights, a European court, an economic union, and the inclusion of Germany into a European community.³ Then in 1950 came the plan for a common market in coal and steel proposed by Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister. It proved to be a highly significant sug-

²Ibid., pp. 11-12.
³Ibid.
gestion and has led to the development of much that has fol-
lowed in Western European integration. More must be men-
tioned of the coal and steel community later, but there is a
further need here to attempt to define—or at least give
some of the varying ideas on—what a united Europe should
be. As Ernst B. Haas has said, "United Europe" is a phrase
meaning many things to many men. To some, it implies the
creating of a full-fledged federation of the states of
Western Europe, either the "Six" of the present E.E.C., or
the many more members of the Council of Europe. To others,
the phrase means no more than the desirability of creating a
loose concert or confederation. Some see in it the death of
cherished patterns of national uniqueness. ¹

While many European politicians—and certainly
Charles de Gaulle—have looked upon some sort of merger of
European nations from a practical analysis of political,
economic and military factors, it seems true that European-
ism in the post-war years became an "idée-force" which
appealed to sentiment as well as to reason. The idea
appealed to the desire of belonging to a powerful political
entity and to the wish to bury old conflicts as well as to

¹Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford,
the desire for economic and material well-being.¹

The nature of integration. How, then, can one define "unity" or "integration," terms used often in the discussion of Western European co-operative ventures? In 1957, C. Grove Haines posed a number of questions about the meaning of "integration" and then provided some of the answers. Does integration mean the dissolution of the separate sovereign states of Europe to be replaced by a single sovereign state? No, Haines answered his own question, no one has proposed this or is likely to do so. Or would it mean formation of some type of federal union, modeled after the United States or Switzerland, "where certain powers are delegated to the federal authority while the remainder are reserved to the individual members?" This, he said, may be more desirable and practicable, but there are formidable obstacles, and neither the U.S. or Swiss examples are wholly relevant, "given the common culture and tradition in the first case and the accidents of geography and historical circumstances in the second." Then Haines asks if integration does not mean something less ambitious than the former examples, and responds that the indications of the previous decade (he was speaking of 1947-57 although the comment

seems still valid today) are that integration has tended to be identified with more limited measures. Finally, he points out, obviously there is no commonly accepted definition for integration, although, "also obviously," it has definite political implications for most of those who use the word.¹

Haas takes this notion of political implications and comes up with this definition of political integration:

The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. . . The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.²

Ben T. Moore says that a group becomes more closely integrated as it moves toward the following goals:

1. A common strategy and military establishments, including nuclear weapons, ready to cope with threats to its security whether such threats are aimed directly at the group or arise outside it. . .
2. A common market including free movement of capital, technology, and people. . .
3. A common foreign policy supported by both the military establishment and the integrated economy. . .
4. Democratic arrangements for making the necessary decisions. . .³

²Haas, op. cit., p. 16.
The nature of supranationality. If definitions of "integration" and "United Europe" are hard to pin down, there is another word in common use in discussions of the integration movement whose definition perhaps is clearer but whose implications are controversial. That is "supranationality," and Haas again is valuable to turn to for a balanced idea of what the term means. Haas wrote that General de Gaulle equated supranationality with a "federalism" which de Gaulle detested, while Jean Monnet identified the term with a federalism of which Monnet is a leading partisan, being considered the father of the system of regional government developed in the Community of the Six. However, said Haas, both men mistake the essence of the phenomenon. The essence of supranationality is in the tendency for economic and social decisions to "spill over" into the realm of the political, "to arise from and further influence the political aspirations of the major groupings and parties in democratic societies." The supranational style stresses the indirect "penetration" of the political by way of the economic because "purely" economic decisions always acquire political significance in the minds of the participants. In short, the kind of economics and social questions here dealt with are "those at the very core of the modern welfare
In the more specific realm of considering supranationality in reference to the institutions of the Six, Jean Ray, president of the Commission of the European Communities (the E.E.C., the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom), told a December, 1968 press conference that the word "is meant to specify the existence of a certain number of powers that have been vested in the Community institutions." The term, he said, does not imply any idea of superiority. Further, Ray added, the powers vested in the institutions which he mentioned could not be dispensed with "without injury to the very substance of the Community."  

Further uses of the term, especially a more thorough analysis of General de Gaulle's view, will be given later.

IV. THE BACKGROUND OF DE GAULLE

It is now necessary to concentrate more directly on Charles de Gaulle and to begin by mentioning some aspects of his background which have had a bearing on the view of integration he held while French president. De Gaulle was born


in French Flanders, in Lille, in 1890. His parents and grandparents have been described as "teachers, philosophers and historians -- deeply patriotic, puritanically Catholic, and strongly intellectual."¹

De Gaulle himself, in his war memoirs, tells his readers that his father was "a thoughtful, cultivated, traditional man, imbued with a feeling for the dignity of France. He made me aware of her history." His mother, de Gaulle adds, "had an uncompromising passion for her country, equal to her religious piety."²

In the early pages of his memoirs, de Gaulle provides the reader with a striking description of his thoughts about his country which in capsule form provides a key for understanding his attitudes toward the entire range of his policy and actions in later years. De Gaulle wrote:

All my life I have thought of France in a certain way. This is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason. The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. Instinctively I have the feeling that Providence has created her either for complete success or for exemplary misfortunes. If, in spite of this, mediocrity shows in her acts and deeds, it strikes me as an absurd anomaly, to be imputed to the faults of Frenchmen, not to the genius of the land. But the positive

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side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless in the front rank. . . In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness.¹

De Gaulle, of course, was a military man, who attended the officers' training academy of Saint-Cyr. Wounded three times in World War I, captured at Verdun and a prisoner for two years, he turned to military theory after the war, teaching tactics and military history. During the period between the two world wars, de Gaulle also served on the staff of Marshal Pétain at the Superior War Council, served periods of active duty in Germany and at Beirut, later becoming secretary of the Superior Council of National Defense. During that period, of 1932-36, he published two well-known books on military topics: The Edge of the Sword (Le Fil de l'épée) and Toward a Career Army (Vers l'armée de métier).

In June, 1940, after the start of World War II, de Gaulle was brought into Paul Reynaud's cabinet as under-secretary of war, a position he held only 11 days. After de Gaulle had learned Reynaud had resigned and the new premier, Pétain, wanted to seek an armistice with the Germans, he decided to leave France and create a center of French resistance in London. This decision to break with Pétain "was

¹De Gaulle, op. cit., p. 3.
the turning point in his life."¹

By the time of the D-Day invasion of Europe, de Gaulle had an army of 250,000 men and was recognized as its head by the Resistance in France. On August 25, 1944, he strode triumphantly down the Champs Elysées of a liberated Paris and for the next 18 months continued to govern France through a coalition. But on January 20, 1946, annoyed with the political parties' preparation of a constitution for the Fourth Republic "which seemed to de Gaulle to perpetuate the governmental weakness of the Third," he resigned and went into self-imposed exile.² In between that time and the time of his investiture as premier in 1958 during the crisis in Algeria, de Gaulle was involved in the creation of the Rally of the French People (R.P.F.) and the writing of his memoirs. As matters turned out, de Gaulle, after taking control of France's destiny again in 1958, was able to end the Algerian war in four years, rule for a consecutive period of almost 11 years, and make a deep impression on the course of events not only in France but throughout Europe and, indeed, the world.

V. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BEFORE 1958

What really can be considered as Europe's first supranational body was the European Coal and Steel Community.

¹Willis, op. cit., p. 4. ²Ibid., p. 5.
proposed in 1950, by Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, a plan actually formulated by Jean Monnet from his position as head of the French Planning Commission. The French support for a common market for coal and steel seemed to be based largely on the idea of containing Germany, or at least substituting interdependence for national antagonisms. The French also looked on the creation of some form of union as a first step toward some type of superstate in which France—perhaps together with England—would predominate. Coal and steel were chosen partly because they were industries symbolizing the struggle between France and Germany and were the foundations of armaments and military power, and partly because they formed an economic base which would be enlarged to include other industries. The Coal and Steel Community bore the mark of supranationality in that it created a High Authority composed of members appointed by their respective governments but expected to act independently of national institutions. Britain, however, refused to participate, and Monnet reluctantly decided to go ahead without the English. On April 18, 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg—the nation-states to become known as the Six—and on July 25, 1952, the E.C.S.C. came into exist-

1Curtis, op. cit., p. 16.  
2Ibid., pp. 16-17.
The European Defense Community. In the meantime, European governments also were discussing, at the height of the cold war, a common defense effort, and a treaty to establish a European Defense Community (E.D.C.) was signed in May, 1952. This time, however, France was reluctant to go along, as most certainly was General de Gaulle. The treaty touched perhaps his most sensitive nerve, national control over the French armed forces. Its integrated European army, which would include French units, was completely unacceptable to him. With the E.D.C., there were a number of parallels to the E.C.S.C., one of the first being that it again grew out of concern for the containment of Germany. But containment of Germany within the E.D.C. also meant German rearmament. To the extreme right and Communists in France, rearmament was not to be tolerated under any circumstances. But perhaps the major opposition in France came from the fact that the British again were holdouts. The opposition arose from the geographical definition of the treaty, which limited it to a narrow continental frame after

1 Ibid., p. 17.
the expressed opposition of Britain to joining it. France at this point, however, still had much of its enthusiasm for wider European unity, but as a counterpoise to the containment of Germany, along with the defeated state's recovery, France wanted the inclusion of Great Britain, a firm commitment from the United States, and the "direct association of the French Empire."  

The European Economic Community. So on August 30, 1954, the French Parliament refused to ratify the E.D.C. treaty. But if there was a mood of pessimism among integrationists over this defeat, it was largely shaken off within a year and the move toward the greatest accomplishment of integration, the European Economic Community, was started. The treaty was drafted with an eye on the failure of the E.D.C., and thus contained a lesser ingredient of supranationality than the Coal and Steel Community. The formal powers of the E.E.C. executive organ were limited, and a corresponding increase was given to the Council of Ministers, in relation to the Treaty of Paris, so as to avoid a rejection of the treaty by France. The challenging words "supranationality" and "High Authority" were avoided deliberately,

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2 Ibid., p. 18.
and the more neutral "commission" substituted. On March 25, 1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed, adding two new institutions—the E.E.C. and the European Atomic Energy Community—to the previous Coal and Steel Community. The two new organs actually went into existence on January 1, 1958—several months before Charles de Gaulle came back into power. The treaties were signed in France despite opposition of the combined Communist, Gaullist and extreme right opposition in Parliament. That the French did approve the treaties was due to a spirit of compromise of the positions taken by the Six during the negotiations. France had wanted integration in a number of sectors rather than the general community that was produced, but did obtain a number of concessions, such as agreements for the marketing of agricultural products and escape clauses that would allow her to continue subsidizing exports for a time.

The European Free Trade Association. Britain, of course, did not seek to join the E.E.C. With the formulation of the new organization of the Six, other countries of Europe sought to form an organization concerned exclusively with the liberalization of industrial trade and with no political objectives—which clearly were a part of the Treaty of Rome. They wished to increase trade with one

1 Curtis, op. cit., p. 21. 2 Ibid.
another and strengthen their individual and collective positions in relation to the new E.E.C. In 1959, representatives of seven states--Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland--met and within eight weeks agreed on establishing the European Free Trade Association, or E.F.T.A. Now it was the Europe of the Seven confronting the Europe of the Six.

The E.F.T.A. was built on principles agreeable to Britain--the progressive lowering of mutual tariffs on industrial goods, no reference to agricultural products, no agreement concerning the tariffs applicable to trading with third countries, and the rule of unanimity. It was to have been a tool of pressure on the Six to eventually obtain concessions for the British access to the Common Market on terms more to British liking. But this move failed. Among the weaknesses of the association was the fact that Britain dominated it--by representing half the economic power of the Seven as measured in the gross national product and the size of external trade.

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1 Ibid., p. 24.
2 Kulski, op. cit., p. 236.  
3 Ibid.
CHAPTER II

DE GAULLE IN POWER--1958-1963

On May 28, 1958, French President René Coty announced that Charles de Gaulle had been asked to form a government. On June 1, by a 329 to 224 vote of the National Assembly, the General was invested as premier, and given power to govern by decree for six months and prepare a new constitution for popular ratification.

I. THE DIRECTORATE

De Gaulle's most pressing concern during those first years after his return to power was the Algerian situation, but he did not confine himself to national and colonial affairs. One of his most important first steps was to seek a "directorrate" of three, including the United States, Britain and France, which would, in his eyes, replace the directorate of two in NATO of the United States and Britain. Roy C. Macridis notes that the de Gaulle memorandum on the matter, dated September 23, 1958, remains technically secret, but a version he lists suggests the establishment of a political and military organization of the U.S., France and Britain which would:

a. Elaborate a common military and political strategy for our planet.
b. Set up for each possible theater of operations allied commands.
c. Decide, when the occasion arose, on the utilization of the weapons of massive destruction. 1

The United States, however, rejected the plan, and thus there probably is some basis for the argument that the anti-NATO, anti-American diplomacy of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic was a substitute for the directorate plan rejected by the United States, jealous of keeping its nuclear trigger unhampered.

On the matter of the Treaties of Rome, de Gaulle promised that he would tear them up after his return to power. 2 But when he did come to power in 1958 he implemented the provisions of the treaties honestly, perhaps hoping to nibble away the supranational elements of the Common Market as the years passed by. 3 There certainly were aspects of the E.E.C. treaty that de Gaulle did not like, including the right of the Commission to submit its own proposals to the Council of Ministers; the plan to allow the Council of Ministers after eight years to make decisions on a number of important matters by a majority vote, and the creation of a European Parliamentary Assembly composed of delegates of national parliaments. 4

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2 Kulski, op. cit., p. 198.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 197.
II. VIEWS ON THE E.E.C. AND EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION

De Gaulle had little to say in his public statements in the 1958-59 period about European unity or the Common Market, however. But after the failure of the summit conference in 1960, President de Gaulle said that France wanted to work toward contributing to the construction of Western Europe into a "political, economic, cultural and human group, organized for action, progress and defense." But, he warned, the nations "which are becoming associated must not cease to be themselves," and the path to be followed "must be that of organized cooperation between states, while waiting to achieve, perhaps, an imposing confederation."¹

De Gaulle then added:

On our old continent, the organization of a western group, at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the east, may one day, without risk to the independence and the freedom of each nation and taking into account the probable evolution of political regimes, establish a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies that would become out-of-date, would again be the heart of civilization. . . . But also, the cohesion of this great and strong European community would lead vast countries in other continents, which are advancing toward power, also to take the way of cooperation, rather than to yield to the temptation of war.²

² Ibid.
The passage above contains some key elements in the thought of de Gaulle. He is stressing a nationalistic point of view in asserting that while states of Europe should co-operate, they must remain independent as well in matters deemed vital to their self-interests. He is speaking as a European, too, as well as a Frenchman, in asserting the historical, cultural and political superiority, in his view, of European civilization. He is saying that such a cooperating organization of states could lead to world peace and stability, mentioning "vast countries in other continents" in a sense forced to cooperate because of the power of the European entity. But, as he said, this would be "an imposing confederation," thus stressing there would be limits on any supranationality of the united body. Not clearly stated, but implied throughout the statement, is that in this most powerful group of states on the face of the earth, France would be one of the major powers.

In September, 1960, de Gaulle then outlined more clearly his thoughts on the role of the organizations of the Six that had been set up by the Treaties of Paris and Rome. First of all, he stated that the states of Europe "are the only entities that have the right to order and the authority to act." He added:

Of course, it is true that, while waiting to come to grips with Europe's problem and tackle it as a whole, it has been possible to institute certain organs that are more or less extranational. These
organs have their technical value, but they do not have, they cannot have authority and, consequently, political effectiveness. As long as nothing serious happens, they function without much difficulty, but as soon as a tragic situation appears, a major problem to be solved, it can then be seen that one "High Authority" or another has no authority over the various national categories and that only the States have it...

Once again, it is quite natural that the States of Europe have at their disposal specialized organs for the problems that they have in common, in order to help formulate and, if need be, follow up their decisions; but the right to take these decisions is theirs alone.1

Thus de Gaulle here relegates organizations such as the Coal and Steel High Authority or the E.E.C. Commission to a role of technical experts, who can help the governments of the states prepare decisions and later help implement them.

II. THE FOUCHET PLAN

In 1961, de Gaulle expanded his ideas on the political organization of Europe in what was known as the Fouchet Plan, a plan which was aborted. It is clear that de Gaulle neither wanted nor believed Europe was ready to form into one supranational community. The plan was built on the basis of existing states and focused on intergovernmental rather than supranational mechanisms.

What de Gaulle had proposed was to bring together, at regular intervals, the heads of European states on a consul-

1Ibid., p. 93.
tation basis and he suggested a European referendum to get the idea of cooperation accepted by the people of the various states. Then a commission of experts would prepare the proposals submitted to the conference of the chiefs of state. He also envisioned a European parliamentary assembly of the three organizations of the Six. While these suggestions might have been accepted by the Six, writes Robert Aron, de Gaulle in 1952 made "an abrupt and very definite volte-face." He cut down the part that would be played by the three existing organizations, as well as that of the proposed parliamentary assembly, "denying it any powers of action."\(^1\)

In a press conference on May 15, 1962, General de Gaulle made some pointed comments on the Pouchet Plan and the political organization of Europe. While giving a minimal sort of compliment to the work done to that point by the E.E.C., de Gaulle said that in the French view, "this economic construction is not enough." Western Europe must form itself politically. Europe must have institutions that will lead it to form a political union, just as it "already is a union in the economic sphere." It is the states that give the Common Market reality and efficiency, "all the more so as it is impossible to take any far-reaching economic mea-

sure without committing a political action."¹ Thus, said de Gaulle:

It is a political action, when tariffs are dealt with in common, when coal-mining areas are converted, when wages and social welfare funds are made the same in the six States, when each State allows workers from the other five States to settle on its territory, when decrees are consequently taken and when Parliament is asked to vote necessary laws, funds and sanctions. It is a political action when agriculture is included in the Common Market. . . . It is a political action when one negotiates with Great Britain on the request that it has made to enter the Common Market.²

But during the same press conference, he rejected merging the six states into a "supranational entity," and the election of a "so-called" European parliament, which would "lay down the law for the six States." In this "integrated Europe," there would "perhaps be no policy at all." But, then, perhaps "this world would follow the lead of some outsider who did have a policy." There would perhaps be a federator, he said, "but the federator would not be European," and here the General is thinking about the United States.³

Thus it seems that de Gaulle, after a few seeming concessions to a federal system, returned to his own ideas of a confederation, and with the idea of French hegemony

³Ibid.
backing it up. And while dramatically stressing the need for a Western European political union in his 1962 statement, the proposal was given less and less attention in future statements and by 1964 was only being given passing mention.

But despite his professed dislike of supranational institutions, on May 20, 1962, only five days after his press conference, he disclosed the reason why he could accept the Common Market despite its supranational aspects: "We have created an economic community among several countries of Western Europe, which is beginning to bear fruit, and which will be, I believe, especially to France's advantage." Otherwise, he declared matter-of-factly, "we would not have joined it." ¹

IV. THE VIEWS OF BRITAIN

While the Common Market was achieving successes on the continent, politicians in Great Britain were taking a new look at the E.E.C. and at their own position in E.F.T.A., as head of the Commonwealth and in relation to the power of the United States and Soviet Union. On August 2, 1961, Harold Macmillan arose in the House of Commons to make formal application to join the E.E.C., marking, as Drew

¹Aron, op. cit., p. 190.
Middleton put it, a farewell to the "proud independence" that once was England's. Macmillan's speech was above all an admission of Britain's inability to maintain independent economic, military and political strength even faintly commensurate with that of the United States or Soviet Union. It indicated Britain's willingness to seek in a time of peace that kind of alliance it frequently resorted to in war and just as frequently abandoned once the war was won. The people of Britain, Middleton said, "were embarking on a course that ran contrary to some of their deepest convictions and most abiding traditions."  

Britain had declined an invitation to join the Coal and Steel Community, and had refused to participate in the negotiations for the Common Market. It was a matter of history that England was opposed to unification of the European continent, and had fought wars to prevent it. But in the early 1960s it was a different question; Britain found herself in a different position in strength vis-à-vis the continental states, and the challenge came not in a military sense, but in an economic one from a group of states that had voluntarily associated to accomplish certain goals. There was relative stagnation in the British economy while

2Ibid., pp. 3-5.
the Six were booming. The Commonwealth was becoming a less significant part of British commerce. The Empire was being liquidated. In addition, there were British supporters of entry into the E.E.C. who cited political grounds as a reason to seek Common Market membership.¹

So negotiations began in October, 1961, with Ireland and Denmark following the British example. The negotiations were suspended in August, 1962, resumed in September, 1962, and then terminated abruptly in January, 1963. Charles de Gaulle had "vetoed" British membership, had drummed Britain out of the E.E.C. even before it could enter.

V. THE VETO OF BRITAIN

As was customary, de Gaulle used a press conference on January 14, 1963, to make his statement. He spoke at length, first pointing to the "real factors of the problem." The members of the E.E.C. "had many more similarities than differences between them." The Six all were continental states, linked together physically, as well as in social progress and technological capability, where they were "moving forward at more or less the same pace." Among them there existed "no kind of political grievance, no border disputes, no rivalry for domination or power." On the con-

¹Curtis, Western European Integration, p. 25.
try, there was a "feeling of solidarity between them," owing to the awareness they had of "together possessing an important part of the origins of our civilization, and also with regard to their security."¹

While it thus was psychologically and materially possible to organize an economic community of the Six, this was not without difficulty. De Gaulle cited especially the problem of agriculture. Also, Britain sought entry, but "on its own conditions." This raised for each of the six states and for England problems of a very great dimension, de Gaulle said, adding:

England is, in effect, maritime, insular, linked through its trade, markets and food supply to very diverse and often very distant countries. Its activities are essentially industrial and commercial, and only slightly agricultural. It has, throughout its work, very marked and original customs and traditions. In short, the nature, structure and economic context of England differ profoundly from those of the other States of the Continent.²

One was sometimes led to believe that the British, in applying for membership in the Common Market, agreed to "change their own ways even to the point of applying all the conditions accepted and practiced by the Six," he said, but added:

... the question is to know if Great Britain can at present place itself, with the Continent and like it, within a tariff that is truly common, give up all

¹De Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-64, p. 212.
²Ibid., p. 213.
preference with regard to the Commonwealth, cease to claim that its agriculture be privileged and, even more, consider as null and void the commitments it has made with the countries that are part of its free trade area. That question is the one at issue.¹

The entry into the Common Market first of Great Britain and then of other countries of the E.F.T.A. would completely change the series of adjustments, agreements and regulations established among the six, and "we then would have to envisage the construction of another Common Market." But this 11-member or 13-member or 18-member Common Market to be built would, without any doubt, "hardly resemble the one the Six have built." It is foreseeable that the cohesion of its members, "who would be very numerous and very diverse," would not hold for long and that in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community "under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community."²

That is an assumption that can be "perfectly justified in the eyes of some, but it is not at all what France wanted to do and what France is doing, which is a strictly European construction."³

So de Gaulle is saying that Britain could not enter the Common Market until she could establish her freedom from

¹Ibid., p. 214. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 215.
the United States, from the E.F.T.A., from the Commonwealth system of economic preference and until she had revised and revived her economy to fit into the Common Market. He is saying that Britain does not accept the concept of economic unity in the E.E.C., but rather sees it as a free trade area; even if Britain accepted the Community, or the Community accepted Britain, in present form, she would obstruct further progress within it. Britain would prevent Europe from drawing closer together, toward further unity. Whatever unity de Gaulle wanted in Europe, he did not believe "that this union could retain its cohesion if it were linked closely with Britain, a nation with global interests in its Commonwealth and its remaining colonies."¹

The view presented of de Gaulle's action by two German federalists, Ernst Friedlaender and Katharina Focke, was that de Gaulle at his press conference "showed his true self as never before." In contradiction to the obvious facts, they said, he described the negotiations with Britain as having no chance of success. De Gaulle closed the door on the British because "he can only maintain the French claim to leadership in the absence of Britain." Only without Britain and against the United States "can he pursue his

policy of a third force in world politics."¹ Since new mem-
bers of the E.E.C., according to the Treaty of Rome, could
be admitted only by the unanimous vote of the original mem-
bers, there was no possibility of setting aside what had
been in effect a veto by de Gaulle.

Why did de Gaulle use the forum of a press conference
to make his decision on Britain known? Alfred Grosser
believes that for the General it must have seemed that the
success of the negotiations was inevitable, and that only
"some dramatic act or utterance could torpedo them." A
second reason he lists, although not to the complete exclu-
sion of the first, is that perhaps de Gaulle maneuvered, "as
would a good strategist," with no trace of sentiment. "As
there can be no Europe without France, the five, disappointed
and rebellious though they may be," would face the alterna-
tive of continuing its development.² And, it might be
added, of continuing its development in a manner consistent
with French desires. As de Gaulle knew and had said earlier,
France needed the E.E.C., so he was taking a risk in what he
did. But as he also knew the interest of the other five

¹Katherina Focke and Ernst Friedlaender, "One Man
Against Europe," De Gaulle: Anachronism, Realist, or
89.

²Alfred Grosser, "Positive Aspects of Foreign Policy,"
De Gaulle: Anachronism, Realist, or Prophet? (New York:
members was in the continuing development of the E.E.C., they would accept the situation. As Grosser put it, the rejection of British entry was considered an offense by France's European partners "much less because of the substance than because of the diplomatic procedure utilized. Members of a community do not behave in such a fashion."  

VI. MEETING IN THE BAHAMAS

But the story of rejection of British membership by de Gaulle must go farther, namely to the December, 1962, meeting in the Bahamas of Britain's Harold Macmillan and American President John Kennedy. The set of circumstances which evolved here probably led to the de Gaulle decision to veto Britain as much or more than any purely economic reasons. The Americans had canceled the Skybolt missile program and the British decided to abandon the construction of delivery instruments and agreed to place their own nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO, accepting American Polaris missiles instead.

De Gaulle, at his press conference, interpreted the agreement this way: It is a question of constituting a "so-called multilateral atomic force," in which Britain "would turn over the weapons it has and will have and in
which the Americans would place a few of its own." This multilateral force would be assigned to the defense of Europe and would be under the American NATO command but it was nevertheless understood that the British retain the possibility of withdrawing their atomic weapons for their own use should "supreme national interest seem to them to demand it." Further, the bulk of the American nuclear force would remain outside the multilateral force, under the direct command of the American president. The British would be able to obtain the submarine-launched Polaris from America.¹ De Gaulle then told the news conference:

France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was conceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it. It truly would not be useful for us to buy Polaris missiles when we have neither the submarines to launch them nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm them. Doubtless the day will come when we will have these submarines and these warheads. But that day will be long in coming... When we will one day have these submarines and these warheads, what will the Polaris missiles then be worth? At that time we will probably have missiles of our own invention. In other words, for us, in terms of technology, this affair is not the question of the moment.

But also, it does not meet with the principle about which I just spoke and which consists of disposing in our own right of our deterrent force. To turn over our weapons to a multilateral force, under a foreign command, would be to act contrary to that principle of our defense and our policy... .

In sum, we will adhere to the decision we have made: to construct, and if necessary, to employ

our atomic forces ourselves.\footnote{Ibid., p. 219.}

To de Gaulle, the Nassau proposal was designed to deprive Britain and France of their independent national defense, and as for France, he would have nothing to do with the idea, which would give the U.S. "the possibility of seizing the French atomic forces."\footnote{Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 127.} And if the British should follow the American proposal, it would be in de Gaulle's eyes an acceptance of American supremacy. Thus Britain would be the American Trojan horse and would have to be kept out of the Common Market.

Grosser saw the Kennedy proposal as an improvisation, in order that Macmillan wouldn't depart empty-handed from the Bahamas meeting. Although it was really an improvisation, it was presented as a very important accomplishment, and therefore de Gaulle concluded that so important a proposal could not have been improvised and that in fact Macmillan had known about it when he and de Gaulle had met earlier in December, 1962. Macmillan, in de Gaulle's view, must have known that "not only would he not give the British atomic force as a dowry to Europe," but that American control over the British force would be increased.\footnote{Grosser in De Gaulle: Anachronism, Realist or Prophet?, pp. 88-89.} In effect,
the Bahamas meeting marked an important date in de Gaulle's foreign policy, in regard to integration of Europe and other matters. It undoubtedly made him more suspect of Britain and of the United States, and tended to free him more to disregard their policies and interests. W. W. Kulski saw a trio of reasons why de Gaulle was miffed by the whole U.S.-British scheme. First, the plan was not acceptable because of his fundamental desire to keep French defense independent and the American plan of nuclear hegemony disregarded his 1958 triumvirate or directorate plan mentioned earlier; second, "no government likes particularly to be told by two other governments that they offer it a bargain on which it had not been consulted and which affects its vital interests"; and besides, de Gaulle was offended by not being invited to the conference in the first place. The whole situation must have brought back to de Gaulle unpleasant memories of the treatment he believed unfair that he received at the hands of the "Anglo-Saxons" during World War II and about which more will be said later.

De Gaulle was not soon to forget the episode. It was at another press conference, on October 26, 1966, when he was again asked about the possibility of British entry that he recalled the Bahamas proposal while defending himself

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1Kulski, *De Gaulle and the World*, pp. 141-142.
against accusations that he had blocked European unity. On the contrary, he argued. Mentioning not only "the untiring contribution of our Ministers and our experts in building the edifice" of the Common Market, he also stressed "that on numerous occasions, it was thanks to the clearness and the firmness of our authorities' action that the undertaking did not stray off into blind alleys." De Gaulle added:

Thus, in 1963, we were led to put an end to the negotiations that Britain opened in Brussels with a view to entering the organization; not, to be sure, that we despaired of ever seeing that great island people truly wed its destiny to that of the continent, but the fact is that it was not then in a position to apply the common rules and that it had just, in Nassau, sworn an allegiance outside of a Europe that would be a real Europe. Now, by continuing fruitlessly, these negotiations were actually preventing the Six from building their community.1

VII. THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY

At any rate, the thunderbolts de Gaulle hurled from the Elysée Palace at the beginning of 1963 marked a new era of independence, or intransigence, for France and de Gaulle. It is a convenient division point in tracing his career as French president. But perhaps one other event should be briefly described before looking into the latter six years of his presidency. That event was the conclusion of a

"common declaration and treaty" between France and the Federal Republic of Germany on January 22, 1963. De Gaulle had set the stage in that same January 14 press conference when he noted that for the "first time in many generations, the Germans and Gauls realize their solidarity." This solidarity exists from the standpoint of their security, from an economic standpoint, from the standpoint of cultural influence and development. Referring to the upcoming meeting of de Gaulle, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and other French and German officials, de Gaulle said:

The French-German meeting that will shortly be held here will permit us, we most sincerely hope, to organize our cooperation better than it is organized already. It goes without saying that there is nothing there that either resembles or tends toward the building up between Germany and France of some kind of exclusive community. The two countries have decided and are committed to being an integral part of Europe, such as it is built on the basis of the Rome Treaty. Moreover, it is absolutely impossible to see how the more effective rapprochement between the French and German peoples would in any way whatsoever harm the fraternity of Italy and France, a fraternity that is two thousand years old and which is today more alive than ever, or harm the close links that the centuries have forged between us and Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.²

In fact, the French president concluded that by tightening their co-operation, Germany and France would be setting an example that may be useful to the co-operation of everyone.

¹De Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-1964, p. 221.
²Ibid.
The treaty itself called for periodic meetings of the heads of state of the two countries as well as their foreign ministers and military chiefs. The two states agreed to consult each other, prior to any decision, "on all important questions of foreign policy, and in the first place on questions of common interest, with a view to arriving, insofar as possible, at a similar position." This consultation was to cover areas including problems relating to the European Communities and European political co-operation; East-West relations; subjects dealt with in NATO, and other matters.¹

It was a de Gaulle objective to establish a special relationship with Bonn similar to that which existed between London and Washington. Adenauer seemed to look upon things somewhat differently, being an ardent integrationist, who believed that the age of national states had come to an end. In Europe, Adenauer believed, the habit of thinking in terms of national states must be broken. As a result of World War II and the development of technology, including weapons of mass destruction, a new set of conditions obtained in the world, and to him the answer in Europe was integration, which he saw also as "a process of regeneration."² But Adenauer also was strongly interested in the "glorious ult-

¹Macridis, De Gaulle, Implacable Ally, pp. 186-191.

mate goal—the ending of future European wars," and thus undoubtedly would be attracted by a treaty between two states that had fought with each other three times during his lifetime. So the treaty was largely one more between two chiefs of state than between France and Germany—for the treaty was never implemented to any great degree. The Gaullist point of view was that the signing of the treaty "implied Germany's rallying to France's thesis of independence from the United States."¹ But the Germans, while attracted by certain aspects of the treaty, refused to implement it at the expense of NATO and its relations with the United States. For one thing, Adenauer was not to be chancellor of the Federal Republic for much longer, and both the upper and lower houses of the German parliament accepted it only with reservations. The upper house, or German Federal Council, adopted the treaty along with an interpretive resolution that welcomed the treaty but invited the government to carry it out along the main lines of Germany foreign policy, including common defense within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, European union with British participation and the reunification of Germany. These, needless to say, were not the objectives of de Gaulle. The lower chamber of the German parliament went even further,

¹Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 132.
attaching a preamble to the treaty, which mentioned, among other things, the "maintenance and strengthening of the Alliance of free peoples, in particular of the close association between Europe and the United States of America," and the unification of Europe "according to the patterns set up by the existing European Communities and by admitting Great Britain and other states which want to join."¹

Thus the action was in effect an approval of closer ties with France—if they could be obtained—but not at the expense of being a tool of de Gaulle's foreign policy, especially his ideas of independence from the United States and refusal to allow Britain to join the European Communities. The earlier warmth which de Gaulle had shown for Germany was to cool down in his future statements.

CHAPTER III

LATTER YEARS OF THE PRESIDENCY

By the middle of 1963, then, there was disappointment among European integrationists, skepticism among the Germans and hostility among many Americans to the independent, nationalistic course de Gaulle now was embarked upon.

I. THE AGRICULTURAL CRISIS

One thing that bothered Americans was de Gaulle's outspoken criticism of the American stance in Vietnam. And in Europe de Gaulle, in effect, provoked a crisis, which, on the surface, was over the failure of the Six to agree on details of a system for financing a common agricultural policy. To de Gaulle, the problem was an important one. He asserted at a January, 1964, news conference that of the six states of the Common Market, France was the most interested in the agricultural question since "we are the ones who can supply the most grain, meat, milk, butter, cheese, wine and, with Italy, the most fruits and vegetables, which led us to appear the most pressing in Brussels."¹

This common agricultural policy that came to the fore involved deciding how the costs of the policy were to be

allocated and benefits distributed; it also involved demands of some of the members that, along with the transfer of authority to dispense the large sums of money involved, should go a transfer of power to the European Parliament and the proposal of the E.E.C. Commission that it should be given its own sources of financial support from the proceeds of industrial tariffs and the agricultural levy system. The formal deadline for decisions on these matters—either of which could be expected to limit the ability of any one government to manipulate the system—was July 1, 1965.¹

On midnight of June 30, 1965, the French walked out of the negotiations; and in the next week it became evident that the French grievances went far beyond the agricultural financing matter, extending to the E.E.C. Commission, its strategy and "political pretensions," the voting system agreed to in the Treaty of Rome, and the "reluctance" of its partners to liberate themselves from the domination of the United States.² Once again at the Elysee Palace in Paris, at a press conference, de Gaulle gave his views of the matter in his characteristically blunt fashion. The three treaties—E.E.C., E.C.S.C. and Euratom—were concluded before France's recovery in 1958. They therefore made

² Ibid.
allowance primarily for "what the others requested." Each of the treaties "instituted an appearance of an executive in the form of a commission independent from the States" and an "appearance of a legislature in the form of an Assembly bringing together members of the various parliaments." This claim held by a "technocracy, for the most part foreign, destined to infringe upon France's democracy in settling problems that dictate the very existence of our country," could not suit France's purposes once she was determined to take her destiny into her own hands. What France wanted, he indicated, was a community that would be fair and reasonable:

Fair: that means that agricultural products . . . should be included in the Common Market concurrently with industrial goods. Reasonable: that means that nothing which is important at present in the organization, and later in the operation of the Common Market of the Six, should be decided and, even more, applied, except by the responsible public authorities in the six States, that is, the Governments controlled by the Parliaments.¹

De Gaulle continued to denigrate a "different concept of a European Federation," in which the countries would "lose their national personalities, and in which, furthermore for want of a federator . . . would be ruled by some technocratic, stateless and irresponsible Areopagus." France is opposing this plan with one that allows organized cooperation among the states, "evolving, doubtless, toward a

confederation."¹

While Leon Lindberg notes one might interpret the boycott and de Gaulle's speech so extreme and provocative that they could be considered the first stage in a French withdrawal from the Community or moves to force the other members to break it up rather than capitulate, the interpretation seems doubtful. If France withdrew or the system collapsed, France would have foregone its major level for intervention in its partners' internal affairs and its chief source of influence over the other five's policies toward the United States, Soviet Union, and East Europe, and the break, too, would be very costly to both French industry and agriculture.²

Rather de Gaulle intended to turn integration to his own purposes rather than undo the structure. France at this point in the mid-1960s was not trapped by integration in the sense that de Gaulle was less subject to internal controls than politicians in the other countries and thus was the only one willing—or able—to threaten to destroy the system if he didn't get his way.³

There was obviously internal opposition, however, to de Gaulle's attitude toward the Community this time, and it

¹Ibid. ²Lindberg, op. cit., pp. 237-238. ³Ibid., p. 239.
may have shown up in the elections in December, 1965, in which what was considered as a considerable anti-de Gaulle protest vote was cast.

The Commission, in effect, had ended up by playing de Gaulle's game in the 1965 plan—which was as much of a challenge to de Gaulle as de Gaulle's veto of Britain was to the Community spirit. The Commission was attempting to force de Gaulle to choose between French farmers' interests and the French national interest in a "European Europe" for agriculture on the one hand, and his own hostility to supranationality and the French national interest—as viewed by de Gaulle—on the other.¹

By the spring of 1965, the Commission had reached the apex of its strength. And while it in March offered this favorable agreement on financing to the French, France was expected to accept the two "political" elements of immediate independent financial resources for the Commission and new powers for the European Parliament. The proposal would have meant the Commission as of 1967 would have received not only proceeds from agricultural levies collected, but the proceeds from all industrial tariffs, too, which might have

been a whopping $4 billion a year.\(^1\)

As de Gaulle said in his September 9 news conference:

It is true that, according to the authors of the draft, this enormous budget, which the States would supply at the expense of their taxpayers but which they would not control, would be subject to examination by the European Assembly. But the intervention of this body which is essentially consultative and whose members have never, in any country, been elected for that purpose, would only aggravate the usurpatory character of what was demanded. Be this as it may, the combination—premeditated or not—of the supranational demands of the Brussels Commission, of the support that several delegations declared themselves ready to give them and, finally, of the fact that some of our partners at the last moment went back on what they had previously accepted, forced us to bring the negotiations to a close.\(^2\)

When France ended the boycott after the elections and returned to the Council of Ministers in early 1966, it combined a reasonable style of negotiations with a series of 10 new demands aimed at cutting down the power of the Commission. De Gaulle, among other things, wanted the Commission to "consult the governments" more closely before making a proposal; stop trying to assume executive powers or tasks involving "discretion or its own responsibility;" stop trying to act as a state in its relations with non-member countries or international organization.\(^3\) All in all, from de Gaulle’s point of view it must have appeared intolerable

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\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 248-249.


\(^3\)Lindberg, op. cit., pp. 250-251.
that this "apartride, irresponsible word-machine" should prove so successful at maximizing the spillover process, at appealing directly to groups and individuals in the member states and at establishing itself as a legitimate European political power. His attack on it indicated that "he takes these things quite seriously and that he fears the dynamism of a system that might outlive him and continue to 'mislead' Europe and the French." ¹

At any rate, in 1966, the Common Market was revived. In January, 1966, after the French return, the Council of Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg, came to a compromise that accepted the French point of view on some things but not on others. The Commission retained its right to initiate proposals, but was instructed to consult the six governments prior to submitting them to the Council of Ministers and was forbidden to disclose their contents publicly until after the completion of the procedure of consultation. The two bodies were to consult each other regarding any requests by third states for closer cooperation with the E.E.C. as well as on contacts to be maintained with international organizations. And the Council was instructed to increase its control over the drafting and implementation of the E.E.C. budget. The effect of this was a reduction of the independence

¹ Ibid., pp. 251-252.
of action of the Commission and a success for France in the fight against supranationality.¹

But France scored less well on another aspect of supranationality. The Six couldn't reach a compromise on the majority vote in the Council of Ministers, but the other Five agreed that if the Commission proposals would affect very important issues of one or more members, they would do their utmost to seek a solution acceptable to all. France made a reservation here, that consultation among the Six should continue until unanimity was assured.² While France was the most outspoken on the matter, it is certainly true to say that none of the other five members would want to be outvoted on a matter of great economic importance, so indeed there is a built-in desire to reach unanimity on important matters. It amounted to a flexible interpretation of the majority rule.

In May of 1966, despite disagreement on matters of British entry and NATO, the six states reached a new compromise agreement involving mainly the agricultural aspects of the union, a pact which it was believed would throw another obstacle in front of the British attempt to join the E.E.C. Among other things, the agreement states that on July 1,

¹Kulski, De Gaulle and the World, p. 223.
²Ibid., p. 224.
1967, the territories of the Six were to be open to the free circulation of all agricultural products except for wine imported from one of them to the other and the products were to be sold throughout the market at prices fixed in agreements concluded by the Six. Imports of agricultural products from third countries were to be subject to levies which would amount to the difference between the Common Market prices and those actually paid by the importing member state. All customs duties on manufactured goods were to be totally eliminated on July 1, 1968, and on the same day the Common Market would have a uniform tariff applicable to imports from all third states.¹

Indeed on July 1, 1968, the customs union among the Six was established and a common external tariff introduced. But even today arguments continue over the agricultural policy (most notable recently wine), and some problems have developed. *Newsweek* magazine recently called the Community little more than "an amorphous customs union of six quarrelsome, nationalistic states with a common agricultural policy that has proved an unmitigated disaster." The magazine pointed out the massive cost of payment of subsidies to farmers—especially to those in France, which has nearly half of the Six-state area's cultivated land—and the con-

¹Ibid., pp. 225-226.
continued increase in prices as food surpluses pile up over Europe. But on April 22, 1970, the Council of Ministers after lengthy debate reached agreement on a common wine policy that removed the last obstacle to again start negotiations toward a possible expansion of the E.E.C. to 10 members. First formal negotiations with Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway were to start in June, 1970, in Brussels. 2

This was to mark the third British attempt at entry; de Gaulle in 1967 in effect had vetoed British entry for a second time. The current French position was that it would not open talks with Britain and other candidates for membership until the whole agricultural package was tied up. At this point it appears to be at least close to agreement, although on another matter, the relations of the Common Market members to their former colonies—an issue particularly important in light of Britain and her Commonwealth—disputes remain.

II. VIEWS OF COMMON MARKET SUCCESS

Despite the criticisms and the arguments, it should not be considered that the Common Market has been a failure or that it does not represent an important step in inter-

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2 Associated Press Dispatch, Des Moines Register, April 22, 1970.
state cooperation and integration. While de Gaulle had a certain idea of political cooperation among the Six—where at least they would hold discussions but not give up the rights of the states to act in what they perceived as self-interest—there is little doubt that the Common Market does have important political aspects, one being merely that it is not possible for one state to adopt a foreign policy that is frankly and bluntly hostile to the others. The implications of the market amount to a restriction on the policy formulations of the others. However, as Miriam Camps has said, while the Common Market probably is irreversible in the sense that it's almost impossible to see the Six re-enacting tariffs and other trade barriers, it is not irreversible in the sense used by some "Europeans." That is, there is no iron law of "spillover" or irresistible internal dynamic that is bound to carry the Six to full economic union and beyond that to some form of political union. 1 But the durability of the European idea and the Common Market is impressive, however. The differences with the French have led, at times, to near stagnation in the Community, "but the Six have shown an ability and a determination to absorb differences of view that on any rational calculation should

have destroyed the Community."

The Community has gone on, however, and despite problems, the member states generally have prospered economically. As early as 1962, Walter Hallstein, president of the E.E.C., was able to say that Great Britain's application for membership in the European Community was "in some respects the most striking testimonial to success--and to its political character--that could have been imagined."

The Europe of the Six has received other testimonials of success. Hans A. Schmitt in 1962 pointed out that ever since they refused to participate in the Marshall Plan, the U.S.S.R. and her satellites "have paid Western European integration the compliment of continuous verbal attack--and the considerably more substantial tribute of imitation." Jerzy Lukaszewski has written that if anything has restored the West's attraction in Central Europe, it is the E.E.C. experiment.

But as Michael Curtis has pointed out, the European

1Ibid., p. 213.


Community still is searching for a means to stem the counter-revolution of nationalism symbolized by President de Gaulle. Said Curtis:

The nature of the European Economic Community and the direction in which it should move still remain contentious. Philosophically the argument is whether European unity should be built around an alliance of sovereign states or through common institutions; economically, between those champions of a basically self-sufficient economic unit and those insisting on an outward looking trade community; politically, between those wanting to keep the Community limited and those arguing that British membership is vital, and between those insisting on European independence and others urging a closer relationship with the United States.¹

One idea on the matter has been the suggestion of "federalism à la carte," because of the unlikely creation of a federal state of Europe in the near future and some observers' belief that there is little need of continuing economic integration with only six states. The "à la carte" suggestion, made by Louis Armand of France, the former president of Euratom, conceives not of a single European community, but a number of them. Thus, ten nations might decide they could unite in the area of transportation, perhaps 25 on a matter such as a common patent law, and perhaps some Eastern European states might be drawn in if these were clearly defined, non-political areas. If something such as this ultimately should occur it might well prove that, "by

¹Curtis, *Western European Integration*, p. 223.
forcing Europeans to face up to the impracticality of instant federalism, de Gaulle has actually contributed significantly to the final realization of a broader European unity."¹

II. THE 1967 VETO

At any rate, on the question of British entry into the European Community, Charles de Gaulle remained opposed until the British had accomplished "the necessary profound economic and political transformation" that would allow them to join the Six.² In a press conference on May 16, 1967, de Gaulle said that the problem of British membership "for our part . . . could not be, and moreover has never been, a question of a veto." Rather, it simply means knowing if a successful outcome "is possible in the framework and the conditions of the present Common Market, without bringing destructive disorder into it." Even then, as she said she was ready to subscribe to the Rome Treaty, "she is asking exceptional and prolonged delays and, as regards her, that basic changes be made in the Treaty's implementation." And the British "make no secret of the fact" that once inside


the Community "they would undertake to obtain many revisions."\(^1\)

In truth, said de Gaulle, it seems that "the change in the situation of the British in relation to the Six, once we would be ready by common consent to proceed with it," might consist of a choice between three issues:

Either recognize that . . . their entry into the Common Market . . . would amount to necessitating the building of an entirely new edifice, scrapping nearly all of that which has just been built. . . .

Or, establish, between the Community on the one hand, and Britain and some States of the "little" free-trade area on the other, a system of association, such as the one provided for in the Treaty of Rome and which could, without creating an upheaval, multiply and facilitate the economic relations between the contracting parties.

Or else lastly, before changing what exists, wait until a certain internal and external evolution, of which Great Britain seems already to be showing signs, is eventually completed. . . .\(^2\)

Thus the writing was on the wall. In July, 1967, the British government reactivated its application to join the Community, but in November of that year, at another press conference, the General announced France wouldn't agree to acceptance of negotiations with respect to British entry.

De Gaulle's action again found anger and discontent among those pressing for further integration. Germany's Willy Brandt, for instance, in December, 1967 delivered a

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 177-179.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 180.
warning of sorts to the French. He noted that Article 5 of the Rome Treaty "enjoins every member state to desist from any measures that might jeopardize the realization of the ends of the treaty." The treaty prescribes negotiations to this end. Every member is free with respect to the final, material decision, "but no one may block the road that according to the treaty leads to a decision concerning the acceptance of new members."  

But even among the staunch supporters of a united Europe, there were those who agreed with the de Gaulle contention that Britain had economic difficulties and would need a transitional period before becoming a member of the Community. Robert Marjolin, a former vice-president of the Commission, noted in a March 1, 1969, speech that there were three major causes of the disenchantment felt among supporters of European unification: That it was difficult to advance any further down the road to economic unification because "of certain acute difficulties, particularly with regard to financing the common agricultural policy"; that no solution had been found to the problem of enlarging the Community; that there had been no breakthrough to a political community. The common agricultural policy was in a state of crisis and it was feared the major portion of the Communi-

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ty's time in the years ahead would be taken up by it. Marjolin said the British question was dividing the Community and that if Britain didn't become a member of the European club, the prospects of the move toward the political unity of Europe were virtually non-existent. ¹

IV. THE SOAMES AFFAIR

The gloominess of the "Europeans" hadn't been eased any by a heated controversy that had broken out earlier in 1969 after a discussion on February 4 between de Gaulle and British Ambassador Christopher Soames. The controversy centered on Soames' report that General de Gaulle had suggested that the Common Market be replaced by a wider economic and political grouping of Western European nations, independent of the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance. According to Soames, this new grouping was to have an inner directorate of France, Britain, Italy and West Germany, relegating other Western European countries to "second-class citizenship." The British communicated this version to France's partners in the Common Market and immediately, after the Soames report was made public, the French officially denied the report and declared no four-power directorate had been mentioned and that the rest of de Gaulle's

statements had been grossly distorted and magnified. The French apparently were miffed not only for the "distortion" of what the General had to say, but for informing other governments of what was supposed to be a confidential conversation.¹

But London denied twisting the General's ideas. Michael Stewart, British foreign secretary, said:

Ideas of this kind affect the security and prosperity of these five, who are our partners in NATO and the Western European Union. We must therefore tell these countries—who are our friends and allies—about what was proposed by the French.²

The controversy was carried out mostly in the press and was the topic of a long debate in the Commission on February 26. But a Commission spokesman said that while deploring the incident, the Commission did not want to make a comment on it. The Bulletin of the European Communities commented that for the Commission, "these surface eddies, however regrettable, did not affect the Common Market in its depth," and that the Commission considered that it "behoved the Community authorities to continue the construction of the common policies without interruption."³ Comments such as those by Michel Debré, the anti-European French minister

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of foreign affairs, didn't make the integrationists feel any better, either. In an address in April, 1969, Debré said that France was opposed to "hare-brained notions of supranationality" and that it could only contemplate a political and economic organization of Europe oriented toward independence of political thought and action.¹

V. DE GAULLE RESIGNS

But before long comments such as those and the unpleasantness of the Soames affair took a back seat and European integrationists suddenly felt a surge of encouragement. Charles de Gaulle, in late April, 1969, resigned after voters had rejected a bill for constitutional reform. The General frequently had felt the need to get new proof of confidence from the nation, but this time he did not obtain it. While the rejection of the referendum may have indicated a disillusionment with certain de Gaulle policies, it is doubtful whether the vote could be considered a rejection of de Gaulle's nationalistic, anti-integration foreign policy, other than in the fact that the French state of economic affairs had ties to certain foreign policy practices. The May, 1968 student and worker rebellion in France

"showed for the first time a crucial flaw in the solidarity of the regime and of the President." Many Frenchmen had been unhappy with the state of economic affairs since the autumn of 1968. Time and aging may have been other factors in the election results, as well as the fact that there was a Gaullist successor--Georges Pompidou--waiting in the wings for the first time.

So Charles de Gaulle suddenly was gone from the European political picture--although it was not so easy to say that Gaullism had departed as well. But before assessing what the prospects of Western European union might be in the absence of de Gaulle, it is necessary to go into a more detailed look at de Gaulle's views on a range of topics to determine fully what effect he had on the matter of European integration.

\[\text{News item in the New York Times, April 28, 1969.}\]
CHAPTER IV

ASSESSING DE GAULLE

In analyzing and interpreting de Gaulle's attitudes toward Europe and European integration, a first step is going back to his war memoirs, written and published during the 1950s, which are most instructive.

I. FRENCH PRIMACY IN WESTERN EUROPE

He states flatly that he "intended to assure French primacy in Western Europe." And how was de Gaulle to do that? By:

... preventing the rise of a new Reich that might again threaten its safety; to co-operate with East and West and, if need be, contract the necessary alliances on one side or the other without ever accepting any kind of dependency ... to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc; to establish this organization as one of the three world powers, and, should it be necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps. Since 1940, my every word and act had been dedicated to establishing these possibilities; now that France was on her feet again, I would try to realize them.¹

Some writers have termed the politics of de Gaulle "inscrutable and ambiguous,"² but this writer would agree with the view of Louis J. Halle, who says that by reading de

¹De Gaulle, Memoirs, pp. 872-873.
²Curtis, Western European Integration, p. 220.
Gaulle it is hard to see how one wouldn't be impressed by the "monolithic simplicity of the man, and without concluding that there is nothing particularly enigmatic about his thinking, his policy, or his purpose."¹

In the passage from his Memoirs above, de Gaulle candidly states his intention to do what he can to insure French primacy in Europe. To do that, France must contain Germany, and it will be willing to contract on the "one side or the other" to do so, but without ever accepting "any dependency." De Gaulle, in his willingness to accept alliances on this "one side or the other," is stating clearly that ideologies have little impact on his methods of operation. As he once mentioned while French president, "The banner of ideology in reality covers only ambitions. And I believe that it has been thus since the world was born."² De Gaulle wanted a Europe, he said in his Memoirs, that can stand as powerful as the Communist bloc or the Anglo-American camp. And by his linking of the British and Americans, even in his Memoirs, it is hard to see how he would be expected to quickly change his view toward Britain. He excluded Britain from this inner circle of Europe in his Memoirs as he did by his later vetoes. De Gaulle often men-

tioned building Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals," which effectively would include Eastern Europe but not Britain.

II. BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND DE GAULLE

Did de Gaulle seek to keep England from entering his sort of Europe because it is an island state far different from the continent, or is it that he feared English influence as a member of the European union that might be formed, especially in its acting as a "Trojan horse" for the United States? And, indeed, although the London Times has called de Gaulle the "wrecker" of the European unity movement, what has been the British attitude?

Going back to late in World War II, de Gaulle received a rebuff to the idea of a British-French alliance. The General, referring to a November, 1944 meeting among himself, Churchill, and Anthony Eden, said that the peace "we French hoped to build in accord with what we regarded as logic and justice, the British found it expedient to approach with formulas of empiricism and compromise." Churchill also "had made for himself a rule to do nothing important except in agreement with Roosevelt." From then on, the

1 Curtis, op. cit., p. 23.
expression "Anglo-Saxons" assumed a special meaning: The British and Americans acting in unison to safeguard their particular interests at the expense of all others—particularly France and Europe.

Another incident late in World War II also proved to be something de Gaulle undoubtedly did not forget later when he was considering Britain in his over-all foreign policy. In April and May of 1945, the English supported underground activities against France in Libya and Syria, two countries then under French mandate. De Gaulle sent in troops to restore peace without bloodshed, but this was not what Churchill had wanted—"he wanted to humiliate France and then to take its place in Libya and Syria." The incident undoubtedly remained in de Gaulle's mind and, along with the December, 1962, Skybolt affair between Macmillan and Kennedy, reinforced the idea that de Gaulle had of the British, as "Machiavellis, cloaked in courtesy and decked out in friendliness."

However, while de Gaulle can throw the British and United States into the same camp on many occasions, there is little doubt that he does have a considerable difference of opinion at base in viewing the two countries. De Gaulle at

1Macridis, De Gaulle, Implacable Ally, p. 196.
3Ibid., p. 146.
least knew Britain rather well and "the least one may say is that he has a deep respect for Britain."\(^1\) But this is not true of the United States, where he never lived and therefore probably found easier to distrust.

In his Memoirs, too, in speaking of Franklin D. Roosevelt, de Gaulle indicates he felt Roosevelt was distrustful of the French general. From the moment America entered the war, Roosevelt was convinced "that France in particular should recognize him as its saviour and its arbiter." Roosevelt, the General said, "beneath his patrician mask of courtesy . . . regarded me without benevolence."\(^2\)

Roosevelt's conception of the post-war world was an imposing one "although disquieting for Europe and for France. . . . It was a permanent system of intervention that he intended to institute by international law." In Roosevelt's mind, a four-power directory "would solve the world's problems." And those four powers did not include France, but only the United States, Soviet Union, China and Great Britain. "As for the future, he was anything but convinced of the rebirth and renewal of our regime."\(^3\)

\(^1\)Kulski, De Gaulle and the World, p. 234.

\(^2\)De Gaulle, Memoirs, pp. 392-393.

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 573-575.
De Gaulle, however, apparently had better relations with Harry Truman. Truman impressed de Gaulle as "equal to his task, his character firm, his mind oriented toward the practical side of affairs—in short, a man who doubtless promised no miracles but who could be counted on in a crisis."\(^1\)

While de Gaulle had some unpleasant war-time dealings with both British and American leaders, these should be considered but probably not overweighed in assessing de Gaulle's policies of later years. Besides, the record has been clear, regarding British attitudes toward European unity and the Common Market, that Britain had been reluctant to enter into any binding relationship with the continental countries. Britain, as France, did not want to surrender any sovereign power, wanted a minimum of centralized machinery, saw the free trade area it helped set up in economic terms only and did not want negotiations extended past industrial products into the agricultural.\(^2\) Several considerations after the war made Britain wary of a federalized Europe. First, the special relationship developed between Great Britain and the United States during the war years—indeed, perhaps strengthened rather than only developed—depended on an independent British diplomacy. Similarly, it was deemed impossible to

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 911.

be both part of the Commonwealth and part of Europe. Also, the Labor Party, which headed the government until the fall of 1951, feared close arrangements with non-socialist countries "when the main levers of England's economy were being brought under state control." And finally, as the "European" area could be confined only to the free and democratic states, there was a reluctance to enter into any formal European agreement that would signify the division of Europe by excluding the Soviet-controlled states as well as the totalitarian states of Southern Europe.¹

But as the 1950s continued, many things happened that affected Britain's view of world events and the Common Market idea. There was a general lessening of cold war tension, a feeling of loss of British World power as her empire shrank, a crisis in the "special relationship" over Suez, problems in the British economy. The British, in their new pursuit of E.E.C. entry, seemed to be abandoning their claims to be a great power for entry into a group in which, they believe, their experience and abilities will entitle them to a leading role.²

So Britain continues to press toward membership in the European Community, the leaders of the movement undoubtedly inspired by the departure of de Gaulle. A few

¹Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe, P. 55.
days after the resignation of de Gaulle, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson commented that "the arguments for progress toward a unified Europe, the need to go forward without more ado, are compelling." Without naming names, Wilson criticized those countries that for the "narrowest" national interests had blocked progress toward that unity. ¹

But, as Newsweek magazine has said, public enthusiasm in Britain for British entry "has been waning sharply ever since General de Gaulle's departure made the prospect valid." The cost in some aspects would come high, it is believed, including sharply higher food prices. But the Labor government and Conservative opposition still are committed to taking Britain into Europe despite growing popular disapproval. British entry would gain access to a free market of 250 million persons, instead of 50 million at home. And on the political front, Britain could again be able "to talk to the superpowers on more equal terms, even if only as part of a united European voice." ²

George Brown, deputy leader of the British Labor Party, conceded recently that there indeed was truth to the view that there was an apparent growing British coldness toward "Europe." But Brown said he still remained convinced

that Britain's "political and economic destiny lies within a larger European unit." To understand the questioning mood in Britain, one has to understand the situation in which the British have been placed. "For almost a decade, Britain has declared her willingness to play her full part in building a wider European unity." It was not the British attitude toward Europe that has changed; rather, it has been "the long time that we have been forced to hang around waiting that has exasperated many people," said Brown. But, he said in late 1969, with a new government in Germany as well as a new French government showing signs of "developing a positive European policy," the atmosphere in Britain is improving.¹

Deputy Foreign Minister George Thompson adds that true, there is concern in Britain about some of the short-term economic effects of entry into the Common Market. But Britain is in a much stronger economic position than at the time of its earlier approaches to the Common Market and is beating its balance-of-payments problem. The continent needs Britain, said Thompson, as much as Britain needs the continent.²

While the British continue to seek entry, the United

States has continued a policy of support of Western European integration as well as support for British entry into Europe. What have been some of the reasons for this support, for it can be considered that a stronger Western Europe might be seen by some Americans as a strong rival for world influence and therefore not to be encouraged? Camps has noted a strong emotional influence in the American support for the European Community since the Community idea was "bold, imaginative and creative," and it "accorded with what most Americans felt in their bones was right, sensible, and long overdue." But the main reason contributing to this American support in the past and now is that it offers the West Germans "the best framework within which to shape their current policies." The Federal Republic needed an alternative to reunification, and the U.S. judged that "deep" integration of the Six offered the best possible available answer to the problems posed by a "truncated but dynamic Germany."¹

As noted before, de Gaulle's different attitudes toward the two American war years presidents might seem to indicate, as Aron has said, that de Gaulle had no a priori attitude toward the United States, knowing that each American president--within limits--could put a different

stamp on his country's policies.¹

However, this argument can be accepted only partially. That is not to say that antagonisms toward the United States and Britain because of a war-time grudge form the basics for his policy--that policy in essence being French power and grandeur--but it seems that there has been an excessive amount of personal memories and that the relations between the Free French and Roosevelt from 1940 to 1944 have not ceased to influence Franco-American relations.²

But it hasn't been only Roosevelt and the World War II era that have influenced de Gaulle's thinking toward the United States. Carroll Quigley believes that the differences that arose between the two countries would have arisen despite the "personal idiosyncracies" of de Gaulle, Roosevelt, John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk. For France, the question of national security always has been much clearer than in the United States, and the alienation of the two states rests as much on the inadequacies of Dulles' policies--and the neo-Dullesism of Rusk and Lyndon Johnson--as on "the difficult personality of Charles de Gaulle."³


Serfaty argues that anti-Americanism goes far beyond de Gaulle himself. It was born in the early days of the Fourth Republic, as a resentment of dependence. And in the 1950s, especially, the anti-Americanism was aggravated by the increasingly liberal U.S. policy on colonial matters.¹

What, however, does all this have to do with de Gaulle's attitudes and policies toward Western European integration? The relationship is important because de Gaulle has been wary that increased federalism and supranationality in Europe would allow the United States to be the hegemon, to dominate France and the other countries at the expense of their national interests. The unification plan has too often been a cover for non-European interests, in other words.² De Gaulle's attitudes toward the United States also have been important in the story of NATO, which, while not an institution confined to Europe, is another form of co-operative or integrated activity which has run beyond a simple military alliance.

It is helpful, again, to inspect some of the words of de Gaulle on this matter and to look more deeply into the question of NATO and the American economic challenge to Europe.

In a press conference on July 29, 1963, de Gaulle--

after giving a typical lengthy review of events leading up to the question at hand—tells how France came out of World War II "greatly weakened in every respect" and that was why, with regard to the United States, she found herself in a position of dependence:

France constantly needed its assistance in order to avoid military collapse. It was from America that she received the weapons for her soldiers. France's security was dependent entirely on its protection. With regard to the international undertakings in which its leaders at that time were taking part, it was often with a view to dissolving France in them, as if self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition, while these undertakings in the guise of integration were automatically taking American authority as a postulate. This was the case with regard to the project for a so-called supranational Europe, in which France as such would have disappeared, except to pay and to orate; a Europe governed in appearance by anonymous, technocratic and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy and a defense—the United States of America.¹

But since then, France's position has changed considerably. Her new institutions put her in a position to wish and act. Once again, the national and international conditions of France resemble less and less what they used to be. Thus, he asks, "How could the terms and conditions of her relations with the United States fail to be altered thereby?"²

²Ibid., p. 234.
On April 27, 1965, de Gaulle again stresses the independence of France, which has not failed to surprise "but even to scandalize certain circles for which French vassalage was the habit and the rule." In strong words directed toward the United States, de Gaulle adds that the fact that France has reassumed its independent policy has served "sometimes to displease a State which may believe that, by virtue of its power, it is invested with supreme and universal responsibility." But, who knows? Perhaps some day the "advantage which this friendly country may have in finding France on her feet will not by far outweigh the annoyance which it now feels about it?"

It is in this speech where it seems de Gaulle unalterably declares the independence of France.

III. NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

One also can see the independent attitude toward European defense develop in de Gaulle's addresses over a period of years and as France moves toward development of a nuclear "force de frappe." On March 25, 1959, in the first press conference held by de Gaulle as president of the French Republic, he mentions the East-West conflict and says that France, without the weaponry of the Americans and

Russians, might try to keep out of the conflict and—if it came to that—the war. But de Gaulle rejects that policy, which would amount to France—in an attempt to keep her life—giving up her reasons for living. And this also would be "to destroy the Atlantic Alliance, an alliance which is unimaginable without the participation of France." Thus, "we prefer to maintain the Alliance until the day when the future of peace is assured." While thus stating the need for the Alliance, de Gaulle in the same press conference tells his audience that he is suspect of an integration in which "peoples and governments find themselves more or less deprived of their roles and responsibilities in the domain of their own defense," and that the Alliance will be "all the more vital and strong as the great powers unite on the basis of a cooperation in which each carries his own load."  

On November 10, 1959, de Gaulle was asked at a press conference to comment on the United Nations debate about the proposed French nuclear tests in the Sahara. He gives here his first clear statement that France was aiming at developing a nuclear force of its own, no matter what the opinion of its NATO allies or the United Nations. The "Anglo-Saxons" and the Soviet Union for years have been testing, manufacturing and inventing "colossal nuclear armaments,"

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1De Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-1964, p. 49.
and the United Nations never has condemned "this dreadful cosmic threat," nor invited the two sides to destroy the weapons or cease manufacturing them. If the two sides want to stop testing, France can only approve. But if anybody wanted to ask France to renounce atomic weapons for herself, "while others are in possession of them and are developing them in tremendous quantities, there is not the slightest chance that she would accede to such a request."¹

On May 31, 1960, after the failure of the summit conference, de Gaulle repeated the two themes. France intends to remain an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance, but France must have her own role and her own personality. This implies that she must also acquire a nuclear armament, that she must be "sole mistress of her resources and her territory; in short, that her destiny, although associated with that of her allies, must remain in her own hands."²

Nearly a year later, on April 11, 1961, de Gaulle was continuing to argue the need for France to develop a nuclear capability since "as long as others have the means to destroy her, it is necessary for her to have the means to defend herself." And on NATO, now there is a somewhat subtle change of tone, where he said he did not question the need for the Alliance, but its present organization, citing

¹Ibid., pp. 60-61. ²Ibid., p. 77.
again the dangers of integration.

After another year, on May 15, 1962, de Gaulle now is questioning whether or not the United States actually would defend France with America's nuclear weapons if it came to that. The Atlantic Alliance must be maintained as long as the Soviet Union threatens the world, but it must be realized that conditions are greatly changed from when the organization was set up 12 years previously. No one could now tell how either the United States or Soviet Union would employ its nuclear arsenal. It is enough to say this, in order to understand that "as regards the defense of France, the battle of Europe and even a world war as they were imagined when NATO was born, everything is now in question."  

By July 23, 1964, General de Gaulle was able to say that France's nuclear program was moving along nicely and now it not only constituted for her "the incomparable guarantee of her security, but also introduces into a dangerous world a new and powerful element of wisdom and circumspection."  

The next spring, on April 27, 1965, de Gaulle, in an obvious reply to critics who said the French nuclear program was costing too much, claims that the French defense costs

1Ibid., pp. 123-124.  
2Ibid., pp. 179-180.  
are "no more than those which we would have to furnish for Atlantic integration, without thereby being sure of protection, if we were to continue to belong to it as subordinate auxiliaries."\(^1\)

On October 28, 1966, asked whether France intended to leave the Atlantic Alliance, de Gaulle did not answer the question directly, but said at that point in time "there remains for us no subordination, either actual or eventual of our forces to a foreign authority," and in five months, "no general staff, no unit, no base of any allied army will remain on our soil." In addition, France was building its nuclear force and giving back to its own forces "their fully national character in the way of command, operation and training." Now, "it is hard to see how the country is being ruined by this, since, in relation to its total budget, it is spending no more than it spent in the past." Besides, there are many signs of what a healthy impression is being produced by France's reappearance in the ranks of the powers. For a world situation in which two superpowers would alone have the weapons capable of annihilating every other country "over the long run, could only paralyze and sterilize the rest of the world." Under these conditions, how could Europe unite?\(^2\)

De Gaulle's independent attitude toward NATO antago-

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 88.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 151.
nized his American allies, for from the American point of view, the French resources would have been better spent on conventional forces rather than nuclear arms. But, noted Henry Kissinger, from the perspective of vindicating France's identity, de Gaulle was not so concerned with the technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem of choice. Wrote Kissinger:

The United States considers central control over nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of general war; De Gaulle gives priority to France's impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; President de Gaulle seeks political ones.1

Despite the independent role adopted by France vis-à-vis NATO and an almost complete withdrawal from the military aspects of the pact, it can be said that France at this point in time is working much closer in military matters with other NATO states than it had been; in fact, the closer relationship had been developed a year and a half before de Gaulle resigned. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union caused de Gaulle to rethink his views of East-West relationships and smashed his plans for East-West agreement.2 In covert form, the closer working relationship of France and NATO followed in the military sphere and there is some belief it will be easier for France to return to

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NATO military co-operation in the absence of de Gaulle.¹

The Czech situation, as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, caused de Gaulle to rethink the status of world power relationships and the part France could play. The Cuban affair deeply changed the balance of power in the world in the eyes of de Gaulle. For de Gaulle, the Soviet Union had acknowledged the superiority of the United States, and therefore there was no longer any military danger in Europe; consequently, one could loosen the Atlantic ties and approach the U.S.S.R.² This dangerous confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers strangely enough resulted in a lessening of the fear of East-West hostilities and brought up more acutely the necessity of NATO. As the 1960s progressed and Western leaders including Lyndon Johnson as well as de Gaulle talked of "building bridges" to the East, the complex climate helped to break down the inner cohesion that had been NATO's mark when first forged around a single main issue. But the Czechoslovakian incident seemingly has acted to breathe new life into NATO while at the same time darkening the possibilities of East-West collaboration. No matter whether de Gaulle or someone else is at the helm in France, however, the problem of the control of nuclear weapons

² Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle, p. 164.
remains. While co-operation indeed may be enhanced in NATO, the question of integration here—with some sort of international control of the nuclear trigger—is doubtful anytime in the near future.

IV. DE GAULLE AND GERMANY

Going back to the days before the de Gaulle presidency and to the development of NATO and the European communities, in both cases it can be said that one of the key issues has been the control of Germany rather than only fear of the Soviet Union or the need of economic gains. For instance, in February, 1948 Georges Bidault, the French foreign minister, spoke of "the integration of a peaceful Germany into a United Europe, a Europe in which the Germans . . . will be able to give up all idea of dominating it."¹ Thus, while the new Atlantic community would protect Europe from without, the European community would protect it from within. The former could balance Soviet imperialism, the latter contain German militarism. During the debates before the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty, the French National Assembly made it clear that it regarded the proposed treaty as directed against Germany as much as the Soviet Union. For the French, the central political func-

¹Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 11.
tion of the alliance was the collective management of
Germany, and more particularly a collective guarantee
against a revival of any form of bilateral German-Soviet
relationship.¹

France and the other countries of the Six also have
felt that a reunification of Germany could threaten European
peace, and it is likely in General de Gaulle's eyes the
European Communities would not have come into being if
Germany had not been divided.² But for the Federal Republic
of Germany, integration had some obvious advantages in the
eyears after the war and its leaders embraced the idea
warmly. For Germany, integration—both in NATO and a Euro­
pean community—meant a leap from "opprobrium and impotence,
to respectability and equal rights" (as for the other small
states in the community it mean exchanging a modest dose of
autonomy for participation in a potentially rich and strong
grouping).³ For Germany and the other members of the Six
except France, integration meant an almost certain improve­
ment in the national situation.

For Germany, supranationality meant at the most
renouncing the acquisition of something it did not yet have,

¹Ibid., p. 155.
²Macridis, De Gaulle, Implacable Ally, p. 77.
³Hoffman, "Obstinate or Obsolete," pp. 211-212.
⁴Ibid.
while for France it meant abandoning a sovereignty already in its possession. This explains the attitudes of France continually being more reserved than that of Germany on the matter of political integration. In the same way, the status of inequality within NATO is much more unacceptable to France, for whom the Big Four once had meaning, than to the Federal Republic, which found the Atlantic Alliance even under American domination "an egalitarian paradise compared with the situation of 1945 and even 1949."

Today Germany has prospered through its relationships with the United States and in the various European organs to become what has been termed "the economic and political strong man of Western Europe." However, as Willy Brandt, the current chancellor of Germany has said, "We ourselves have disaccustomed ourselves to claims of leadership and do not wish to be confronted by a choice between Paris, London and Bonn." The promotion of the European communities, their elaboration, and their extension "must be considered as a constant of German policy." As far as the United States is concerned, "We wish to build our European house

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3 Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe, p. 63.
4 Ibid., p. 32.
together with our neighbors and to settle ourselves in it livably." However, "most of us know how crucial the role of the United States is in ensuring that this house not be destroyed by tempests."

While supporting Western European unification, the Federal Republic has not rejected its desire to reunify the now split country. There is "one single nation, not two. And that is no new reality, but an old one." 2

The German question is the greatest national problem of present-day Europe and it is a "commandment of historical common sense" to solve the question within the framework of a general European peace order in such a way that "the right to self-determination is satisfied by it just as well as the legitimate interests of the neighboring states." 3 But for the present the idea of an integrated Europe has been a plausible alternative to a reunited or nationalistic Germany. As Michael Curtis has said, however, the breakdown of progress to political union and the policies of Charles de Gaulle "have lessened the likelihood of a Germany submerged in a larger entity, and the exaltation of nationalism in France may have an intoxicating effect on its neighbor." 4 Halle put the situation in a similar way in an article pub-

1 Ibid., p. 78. 2 Ibid., p. 132.
3 Ibid., p. 215.
4 Curtis, Western European Integration, p. 222.
lished in 1967:

As of today, the Germans appear not to want to return to the kind of world that, though it made them momentarily predominant in Europe, led to the general wreckage in which they shared. But if de Gaulle succeeded in restoring it they could not refuse, for themselves alone, the independence of action and the self-contained means of defense that in such a world would, as de Gaulle has said, pertain to every great nation.1

De Gaulle, as noted earlier, made a great effort at developing a Franco-German accord in the 1963 treaty arrangement drawn up between him and Adenauer, but the Germans refused to go along with many aspects of it. In his press conference on February 4, 1965, General de Gaulle asserted that the German problem "is, indeed, the European problem." He once again gave a lengthy historical discourse, in effect blaming Germany for causing World War I ("Already, because of the German Empire, the first World War had caused a gigantic shock in the west, east, north and south of Europe"). He also spoke of the "tragedy" of World War II which left deep scars. Thus, it was with circumspection and even with some uneasiness that public opinion in Western Europe sometimes viewed the economic expansion, military rebirth and political recovery of the Federal Republic. For France now, the problem of Germany involved three closely linked questions—to see that Germany henceforth becomes a

"definite element of progress and peace;" on this condition, to help with its reunification, and to make a start "and select the framework that would make this possible." De Gaulle sharply criticized the policy of the United States and Dulles, who he said believed that the West by strongly reinforcing NATO, would make Moscow withdraw and thus restore German's unity. But that plan "was only a dream, unless someone made war--something which Washington and its allies were in no way disposed to do." Such indetermination in Germany obviously cannot go on forever. Yet in the same breath de Gaulle notes that "doubtless one can imagine things continuing as they are for a long time" without provoking a war. And then he stresses again that what must be done will not be done except by the "understanding and combined action of the peoples who have always been, who are and who will remain principally concerned by the fate of the German neighbor--in short, the European peoples."¹

In effect, de Gaulle was telling the world that the German problem had to be solved by Europeans, effectively excluding the United States. He termed as foolish the American doctrine that integration of West Germany into NATO and a European federal state would lead to reunification of the two Germanys. Germany remained Europe's black sheep in

de Gaulle's eyes. She would not be reunited for a long time, which, of course, would be in what France saw as its self-interest—to keep Germany disunited and at least weaker than the strong, dangerous country she certainly would be if put back together again. It was almost the same sort of attitude as that followed by Cardinal Richelieu in the Thirty Years War of more than three centuries ago: For reasons of the French state, Germany should be kept disunited. And France, in the intervening centuries, had seen too many times what a united Germany could do.

A year later, on February 21, 1966, at another press conference, de Gaulle did not even answer directly two important questions put to him: whether German unification was consistent with French national interests and an inquiry regarding West German access to nuclear weapons. He came up with only a rather vague response to the over-all matters:

The union of the Six can and must also be one of the piers on which gradually will be built first the equilibrium, then the cooperation and then, perhaps, one day the union of all of Europe, which would enable our continent to settle its own problems peacefully, particularly that of Germany, including its reunification, and to attain, inasmuch as it is the main hearth of civilization, a material and human development worthy of its resources and its capacities.¹

Thus the future of German reunification again is relegated to an uncertain future.

¹Ibid., pp. 120-121.
So while the friendship treaty between France and Germany continued to exist, it was obvious there were wide differences between the two states on some fundamental matters. In March, 1969, shortly before his resignation, de Gaulle met in Paris with the then German chancellor, Kurt Kiesinger, and said that the friendship treaty was a good instrument for cooperation "provided that one remains faithful to it." It was a reference to the German efforts on behalf of the British candidacy to the Common Market, which had been regarded by the General as "bordering on unfaithfulness toward France."1 As the March, 1969 meeting ended, Couve de Murville, a de Gaulle faithful and then premier, said the two governments were in fundamental disagreement on the British bid for membership. De Gaulle expressed the view that Europe had to choose between maintaining the present six-nation community or forming a new, much more loosely organized grouping that might include not only Britain and Scandanavia but also "the Turks and the Swiss."2

All in all, as Brandt has said, he has regretted some de Gaulle decisions from the point of view of the Western community. This holds true for questions of European unification, of the Atlantic partnership, and also of NATO and of nuclear defense. "The security of Western Europe is indivisi-

2 Ibid.
ble. "It rests ultimately on the trustworthiness of the American commitment."¹

V. THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE

But the American role regarding the defense of Europe is only one of the major questions involving the relationship of Europe to the United States. A key factor today—so clearly pointed out in J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's The American Challenge—is the economic dependence, or independence, of Europe in relation to the power of American business and industry. The American challenge is not basically industrial or financial but is, above all, "a challenge to our intellectual creativity and our ability to turn ideas into practice."² It is a matter of organizing production relations and social relations so that Europeans may fulfill the potential of their abilities. It is above all a political problem.³ Neither Europe nor France can escape American "colonialization" until the present political structure is replaced by a European federation. "Unanimity is a formula for negation, majority rule a formula for action. To want the Common Market without accepting majority rule is to seek

¹Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe, p. 45.
³Ibid., p. 203.
a utopian society where there is no authority."¹

To build a powerful and independent Europe means strengthening the economic and political bonds of the Common Market, Servan-Schreiber says. No single nation is strong enough to support efficient production in all areas of advanced technology, for "the national framework is too narrow and cannot provide adequate markets for such products." The Common Market for years has "avoided fundamental problems that demand difficult choices and bold solutions. Foremost among these problems is an industrial policy for Europe."² Britain would be the best possible ally for France within the Common Market because Britain concentrates her efforts on electronics, electrical equipment, nuclear energy and aviation—the various areas that the European Community should be developing. Britain could help endow Europe with a world role "and save her from becoming an overgrown Switzerland."³

Resurrecting the vision of a united Europe in this way could have a powerful impact on French politics, claims Servan-Schreiber. A federated Europe must be more than a mere footnote in party platforms. "While students all over the Continent are protesting against the old order, Europe

¹Ibid., pp. 174-175. ²Ibid., pp. 154-157. ³Ibid., p. 162.
is becoming the natural scene of the new Renaissance."

Servan-Schreiber's ideas are forceful and obtained a tremendously wide reading throughout France and Europe. But some of the essential ideas of the work had been voiced earlier. For example, in 1966 Gaston Defferre, the Socialist candidate for French president in 1964-65, claimed that the de Gaulle policy, under an appearance of independence, was leading to the colonialization of the French economy by the United States. He said:

The formula for resistance is to make a reality of Europe, an independent Europe. Only when Europe is economically and politically united, endowed with a supranational authority and a parliament elected by universal suffrage—in other words, the exact opposite of what General de Gaulle wants—will it be capable of confronting the dangers of economic colonialization by the United States.2

Three decades earlier, Count Richard de Coudenhove-Kalergi had said that he believed European economic independence was threatened by the competition of American producers and businessmen. Thus, in order to safeguard continental independence from America, Europe must unite. Customs barriers must be abolished, and economic national regions must be fused into a "Pan-European" region which "alone would be successfully able to keep pace with American


industry."¹

Even American politicians and diplomats have said essentially the same thing. Nicholas Katzenbach, then U.S. under secretary of state, noted in 1968 that if the technological gap between Europe and the United States is to be closed, "Europe must coordinate and pool its creative energies more effectively."² George Ball, another former American under secretary of state, has noted that "unless Europeans move decisively toward some form of political union," it was highly doubtful that European business would "change its habits of thought and action enough to modernize its structure."³ Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg minister of foreign affairs, said, "Technology will only be able to make progress in Europe on a Community basis, and it will therefore need to be organized jointly."⁴ Brandt adds that with the inclusion of Great Britain in the E.G.C., Europe would


be in a better position to maintain itself vis-à-vis the technology of the superpowers. For Brandt, the division of Western Europe into two economic groupings—of the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A.—must not be allowed to continue. Europe's stance in the world would be substantially stronger if the community were expanded—"not only economically and technologically but politically as well."

VI. APPEALS FOR UNITY

Thus the pleas for European unity continue despite the setbacks, and—at least for some—the emotional appeal remains. A good example of this was expressed by Jean Ray in a speech to the European Parliament at Strasbourg on May 15, 1968:

How beautiful Europe would be if it were united—if our old continent, laid waste down the centuries by so many conflicts, and having unleashed the last two world wars on its own soil in the clash of European nationalisms, were capable of rising above past divisions and outworn nationalisms and of building a society looking toward human freedom, reconciliation between peoples and social progress!

This was the idea which, nearly twenty years ago, inspired the founders of the European Community. It is still our ideal today, but have our Member States forgotten it? Can they not see that the venture of unifying this old and ravaged continent is the greatest political work they have accomplished since the Second World War, one which earns them the

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1 Brandt, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
2 Ibid., p. 34.
respect of the entire world and to which they should first and foremost devote their intelligence and their energies?\(^1\)

Coudenhove-Kalergi, still active in the European unity movement as president of the Pan-European Union, launched an appeal in March of 1969—just after the controversial Soames affair and prior to the de Gaulle resignation—that called for a Franco-British entente, the entry of Britain into the continental system, a transformation of NATO to replace the American hegemony by a balance between America and a united Europe. All this is needed to transform Europe into a "fourth power," along with the United States, U.S.S.R. and China, "free and peaceful, prosperous and happy."\(^2\)

During the same month, on March 23, 1969, Pope Paul VI also made an appeal for European unity. While it "does not behove us to judge or intervene in this matter," it is a duty for all "and for us in particular," to create a new moral atmosphere which can facilitate the solution desired. This means that "this cannot be the mentality of discord, hegemony and nationalist egoism."\(^3\)

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And on April 28, 1969, just as de Gaulle was removing himself from the French presidency, the governments of Italy and Great Britain adopted a declaration strongly supporting European unification efforts after a London conference. Britain and Italy agreed that the economic and political integration of Europe both are essential and that, "as experience has shown, neither can go forward without the other." The European Communities "remain the basis for European unity." The treaties establishing these communities provide for the accession of other European countries. If the Communities are to develop, they must be enlarged, since the enlargement of the Communities "would not alter their nature, but rather ensure their fulfillment." The two governments stated that the political development of Europe requires that all member countries of an enlarged community shall be able to play a full part. Europe must be firmly based on democratic institutions, and the Communities should be sustained by an elected parliament, as provided for in the Treaty of Rome. "The role of the present European assemblies must be enhanced," and Europe must "increasingly develop a foreign policy so that she can act with growing effectiveness in international affairs."

Despite all these pleas, made either emotionally from

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the heart or on a harder pragmatic basis, the truth probably is, however, that at this time European union is not a necessity but a matter of choice for the governments and peoples involved. While it probably is the best road to the kind of society and role in the world the key Western Euro­pean countries seem to want, it is difficult to make a convinc­ing case that either their economic prosperity or their political freedom depend on it. Thus it is not surprising that the enthusiasm and emotionalism that characterized the European movement in the early post-World War II years largely has disappeared. But if the integration movement idea does not enflame millions as communism or nationalism have done, it has attracted increasing support by the suc­cess in movements toward that direction. Says Curtis: "The standardization of European beer bottles is hardly a revolu­tionary cause, but in a consumption-conscious economy, tangible results may have a greater impact than ideological convictions."  

VII. POLITICAL PARTIES, UNIFICATION AND NATIONALISM

The movement toward integration in Europe was created by intellectuals and political elites rather than by mass

1 Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, p. 213.
2 Curtis, Western European Integration, p. 8.
Among the most unanimous and consistent advocate of European unity has been the European-wide association of Christian-Democratic parties. Socialists, too, have had their European-wide association dedicated to promote a United Europe.  

In France, the parties which have had the most consistent record of supporting Europeanism have been basically the Socialists and the M.R.P. (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) plus certain groups in other parties. The chief French anti-European party has been the Communist Party, not surprisingly, while groups of varying importance within the other parties have opposed integration, particularly the Gaullist Party or the U.N.R.--Union pour la Nouvelle République. But while there are differences among the parties and within them, too, on matters such as integration--and this includes the Gaullists--it remains true, however, that historical, political and cultural considerations narrow the gap that separate them on the role and future of France. It has been common to speak of nationalism in

1 Ibid.
2 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, pp. 24-25.
reference to the France of the past few years. But Lawrence Scheinman says that nationalism always was present in postwar France, and the Resistance particularly bred an intense patriotism. This is an argument that carries weight to say that only the form and intensity of French nationalism were changed by de Gaulle's return to power, not the very fact of nationalism itself. Scheinman carries his analysis further, and it is an interesting one to contemplate:

Thus Gaullists and anti-Gaullists, nationalists and self-proclaimed antinationalists, starting from different assumptions about the limits of the present and the promise of the future, speaking different languages and working in different styles, meet at the critical juncture of the sense of French destiny, mission and leadership, of a great force and status. For de Gaulle these goals could be achieved only by avoiding the merger of France in a larger enterprise, by maintaining independence of action, and by holding fast to the principle of sovereignty. For the opposition this is the age of the passing of traditional sovereignty. It is only through a unification that entails something more than purely intergovernmental relationships that France's future and status can be assured; sovereignty is not the highest value, and the principle of supranationalism is an acceptable starting point. De Gaulle and his opposition share similar goals, seek similar objectives, and envision the future of France as a France of grandeur. But the Gaullist identifies status and power with a particular form of political organization, the nation-state; while for the opposition the parameters of status and power, prestige and independence, and the answer to the question of the uses to which power, once recovered, should be put, remain less choate and only vaguely articulated.

French nationalists, generally including the

Gaullists, thus have regarded deep European unification as something of an idle dream, but instead supported a sort of unity in the sense that the co-operation would be built on responsible national governments and parliaments and the reality would come out of this political content. The Europeanists have consisted of minimalist and maximalist sections. The minimalists—mostly Socialists and a few Radicals—were willing, under certain conditions, to go beyond national sovereignty as needs and circumstances required, but generally stopped short of total endorsement of European union. The maximalists—essentially Christian Democrats—included those who placed emphasis first and foremost on the goal of European integration, "however obtained and in whatever form."

During the whole of the Fourth Republic there never was a European majority among French political parties, and the approval of participation in the Coal and Steel Community "had been due to an ad hoc alliance between minimalists and maximalists," with Germany the common denominator.

Throughout the 1950s, the Gaullists opposed various measures of European unification for two reasons. First, they wanted European unity as "an act of self-differentia-

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1 Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe, pp. 51-52.
2 Ibid., p. 64.
tion from the United States," where the maximalists of the Fourth Republic often regarded the European community as part of a constantly evolving Atlantic community. Second, they attacked a European union that would be constructed as a technocracy along supranational lines. While hostile by the end of 1957, the Gaullists nevertheless joined the consensus in favor of European unity in the matter of the E.E.C., primarily based on the possibility of immediate economic goals. There was thus a distinction drawn between the politics and economics of European integration.

In essence, what the record has shown, is that the Fifth Republic hasn't been as anti-European or anti-American as Americans sometimes have tended to believe; nor had the Fourth Republic been as satisfied and satisfying a NATO ally, as unconditionally in favor of European integration, as Americans sometimes remember. The rejection of the European Defense Community is one example of that. Opinion polls throughout the presidency of de Gaulle have indicated that a majority of Frenchmen agreed with him except when he seemed to threaten the very existence of the Common Market. So on this whole matter of nationalism, Maurice Duverger

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1 Ibid., pp. 134-135.  
2 Ibid., p. 135.  
argues that despite some apparent appearances to the contrary, France is not more nationalistic than the United States or Great Britain. He further argues that there is no difference in the intensity of nationalism between France and the other nations of Western Europe.\(^1\) This development of French nationalism of the 1960s came more from world developments than from the personality of General de Gaulle, and the independence of French diplomacy was asserted after 1962—with the end of the Algerian war—and not when de Gaulle returned to power.\(^2\)

Perhaps, as Macridis put it, it is a moot point whether de Gaulle's nationalism is different from American or Russian nationalism, "unless we were willing to argue that big nationalisms are better than smaller ones and that small bombs are more dangerous than big ones."\(^3\) Kissinger gives this view of U.S. attitudes toward French nationalism—in the emerging areas, the nation-state was treated as natural and in Eastern Europe great hope was placed in nationalism as a counterweight to Communism. "But in Western Europe, where the concept of nationalism had originated, American policy decreed the nation-state as outdated and backward," and thus here came part of the U.S.-French

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\(^2\) Ibid., pp. xxvii.

\(^3\) Macridis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 25.
It has become an increasingly common theme of analysts of French politics during the late 1960s that the departure of de Gaulle would not entail dramatic reversals or radical departures in French foreign policy. It probably is true that it is likely that the Gaullists as a group are more integration-minded than General de Gaulle. But a quick jump to a European federation or to British Common Market entry or other major significant changes will not come overnight, sans de Gaulle or not.

VIII. INTERPRETING THE DE GAULLE STYLE

How then can one assess the policies of de Gaulle, who had managed to arouse such emotions it was "increasingly difficult to form a satisfactory dispassionate assessment" of his basic policies. This assessment of the difficulty of analysis due to emotions was made in 1968, but even a year after de Gaulle's resignation, the same problem presents itself. Macridis noted in 1966 that de Gaulle and his policies "have long been an annoyance and an enigma to American leaders and political commentators." The usual

2Scheinman, "Nationalism in Contemporary France," p. 337.
3Clarkson, "Peaceful Coexistence, Gaullist Style," p. 160.
argument was that de Gaulle "is a nationalist; he has failed to act as a 'faithful ally'; he has balked at European unity and has by his acts and gestures weakened NATO." ¹

Almost every interpretation of the de Gaulle style starts from the assumption that the nation-state is the ultimate reality for de Gaulle, that only the nation-state can be the basis for political action, that nationalism is the strongest of political emotions. Going beyond that, a second and interrelated premise is de Gaulle's preoccupation with the grandeur and strength of France and its ability to play an important, independent role in politics. Thus his attitude to Western European problems revolves around a nuclear deterrent for France, a protectionist agricultural policy and a European community not supranational but which can act as an important force in world affairs. ² Friedlaender and Focke saw de Gaulle's policies as great power policies "carried out with all the weapons of the past." They cited his call for a three-power directorate in NATO; independent nuclear power as a force de frappe; the attempt "to remove the greatest possible forces from NATO"; the exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, and the "courting of the

¹Macridis, op. cit., p. xii.
²Curtis, Western European Integration, pp. 220-221.
'great power' of Germany."

Some critics considered the de Gaulle policy anachronistic mainly because of the General's faith in the nation-state which they considered to be obsolete. Hoffman adds that those who pointed out that de Gaulle's concern for the good of France apparently ruled out the good of mankind or of broader communities "still have to demonstrate that the latter would have been better served by another policy, and can in practice be separated from the good of specific nations." De Gaulle's critics attacked his belief that in the present world a nation of France's size and resources could play an important role, and saw in it a grave danger since other national leaders, "less prudent, perhaps, might make the same mistake with worse results." However, at this time it cannot be said whether the critics were right or wrong. This must wait "until the returns are in, until the consequences have become clear." And as of now the question of the value or harm of the de Gaulle policy cannot be fully, clearly answered.

While this paper is concerned chiefly with certain aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy, his domestic policies obviously had relationship to what de Gaulle could do or did

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1Focke and Friendlaender, "One Man Against Europe," p. 88.

2Stanley Hoffman in the Preface to Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, pp. ix-x.
do in foreign policy. And it was domestic issues which led the General to resign from the presidency. While it is difficult to label many men as liberal or conservative (they may tend toward the conservative in domestic matters and the liberal in the foreign field), it is almost impossible to put de Gaulle into a mold. At first glance, most might call him largely conservative. In domestic matters this might be largely correct. His goal, said Duverger, was to "affirm the authority of the State in order to assure public order and civic obedience." His temperament, further, was authoritarian, and he established "a paternalistic regime."¹

De Gaulle favored private initiative and was "opposed to socialist institutions and principles." His regime favored the businessman, bankers and speculators and was "relatively insensitive to the claims of the salaried groups and wage-earners, many of whom have a low standard of living."² Yet de Gaulle headed a leftist government in 1944-46, and this government nationalized several industrial sectors and established a comprehensive system of social security. Adding to this the fact that de Gaulle "contributed to the destruction of the remnants of the dictatorship of Marshal Pétain," and to the re-establishment of democracy

¹Maurice Duverger in the Preface to Macridis, De Gaulle, Implacable Ally, p. xvii.
²Ibid., p. xvii.
in France, "we see why we cannot call him a conservative." ¹

Also, before World War II broke out, de Gaulle was one of the few military leaders on the Allied side "who refused to conceive of the coming war in terms of the principles and tactics of the past and who laid the basis of a new strategy." This, of course, doesn't mean that because de Gaulle was right in the 1930s, he also was right in the 1960s. But in Duverger's view, de Gaulle's policies with regard to Algeria, Africa and the underdeveloped countries showed he was able to understand the future and prepare for it. Was de Gaulle--like the young colonel of the 1930s--really "a modern spirit concerned with the advent of the twenty-first century rather than with the restoration of the nineteenth?" ²

At any rate, de Gaulle always was more concerned with France than with Europe, and his policies reflect that judgment. In de Gaulle's mind the world supremacy of France represented the normal order, an order that was temporarily subverted in the period from the mid-1800s to the middle of the present century "by a combination of unfortunate circumstances and the inadequacy of those who directed French affairs." ³ France could only achieve its former grandeur and true independence if certain circumstances were met.

Among these was first the ability of a nation to assure its own defense. This is not to say that de Gaulle felt France had to have the military power of the Soviet Union or the United States, but that this defense capability could not be allowed to remain outside the national framework or mingled with something else. Second, in the nuclear age, this defense could be achieved only through the nuclear medium.

Third, independence must be viewed not only from the perspective of one's present enemies but also one's present friends and prospective protagonists. Fourth, independence entails monetary policies aimed at insuring financial independence which in turn strengthens freedom of political independence; hence the French attack on the dollar during recent years. And, finally, independence conditions a whole range of French policy with regard to European and Atlantic questions. Thus de Gaulle's policy was to free Europe from the two hegemonies and to assure France a role to play in an eventually reunified and independent Europe. It was a policy aiming for an independent France in an independent Europe but one in which some countries—namely France—would be more equal than others—namely Germany—in areas such as nuclear defense.¹

One thing is certain—when de Gaulle spoke of Europe, he made clear that the United States belonged to a different

¹Scheinman, "Nationalism in Contemporary France," pp. 841-843.
world. His Europe is either Western Europe or Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. But was de Gaulle a "European?"

Kukski sees the answer as yes and no. The General favored a European unity founded on the reconciliation of all the European peoples—his distant vision of "Big Europe." And at the same time, he has been a partisan of a close union of Western Europe as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. This initial Little Europe would first be an arbiter between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and later a superpower in its own right, and "on that distant day the two parts of Europe would discover that they form one fraternal family."² De Gaulle is a "European," but a conditional one. His Little Europe must be economically, militarily and politically an independent union and should never become a unit of the Atlantic community dominated by the United States; further, it must rest on the co-operation of policies of its member states without any trace of supranational institutions.

"For reasons known only to himself, his two conditions merge into one ... the French veto is the only guaranty of European independence."³

Doubts about Germany have been a key reason why de Gaulle was intransigent regarding integration. In an inte-

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¹Kulski, De Gaulle and the World, p. 31.
²Ibid., p. 38.
³Ibid., p. 196.
grated Europe Germany might not only play an important role on a level of equality, "but also attempt to dominate the whole in a manner inconsistent with French interests." But more importantly, integration might create a political entity that would be, at least in the beginning, "so lacking in authority and organization as to be dominated by the United States;" and this to de Gaulle would be less European than a Europe consisting of nation-states co-operating on the basis of "common interests and affinities."  

There is little doubt that the crises that have arisen in Western Europe over integration were in large part caused by de Gaulle. He has been accused of having contributed to the disintegration of Europe; and this is true, at least in regard to style, notably in his 1963 veto of the British. But at bottom, says Grosser, he has not been able to find any "Europeans" who can very clearly define just what they mean in terms of a more united Europe, particularly "in regard to defense, to atomic power, to policy toward the United States, to supranationality, to the geographic boundaries of this Europe." Kulski offers the parallel observation that while the de Gaulle "Grand Design" had flaws, his French opponents who clamored for a supra-

1Macridis, op. cit., p. 156.  
2Ibid.  
3Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p. 96.
national Europe do not escape the same criticism. They, as de Gaulle, "never stop to examine the difficulty of defining one foreign policy for a federal Europe," in which five states would be status quo powers and the sixth, West Germany, a revisionist power.  

So whether or not a united Europe, according to certain stated formulas, was really possible or not, de Gaulle was accused of blocking it. Paul Reynaud, the former French premier, charged that by "going it alone," without allies, without Europe and in "deliberately destroying the ancient and valued friendship of the United States," the General threw away his real chance of greatness. If de Gaulle had not upset the work of Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister who helped establish both the Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market, the General could have become the first president of the United States of Europe, Renaud said.  

The New York Times, in an editorial a few days after de Gaulle's resignation in 1969, declared that de Gaulle's tragedy, and the world's, "is that he failed to use his vast talents in the broader interests of a genuine European unity and world order, under the rule of law."  

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1 Kulski, op. cit., p. 31.  


While many students of the de Gaulle style have seen his downfall perhaps not so much directly caused by his foreign policy attitudes and actions, they do at least find an indirect link. As Hoffman put it, all the resources devoted to foreign affairs—for the nuclear force, for overseas aid, for the accumulation of gold—were thus diverted from productive investments in France, or from "carrying out an 'incomes policy,'" so as to raise the standard of life of the underprivileged.¹ De Gaulle's foreign policy cured the French of their "ugly nationalism of resentment," and he raised their self-respect, but it was "inevitably fragile." His domestic opponents stressed the difference between "a heroic stance of independence, which they deemed politically futile and economically self-defeating, and economic progress at the cost of sacrifices of sovereignty."² The chief offense of Gaullism to the mass of Frenchmen was "the unending stringency of the government's economic policies."³ The May, 1968 crisis, which perhaps was a portent that de Gaulle would not stay on much longer, was a challenge not only to de Gaulle but to everything he stood for—"a centralized social order, an almost biological inability to adapt to

²Ibid., p. 20.
movement and change. The May crisis ended because the fear of chaos overwhelmed the demands for change. But in 1969, when de Gaulle decided to address himself directly to the people in the referendum, the electorate made up its mind. Many who voted no were confident that de Gaulle would win anyway, "but the fact that they were willing, this time, to say no to him, showed that they had grown tired of government by charisma." 

IX. THE FUTURE OF INTEGRATION

With de Gaulle gone, will the movement to further European integration speed up again, show real change? Some writers and periodicals think it will, and there are several factors which indicate French policy may turn—or already may have turned—toward a more pro-integration stance. But the real problems of proceeding with the movement remain, and the attitudes of the British and Germans certainly will have a major impact on the outcome as well as the views of the French. After the French elections in 1969, the New York Times editorialized that it felt the direction the new France will take "is the course of cooperation with neighbors and allies, the resumption of a sense of responsibility for the future of Europe and the Atlantic world." 

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1 Servan-Schreiber, The Spirit of May, p. 70.
the cabinet of Georges Pompidou suggested "not only a pre-European policy but a return to a more traditional pro-Western posture." Pompidou replaced Michel Debré as foreign minister with Maurice Schumann, "the most European of the Gaullists and the most Gaullist of the Europeans." Debré had been regarded as a Gaullist "purist," and had the reputation of a fierce nationalist and "anti-European." The "European tendency in the cabinet also was reinforced by the choice of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as minister of economy and finance, and Justice Minister René Pleven and Agriculture Minister Jacques Duhamel also are strong advocates of European integration.

While public opinion polls may not be decisive in statesmen's decisions, results of some recent surveys in France and Western Europe tend to reinforce the opinion that Europeans generally favor continued integration efforts--other than in Great Britain. In November, 1969, a Paris-Match magazine poll showed 66 per cent of those interviewed in France favored a common system of defense and diplomacy if a European political organization were to be set up, and 52 per cent favored British admission into the Common

Market. (Only 16 per cent opposed British entry; another 32 per cent were undecided.) The poll also showed that in the case of an election of a president of this European political organization, 66 per cent polled would vote for a foreign candidate if his views reflected more accurately their own than the French candidate's. The young are more European-minded than their elders. Seventy-seven per cent of those 34 and younger would vote for a foreign candidate, but only 61 per cent in the 50-64 age group and 45 per cent of those over 65. The same magazine in March, 1970, reported on a much wider poll of residents in the countries of the Six and in Great Britain conducted through a number of influential newspapers and several polling institutions. On the question of whether they favored the evolution of the Common Market into the formation of a United States of Europe, the yes answers ranged from 60 per cent in Belgium to 75 per cent in Luxembourg (67 per cent in France) in the countries of the Six. But only 30 per cent in Britain answered favorably. But a large majority of the British felt resigned to the fact that continued European integration was irreversible. 2

In the initial press conference held by Pompidou as


French president, he struck a pro-European attitude as well, in the sense that he said that he considered that "the first thing to be done is to continue building the Community of the Six." The transitional stage, he said, must be terminated: that is our priority task.\(^1\) Raymond Aron said he felt Pompidou "thinks more European than the General; however, that definitely does not mean he holds a different position regarding Britain's entry." Pompidou will "protect the continuity" of French foreign policy, but will slowly move away from the sort of policy pursued by de Gaulle, at least as to style. It is hard to imagine that Pompidou would call news conferences twice a year at which 1,000 journalists would "listen to his meditations about the world for an hour and a half." Pompidou will surely not imitate de Gaulle "as the French no longer want poetry but an able government."\(^2\)

Whereas de Gaulle had the backing of a parliamentary majority hostile to supranational integration (and the General exerted the kind of rule that parties and pressure groups didn't affect much anyway), Pompidou or other successors may have to depend for domestic support and survival "precisely on those parties and pressure groups which had

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started to weave a transnational fabric." Should this be the case, the Europe of the Six, "instead of being as close as it is now to the traditional model of interstate relations, might move again toward the other ideal-type, that of political community-building." ¹

But even if all the political leaders of Western Europe struck a non-nationalistic approach, differences in the national situations still would lead to different definitions of the national interest. In particular, the problem of nuclear weapons control and command in a grouping divided between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" may prove to be as much of a problem in Western Europe community-building as it was in NATO. ²

¹Hoffman, "Obstinate or Obsolete?," p. 220.
²Ibid., pp. 220-221.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The impact of Charles de Gaulle on the European unity movement might have to wait some time to be fully understood; that is, the way the European Communities develop in the future or what may grow out of the present regional structure may provide the answer better than any present analysis. However, certain points can be re-emphasized that point the way to at least some understanding of the General's impact.

I. SUMMARY

In summarizing this analysis of de Gaulle and the integration movement, several things can be restated. De Gaulle's actions in regard to European integration at each step of the way have been colored by his intense feeling of nationalism for the French state, an entity to him that is a combination of the concrete and the mystical. The condition of France in the post-war years, and, indeed, until several years after de Gaulle claimed the presidency were not, in his mind, what France should be. A strong, powerful France of grandeur was what de Gaulle sought, was what to him was a natural thing—and in this perhaps at times he let his emotions spirit him away from the practical. It was not that
de Gaulle felt France could claim as much influence in world affairs as the United States or the Soviet Union, but could be among the most powerful of the middle powers or even the central figure in a Western Europe that could challenge either of the two superpowers for world prominence. In other words, de Gaulle was able to understand how changing world conditions regarding the use of force gave new leeway to the middle powers. He was able to pursue a more independent course as world conditions developed, and this was what France had to do if it were to regain its former grandeur. Nowhere was this more true than in the military or defense field. France could not achieve any great degree of glory if she had to depend on others for her defense—thus, the de Gaulle emphasis on development of an independent French nuclear force. He pursued a policy that was willing to take risks—his challenges to the Common Market were prime examples—rather than resign France to what he saw as continued mediocrity.

In doing all this, however, de Gaulle was not acting against the grain of current French thought. Both he and the opposition in France sought similar goals of a France of grandeur, but de Gaulle felt the means to reach this condition could only be the nation-state. So the nationalism of France was not a phenomenon created by de Gaulle. There was a strong feeling in France of wanting independence, espe-
cially from the United States, but as events showed, this could only go so far. Eventually the French people—or a majority of them—said that independence is fine, but not at the expense of a better standard of living at home. De Gaulle's foreign policy found general acceptance throughout France, but not when it came to halting progress in the Common Market, which most Frenchmen seemed to see as a positive good, all factors of politics and independence aside. And to blame de Gaulle for some of the conflicts between France and other Western states is to overlook the fact that these conflicts existed before he took over the reins of French government. As examples, prior to the de Gaulle presidency there already were problems involving defense, supranationality, economic policy, the question of Germany.

So in the de Gaulle style of foreign relations, he was quite willing for co-operation among states, but the states had to remain independent in matters vital to their self-interests. States are the only entities that have the power to act, not faceless organizations made up of stateless technocrats that usurp powers that rightfully belong to the states. But de Gaulle was able to bend to some extent to this basic belief if he thought it was in the interest of France to do so. In other words, a certain amount of supranationality could be accepted, at least in the economic
area, if it would be to the benefit of France, and de Gaulle's policy was to mold the Common Market to the benefit of his country if he could do so. It is almost surprising to find the widespread opposition to the de Gaulle policy since he was, after all, the chief executive of France and, after all, was expected to act in what he felt were the best interests of his country.

As for Europe, it is true that General de Gaulle saw something superior in the European culture, but foremost in his mind was the role of France in this larger European entity. Hence the way he interpreted things was that France rightly could try to force its will upon the conditions of the Common Market, but France, too, should be able to resist the similar sort of thing that England was attempting to do. De Gaulle probably did believe, insofar as future success of the Common Market was concerned, that British entry in 1963 and 1967 would have harmed the institution that had been developed at those points in time. And beyond that, he was concerned about Britain acting in the Trojan horse role—entering the Common Market only to allow the Americans through the British to get a tighter hold on Europe. He was, besides, distrustful of Britain and the United States. His treatment by them in past years had not been to his liking. Of course it was obvious through his speeches and messages that he thought the United States was making major
In conclusion, these things can be said about de Gaulle as well as his position and role in regard to European integration. He did indeed slow down the integration movement, or at least changed the direction of it. But to say that is not to make a judgment on whether what he did was harmful or valuable insofar as the future well-being of the states of Western Europe is concerned. There were positive aspects of de Gaulle's actions as well as negative ones. In some of his actions, he was in effect saying to the other countries of Western Europe, "Slow down, you aren't sure where you're going." He was able to reveal the holes in the thinking of some of the "Europeans," to make the promoters of European unity rethink what it was they wanted and how they could go about reaching a lasting union. Other heads of state in the Europe of the Six spoke in favor of European unity, but they seemed to be unwilling to work for independence from the United States. By forcing Europe to face up to the impracticality of what has been termed "instant federalism," de Gaulle may have contributed to a later realization of a broader unity. By such Gaullist policies and also by attempts at rapprochement with the Communist world, the General also served to shatter the
image of unity among the Western "imperialists," thus reducing the threat felt in the Communist world.

As things stand now, the future nature of Western European union remains controversial, although early impressions are that the present French leadership will not be as forceful as de Gaulle in fighting against schemes of supranationality and visionary unification. The absence of de Gaulle cannot erase the problems of a disunited Germany, the problem of control of nuclear weapons, the entry of Britain, or the relationship of Europe to the United States and the U.S.S.R.

While the future of European unification then remains uncertain, it cannot be said that de Gaulle himself destroyed its future. It is indeed possible that Western Europe will yet advance far beyond what has been accomplished to something completely new in the realm of a regional government polity.

As someone once wisely said, de Gaulle may have "insulted" the future of European integration, but he did not single handedly destroy it.
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