| dc.contributor.author | Robins, Jinger B. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-04-29T15:26:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-04-29T15:26:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1981-06 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 1981 .R556 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2092/742 | |
| dc.description | v, 29 leaves. Advisor: Margaret E. Lloyd | en |
| dc.description.abstract | The problem. Most companies provide a certain number of paid sick leave days for their employees. If employees take paid sick leave days even when they aren't sick a high absenteeism results. This is costly both in terms of direct sick leave payments and loss of productivity. Incentives for attendance might reduce absenteeism. Procedure. Baseline absenteeism was determined. Next, a bonus of $20 was made available for perfect monthly attendance. Finally employees were offered a choice of incentives for attendance. Findings. The percent of absences decreased with the introduction of both the bonus and the choice of incentives conditions. Conclusion. Incentives for attendance significantly decreased absenteeism. Reduced costs for paid sick leave days also occurred. Recommendations. Incentives for attendance should be implemented·in settings where employee absenteeism is high. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 1609932 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Drake University | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Drake University, School of Graduate Studies;1981 | |
| dc.subject | Absenteeism (Labor) | en |
| dc.subject | Employee morale | en |
| dc.subject | Behavior modification | en |
| dc.title | Employee Absenteeism | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |